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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the firm-specific and country-level determinants of accruals-based 
earnings management and real activities-based earnings management of firms in the MENA 
region. In addition, this thesis examines whether earnings management techniques are used as 
substitutes or complements, and whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. A 
pooled cross-sectional regression is used to test a sample of 802 non-financial firms listed on the 
stock exchanges of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates over the period 1996-2014. Regarding the determinants of 
accruals-based earnings management, the results show that GDP growth, the country-level index 
variables, leverage, profitability, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, and earnings management 
flexibility are positively associated with discretionary accruals while firm size, growth 
opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, and asset tangibility are negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. Further, industry membership is found to impact upon discretionary 
accruals. Regarding real earnings management, the results provide evidence that financial 
development is associated with lower levels of real earnings management, and provide strong 
evidence that GDP growth, IFRS adoption, firm size, and earnings management flexibility 
positively impact upon the overall degree of real earnings management. Further, there is weak 
evidence that free cash flows are positively associated with the degree of real earnings 
management. The results also provide strong evidence that the country-level index variables, 
leverage, profitability, asset tangibility, the operating cycle, and Altman’s Z-Score negatively 
impact upon the overall degree of real earnings management. There is weak evidence that higher 
dividend payout ratios are associated with lower levels of real earnings management, and weak 
evidence that higher growth opportunities are negatively associated with the degree of real 
earnings management. Further, industry membership is found to significantly impact upon the 
overall degree of real earnings management behaviour of firms in the MENA region. The results 
also provide strong evidence that firms use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management techniques as complements rather than as substitutes. Regarding the efficient versus 
opportunistic earnings management model, the results provide evidence that earnings management 
in the MENA region tends toward being opportunistic rather than efficient.     
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Chapter I – Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Earnings management has become a significant issue in the accounting literature and has attracted 
much attention by academic researchers. It is defined by Schipper (1989, p.92) as a “purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private 
gain.” While there are many definitions of earnings management in the existing literature, they 
share the common feature that earnings management involves the use of discretion in financial 
reporting with the aim of altering earnings to meet predetermined targets, which may be set by 
management or in terms of analyst forecasts, or to achieve a more sustainable earnings stream for 
the sake of achieving some private gain.  
 
The topic is an important issue for both academics and practitioners (Dechow et al., 2012) since 
earnings management can be misleading to stakeholders, and thus the earnings management 
literature is extensive. To highlight the significance of earnings management, Gaio (2010) argues 
that the lack of transparency in financial reporting and the quality of financial accounting 
information are attributed to the decline in equity markets around the world in the early 2000s. 
Further, the author argues that the quality of earnings has become a very popular topic of debate 
among investors, analysts, regulators, and the financial press.   
 
Earnings management is undertaken by managers by means of three broad techniques. The first is 
accruals-based earnings management in which managers change estimates and accounting policies 
to increase or decrease earnings. By engaging in accruals-based earnings management, managers 
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can recognize revenues before they are earned or delay the recognition of expenses which have 
been incurred. The second technique is referred to as real activities-based earnings management. 
This occurs when managers intentionally make operating decisions that have actual cash flow 
consequences with the goal of altering reported earnings. For example, managers may 
opportunistically reduce research and development expenditures in order to reduce expenses in the 
income statement in a given period (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The third broad earnings 
management technique is referred to as classification shifting-based earnings management in 
which core expenses are shifted to special items in the income statement to increase earnings 
before extraordinary items.   
 
The phenomenon of earnings management is positioned under the umbrella of what has become 
known as creative accounting. Mulford and Comiskey (2002) refer to creative accounting practices 
as any and all steps taken to engage in the aggressive choice and application of accounting 
principles, fraudulent financial reporting, or earnings management. Although the definitions of 
earnings management may imply that it is a fraudulent activity, earnings management differs from 
fraud since managers may engage in earnings management within the boundaries of the flexibility 
afforded by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) without violating these standards, 
thereby making it a legal practice.  
 
Even though earnings management may not be fraudulent, it is still a significant issue as it can be 
opportunistic. Opportunistic earnings management occurs when accounting choices are 
intentionally selected in ways that mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Opportunistic earnings management is 
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undertaken by managers for their own private benefits and is misleading to stockholders (Rezaei 
and Roshani, 2012). Thus, it is considered the ‘bad side’ of earnings management. Furthermore, if 
taken too far, earnings management can cross into the realms of fraud.  
 
Despite the often negative perception of earnings management, some authors argue that it can be 
beneficial since it can potentially enhance the information value of earnings by conveying private 
information to both stockholders and the public. This is referred to as efficient earnings 
management (Jiraporn et al., 2008). However, regardless of whether earnings management is 
opportunistic or efficient, studying the phenomenon of earnings management remains of 
significant interest to both academics and practitioners, and this is evidenced by a large body of 
literature.   
 
Existing authors investigate various issues within the earnings management paradigm such as the 
range of incentives to engage in earnings management, which include, for example, compensation 
contracts, debt covenant considerations, political and governmental regulatory considerations, and 
equity incentives (Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney, 1996). Existing authors also investigate the relationship between earnings management 
and firm-specific factors such as corporate governance variables (Siregar and Utama, 2008; 
Garcia-Osma and Noguer, 2007; Xie et al., 2003), and whether the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards can mitigate earnings management behaviour (Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2008).  
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1.2 The Research Problem 
The extant earnings management literature is diverse and focuses on a range of different issues. 
However, research into the firm-specific and country level determinants of earnings management 
seems to be rather thin, especially in relation to the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). 
In fact, Hessayri and Saihi (2015) argue that there are few studies dealing with earnings 
management in emerging markets.  
 
The majority of research papers investigating the paradigm of earnings management seem to focus 
primarily on its interaction with corporate governance factors (Abdelrazek, 2012; Kamel and 
Elbanna, 2011; Siregar and Utama, 2008; Park and Shin, 2004; Ching et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003; 
and Piot and Janin, 2007). This seems to be the case in particular for research focusing on Egypt 
and the wider Middle East. Empirical studies of earnings management in Egypt and the Middle 
East are fairly recent extensions of the literature. Aside from corporate governance, another main 
focus of these studies is earnings management leading up to initial public offerings, which is the 
offering of a company’s stock in a public stock exchange for the first time.  
 
In addition, although the earnings management literature is extensive, most research into earnings 
management focuses on accruals-based earnings management. Relatively few studies examine real 
earnings management, especially in the case of investigating the determinants of earnings 
management behaviour. Further, there has been extensive research on earnings management, 
though there is a paucity of literature concerning factors that influence the selection of a particular 
type of earnings management (Siregar and Utama, 2008). In the context of MENA country firms, 
research into whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic is particularly thin. In 
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addition, there is a paucity of research into the macroeconomic characteristics of earnings 
management. For example, Filip and Raffournier (2014) argue that there is an extensive body of 
research into the determinants and consequences of earnings management. However, these studies 
share the common characteristic that they do not take into consideration the macroeconomic 
environment of the firm.   
 
1.3 Aim of the Study and Research Questions 
Since studies of earnings management focus primarily on corporate governance and initial public 
offerings for accruals-based earnings management, this study aims to expand the earnings 
management literature for the Middle East and North Africa region by investigating the firm-
specific and country-specific determinants of both accruals-based earnings management and real 
activities-based earnings management. Further, this thesis seeks to investigate whether earnings 
management techniques within MENA region firms are employed as complements or whether they 
substitute each other. In addition, this thesis aims to investigate whether earnings management is 
efficient or opportunistic in the MENA region. Accordingly, the following research questions are 
stated: 
 
Question 1: What are the firm-specific and country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings 
management for firms in the MENA region? 
 
Question 2: What are the firm-specific and country-level determinants of real activities-based 
earnings management for firms in the MENA region? 
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Question 3: Are earnings management techniques used as substitutes or complements by firms in 
the MENA region?  
 
Question 4: Is earnings management efficient or opportunistic within firms in the MENA region? 
 
1.4 Expected Contributions  
There are five key ways in which this thesis is expected to contribute to the extant literature. First, 
this thesis not only examines accruals-based earnings management, but also examines real 
activities-based earnings management. In addition, this thesis investigates whether earnings 
management techniques are used as substitutes or complements, as there is a paucity of research 
in this particular area, especially in relation to firms in the MENA region. Prior research has 
focused almost exclusively on the practice of accruals-based earnings management (Sellami, 
2015). Consistent with this argument, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that recent research has 
shown an increased appreciation of the significance of understanding earnings management 
through real activities in addition to accruals-based activities. The authors state that real activities-
based earnings management has not been as widely studied as accruals-based earnings 
management. Further, Lemma et al. (2013) argue that despite the substantial evidence for the 
presence of real earnings management activities in firms, the earnings management academic 
literature is largely dominated by investigations of accruals-based earnings management. Further, 
Kuo et al. (2014) argue that the switching of firms between the accruals and real-based earnings 
management methods is an area overlooked by investors in the emerging markets context, and may 
therefore require the attention of regulators. Therefore, by employing both accruals-based earnings 
management and real activities-based earnings management and investigating whether they are 
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employed by firms in the MENA region as substitutes or complements, this thesis provides a 
significant contribution to the literature.  
 
Second, the investigation of the determinants of real earnings management in addition to accruals-
based earnings management provides some contribution since most research in earnings 
management focuses on the latter. Doukakis (2014) argues that the prior literature has primarily 
focused on the effect of IFRS adoption on accruals-based earnings management. However, 
according to the author, no study to date has examined the impact of IFRS adoption on real 
earnings management, which indicates that there is a paucity of research into the determinants of 
real earnings management in this context. Further, Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) argue 
that research into the association between leverage and real earnings management is limited, which 
is an additional example of the paucity of research into the determinants of real earnings 
management behaviour.   
 
Third, studies that investigate the determinants of earnings management behaviour focus on firm-
level factors. However, country-level factors can potentially impact upon earnings management, 
though they are not studied sufficiently. Very few studies examine the macroeconomic 
determinants of earnings management, especially in the context of real earnings management. For 
example, Rathke et al. (2015) argue that there exists a wealth of literature regarding corruption 
and earnings quality as two separate fields of research, though the same cannot be said about 
studies analysing the possible relationship between the two. Further, as previously mentioned, Filip 
and Raffournier (2014) argue that there is an extensive body of research into the determinants and 
consequences of earnings management. However, these studies share the common characteristic 
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that they do not take into consideration the macroeconomic environment of the firm. Thus, by 
employing firm-specific and country-specific factors as determinants of both accruals-based and 
real activities-based earnings management in this thesis, an important contribution is made to the 
existing literature.  
     
Fourth, Siregar and Utama (2008) argue that there has been extensive research on earnings 
management in general, though the literature regarding the factors that impact upon the selection 
of a particular type of earnings management technique, whether it is efficient or opportunistic, is 
underdeveloped. In the context of MENA country firms, very few studies are conducted in this 
area and those that exist are exclusively for Iranian firms. There does not seem to exist studies in 
the context of other MENA countries. By investigating whether earnings management activities 
are efficient or opportunistic within firms in the MENA region, this thesis provides an additional 
contribution to the extant literature.  
 
Fifth, in order to examine whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic, this thesis 
employs a model proposed by Siregar and Utama (2008). However, a modification is made to this 
model in order to take account of different variables that may moderate the relationship between 
the earnings management proxy measure and the future profitability variables that enable the 
researcher to test whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. This modification to 
the model has not been conducted in studies prior to this thesis.    
 
1.5 The Importance of the Study 
Earnings management is a significant social and economic issue. Reported earnings have a 
powerful effect on the full range of a firm’s business activities as well as the decisions made by its 
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management (Mulford and Comiskey, 2002). Earnings are a major component of a firm’s annual 
report and are used to develop corporate policies such as executive compensation and capital 
raising. In addition, other major decisions that are shaped by the information in annual reports 
include debt covenants and the investment decisions of external investors. Ideally, reported 
earnings should facilitate resource allocation within the firm and reflect a firm’s underlying 
operating economics (Sun and Rath, 2008). However, according to Mulford and Comiskey, 
managers of companies are preoccupied with meeting stock market expectations since they are 
concerned about the potential negative consequences on the value of a company’s shares if it fails 
to meet those expectations. They therefore argue that management may view it as its responsibility 
to do everything possible, within its limits, to ensure that the consensus forecast of market analysts 
is met or exceeded in response to this prospect. This includes engaging in earnings management 
behaviour.  
 
Mulford and Comiskey further argue that firms which communicate higher earnings power to 
investors will likely observe a favourable effect on their share prices. Thus, for the firm, higher 
share prices increase market valuation and reduce its cost of capital. For managers of the firm who 
have equity stakes or options on equity stakes, higher share prices augment their personal wealth. 
Therefore, Mulford and Comiskey argue that by engaging in earnings management, managers may 
be able to communicate to investors that the firm is characterised by greater earnings power, 
helping to foster a higher share price. 
 
In addition to higher share prices and increased corporate valuation, earnings management is an 
important economic issue since it can be conducted for borrowing cost effects, bonus plan effects, 
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and political cost effects. Mulford and Comiskey argue that higher reported earnings, higher assets, 
lower liabilities, and higher shareholders’ equity values that accompany higher earnings can 
convey an impression of improved credit quality and a higher debt rating to a bond investor or 
lender.     
 
In terms of bonus plan effects, if companies use a measure of earnings such as pre-tax income in 
calculating a cash or stock bonus, an incentive may arise for managers to employ earnings 
management in an attempt to maximize their bonusses. With regard to political cost effects, large 
and high profile firms may have an incentive to manage their earnings downward in an attempt to 
be less conspicuous to regulators.   
 
Further, earnings management distorts the information environment. If investors are unable to 
detect the direction and magnitude of the managed portion of reported earnings, they may tend to 
over-value firms engaging in income-increasing earnings management and under-value firms 
engaging in income-decreasing earnings management, which could lead to the misallocation of 
invested capital (Chambers, 1999). Earnings management could potentially impact negatively 
upon stock returns. By adopting discretionary accounting accrual adjustments, issuers can raise 
reported earnings relative to cash flows. If buyers of the firm’s stock are guided by earnings while 
unaware of the fact that earnings are inflated by earnings management, they could pay a high price 
for the stock. However, over time, information about the firm is revealed by media, analysts’ 
reports, and subsequent financial statement disclosures. Investors may then recognize momentum 
in these earnings is not maintained and thus lose optimism. Thus, a price correction occurs and the 
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greater the earnings management at the time of the offer, the larger the ultimate price correction 
(Teoh et al., 1998).  
 
Since earnings management is an important economic issue, addressing the research questions 
proposed in this thesis is essential for regulators, investors, lenders, auditors, and analysts. By 
understanding the determinants of earnings management, investors can make more informed 
investment decisions. Knowledge of which firms are more predisposed to earnings management 
behaviour can also help auditors to be more cautious when auditing firms. Further, lenders can use 
this information to make more informed decisions regarding advancing loans to firms. 
Additionally, analysts may use the information to make a more informed interpretation of the 
financial performance of firms.  
 
Furthermore, the investigation of the substitutability, or otherwise, of earnings management 
techniques should help auditors to take care when examining whether firms are using one type of 
technique or employing both concurrently. By understanding whether earnings management is 
efficient or opportunistic, analysts may become more aware of whether earnings management is 
conducted opportunistically by managers for private gain, or whether earnings management 
instead enhances the information value of earnings.  
 
1.6 Research Outline   
This thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter two provides a theoretical framework for earnings 
management behaviour, and a detailed review of the earnings management literature. This review 
starts out with the definitions of earnings management, a review of earnings management 
techniques, an examination of the incentives that induce earnings management behaviour in firms, 
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and a review of the literature which focuses on earnings management within MENA country firms. 
The chapter then concludes with a summary of the relevant literature.  
 
Chapter three develops and discusses the three main hypotheses in order to address the research 
questions. The first hypothesis addresses the firm-specific and country-level determinants of 
accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management. The second hypothesis addresses 
the substitutability, or otherwise, of earnings management techniques, and the third hypothesis 
addresses the efficient versus opportunistic nature of earnings management behaviour of firms in 
the MENA region.  
 
Chapter four outlines the research methodology, and discusses the data collection and sample 
selection used to address the research questions. The dependent and independent variables used in 
the research are defined and discussed in detail. The diagnostic statistics used to test 
multicollinearity are also explained. Finally, the econometric model specifications used to test the 
research hypotheses are presented and explained.  
 
Chapter five presents and discusses the results of the accruals-based earnings management models, 
beginning with a discussion of the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and multicollinearity 
diagnostics for the model variables. The chapter then presents the discussion of the regression 
model results and hypothesis tests. Chapter six presents and discusses the results of the real 
activities-based earnings management models, again beginning with a discussion of the model 
variable descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and multicollinearity diagnostics. The chapter 
then goes on to discuss the regression results and hypothesis tests. Chapter seven presents the 
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discussion of the results of the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management tests, beginning 
with a discussion of the relevant descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multicollinearity 
diagnostics, and then moving on to the regression results in order to test the hypotheses.  
 
Finally, Chapter eight provides a summary and discussion of the salient findings of the thesis. The 
chapter provides conclusions regarding the overall results and readdresses the thesis research 
questions, it discusses the limitations of the research, and sets out recommendations for future 
research in the field of earnings management.    
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Chapter II – Theoretical Framework and Review of the Earnings Management Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There are four research questions presented in this thesis: (i) what are the firm specific and country-
level determinants of accruals-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region?; (ii) 
what are the firm-specific and country-level determinants of real activities-based earnings 
management for firms in the MENA region?; (iii) are earnings management techniques used as 
substitutes or complements by firms in the MENA region?; and (iv) is earnings management 
efficient or opportunistic within firms in the MENA region? In order to address these research 
questions, this chapter provides a review of the theoretical framework and literature of the earnings 
management paradigm.  
 
The chapter begins by discussing definitions of earnings management, followed by a discussion of 
the range of earnings management techniques. Section 2.4 provides a discussion of the theoretical 
framework underpinning earnings management. Following this, section 2.5 goes on to review the 
literature on the incentives to manage earnings. Section 2.6 explores the literature pertaining to 
earnings management in the MENA region. Finally, section 2.7 provides a summary of the salient 
points of the chapter.  
 
2.2 Definitions of Earnings Management  
There are various definitions of earnings management found in the existing literature. It is defined 
by Schipper (1989, p.92) as the “purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process 
with the intent of obtaining some private gain.” According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368), 
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“earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.” An additional definition by Mulford and Comiskey 
(2002, p.3) states that earnings management is the “active manipulation of earnings toward a 
predetermined target, which may be set by management, a forecast made by analysts, or an amount 
that is consistent with a smoother, more sustainable earnings stream.”  
 
While these definitions differ, they have some commonality: they focus on the intervention in the 
financial reporting process to achieve some private gain, which is implicit of opportunistic 
practices. The definition of Schipper implies that activities wherein managers influence reported 
earnings for private gain are considered earnings management practices. This definition is rather 
broad and lacks deeper insights into the specific mechanisms and objectives of earnings 
management. On the other hand, Healy and Wahlen’s definition is focused specifically on the 
judgement that managers can use in financial reporting and the structuring of transactions to alter 
financial reports to mislead stakeholders. It suggests that manipulation is inherent in the practice 
of earnings management by stating that judgement is used in financial reporting to mislead 
stakeholders. The definition of Mulford and Comiskey emphasises similar manipulation but is 
more specific regarding the motive behind earnings management, that is the need to meet 
predetermined targets or analyst forecasts. Further, this definition makes smoother, more 
sustainable earnings an additional objective of earnings management.  
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The phenomenon of earnings management is positioned under the umbrella of what has become 
known as creative accounting. Mulford and Comiskey (2002) refer to creative accounting practices 
as any and all steps taken to engage in aggressive choice and application of accounting principles, 
fraudulent financial reporting, or earnings management. Although the definitions of earnings 
management may imply that it is a fraudulent activity, earnings management differs from fraud 
since managers can engage in earnings management within the boundaries of the flexibility 
afforded by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) without violating these standards, 
making it a legal practice. Managers can also engage in income smoothing. This is a form of 
earnings management that is described by Mulford and Comiskey (2002) as a means by which 
managers remove peaks and troughs from a normal earnings series in order to give earnings a more 
stable outlook. This includes steps taken to reduce and store profits during good years for use in 
future, less profitable years.  
 
2.2.1 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management  
Although earnings management is not fraudulent, it is still a significant issue because it can be 
opportunistic. Opportunistic earnings management occurs when accounting choices are 
intentionally selected in ways that mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). If taken too far, earnings management 
can cross into the realms of fraud. There is evidence in the extant literature regarding the 
opportunistic use of earnings management. In a study of US firms over the period 1976-1994, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find evidence that managers opportunistically avoid reporting 
earnings decreases and losses to decrease the costs imposed in transactions with stakeholders. 
Further, Balsam et al. (2002) find evidence of opportunistic earnings management in a study of 
US firms over the period 1996-1998.      
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However, despite the negative outlook associated with earnings management, some authors argue 
that it can be beneficial since it can potentially enhance the information value of earnings by 
conveying private information to stockholders and the public. This is referred to as efficient 
earnings management (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Siregar and Utama (2008) explain the difference 
between opportunistic and efficient earnings management by stating that efficient earnings 
management improves earnings informativeness in communicating private information, while 
opportunistic earnings management is conducted by managers to opportunistically maximize their 
utility. Earnings informativeness relates to the information content carried in earnings that is 
conveyed to the market. Thus, the more informative earnings are, the more information value they 
carry to outsiders, which can be viewed as a good side to earnings management. Consistent with 
this perspective on earnings management, Wang and Williams (1994) argue that income 
smoothing enhances the informational value of reported earnings since the process of income 
smoothing incorporates the private knowledge of managers with regards to the firm’s future 
performance, and this private knowledge is valuable to prospective investors. Although the goal 
of income smoothing is the shifting of earnings to a future period to smooth the earnings rather 
than to present a true and fair view of the firm’s financials, prospective investors could benefit 
from the process of income smoothing.   
 
There is a considerable literature on the motivations of opportunistic earnings management. In 
fact, Chung et al. (2002) argue that most of the studies of earnings management conclude that 
managers engage in opportunistic earnings management. For example, in a study of initial public 
offerings (IPO) and earnings management, Shette et al. (2016) find evidence of opportunistic 
accruals-based earnings management. However, Subramanyam (1996) finds evidence for US firms 
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over the period 1973-1993 that earnings management improves the ability of earnings to reflect 
economic value. This means that discretionary accruals communicate information about the future 
profitability of firms. Further, the author finds evidence of pervasive income smoothing, which 
improves the persistence and predictability of reported earnings since income smoothing reduces 
earnings variability.  
 
Siregar and Utama (2008) investigate whether earnings management is opportunistic or efficient 
for companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange over the periods 1995-1996 and 1999-2002. 
They find evidence that the type of earnings management selected by these firms tends toward 
efficient earnings management. Consistent with these findings, Rezaei and Roshani (2012) 
investigate Iranian firms over the period 2004-2009 and find evidence of efficient earnings 
management. Omid et al. (2012) find similar evidence for Iranian firms over the period 2002-2010. 
They argue that managers of Iranian firms use their discretion to communicate private information 
about the profitability of the firm.  
 
In a study of Taiwanese listed firms over the period 1997-2007, Lin (2011) finds that when 
managerial ownership is less than around 10%, managers may engage in opportunistic earnings 
management. However, managers tend toward efficient earnings management when managerial 
ownership is higher than this proportion. She argues that this is consistent with the alignment 
effect, that is, as managerial ownership increases, managers engage in efficient earnings 
management to improve firm value. Regardless of whether earnings management is opportunistic 
or efficient, it is a significant issue as evidenced by the extensive extant literature exploring the 
phenomenon. 
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2.3 Earnings Management Techniques 
There are three broad techniques used to manage earnings: (i) accruals-based earnings 
management by changing estimates and accounting policies; (ii) real activities-based earnings 
management that has direct cash flow consequences; and (iii) classification shifting-based earnings 
management such as shifting the classification of core expenses to special items in the income 
statement.   
 
2.3.1 Accruals-Based Earnings Management 
Accruals are the difference between earnings and cash flows and are a standard component of a 
firm’s transactions. As an illustration, if a firm makes a sale on credit, the sale is recognized as 
earnings regardless of whether cash has been received or not. This leads to the creation of a 
receivable which is cancelled when cash is received in the future (McVay, 2006). Accounting 
practices allow discretion for managers in the financial information provided. Managers can 
exploit this by recognizing revenues before they are earned or delaying the recognition of expenses 
which have been incurred, which results in accruals.   
 
Accruals-based earnings management occurs when managers intervene in the financial reporting 
process by exercising discretion and judgment to change reported earnings without any cash flow 
consequences (Kothari et al., 2012). Firms can be aggressive with their accounting choices by 
bringing forward earnings from a future period, through the acceleration of revenues or 
deceleration of expenses, thereby increasing earnings in the current period. This creates what is 
called discretionary accruals in the literature. Since accruals reverse over time, earnings will be 
lowered automatically by the amount of earnings that was brought forward in the previous period.  
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Conversely, a firm can be conservative and save up earnings for a future period. As an illustration, 
conservative revenue recognition practices can be used to defer revenue and reduce current period 
earnings. In the literature, this is referred to as ‘cookie jar reserves’ whereby a firm is able to store 
earnings for future years when earnings may be below the target rate of growth (Mulford and 
Comiskey, 2002). A reduction in deferred revenue can also be made to boost revenues and earnings 
in the following periods.  
 
When accruals are increased in one period, they must be offset by lowering them in a subsequent 
period. Therefore, poorly performing firms cannot continue to overstate earnings without 
ultimately being detected. However, firms that perform well will likely have growth in earnings 
and increases in cash flows which can offset reversals from previous earnings management actions. 
Roosenboom et al. (2003) argue that firms performing well can be aggressive with their accounting 
choices and get away with it during periods of growth.   
 
By making use of the flexibility allowed under GAAP, firms can make conservative assumptions 
about the collectability of accounts receivable or about the useful lives and residual values of fixed 
assets in order to increase expenses, thereby managing earnings downward. However, in slower 
years, a firm may reduce the allowance for uncollectible accounts receivable, fixed asset useful 
lives may be extended, or the residual values of fixed assets may be increased. In so doing, 
expenses will decrease and earnings will increase (Mulford and Comskey, 2002). 
 
Firms may also switch between costing methods such as changing from the first-in, first-out 
(FIFO) inventory method to the last-in, first-out (LIFO) or average cost method because these 
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different methods reflect differently on the cost of goods sold and balance sheet inventory values. 
The use of FIFO minimizes cost of sales and maximizes profit compared with LIFO in periods of 
increasing prices. Managers may switch between these methods to achieve a lower or higher cost 
of goods sold on the income statement, thereby reflecting on lower or higher earnings. Although 
it is perfectly acceptable to make these changes so long as they are economically justified, a firm 
can make opportunistic use of the flexibility of GAAP in this regard to alter its earnings value, 
thereby engaging in opportunistic earnings management. Further, accruals-based earnings 
management may be used to understate liabilities. This could be conducted by determining the 
allowance required for warranty obligations in a way that understates the liability. Firms could 
also understate accrued expenses payable and environmental claims (Mulford and Comiskey, 
2002).     
 
In a study of Egyptian firms, Kamel and Elbanna (2010) assess respondents’ perceptions of the 
quality of reported earnings in Egypt by means of semi-structured interviews and questionnaire 
surveys for accounting academics, external auditors, and financial managers. They find that firms 
make inadequate provisions, capitalize rather than expense expenditures, and overestimate 
inventory value as techniques of engaging in earnings manipulation. Thus, accruals-based earnings 
management can be used to overstate earnings, understate expenses, overstate asset values, and 
understate liability values.   
 
2.3.2  Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Real earnings management occurs when managers intentionally make operating decisions that 
have actual cash flow consequences with the goal of altering reported earnings. For example, a 
firm may offer price discounts and offer more flexible credit terms to customers to boost sales 
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revenues temporarily. In addition, managers may opportunistically reduce research and 
development expenditures in order to reduce expenses in the income statement (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). Further, managers can delay maintenance expenditures to increase reported 
earnings.  
 
Zang (2012) explains this type of earnings management behaviour as purposeful action taken in 
order to alter reported earnings in a certain direction by means of changing the timing or structuring 
of an investment, operation, or financing transaction, which is consistent with the definition of 
earnings management presented by Healy and Wahlen (1999). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) explain 
real activities-based earnings management as the actions managers take that deviate from normal 
business practices, and that these actions are manipulations that affect cash flows. The 
commonality between these different explanations is clearly the fact that real activities-based 
earnings management is purposeful in nature and has actual cash flow consequences.  
 
2.3.3  Classification-Based Earnings Management 
Classification-based earnings management is an earnings management technique whereby core 
expenses such as general and administrative expenses are shifted to specific accounts in the income 
statement (McVay, 2006). While this does not change bottom line net income, it does increase 
core earnings (i.e. earnings from the firm’s main business activities less all expenses and revenues 
from non-core activities) since core expenses will be shifted to the special items section of the 
income statement and will not reduce core earnings. While this may not seem effective since 
bottom line net income remains unaffected, it can in fact mislead users of financial statements 
interested in the core earnings of a firm since recurring income is the focus of analysts and equity 
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investors. In this thesis, the focus is on accruals-based earnings management and real activities-
based earnings management. Classification-based earnings management is not empirically tested 
since it does not change bottom-line earnings, and thus auditors are less likely to expend energy 
on the identification, or compulsory adjustment, of the accounts affected by this technique 
(McVay, 2006).   
 
2.3.4 The Substitutability of Earnings Management Techniques 
The extant literature demonstrates that both accruals-based earnings management and real 
activities-based earnings management methods may be employed by firms as substitutes or 
complements, that is, earnings management is not restricted to being either accruals-based or real 
activities-based, and authors document evidence of both occurring simultaneously in firms 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Doukakis, 2014; and Zhu et al., 
2015).  
 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that firms use both accruals-based and real activities-based 
earnings management methods around seasoned equity offerings and that the choice between the 
two alternative strategies varies predictably as a function of their ability to use accruals 
manipulation as well as the costs of doing so in a study of US firms over the period 1987-2006. 
They explain that the costs of using accruals-based earnings management include potential 
litigation penalties and the scrutiny of regulators and auditors. Similarly, Doukakis (2014) argues 
that accounting choices are subject to auditor scrutiny.  
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Zang (2012) conducts a study over the period 1987-2008 for US firms and finds evidence of firms 
substituting the two techniques. She argues that firms encounter different constraints for the two 
methods and provides evidence that the trade-off decision is dependent upon the relative costs of 
the two strategies. She explains that when one earnings management method is constrained, 
managers will make use of the other.  
 
Similarly, Zhu et al. (2015) investigate how Chinese reverse merger firms trade off and conduct 
income increasing earnings management through both accruals-based and real activities-based 
methods over the period 1990-2011, and find that firms substitute the two methods. According to 
the authors, firms substitute accruals-based earnings management with real earnings management 
due to the costs and constraints of utilizing accruals-based earnings management.  
 
Doukakis (2014) examines the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on both accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management for 22 European countries over the period 2000-2010, and 
also finds that firms substitute the two techniques. A substitution effect between earnings 
management techniques is also confirmed by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) for US firms 
over the period 1990-2009. This finding is also consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) for US firms 
over the period 1987-2005. In contrast to the research findings of a substitution effect, Kuo et al. 
(2012) find that Chinese listed firms over the period 2002-2011 display a long-term positive 
relationship between accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management techniques. 
This indicates that firms can also use both techniques to supplement each other in order to achieve 
earnings targets. It is evident that research in this area, however, is lacking for the MENA region. 
32 
 
Most studies of the substitutability of earnings management are primarily conducted for US or 
Chinese firms, and this shows that there is a gap in the literature.   
 
In sum, earnings management can be undertaken by exercising discretion in financial reporting to 
accelerate or decelerate revenues and expenses in order to increase or reduce earnings, thereby 
creating discretionary accruals. This is known as accruals-based earnings management. Earnings 
management can also be achieved by opportunistically making operating decisions with cash flow 
consequences to alter reported earnings, which is known as real earnings management. Earnings 
management can also be accomplished by shifting the classification of core expenses to the special 
items section of the income statement to increase core earnings, which is referred to as 
classification-based earnings management. Further, the extant literature evidences that firms are 
not restricted to utilizing accruals-based earnings management or real activities-based earnings 
management, and may employ the two techniques as substitutes or complements depending on 
their relative costs and the extent to which one method is constrained relative to the other.   
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework of Earnings Management 
There is no single theory in the earnings management literature that provides an adequate 
explanation for earnings management activities. The two prevailing conditions for earnings 
management activities in the relevant literature are information asymmetry and agency theory (Sun 
and Rath, 2008). Further, the Political Cost Hypothesis is a likely explanation of earnings 
management behaviour in the literature. Information asymmetry occurs when one participant in a 
market has knowledge pertaining to an asset being traded that the other participant does not know 
about (Scott, 2009). Since managers possess private information about the firm and its current and 
prospective earnings streams that current and potential shareholders do not have, then information 
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asymmetry exists between managers and shareholders, which could lead to earnings management 
activities (Richardson, 2000).  
 
Agency theory posits that when the goals of management are aligned with the goals of 
shareholders, no conflict of interest would exist between these two parties. According to this 
theory, principals use contracting to motivate agents to prevent this conflict of interest (agency 
conflict). Despite the fact that contracting is primarily designed to align the incentives between 
principals and agents (Deegan, 1996), agency concerns are created as a result of incompleteness 
and the rigidities in binding of contracts, which lead to the manipulation of the reporting process 
(Sun and Rath, 2008).  
 
However, before a discussion of the relevant theories, it is essential to first discuss the concept of 
earnings. Earnings is a summary item in financial statements that is represented by the bottom line 
of the income statement (Yaping, 2005). The primary role of financial statements is to report 
financial information of firms with faithful representation and in a timely manner to both internal 
and external financial statement users. They are the primary way by which the financial position 
and performance are conveyed to shareholders and other relevant users of this information. 
Earnings are a major component of these reports and are used to develop corporate policies such 
executive compensation and capital raising. In addition, other major decisions that are shaped by 
information in annual reports include debt covenants and investment decisions by external 
investors. Ideally, reported earnings should facilitate resource allocation within the firm and reflect 
a firm’s underlying operating economics (Sun and Rath, 2008).  
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Goel (2012) defines earnings as the “bottom line” or “net income” and argues that earnings are the 
single-most important item in financial statements because they indicate the extent of a company’s 
value added activities and aid in the mobilization of resources in the capital markets. The author 
also emphasises the importance of earnings by indicating that management is always interested in 
its reporting.  
 
Earnings are also an important part of the financial reporting process because it is the focus of 
management and auditors. According to Sprouse (1978), managers are earnings-oriented. They 
perceive the reported earnings figure to be the main measure of their performance, especially when 
the reward system of top management is tied to a measure of earnings activities. The author argues 
that auditors are also earnings-oriented and the leading criterion for independent auditors’ 
materiality decisions tends to be the effect on reported earnings. He further argues that a great deal 
of evidence also points to the significance of earnings figures to users. Therefore, since earnings 
is a major component of the financial reporting process and earnings management is a significant 
issue, it is essential to review the theories that attempt to explain the prevalence of earnings 
management.  
 
2.4.1 Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is considered to be a likely explanation for earnings management. 
Asymmetric information makes it possible for managers to manage earnings since it may be 
difficult for investors to ascertain the extent of earnings manipulation in firms characterized by an 
opaque information environment (Liu et al., 2010). When information asymmetry is high, 
stakeholders lack the sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to enable 
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them to monitor the actions of managers, giving rise to the practice of earnings management 
(Richardson, 2000). Richardson uses two measures to detect information asymmetry. The first 
measure is the closing bid and ask quotes for the last trading day for each year of the sample, since 
information asymmetry causes an unwillingness to trade and increases the cost of capital as 
investors ‘price protect’ themselves against potential losses from trading with market participants 
who are better informed. The second measure is the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, since there 
is likely to be a higher consensus among financial analysts about the future performance of the 
firm as the amount of information asymmetry decreases. Richardson finds a systematic 
relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management for US firms over the 
period 1988-1994.  
 
Further, Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue that a higher degree of asymmetric information makes it more 
difficult for shareholders to monitor the behaviour of managers, giving managers greater ease in 
terms of abusing their discretion in financial reporting. The authors employ analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts as measures of information 
asymmetry. In addition, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) argue that with the increase of institutional 
investor shareholdings in a firm, information asymmetry between managers and shareholders will 
decline since institutional investors are more sophisticated and better informed than individual 
investors, and thus there will be lower degree of earnings management.   
 
2.4.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is a prominent explanation of earnings management behaviour in the extant 
literature. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a conflict of interest between management 
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and shareholders exists when managers seek to maximize their utility in a way that is not in the 
best interest of shareholders. As a result of this conflict, costs are incurred which are known as 
agency costs.  
 
Bhundia (2012) explains that in order to maximize their interests or keep their position, agents are 
willing to present a good picture of the firm’s financial position to shareholders. However, agency 
problems arise when the maximization of the agent’s wealth does not necessarily lead to the 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth. Managers or agents may have an incentive to manipulate 
earnings in order to maximize their self-interest. The author argues that if earnings management is 
conducted opportunistically, then firms will have higher agency costs.  
 
However, if shareholdings are held by managers of the firm, the goals of managers and 
shareholders should be aligned and less earnings management will occur since the interests of 
managers and shareholders are the same. Teshima and Shuto (2008) argue that this incentive 
alignment effect is expected to have more impact as managerial ownership increases, which 
suggests that corporate performance improves and opportunistic managerial behaviour decreases 
as managerial ownership increases in the firm. However, it can also be argued that more dominant 
managerial ownership leads to a greater degree of earnings management since greater ownership 
provides managers with deeper entrenchment and thus greater scope for opportunistic behaviour 
(Morck et al. (1988).  
 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue that where agency costs are high, firms should exhibit a high degree 
of opportunistic earnings management. Conversely, if earnings management enhances the 
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information content of earnings and is beneficial to shareholders by conveying private information, 
then earnings management is expected to be low since managers should not engage in earnings 
management for the sake of their private benefits. The empirical evidence in this study for the 
years 1993, 1995, and 1998 shows a negative relationship between agency costs and earnings 
management. This indicates that in firms where agency costs are lower, the extent of earnings 
management is higher, suggesting that earnings management does not appear to provide private 
benefits to management. In addition to information asymmetry and agency theory, another possible 
explanation for earnings management in the literature is the Political Cost Hypothesis.  
 
2.4.3 Political Cost Hypothesis 
Political and governmental regulations are identified in the literature as incentives for earnings 
management. In an effort to be less conspicuous to regulators, large and high profile firms may be 
motivated to manage their earnings downward. By doing so, firms can avoid government 
interference by appearing less profitable. As an illustration, the earnings of US oil companies in 
the 1970s were viewed as so high that Congress imposed a special tax on these firms. This may 
have motivated these companies to defer revenues or accelerate expenses in order to decrease their 
reported income (Mulford and Comsikey, 2002).       
 
In the earnings management literature, authors suggest that earnings management activities occur 
as a result of the Political Cost Hypothesis in relation to firm size. Watts and Zimmerman (1978), 
for example, identify firm size as a factor which can impact upon accounting numbers. They argue 
that there may be circumstances where it is not in the best interest of larger firms to appear to be 
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profitable since they would face increased intervention by regulators. For this reason, firms may 
have a motivation to engage in income decreasing activities to reduce such political exposure.  
Various authors in the literature examine earnings management and attribute their findings to the 
Political Cost Hypothesis. For example, Monti-Belkaoui, et al. (1999) argue that as growth 
opportunities increase, firms may experience higher profitability. This may result in higher 
political risk which could lead firms to resort to earnings management to reduce earnings in order 
to lower such risk. Thus, firms with high growth opportunities may engage in greater income 
decreasing earnings management to reduce their political exposure when compared to low growth 
firms. Further, Jones (1991) argues that managers may manage earnings in order to increase the 
likelihood of receiving benefits from import relief.  
 
2.5 Incentives to Manage Earnings 
From the 1980s onwards, there was a focus in the literature on examining the incentives to engage 
in earnings management (Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Jones, 1991; Holthausen et 
al., 1995; Gaver et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; DeGeorge et al., 
1999; Guidry et al., 1999; Beatty et al., 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). The most common 
incentives for earnings management in the literature are management compensation contracts, debt 
covenant considerations, political and governmental regulatory considerations, equity incentives, 
initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings, and mergers and acquisitions. 
 
One possible incentive to induce earnings management behaviour is management compensation. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that management compensation is expected to affect 
managers’ choice of accounting procedures in order to augment the present value of their awards. 
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They argue that managers have an incentive to bring forward the reported earnings from the future 
to the current accounting period so long as a bonus award plan exists. Consistent with this 
argument, Healy (1985) argues that bonus schemes create incentives for managers to select 
accounting procedures to maximize the value of their bonus awards. He studies 94 US Industrial 
corporations and finds results suggesting that the accrual policies of managers are related to the 
income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts and that the changes in accounting procedures 
are associated with the adoption or modification of their bonus plan. He concludes that there is a 
greater likelihood for managers to select income-decreasing accruals when the upper or lower 
bounds of their bonus plan are binding, and income-increasing accruals when these bounds are not 
binding. Thus, managers increase earnings when they are at their bonus threshold in order to 
receive higher bonuses. However, when they reach their maximum bonus potential, their incentive 
shifts toward reducing earnings to save some of the profit for a future accounting period.    
 
A study by Holthausen et al. (1995) later expands the literature in this area by utilizing proprietary 
databases from two human resource consulting firms over the period 1982-1984 and 1987-1991, 
allowing them to study actual bonus plan payments and thresholds in conjunction with accruals-
based earnings management. The authors find evidence that managers manipulate earnings 
downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum. However, they do not find any evidence of 
earnings being manipulated downward when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive 
a bonus. This means that managers manipulate earnings downwards when they reach their bonus 
thresholds in order to save the extra profits for future periods. However, managers do not do this 
if earnings are far below their bonus threshold.  
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Studying the management and financial reporting databases of a large US conglomerate, Guidry 
et al. (1999) both replicate Healy’s findings and extend the earnings management literature by 
conducting their analysis at the business unit level since the database provides detailed information 
about business unit managers’ bonus targets and bonus payments. The study supports previous 
research by revealing that managers do in fact manipulate earnings using accruals-based earnings 
management for the sake of maximizing their short-term bonus pay-outs.      
 
The existing literature also examines the association between earnings management and equity 
ownership incentives. It may be argued that shareholdings held by managers help to align 
management interests with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As managerial ownership 
increases, corporate performance is likely to increase and opportunistic behaviour of managers is 
likely to decrease since the goals of managers and shareholders will be aligned (Teshima and 
Shuto, 2008). Thus, it can be expected that when less equity is held in a corporation by managers, 
incentives can arise for managers to pursue non-value maximizing behaviour for their personal 
benefit such as shirking (Warfield et al., 1995). Further, managers could select non-value 
maximizing accounting procedures that make the manager better off at the expense of some other 
contracting party, rather than to maximize the value of the firm (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). 
Managers may then engage in earnings management to compensate for the negative effects of 
these investments (Kazemian and Sanusi, 2015).   
 
In a study of US firms over the period 1993-2000, Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the link 
between managers’ equity incentives arising from stock based compensation and stock ownership 
and accruals-based earnings management, and find that managers with significant equity 
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incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just exceed analysts’ forecasts. They also 
find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive 
earnings surprises. The authors argue that the wealth of these managers is more sensitive to future 
stock performance, which leads them to increase their reserves of current earnings to avoid future 
earnings disappointment, rather than reporting large positive earnings surprises. Ultimately, they 
find that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management.  
 
Warfield et al. (1995) find that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is negatively related to 
managerial ownership. They argue that when ownership and control are distinct, accounting-based 
contractual constraints are often imposed on managers to restrict their value-reducing behaviour. 
These contractual constraints include accounting-based restrictions on the actions of managers 
such as debt covenants, corporate charters, and bylaws.  
 
A further potential incentive for earnings management is the use of debt covenants. Covenants that 
protect lenders from the actions of managers that may conflict with the best interests of lenders are 
normally included in long-term lending contracts. These covenants include such criteria as 
achieving a desirable earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), 
maintaining a maximum debt-to-assets ratio, maintaining minimum financial ratios such as 
profitability ratios, and restrictions on dividend payment levels. If these covenants are violated, 
high penalty rates and costs are imposed on the borrowers, the firms may be required to put up 
collateral, and the loan itself may be recalled. Thus, an incentive is expected to exist for managers 
to engage in earnings management in order to avoid breaching such debt covenants (Scott, 2009).   
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Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) study 94 firms that violated their debt covenants in the National 
Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS database) over the period 1985-1988 and find 
evidence of discretionary accruals one year prior to the violation of covenants. This means that 
these firms attempted to avoid the violations by managing their earnings through accruals-based 
earnings management but were unsuccessful. 
 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) investigate factors that influence accruals-based earnings management 
for Canadian and French firms and provide evidence that incentives for earnings management in 
French firms are specifically linked to contractual debt costs. However, capital markets are the 
main driver of the incentives to induce earnings management behaviour for Canadian firms. For 
example, the authors find that issuing equity is a strong motive for earnings management in 
Canadian firms. The authors argue that the difference in the results between these two countries 
could potentially be explained by the fact that French companies rely less on the capital market as 
a source of financing compared with Canadian companies.   
 
Political and government regulations are also identified as incentives for earnings management 
since firms can avoid government interference by appearing less profitable. As previously 
mentioned, in an effort to be less conspicuous to regulators, large and high profile firms may be 
motivated to manage their earnings downward. Jones (1991) tests whether firms that that would 
benefit from import relief such as tariff increases and quota reductions engage in accruals-based 
earnings management in order to reduce earnings to increase the likelihood of obtaining import 
relief and or increase the amount of relief granted. Import relief refers to measures imposed by a 
government which restrict the importation of products in order to protect domestic manufacturers 
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from competition. These import relief measures can also be in the form of subsidies, low interest 
loans, and tax relief. In this study, the behaviour of earnings management during import-relief 
investigations by the US International Trade Commission is tested, and it is found that managers 
in fact understate earnings during a year of import-relief investigations.    
 
The literature further includes significant evidence of earnings management around initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). A SEO is a new equity issue of a company 
that is already publicly traded. Since firms prefer to issue shares at the highest possible price, it 
stands to reason that they may engage in income increasing earnings management which would 
reflect positively on their share prices. Jain and Kini (1994) investigate US firms transitioning 
from private to public ownership and conclude that these firms engage in window-dressing 
behaviour to improve the appearance of their prospects. Friedlan (1994) studies US IPO firms that 
went public between 1981 and 1984 and finds income-increasing discretionary accruals in the year 
before going public.  
 
In a study that examines earnings management and the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of Korean 
firms over the period 1995-1997, Yoon and Miller (2002) find that Korean firms manage earnings 
through accruals-based earnings management prior to the offer, particularly when their operating 
performance has been poor and the offer size is large. Additionally, Kim and Park (2005) find 
evidence that US SEO firms over the period 1989-2000 make opportunistic accounting decisions 
to issue shares at inflated prices. In a more recent study by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) for US firms 
over the period 1987-2006, SEO firms are shown to engage in real activities-based earnings 
management prior to the offerings.  
44 
 
Existing studies also observe earnings management activity prior to mergers and acquisitions. 
Since mergers and acquisitions are significant events that result in the destruction, creation, and 
redistribution of wealth, then mergers and acquisitions may motivate managers to engage in 
earnings management. Authors investigate this relationship and find that earnings are in fact 
managed ahead of stock-for-stock mergers (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; Gong et al., 
2008; and Botsari and Meeks, 2008). The rationale underlying this is that the acquiring firm 
attempts to increase the value of its stock prior to the merger in order to complete the acquisition 
at a lower cost. According to Erickson and Wang (1999), when a stock-for-stock merger occurs, 
the shares of the acquiring firm (acquirer) are exchanged for the shares of the target firm (target). 
Target shareholders receive a specified number of acquirer shares for each of the target shares. 
Once the acquirer and the target agree on the purchase price, an exchange ratio for the number of 
shares to be exchanged for each target share is determined based on the price of the acquirer stock. 
Thus, the higher is the price of acquirer stock on the agreement date, the smaller is the number of 
acquirer shares required by the target (i.e. the share exchange ratio). Therefore, acquirers have an 
incentive to manage earnings upward before engaging in a stock-for-stock merger in order to 
increase the share price, thereby reducing the share exchange ratio, which would reduce the overall 
acquisition cost to the acquirer.  
 
Erickson and Wang examine 119 mergers of US firms from 1985-1990 to investigate whether 
acquiring firms attempt to increase their stock price prior to a stock-for-stock merger in order to 
reduce the cost of buying the target. They find that acquiring firms manage their earnings upward 
through accruals-based earnings management in the periods prior to the merger agreement. 
Further, they report a positive relationship between the extent of income increasing earnings 
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management and the size of the merger. Similarly, Louis (2004) finds strong evidence suggesting 
that acquiring firms report significant positive abnormal accruals in the quarter preceding stock 
swap announcements for US companies over the period 1992-2000. Consistent with these findings, 
Higgins (2009) provides evidence of the presence of acquirer earnings management after finding 
higher discretionary accruals of acquirers for Japanese firms over the period 1990-2004. 
 
Overall, the literature evidences a range of incentives for firms to engage in earnings management. 
Managers may be motivated to engage in earnings management in order to maximize their 
compensation benefits. Equity incentives are also shown to provide a further incentive for earnings 
management. Moreover, managers may engage in earnings management to avoid debt covenant 
violations so as to avoid the penalties associated with these violations, or to avoid governmental 
and regulatory intervention. Further, managers may undertake earnings management to inflate 
stock prices prior to initial public offerings or seasoned equity offerings to issue shares at higher 
prices. Acquiring firms may also be motivated to engage in earnings management in an attempt to 
increase their stock price prior to a stock-for-stock merger in order to reduce the cost of buying 
the target.  
 
2.6 Earnings Management in the MENA Region 
Studies of earnings management in MENA country firms are fairly recent extensions of the 
earnings management literature. While there are few studies that examine the determinants of 
earnings management and the practice of real earnings management, the majority of studies focus 
on the interactions between corporate governance variables and ownership structure and earnings 
management (e.g. Abbadi et al., 2016; Alzoubi, 2016; and Farooq and Jai, 2012).  
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Abbadi et al. (2016) examine the impact of corporate governance quality upon the extent of 
accruals-based earnings management in Jordanian firms over the period 2009-2013. They find 
evidence that earnings management is negatively associated with an overall category of 
governance index representing the board of directors, board meetings, audit and nomination and 
compensation committees. With regard to their control variables, they find evidence that earnings 
management is negatively associated with firm size and profitability. On the other hand, 
discretionary accruals are found to be positively associated with leverage. They argue that this is 
likely due to these firms engaging in earnings management in an attempt to avoid debt covenant 
violations.  
 
Farooq and Jai (2012) investigate the effect of ownership structure on accruals-based earnings 
management for firms in Morocco over the period 2004-2007 and find that the presence of 
institutions as the largest shareholders has a negative impact upon the extent of earnings 
management. They argue that institutions have greater resources, expertise, and a higher degree of 
sophistication than individual investors, which results in a lower extent of earnings management 
in these firms.   
 
Alzoubi (2016) examines the association between corporate governance and earnings management 
in Jordanian firms. He examines all listed industrial companies at the year-end of 2013 and finds 
that measures of ownership structure such as managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and 
family ownership are negatively associated with accruals-based earnings management. He argues 
that greater managerial ownership reduces earnings management behaviour since the interests of 
managers are aligned with those of shareholders. Further, he argues that institutional ownership 
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plays an important role in monitoring the discretion of managers since institutional investors are 
not only sophisticated but also have significant investments in the firm. In firms characterised by 
family ownership, monitoring costs are lower and thus earnings management is more effectively 
mitigated. With regard to the control variables in his study, he finds that larger firms, firms 
characterised by greater cash flows from operations, and higher growth firms are associated with 
a higher degree of accruals-based earnings management. Conversely, profitability and leverage are 
associated with a lower degree of accruals-based earnings management. He argues that larger firms 
may be motivated to augment their earnings through earnings management in order to meet or beat 
the expectations of analysts. Higher leveraged firms are likely to be under greater scrutiny from 
lenders and thus less capable of engaging in earnings management.  
 
Charfeddine et al. (2013) examine factors that determine accruals-based earnings management in 
Tunisian firms over the period 2003-2009. The authors find that leverage is positively associated 
with discretionary accruals and argue that Tunisian firms engage in earnings management to avoid 
debt covenant violations. Further, they find that firm size is positively associated with discretionary 
accruals and argue that larger firms engage in a higher degree of earnings management to provide 
signals about their future profitability to investors. Managerial ownership is found to be positively 
associated with discretionary accruals and the authors argue that more dominant managerial 
ownership leads to a greater extent of earnings management since greater ownership provides 
managers with deeper entrenchment and thus greater scope for opportunistic behaviour.  
 
Bassiouny et al. (2016) investigate the effect of firm characteristics on accruals-based earnings 
management for Egyptian firms over the period 2007-2011. They find that only leverage has a 
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significant and positive relationship with discretionary accruals. Firm size, firm age, and the firm’s 
audit quality, on the other hand, are found to be insignificant determinants. They argue that firms 
which rely on debt financing have an inclination to select accounting policies that increase income 
in order to abide by the debt covenants imposed by lenders, as well as to avoid any potential 
renegotiation costs.   
 
Amin and Amin (2015) explain that the accounting standards of Iran, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi 
Arabia have been reformed to improve the quality of accounting information. These Middle 
Eastern countries have adopted international accounting standards in order to gain access to global 
capital markets. In their study of the impact of the adoption of international financial reporting 
standards on accruals-based earnings management for firms listed in the stock exchanges of these 
countries over the period 1996-2010, they find that the adoption of international financial reporting 
standards reduces accruals-based earnings management. This is likely due to the fact that more 
principle-based accounting standards decrease the opportunistic interpretation of complex rules 
and force firms to comply with the intent of the standards (Ho et al., 2015).   
 
Farooq and AbdelBari (2015) examine firms listed on the stock exchanges of Morocco, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain over the period 2005-2009 to investigate 
whether accruals-based earnings management behaviour differs between Shariah-compliant and 
non-Shariah compliant firms. The authors find that Shariah-compliant firms engage in a lower 
degree of accruals-based earnings management compared with non-Shariah compliant firms, and 
argue that the lower levels of cash at hand available to Shariah-compliant firms decreases the 
ability of managers to invest in unprofitable projects and consequently reduces agency problems. 
49 
 
Therefore, lower agency problems lead to improved disclosure and a lower extent of earnings 
misrepresentation. 
 
In a study of real activities-based earnings management, Hamza and Bannouri (2015) examine 
Tunisian firms over the period 2003-2012 and find that Tunisian firms engage in real earnings 
management activities. They argue that Tunisian firms employ real earnings management 
techniques in a tightened regulatory environment. This is likely due to the fact that a stricter 
regulatory environment mitigates the ability of firms to engage in accruals-based earnings 
management. Further, they find that profitability is significantly positively associated with real 
earnings management. Overall, however, there appears to be a paucity of research in relation to 
the determinants of earnings management in the MENA region, especially in relation to real 
activities-based earnings management. Further, there appears to be a paucity of research into the 
investigation of the substitutability or complementary nature of earnings management techniques, 
or whether earnings management in the MENA region is efficient or opportunistic.   
 
2.7 Summary  
Earnings management is defined by Mulford and Comiskey (2002, p. 3) as the “active 
manipulation of earnings toward a predetermined target, which may be set by management, a 
forecast made by analysts, or an amount that is consistent with a smoother, more sustainable 
earnings stream.” It involves using judgment and discretion in financial reporting by exploiting 
the flexibility allowed within generally accepted accounting principles. Since earnings 
management occurs within the boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles, it is a legal 
activity and only becomes fraudulent once it breaches these standards. The earnings management 
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literature is extensive and focuses on a range of issues such as the incentives to manage earnings, 
the techniques of earnings management, and the factors that can impact upon earnings 
management. 
 
In terms of earnings management techniques, there are three primary techniques which are (i) 
accruals-based earnings management by using discretion to change estimates and accounting 
policies; (ii) real earnings management that has direct cash flow consequences; and (iii) 
classification shifting-based earnings management such as shifting the classification of core 
expenses to special items in the income statement. The extant literature provides evidence that 
firms can substitute accruals-based earnings management with real earnings management or vice 
versa, or employ both simultaneously. While some authors provide evidence for opportunistic 
earnings management which is employed by managers for personal benefit, other authors provide 
evidence of efficient earnings management which can enhance the information value of earnings.    
 
It is evident in the literature that a range of incentives exist for managers to engage in earnings 
management. Managers can be expected to manage earnings for the sake of compensation benefits. 
Equity incentives are also identified in the literature as being a possible incentive for earnings 
management behaviour. Managers may also engage in earnings management to avoid the penalties 
associated with the breach of debt covenants, or to avoid governmental and regulatory intervention. 
Further, earnings management can be undertaken to inflate stock prices prior to initial public 
offerings and seasoned equity offerings to issue shares at higher prices. In the existing literature, 
mergers and acquisitions are identified as possible incentives for earnings management since 
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earnings may be managed upward prior to a merger or acquisition in order for the acquirer to raise 
the market price of the stock to lower the cost of the acquisition.  
 
Further, the literature evidences that studies of earnings management in MENA country firms are 
fairly recent extensions. While there are few studies that examine the determinants of earnings 
management and the practice of real earnings management, the majority of studies focus on the 
interactions between corporate governance variables and ownership structure and earnings 
management. Therefore, there is a gap in the literature in terms of investigating the firm-level and 
country-level determinants of accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management for 
firms in the MENA region. Moreover, there is a paucity of research into whether firms in the 
MENA region substitute or complement the two techniques, and whether earnings management is 
efficient or opportunistic.   
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Chapter III – Hypothesis Development  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Grounded in the literature review presented in Chapter two, this chapter develops a set of 
hypotheses to address the research questions. The research questions presented in this thesis are as 
follows: (i) what are the firm-specific and country-level determinants of accruals based earnings 
management for firms in the MENA region? (ii) what are the firm-specific and country-level 
determinants of real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region?; (iii) 
are earnings management methods used as substitutes or complements by firms in the MENA 
region?; and (iv) is earnings management efficient or opportunistic within firms in the MENA 
region? Accordingly, a set of hypotheses is developed in the following sections. Section 3.2 
addresses the firm-level and country-level determinants of the accruals-based and real activities-
based earnings management models. In section 3.3, the substitutability of the two earnings 
management techniques is addressed. Section 3.4 addresses the efficient versus opportunistic 
earnings management model, and the chapter concludes with a summary in section 3.5.     
 
3.2 Firm-Specific and Country-Level Determinants of Earnings Management 
The extant literature finds empirical evidence that various firm-specific factors such as firm size, 
leverage, growth opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, free cash flow, and profitability impact 
upon earnings management behaviour (e.g. Heninger, 2001; Siregar and Utama, 2008; Sun and 
Rath, 2009; Jelinek, 2007; Iturriaga and Hoffmann, 2005; Hessayri and Saihi, 2015; Chung et al., 
2005; Daniel et al., 2008). In addition, industry membership and country level factors are shown 
to impact upon earnings management (e.g. Lemma et al., 2013; Dyreng et al., 2012; Enomoto et 
al., 2014; Leuz et al., 2003; Rathke et al., 2015). Both accruals-based and real activities-based 
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earnings management methods are shown to be driven by these determinants. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is stated:  
H1: Earnings management is affected by firm-specific and country level factors. 
Hypothesis 1 is further decomposed into the subsidiary hypotheses that follow.  
 
3.2.1 IFRS Adoption and Earnings Management 
With the aim of improving the quality of financial reporting, International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) have been adopted by various countries around the world to replace their national 
accounting standards either on a voluntary or mandatory basis. It can be expected that the adoption 
of IFRS should minimize earnings management since adopters of IFRS would be expected to 
report accounting information within the confines of these standards. However, low enforcement 
and low litigation risk may result in firms being encouraged to send false signals of being high 
quality firms by adopting IFRS even if they are not actually reporting high quality information. 
Although a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings can be curbed by accounting rules, it 
depends more on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz et al., 2003). In developed economies, 
studies show that accounting standards add value to accounting information (Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007).  
 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) argue that clearer accounting rules and stricter accounting standards 
result in less earnings management and a higher quality of earnings. Consistent with this argument, 
Ho et al. (2015) argue that IFRS adoption is likely to curb accruals-based earnings management 
since more principle-based accounting standards decrease the opportunistic interpretation of 
complex rules and force firms to comply with the intent of the standards. Further, the costs of 
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conducting accruals-based earnings management can be expected to rise as a result of heightened 
outside scrutiny from the audit reform and other regulations. In the context of developed 
economies, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on the 
financial statements of German firms and find that the quality of earnings is higher under IFRS 
compared to German GAAP, indicating that the adoption of IFRS reduces the extent of accruals-
based earnings management. Barth et al. (2008) conduct a study that investigates the accounting 
quality of firms in 21 countries that adopted International Accounting Standards (IAS). The 
authors show that higher accounting quality is exhibited by firms that apply IAS since these firms 
are found to engage in less income smoothing, have more timely recognition of losses, and there 
is a higher association of accounting information with share prices and returns for such firms. 
 
Cai et al. (2008) examine the effect of IFRS adoption on accruals-based earnings management 
across 32 countries, and find that earnings management has been declining in the countries that 
have adopted IFRS. The authors conclude that countries with stronger enforcement have in general 
experienced reduced earnings management. In a study that examines 46 countries around the world 
that instituted the mandatory adoption of IFRS, Hoque et al. (2012) find that mandatory adoption 
of IFRS increases the quality of earnings, but only when a country has a strong investor protection 
regime. Consistent with this, Lemma et al. (2013) argue that IFRS adoption increases transparency 
and reduces agency costs, thereby curbing earnings management. They find a negative relationship 
between IFRS adoption and both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
for 44 countries.  
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However, although most authors find that the adoption of IFRS minimizes earnings management, 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find that earnings management is not affected by the adoption 
of IFRS. They examine German listed companies and find that voluntary adoption of IFRS does 
not result in different accruals-accruals-based earnings management behaviours of adopting firms 
compared with firms reporting under German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (German 
GAAP).  
 
The quality of financial reporting is investigated by Paananen (2008) for Swedish firms, and the 
study results show that the quality of financial reporting decreases after the adoption of IFRS. 
Consistent with these results, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) argue that management incentives and 
national institutional factors play a key role in framing the characteristics of financial reporting, 
and argue that these factors are likely to be even more important than accounting standards alone. 
Thus, they suggest that efforts should be devoted toward the harmonization of legal enforcement 
systems, competition rules, market access conditions, and effectiveness of the legal system, since 
these appear to be factors that are better able to guarantee comparable accounting practices. They 
analyse whether the obligatory adoption of IFRS influences accruals-based earnings management 
in France, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and find that the frequency of earnings management 
did not diminish after the adoption of IFRS. In fact, while the frequency of occurrence of earnings 
management remained the same in the United Kingdom and Australia, it actually increased in 
France. In a study that examines the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on both accruals-based 
and real activities-based earnings management using a sample of 22 European countries, Doukakis 
(2014) finds no significant impact on either of the two earnings management strategies in contrast 
to studies that find a significant relationship. 
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In the context of developing economies, Jing and Kyu (2012) examine the association between 
earnings management and IFRS adoption and compare the direction and magnitude of earnings 
management before and after the adoption for Chinese firms. They show that total accruals and 
discretionary accruals following the adoption of IFRS are greater than they were prior to the IFRS 
adoption period. Therefore, Chinese firms engage more in earnings management after adopting 
IFRS. Similarly, Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012) find that Indian firms adopting IFRS are more 
likely to smooth earnings compared with firms that do not adopt IFRS. Furthermore, they conclude 
that these findings might encourage regulators to reconsider the effectiveness of IFRS in curbing 
earnings management in emerging economies.  
 
Ho et al. (2015) examine the impact of IFRS adoption upon accruals-based and real activities-
based earnings management in Chinese firms and argue that higher quality accounting standards 
associated with IFRS and or simultaneous changes in the governance regimes introduced as part 
of the IFRS mandate curb accruals-based earnings management behaviour. However, real earnings 
management becomes easier to conduct since it is not affected by IFRS. Thus, if there is a trade-
off of one earnings management method for another, firms are likely to trade off upward accruals-
based earnings management for real earnings management. They find that Chinese firms are less 
likely to engage in accruals-based earnings management following the adoption of IFRS, and 
instead shift to real earnings management. The same logic could also be expected to apply to 
MENA country firms which are likely to experience greater difficulty engaging in accruals-based 
earnings management following the adoption of IFRS, and thus shift toward real earnings 
management. Based on this argument, the following hypotheses are stated:       
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H1.1a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and IFRS adoption. 
H1.1b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and IFRS adoption.        
 
3.2.2     Firm Size and Earnings Management 
Firm size may have a negative impact upon earnings management, meaning that the larger the firm 
the less the extent of earnings management since larger companies may have more sophisticated 
internal control systems and more competent internal auditors that would mitigate earnings 
management. Larger firms are also usually audited by large audit firms with more experienced 
auditors that could prevent earnings management. Large firms may also have more concern about 
their reputation which could prevent them from manipulating earnings (Kim et al., 2003; Lemma 
et al., 2013). Lemma et al. argue that large firms incur relatively high reputation costs if the 
credibility of financial information disclosed is compromised compared to smaller firms, and enjoy 
the benefits of receiving better audit services which likely diminishes their earnings management 
capability.  Further, large firms may have an incentive to avoid earnings management as they are 
subject to greater scrutiny from analysts, investors, and regulators (Sun and Rath, 2009). Similarly, 
Kuo et al. (2014) argue that larger firms face greater scrutiny by auditors and regulators compared 
with small, rapidly growing firms whose business activities cannot be so easily observed.  
 
Conversely, an argument can be made in favour of a positive impact upon earnings management 
since large firms face more pressure to meet or beat analysts’ expectations (Lemma et al., 2013). 
In addition, larger firms usually have greater bargaining power with auditors and auditors are more 
likely to waive earnings management attempts by larger clients (Nelson et al., 2002). Larger firms 
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also have more current assets and thus a higher ability to engage in earnings management relative 
to smaller firms (Kim et al., 2003).  
 
The results regarding the nature of the relationship are therefore mixed. Koh (2003) argues that 
the relationship between firm size and discretionary accruals is ambiguous. He further argues that 
although large firms have incentives to reduce political costs, they are also likely to be under 
greater scrutiny by analysts, which may potentially mitigate opportunities for earnings 
management. Thus, while some authors find that size is positively related to earnings management 
(Moses, 1987; Rangan, 1998; Michaelson et al., 1995; Lemma et al., 2013), others find a negative 
association (Heninger, 2001; Sirat, 2012).  
 
In the context of developed economies, Michaelson et al. (1995) argue that larger firms engage 
more in income smoothing than smaller firms to appear to have more consistent earnings and thus 
be perceived as less risky by investors. They examine US firms and find consistent evidence. 
Likewise, Moses (1987) argues that larger firms have a greater incentive to smooth earnings 
compared with smaller firms as the accountability of managers in larger firms is greater than in 
smaller firms. He conducts a study of US firms and finds consistent evidence. 
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) study US firms and examine whether accruals-based earnings 
management activities are conducted in these firms. They find that both large and small firms 
manage earnings upwards after having incurred losses or decreases in earnings. They conclude 
that managers avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses to decrease the costs imposed on the 
firm in transactions with stakeholders.  
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Rangan (1998) studies a sample of US firms and finds a significant relationship between accruals-
based earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Additionally, the 
study also shows that current accruals are adjusted by older and larger firms in an attempt to 
exaggerate the earnings of the seasoned equity offerings, thus indicating a positive relation 
between earnings management and firm size.  
 
Lemma et al. (2013) argue that greater pressure to meet or beat benchmarks and greater bargaining 
power with auditors result in a higher degree of earnings management. They further argue that 
firms with more sophisticated internal control systems, better audit services, and higher 
reputational costs find it more difficult to engage in accruals-based earnings management. In 
addition, market and regulatory pressure, monitoring and reputational costs, and the flexibility in 
accounting choices that come with larger sized firms make it difficult for firms to continue 
employing accruals-based earnings management, thereby leading them to resort to real earnings 
management. They investigate 44 countries across the world and find a positive relationship 
between firm size and real earnings management. In their examination of accruals-based earnings 
management, they document a negative relationship. Consistent with these findings, 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) find a positive relationship between firm size and real 
earnings management for US firms.  
 
A negative relationship between accruals-based earnings management and firm size is documented 
by Heninger (2001) for US client firms. In this study, large firms are shown to be better placed 
than small firms in terms of receiving better audit services from established auditing firms due to 
larger operating budgets. Therefore, these larger firms receive better audit services, and thus they 
60 
 
exhibit a lower extent of accruals-based earnings management behaviour. Similarly, in a study of 
earnings management in Australian firms, Sun and Rath (2009) find that small companies with 
lower profits engage in greater accruals-based earnings management.  
 
In an in-depth examination of the association between firm size and earnings management, Kim 
et al. (2003) study US firms to analyse the accruals-based earnings management behaviour of 
small, medium, and large companies in relation to firm size. They find empirical evidence that 
both large and small firms manage earnings to avoid reporting negative earnings or small earnings 
decreases. However, the study reveals different motives behind their earnings management 
activities. They find that small firms tend to engage in more earnings management to avoid 
reporting losses, whereas large and medium sized firms exhibit more aggressive earnings 
management to avoid reporting decreases in earnings. The authors argue that it is easier for larger 
firms to report positive changes in earnings rather than turning losses into earnings. This is likely 
due to the fact that larger firms are under higher scrutiny compared with smaller firms.  
 
Consistent with this, Doukakis (2014) finds that smaller firms engage in higher levels of real 
earnings management in a study of 22 European countries. Chen (2009) studies US firms and also 
finds a negative relationship between firm size and the extent of real earnings management, 
consistent with Doukakis. These results are also supported in the context of developing economies 
in a study by Ho et al. (2015) for Chinese firms. They find a lower extent of real earnings 
management for larger sized firms. Similarly, Kuo et al. (2014) find consistent results for Chinese 
firms. Siregar and Utama (2008) argue that large firms do not engage in opportunistic accruals-
based earnings management significantly more than small firms since the former are more easily 
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scrutinized by investors or regulators than the latter. Thus, larger firms are expected to engage in 
less opportunistic earnings management than smaller firms. The authors examine Indonesian firms 
and find consistent evidence with their argument.  
 
Sirat (2012) analyses the effect of corporate governance practices, ownership, and firm size on the 
extent of earnings management in Indonesian firms. He finds that firm size and family ownership 
are determinants of the extent of discretionary accruals, and that firm size is negatively associated 
with the degree of accruals-based earnings management. However, Abdul Rauf et al. (2012) 
investigate accruals-based earnings management in Malaysia for the year 2008 and find a 
significant positive relationship between accruals-based earnings management and firm size.  
 
In relation to real earnings management, Zamri et al. (2013) argue that larger firms refrain from 
earnings management since they are satisfied with their financial position, and find a negative 
relation with firm size for Malaysian firms. In contrast to the findings of the authors mentioned 
above, Llukani (2013) examines the relationship between accruals-based earnings management 
and firm size for Albanian firms and shows that whilst firms engage in earnings management, there 
is no significant difference between the earnings management practices of large and small 
companies. 
 
In the context of MENA region countries, Mordadi et al. (2012) argue that the larger the firms in 
Iran, the more they engage in earnings management in order to be perceived more favourably by 
shareholders. They find a positive relationship between accruals-based earnings management and 
firm size. Similarly, Alzoubi (2016) examines Jordanian firms and finds consistent results. Further, 
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Charfeddine et al. (2013) study Tunisian firms and find a positive relationship between accruals-
based earnings management and firm size. In contrast, Omid et al. (2012) investigate the effect of 
firm size on accruals-based earnings management in companies listed on the Tehran Stock 
Exchange (TSE), and find a significant negative relationship.  
 
In a study of both MENA countries and emerging economies, Hessayri and Saihi (2015) argue that 
larger firms engage less in accruals-based earnings management as a result of such firms having 
fewer opportunities for earnings management since they are under closer scrutiny by analysts. 
They find consistent evidence for firms in the UAE, Morocco, South Africa, and the Philippines. 
Further, Abbadi et al. (2016) investigate Jordanian firms and find a negative relationship between 
accruals-based earnings management and firm size.  
 
Despite the mixed evidence, Zhu et al. (2015) argue that firm size is negatively associated with 
both methods of earnings management since smaller firms are more vulnerable to business risk 
and therefore have a higher likelihood of resorting to earnings management to avoid bankruptcy. 
Further, Kuo et al. (2014) argue that it might be more difficult for large firms to manipulate 
earnings, through either method, since they face greater scrutiny from auditors and regulators 
compared with small, rapidly growing firms. Looney (2005) argues that MENA countries are 
lagging in the control of corruption, the rule of law, and political stability. Therefore, it is possible 
that, as a result of the relatively high political instability and weak rule of law inherent to the 
MENA region, smaller firms are exposed to a greater degree of business risk, and consequently 
engage in higher accruals-based earnings management to portray improved prospects in order to 
be perceived as more profitable and attract investors, and to avoid bankruptcy. Larger firms, on 
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the other hand, are likely to be less capable of doing so as a result of the greater scrutiny and 
monitoring by analysts, investors, and regulators. Larger firms are thus more likely to rely on real 
earnings management since it is not as easily detected. Based on this argument, the following 
hypotheses are stated: 
H1.2a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and firm size.  
H1.2b There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and firm size. 
 
3.2.3 Leverage and Earnings Management 
An argument can be made that high leveraged firms may tend toward earnings management in 
order to prevent breaches of debt covenants (Mohrman, 1996; Sun and Rath, 2009; Becker et al., 
1998; Defond and Jimbalvo, 1991; Lemma et al., 2013; and DeAngelo et al., 1994). Since debt 
covenant violations result in penalties for firms, an incentive may exist for firms to engage in 
earnings management to avoid breaching their debt covenants. In contrast, higher leverage may 
reduce opportunistic earnings management behaviour since firms that employ debt are often 
subject to lender-imposed spending restrictions (Jelinek, 2007). Jelinek argues that if free cash 
flow usage is restricted by leverage-increasing firms, managers will strive to use the remaining 
discretionary cash on allowable projects in order to create value for shareholders. Further, higher 
leverage may result in more thorough scrutiny and control of firms by lenders which could mitigate 
the extent of earnings management (Jelinek, 2007; Iturriaga and Hoffmann, 2005; Zamri et al., 
2013). The extant literature therefore evidences mixed results in relation to the impact of leverage 
upon earnings management behaviour.  
 
64 
 
In the context of developed economies, Sweeney (1994) examines the association between capital 
structure and accruals-based earnings management for US firms and finds that income-increasing 
accounting changes are employed by firms nearing technical default as a delaying tactic. Income 
increasing accounting changes include changes in pension assumptions, pension terminations, 
changes in the inventory method, and liquidations of last-in, first out inventories.  
 
DeAngelo et al. (1994) study US firms to investigate debt financing and debt covenants and their 
association with accruals-based earnings management, and find that managers engage in earnings 
management in order to present a favourable picture of the firm to creditors, in turn in order for 
the latter to reduce the commitments associated with debt contracts. This view is also supported 
by Mohrman (1996) who argues that accounting procedures that increase current income are 
expected to be adopted by firms with higher leverage for the sake of avoiding debt covenant 
violations. Likewise, Becker et al. (1998) investigate a sample of US firms and find that managers 
of highly leveraged firms have an incentive to strategically report discretionary accruals in order 
to increase reported earnings in an effort to avoid debt covenant violation.  
 
In a sample of Belgian non-listed firms, Sercu et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between 
accruals-based earnings management and leverage and find that debt is heterogeneous, that is, 
judging by the extent of earnings management it triggers, bank debt seems to be perceived as more 
alarming for the firm than trade credit. Overall, their results suggest that earnings management is 
strongly related to bank credit since banks are not as lenient as suppliers in terms of financial stress. 
Thus, this indicates that firms engage more in earnings management related to bank debt since 
banks are not as easy going as suppliers in the terms related to their lending. This means the firm 
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engages more in earnings management to avoid any problems associated with bank loans 
compared with trade credit.  
 
Charitou et al. (2007) argue that managers of highly distressed firms shift earnings downwards 
through accruals-based earnings management prior to a bankruptcy filing for two reasons. The first 
is that management turnover among distressed firms leads new managers to big bath choices 
during the period of distress. The second factor is that qualified audit opinions put pressure on 
managers to follow more conservative earnings behaviour during the period of distress. In their 
study of US firms, they find consistent evidence. Rodriguez-Peres and Van Hemmen (2010) 
analyse Spanish firms and investigate the association between debt, diversification, and accruals-
based earnings management, and find that increases in debt provide a motivation for managers to 
manipulate earnings.  
 
Liu et al. (2010) examine whether US firms manage earnings before issuing bonds to achieve a 
lower cost of borrowing. Their results reveal significant income-increasing accruals-based 
earnings management prior to bond offerings. After controlling for various bond issuer and issue 
characteristics, they also show that firms that managed earnings upwards issue debt at a lower cost. 
A possible reason for this is that the higher earnings of firms provides greater assurance that the 
principal and interest will be repaid. Thus, lenders would be more willing to lend. Lemma et al. 
(2013) investigate 44 countries across the world and argue that levered firms engage in earnings 
management to avoid debt covenant violations. They find a positive relationship between leverage 
and both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management.  
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In a study of US firms, Chen et al. (2015) argue that firms with high leverage are associated with 
high default risk and therefore CEOs in these firms exploit real earnings management activities to 
window-dress their performance. They find a positive relationship between leverage and real 
earnings management. Consistent results are also found by Kim et al. (2010) for US firms, as well 
as Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) for US firms. Further, Lara et al. (2012) find a positive 
relationship between leverage and real earnings management for US firms. In his study of 22 
European countries, Doukakis (2014) finds that highly leveraged firms engage in higher levels of 
real earnings management. 
 
In contrast to the findings supporting a positive relationship between earnings management and 
leverage, Ke (2001) argues that higher leveraged firms are more closely scrutinized by analysts 
than less leveraged firms and thus their earnings management activities are constrained. He 
investigates a sample of publicly traded firms from the EXECOMP database and provides evidence 
that highly leveraged firms are less likely to augment earnings through the use of discretionary 
accruals. Jelinek (2007) argues that leverage mitigates management’s control over free cash flow 
which might otherwise be used to invest in negative net present value projects, and then 
compensate for the negative impact of these projects by managing earnings. She studies US firms 
and finds that firms characterized by higher leverage have reductions in accruals-based earnings 
management. Similarly, Gopalakrishnan (1994) studies a sample of US firms and finds that 
unlevered firms tend to choose income-increasing accounting methods more than their levered 
counterparts.  
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Alsharairi and Salama (2011) argue that creditors play a crucial role in monitoring the firm, 
increasing the credibility of corporate reports and restricting the use of management’s 
discretionary power to manipulate earnings prior to special business events such as mergers and 
acquisitions. In their study of pre-merger earnings management for US firms with an emphasis on 
leverage, they find significant evidence of a negative relationship between discretionary accruals 
and leverage.  
 
However, not all empirical evidence finds a distinct positive or negative relationship between 
leverage and earnings management. Ghosh and Moon (2010) argue that firms that rely heavily on 
debt financing may resort to earnings management in order to avoid breaching debt covenants that 
are larger for higher levels of debt, but this is not as necessary for low levels of debt.  They examine 
the association between debt financing and the quality of earnings for US firms. They find that the 
relationship between debt financing and earnings quality is positive at low levels of debt, and 
negative at high debt levels. This shows that there is a nonlinear relation between debt financing 
and earnings quality.  
 
In the context of developing economies, Iturriaga and Hoffmann (2005) argue that the higher the 
leverage, the more thorough is the control applied by lenders, and the more difficult for these firms 
to engage in earnings management. Furthermore, the managers of highly leveraged firms have 
fewer motives to manage earnings because their creditors are interested in debt service rather than 
accounting information, which they believe leads to the financial statements revealing less relevant 
informational content. They find a negative relationship between debt financing and the use of 
discretionary power in managers' accounting decisions for Chilean firms.  
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Wasimullah et al. (2010) examine the impact of leverage on practices of accruals-based earnings 
management for textile firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and argue that firms 
with high leverage have low free cash flows since a large portion of cash flows is used for the 
payment of interest expenses. In this case, such managers will be unable to use this free cash flow 
to invest in non-value maximizing projects for their personal benefits and then manage earnings 
to compensate for their opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, this limits the discretionary behaviour 
of managers, and thus leverage increases are shown to reduce the extent of earnings management. 
Consistent with this argument, the authors find a negative relationship.  
 
Naz et al. (2011) study companies from the Cement, Sugar, and Chemical sectors of Pakistan, and 
find a significant negative impact of capital structure on accruals-based earnings management, 
concluding that firms with high debt in their capital structure mix have creditors acting as a 
watchdog on earnings management practices, and thus higher leverage results in a lower extent of 
earnings management since these firms are not easily able to manage earnings. 
 
Lee et al. (2012) argue that since there are more restrictions under debt covenants, higher leverage 
will likely lower the extent of discretionary accruals. The authors study Taiwanese firms and also 
find a negative relationship between discretionary accruals and the debt to assets ratio. In an 
investigation of the impact of leverage on real earnings management for Malaysian firms, Zamri 
et al. (2013) argue in favour of the view that leverage is a controlling and monitoring system which 
limits earnings management, and find a significant negative association.  
 
In contrast, Waweru and Riro (2013) argue that firms would engage in earnings management in a 
bid to have reports that will enable them to attract more capital at reasonable rates. They find a 
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positive relationship between accruals-based earnings management and leverage for Kenyan listed 
companies. 
  
Ho et al. (2015) examine Chinese firms and find that leverage leads to higher levels of real earnings 
management. Kuo et al. (2014) argue that leverage results in higher real earnings management 
since the possibility of getting caught is lower when firms engage in real earnings management 
activities. They document a positive relationship between leverage and real earnings management 
for Chinese firms. Although there is considerable evidence of a relationship between leverage and 
earnings management, Ardison et al. (2012) analyse the relationship between leverage ratio and 
the decision to manage earnings through discretionary accruals for Brazilian firms, but find no 
significant relationship.  
 
In the context of MENA region countries, Valipour and Moradbeygi (2011) study the relationship 
between corporate debt financing and earnings quality in Iranian firms and find that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between debt and earnings quality at low levels of debt 
financing, whereas there is a negative and significant relationship between debt and earnings 
quality at high levels of debt financing. At low levels of debt, the authors argue that managers are 
likely to use accounting discretion to provide private information about the firm’s future prospects 
in order to lower financing costs. However, for firms with high levels of debt, aggressive earnings 
management is used to avoid debt covenant violations.  
 
Consistent with evidence of a negative relationship between accruals-based earnings management 
and leverage, Nejad et al. (2012) argue that liabilities restrict the access of managers to free cash 
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flows since funds are directed towards paying liabilities and interest. They test a sample of firms 
listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and find that an increase in most liabilities causes a decrease 
in the extent of accruals-based earnings management.  
 
In contrast, Bassiouny et al. (2016) find a positive relationship between accruals-based earnings 
management and financial leverage for Egyptian firms. Consistent with a positive association, 
Abbadi et al. (2016) and Charfeddine et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between accruals-
based earnings management and leverage for Jordanian firms and Tunisian firms, respectively.  
 
Thus, there is mixed evidence in terms of the relationship between earnings management and 
leverage in studies of both developed economies, developing economies, and MENA region 
countries. However, Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) argue that increases in leverage can 
be expected to bring about increased monitoring and scrutiny. Thus, firms would have a preference 
for real earnings management over accruals-based earnings management since real earnings 
management activities can be masked in the form of everyday transactions to avoid being detected. 
Based on this argument, the following hypotheses are stated: 
H1.3a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and leverage. 
H1.3b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and leverage.   
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3.2.4 Growth Opportunities and Earnings Management 
Growth opportunities include discretionary expenditures such as capacity expansion prospects, 
acquisition of other firms, new product innovations, investments in brand name through 
advertising, and even the maintenance and replacement of existing assets (Alnajjar and Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2001). Pindyck (1988) argues that growth opportunities are important since they account 
for a significant proportion of the market value of equity.  
 
As growth opportunities increase, it is expected that firms will have higher profitability. This may 
result in higher political risk (Monti-Belkaoui, et al. 1999), which could lead firms to resort to 
earnings management to reduce earnings in order to lower such risk. As discussed above, the 
Political Cost Hypothesis predicts that firms resort to earnings management to reduce earnings in 
order to diminish the likelihood and size of politically imposed wealth transfers by government 
legislation or regulations such as higher taxes (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  
 
Therefore, firms with high growth opportunities can be expected to engage in more income 
decreasing earnings management to reduce their political exposure in comparison to low growth 
firms. Sun and Rath (2009) offer a different explanation for the relationship between earnings 
management and growth opportunities by arguing that growth opportunities can provide managers 
with an incentive to smooth earnings since uncertain opportunities can result in volatile earnings. 
Further, growth firms may have an incentive to signal a rosy picture of their future prospects in 
order to obtain external funding (Lemma et al., 2013). However, growth opportunities can also 
decrease earnings management behaviour. Growing firms might refrain from engaging in earnings 
management behaviour in order to improve earnings quality so that they may access external 
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financing at a lower cost of capital (Gaio, 2010). Further, these firms are likely to be under close 
scrutiny by outsiders which would make it harder to manipulate earnings (Lemma et al., 2013).  
 
In the context of developed economies, Alnajjar and Riahi-Belkaoui (2001) argue in favour of the 
Political Cost Hypothesis in their study of US firms, and find that management of firms with high 
growth opportunities make accounting choices to reduce reported earnings. However, Robin and 
Wu (2012) examine US firms to test how growth conditions impact upon the pricing of 
discretionary accruals and find that there is no significant difference between high growth firms 
and low growth firms in terms of discretionary accruals. 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) argues that growth firms are likely to be under greater pressure to meet 
earnings thresholds and are thus more inclined to engage in earnings management. He finds a 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and real earnings management in a study of US 
firms. Similarly, Doukakis (2014) finds a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
the extent of real earnings management in a study of 22 European countries.  
 
In contrast, Lemma et al. (2013) argue that growing firms are likely to refrain from engaging in 
earnings management in order to improve earnings quality to access external financing at a lower 
cost of capital. They find that earnings management is a decreasing function of growth 
opportunities with regard to both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management in 
a study of 44 countries across the world.  Lara et al. (2012) find a negative relationship between 
the extent of real earnings management and growth opportunities for US firms. A negative 
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relationship between growth opportunities and real earnings management is also documented by 
Kim et al. (2010) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) for US firms.  
 
In the context of developing economies, Kuo et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and real earnings management for Chinese firms. Similarly, Chen and Liu 
(2010) examine Taiwanese firms to investigate whether earnings management is associated with 
independent (non-CEO dominated) corporate boards, and incorporate growth opportunities into 
their analysis. The authors find that accruals-based earnings management is more likely in high 
growth firms. Conversely, Ho et al. (2015) find that firms with higher growth opportunities are 
characterized by a lower extent of real earnings management for Chinese firms.  
 
In the context of MENA region countries, Alzoubi (2016) finds a positive association between 
discretionary accruals and growth opportunities for Jordanian firms. Further, Hessayri and Saihi 
(2015) argue that high growth firms have an incentive to manage earnings upward to avoid 
earnings disappointments. In their investigation of firms in the UAE, Morocco, South Africa, and 
the Philippines, they find a positive relationship between accruals-based earnings management and 
growth opportunities.  
 
Moreover, Im et al. (2015) argue that firms characterized by higher growth are more likely to 
manage their performance upward and hypothesize a positive relationship. Consistent with this, 
Zhu et al. (2015) expect growth opportunities to be positively associated with both earnings 
management measures. Since studies of MENA region countries find evidence of a positive 
relationship, then based on these findings and arguments, the following hypotheses are stated:  
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H1.4a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and growth opportunities. 
H1.4b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and growth opportunities. 
 
3.2.5 Free Cash Flow and Earnings Management 
Free cash flow may be defined as net income plus depreciation and amortization minus capital 
expenditures (Mills et al., 2002). According to Chung et al. (2005), managers of low growth firms 
with high free cash flows may use income-increasing discretionary accruals to compensate for the 
low or negative earnings that accompany investments with negative net present value projects. 
They argue that low growth firms with high free cash flows make expenditures that are not in the 
best interest of shareholders, which results in diminishing shareholder wealth. For example, risk-
averse managers could forego profitable opportunities in which the shareholders would prefer to 
invest. Further, managers could pursue non-value maximizing behaviour to avoid completing a 
merger or acquisition. Managers of these firms then use accounting discretion to increase reported 
earnings. In their study of US firms, the authors find evidence consistent with their argument.   
 
Studies of earnings management in emerging economies and the MENA region also document 
consistent evidence. In the context of developing economies, Bukit and Iskandar (2009) argue that 
managers of high surplus free cash flow companies tend to use their discretion to increase reported 
earnings so that their choices of not investing in wealth maximizing projects can be concealed. 
They examine Malaysian firms to test whether high surplus free cash flow is related to accruals-
based earnings management and find a positive relationship between earnings management and 
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free cash flow. Likewise, Bhundia (2012) studies firms listed on the Indian Stock Exchange and 
finds a positive relationship between accruals-based earnings management and free cash flow.  
 
In the context of MENA region countries, Chalak and Mohammadnezhad (2012) investigate the 
relationship between accruals-based earnings management and free cash flows in firms with high 
free cash flows and low growth, employing data collected from companies listed on the Tehran 
Securities Exchange. The authors find a positive and significant association between free cash 
flows and discretionary accruals. Further, Alzoubi (2016) finds a positive relationship between 
accruals-based earnings management and free cash flow for Jordanian firms. Therefore, higher 
free cash flows could provide managers with an increased capacity to invest in non-value 
maximizing investments and then engage in earnings management to compensate for the negative 
effects, and evidence of this is documented in investigations of firms in the MENA region. Thus, 
the following hypotheses are stated: 
H1.5a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and free cash flow. 
H1.5b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and free cash flow. 
 
3.2.6 Profitability and Earnings Management 
Sun and Rath (2009) provide an explanation for the existence of a relation between earnings 
management and profitability. The authors argue that profitability affects the level of earnings 
management since lower accounting profits can motivate firms to manipulate earnings since these 
firms are likely to be facing financial constraints. The authors further hypothesize that the degree 
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of earnings management is dependent upon the firm’s operating performance. If operating 
performance is very low, some firms may take a big bath by severely decreasing income, in order 
to make future earnings targets easier to reach. Further, Im et al. (2015) argue that higher 
profitability is related to stable financial conditions and thus hypothesize a negative relationship 
between profitability and the two earnings management techniques since a firm characterized by 
more stable financial conditions is less likely to require a higher extent of earnings management.  
Conversely, an argument can be made that higher accounting profits can lead to a higher extent of 
earnings management. Firms characterized by higher profitability can have higher incentives to 
manage earnings since financial performance affects the compensation of management (Koh, 
2007; Hessayri and Saihi, 2015).  
 
In the context of developed economies, Sun and Rath (2009) find that ROA is a primary 
determinant of accruals-based earnings management in Australia. They find that less profitable 
firms are more likely to engage in earnings management. Consistent with this finding, Chen et al. 
(2015) argue that firms with better performance have less motivations to engage in real earnings 
management. They examine US firms and find a negative relationship between ROA and real 
earnings management. Similarly, Doukakis (2014) finds that less profitable firms engage in higher 
levels of real earnings management in a study of 22 European countries. Similar results are 
reported by Kim et al. (2010) for US firms who find a negative relationship between profitability 
and real earnings management.  
 
Similarly, Chen (2009) finds a negative relationship between ROA and the extent of real earnings 
management for US firms. In the context of developing economies, Ho et al. (2015) find that the 
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extent of real earnings management is lower for firms with higher profitability in a study of 
Chinese firms. The same result is found by Kuo et al. (2014) for Chinese firms. Consistent with 
the finding that less profitable firms engage in earnings management, Ashari et al. (1994) conduct 
a study of Singaporean firms and find that income smoothing is exhibited by firms with poor 
profitability and severe fluctuations in income. In contrast, Ghazali et al. (2015) find that 
companies characterised by higher profitability exhibit higher discretionary accruals for a sample 
of Malaysian publicly listed firms. Likewise, Zamri et al. (2013) examine Malaysian firms and 
argue that managers of these firms exercise operational discretion to portray better future 
performance. They find a positive relationship between profitability and real earnings 
management.  
 
In the context of MENA region countries, Abbadi et al. (2016) and Alzoubi (2016) find a negative 
relationship between accruals-based earnings management and profitability for Jordanian firms. 
On the other hand, Hessayri and Saihi (2015) examine firms in the UAE, Morocco, South Africa, 
and the Philippines and find a positive association. Similarly, Hamza and Bannouri (2015) examine 
real earnings management activities in Tunisian firms and find a positive association.  
 
It is also possible that analysts and investors expect firms characterised by higher profitability to 
continue to perform well. In order to meet this expectation, such firms are likely to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management to avoid reporting decreases in earnings. As previously 
mentioned, the MENA region is characterised by relatively high political instability. Under such 
conditions, profitable firms are more likely to engage in earnings management, through either 
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method, in order to continue to perform well and meet the expectations of analysts and investors. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.6a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and profitability.  
H1.6b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and profitability.   
 
3.2.7 Asset Tangibility and Earnings Management 
Asset tangibility, as measured by the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets, may 
also be related to earnings management. The ability of managers to exercise discretion over 
reported earnings depends on the level of the firm’s current and non-current assets and liabilities 
(Sun and Rath, 2009). If firms are characterized by higher asset tangibility ratios, then it may be 
more difficult to manage earnings since they hold more non-current assets which do not provide 
manoeuvre room for earnings management as opposed to current assets which can be used for 
working capital accruals.   
 
Consistent with the argument of Sun and Rath, Kim et al. (2003) argue that asset tangibility may 
impact upon the ability of managers to engage in earnings management. They argue that a lower 
capital intensity ratio is likely to lead to higher earnings management since firms with larger 
current assets and current liabilities have a greater ability to manipulate earnings through accruals. 
However, the literature seems to be particularly lacking in a thorough examination of this variable 
in terms of empirical evidence. Sun and Rath find weak evidence that high capital intensity firms 
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have a tendency to engage in more income-decreasing accruals-based earnings management. 
Further, Kim et al. find an insignificant relationship.  
 
If firms use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management methods as substitutes 
and trade off one method for the other depending on the relative costs and constraints of each, then 
it can be expected that higher capital intensity ratios would reduce the extent of accruals-based 
earnings management, thereby leading firms to shift toward real earnings management. Therefore, 
the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.7a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and asset tangibility.  
H1.7b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and asset tangibility.  
 
3.2.8 Dividend Policy and Earnings Management 
In the existing literature, authors establish a link between earnings management and dividend 
payout policy, arguing that earnings management is often conducted to maintain a desired payout 
ratio or to meet certain dividend thresholds since the payout ratio is considered a signal of the 
future growth prospects of a firm (Miller and Rock, 1985; Ambarish et al., 1987). Firms may 
manage reported earnings to pay a certain level of dividends without having to change their payout 
policy, assuming sufficient cash exists in the firm. However, the opposing view is that managers 
of firms may utilize earnings management in order to reduce earnings in an attempt to avoid paying 
dividends if dividends become a constraint on the firm (Shah, et al., 2010). Another argument can 
also be made in favour of a negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio and earnings 
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management. Chansarn and Chansarn (2016) argue that as the earnings of firms increase as a result 
of earnings management, firms become more attractive to investors and investments in these firms 
lead to higher stock prices. However, these earnings and stock prices do not reflect the true 
financial position of firms and the cash flow component of earnings is unlikely to grow as fast as 
the accruals component of earnings. Thus, the ability of these firms to pay dividends diminishes 
and dividend payout ratios decline.    
 
In the context of developed economies, Daniel et al. (2008) argue in favour of a positive 
relationship between accruals-based earnings management and the dividend payout ratio. They 
argue that firms engage in earnings management behaviour since they view expected dividend 
levels as significant earnings thresholds. They conduct a study of US firms and find that firms tend 
to manage earnings upward through accruals-based earnings management when their earnings 
would otherwise fall short of expected dividend levels. They find that earnings management was 
more aggressive in response to an earnings shortfall prior to the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
firms with high payout ratios, and in firms in which CEOs receive higher dollar dividends.  
 
Kasanen et al. (1996) examine the relationship between accruals-based earnings management and 
dividends in Finnish firms. They argue that major institutional shareholders in Finland demand 
high yields on their stock holdings and expect smooth dividend streams. As a result, firms engage 
in earnings management in order to meet the earnings required for the payout of dividends. The 
authors find consistent evidence with this argument. Similarly, Kato et al. (2002) study Japanese 
banks and find evidence of a positive relationship between dividend payments and earnings 
management by examining accruals and deferrals.  
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In the context of developing economies and in contrast to the above studies that find a clear 
relationship between earnings management and the dividend payout policy, Shah et al. (2010) 
analyse the impact of dividend payments on accruals-based earnings management in China and 
Pakistan for listed companies and find no relationship. The authors suggest that this may be due to 
laws or the presence of family ownership in both countries that restrict the manipulation of 
earnings in relation to dividend payments.   
 
However, according to Im et al. (2015), firms experience pressure to pay out dividends from 
institutional investors who pursue investments in firms characterized by high dividend payout 
ratios, and managers therefore provide high dividend payouts to meet expectations. However, this 
becomes difficult to justify to stakeholders when income is low or when the firm experiences 
losses. Thus, they argue that managers are likely to depend on both accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management to raise reported income. The authors examine Korean firms 
and find that firms with high dividend payout policies are likely to conduct greater earnings 
management through both discretionary accruals and real earnings management. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.8a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and the dividend payout ratio. 
H1.8b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and the dividend payout ratio.  
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3.2.9 The Firm’s Operating Cycle and Earnings Management 
Ross et al. (2013 p.517) define the operating cycle as “the time period between the acquisition of 
inventory and the collection of cash from receivables.” There seems to be a gap in the literature in 
terms of examining the link between a firm’s operating cycle and its earnings management 
practices. However, a link between the two can be expected.  
 
Zang (2012) argues that firms with longer operating cycles are afforded greater flexibility for 
accruals-based earnings management since they have larger accruals accounts and a longer period 
for accruals to reverse. She finds that accruals-based earnings management is constrained by the 
length of the operating cycles of firms and explains that firms with shorter operating cycles have 
less accounting flexibility to inflate accruals and incur higher costs of doing so. She also finds that 
a shorter operating cycle leads to higher degree of real earnings management. Thus, firms with 
shorter operating cycles are likely to shift toward real earnings management activities since their 
accruals-based earnings management activities are constrained.  
 
Consistent with the argument presented by Zang, Beuselinck et al. (2014) investigate the impact 
of the operating cycle on accruals-based earnings management for a sample of 89 countries, and 
find that firms with longer operating cycles exhibit higher levels of discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, MENA country firms characterized by longer operating cycles should be expected to 
engage in a higher degree of accruals-based earnings management and a lower degree of real 
earnings management. Therefore, the following hypotheses are stated:   
H1.9a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and a firm’s operating cycle.  
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H1.9b: There is a negative relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and a firm’s operating cycle. 
 
3.2.10    Altman’s Z-Score and Earnings Management 
Altman’s Z-Score is a composite measure of default risk which reflects the likelihood of a business 
defaulting. This score depends on the weighted importance of various financial ratios of a borrower 
derived from a discriminant analysis model (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). The Z-Score is an 
indicator of the overall financial health of a firm (Agrawal and Chatterjee, 2015) and a firm’s 
financial condition could lead it to resort to earnings management behaviour. Firms experiencing 
poor financial conditions, especially those nearing bankruptcy, are expected to do everything they 
can to improve their financial situation, such as adopting radical operating decisions to decrease 
losses and ameliorate their future prospects (Lara et al., 2012). Thus, it can be expected that firms 
with lower Z-Scores engage in higher earnings management activities since these firms are 
characterised by poorer financial health.  
 
Lara et al. find a negative relationship between real earnings management and Altman’s Z-Score, 
consistent with their expectations for US firms. Similarly, Chen (2009) finds a negative 
relationship between Altman’s Z-Score and real earnings management for US firms. Consistent 
with this finding, Jha (2013) investigates nonfinancial and non-utilities firms for discretionary 
accrual behaviour in relation to debt covenant violations, and finds a negative relation between the 
Altman’s Z-Score and discretionary accruals.  
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A contrasting argument can also be made that financially healthy firms are more capable of 
managing earnings since these firms perceive themselves as having a higher degree of flexibility 
to deviate from optimal business decisions in light of their healthy financial condition or 
competitive advantage (Zang, 2012). Further, Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015) argue that firms 
facing lower financial distress may be more prone to concealing their true financial position and 
recommend that lenders and investors be cautious of this. Zang (2012) finds a positive relationship 
between Altman’s Z-Score and real activities-based earnings management for US firms. Similarly, 
Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015) find a positive relationship between Altman’s Z-Score and 
discretionary accruals in their investigation of the impact of financial distress on accruals-based 
earnings management for Indian firms. In support of a positive relationship in emerging 
economies, Ghazali et al. (2015) argue that distressed companies are less capable of managing 
earnings since they have exhausted the means by which they can engage in earnings management 
prior to the distress. In their examination of Malaysian firms, they find that accruals-based earnings 
management is higher for financially healthy firms. Overall, however, there is a paucity of 
empirical research into the link between Altman’s Z-Score and earnings management, particularly 
within the context of the MENA region.  
 
However, according to Zang (2012), firms characterized by poor financial health incur a higher 
marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies. In this case, managers might perceive 
real activities manipulation as relatively costly since their primary goal is to improve operations. 
Therefore, she hypothesizes that poor financial health leads to higher accruals based earnings 
management and less real earnings management. Based on this argument, the following 
hypotheses are stated: 
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H1.10a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and Altman’s Z-Score.  
H1.10b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and Altman’s Z-Score.   
 
3.2.11  Ownership Concentration and Earnings Management 
Ownership is considered highly concentrated when a significant portion of its equity is owned by 
a few individuals. If ownership is widely dispersed, shareholders lack the sufficient incentives to 
monitor management closely since the benefits are too small relative to the costs of monitoring. 
However, when ownership is concentrated, corporate performance may be enhanced since 
controlling shareholders are in a position to harvest a considerable portion of the gains from the 
improvement in the firm’s performance. In addition, Usman and Yero (2012) argue that when 
ownership is concentrated, owners have more stake in the firm and thus are more likely to monitor 
the actions of managers.  
 
A contrasting argument, however, is that when controlling shareholders control a large portion of 
the firm’s equity, they might collude with managers to manage earnings (Li et al., 2011). Further, 
Sarkar et al. (2013) argue that controlling shareholders engage in opportunistic earnings 
management to compensate for the various ways in which they seek to acquire and retain private 
benefits of control. As an illustration, controlling shareholders are capable of manipulating a firm’s 
earnings to extract private benefits of control though the expropriation of cash, assets, and equity. 
As a result of their influence and control, controlling shareholders are able to engage in earnings 
management to prevent subsequent detection by manipulating their accounting information. 
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Further, since insiders typically serve on the board, the board of directors may be ineffective in 
monitoring and preventing insiders from engaging in such activities.  
 
Gopalan and Jayarman (2012) argue that firms which are controlled by insiders such as a family, 
financial institution, or the government usually have concentrated ownership and enjoy control 
rights that exceed their cash flow rights. The disproportionate control, in conjunction with a lack 
of intervention from outside shareholders, provides insiders with considerable autonomy over the 
decisions of the firm. Therefore, the concentration of ownership could lead to a higher extent of 
earnings management behaviour as a result of the agency problems between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders, as well as the possibility that controlling shareholders 
could use their autonomy to manipulate earnings and gain benefits. In contrast, it may also be 
argued that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to monitor the behaviour of managers 
and improve earnings quality.  
 
In the context of developed economies, Grimaldi and Muserra (2017) study Italian firms and find 
a negative relationship between accruals-based earnings management and ownership 
concentration. In studies of developing economies, similar evidence is found. Alves (2012) finds 
a negative relationship for Portuguese firms. Further, in a study of Nigerian firms, Usman and 
Yero (2012) find a negative relationship between accruals-based earnings management and 
ownership concentration. 
 
In the context of MENA region countries, Roodposhti and Chashmi (2010) study Iranian firms and 
find a negative relationship between accruals-based earnings management and ownership 
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concentration. Likewise, Alzoubi (2016) finds a negative relationship for Jordanian firms. There 
is a paucity of research into real earnings management behaviour and ownership concentration in 
the MENA region. However, based on the research findings which show a negative relationship 
between accruals-based earnings management and ownership concentration in relation to 
emerging economies and MENA country firms, it could be hypothesized that ownership 
concentration mitigates accruals-based earnings management behaviour, thus leading managers to 
resort to real earnings management. Therefore, the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.11a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and ownership concentration. 
H1.11b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and ownership concentration.   
 
3.2.12 Suspect Firms and Earnings Management 
According to Siriviriyakul (2013), suspect firms are firms that just beat their previous year’s 
performance. Siriviriyakul and Roychowdhury (2006) include this variable in their investigation 
of real earnings management, arguing that small profit firms are likely to make use of real earnings 
management to avoid losses. Lara et al. (2012) explain that suspect firms have a high probability 
of having engaged in earnings management to just beat or meet important earnings benchmarks. It 
is likely for firms in years where their earnings are right at or just above their benchmarks to 
manage earnings in order to meet these benchmarks, and firms with zero earnings are one such 
important benchmark (Zang, 2012). Therefore, it is likely that such firms engage in both accruals-
based earnings management and real activities-based earnings management.  
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Siriviriyakul and Roychowdhury further argue that when a firm engages in real activities 
manipulation to increase earnings, it will be characterised by one of the following: unusually low 
cash flows from operations or unusually low discretionary expenditures. In addition, suspect firm 
will have unusually high production costs. In a study that investigates the real earnings 
management practices of Tunisian firms, Hamza and Bannouri (2015) find consistent evidence. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.12a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and the suspect firm variable. 
H1.12b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and the suspect firm variable. 
 
3.2.13 Earnings Management Flexibility and Earnings Management 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), the extent of real activities-based earnings management 
should vary with the flexibility of managers to conduct such activities. He argues that it is easier 
to accomplish excess production to absorb fixed costs and more likely to escape detection when a 
firm maintains a high stock of inventory. Moreover, it would be easier for firms with considerable 
credit sales to dealers to engage in ‘channel stuffing’ or accelerate the recognition of sales by 
shipping goods early to dealers and booking receivables. Thus, it is likely that a high stock of 
receivables generates a more effective ability to accelerate sales as well as a lower probability of 
detection by regulators. Therefore, Roychowdhury argues that earnings management flexibility, 
measured as the sum of the stock of inventories and receivables as a percentage of total assets, 
should be positively correlated with the ability of managers to engage in real activities-based 
earnings management. Consistent with this argument, he finds a positive relationship between 
earnings management flexibility and real earnings management for US firms. Anagnostopoulou 
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and Tsekrekos (2016) also find consistent results in a study of US firms. The same logic should 
also apply to MENA country firms. Thus, the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.13a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and earnings management flexibility. 
H1.13b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and earnings management flexibility. 
 
3.2.14 Industry Membership and Earnings Management 
Sun and Rath (2009) argue that, in the area of earnings management, industry membership has 
proved to be of substantial importance. Ashari et al. (1994) argue that companies in industries that 
are more competitive and more susceptible to international, economic, and political events have a 
greater predisposition towards smoothing their income. It is possible that firms in higher risk 
industries smooth their income to achieve a more consistent earnings stream and thus appear less 
risky to investors. Further, Lemma et al. (2013) argue that information asymmetry, agency issues, 
and the institutional pressures inherent to an industry may impact upon the earnings management 
practices of firms belonging to that industry.  
 
Sun and Rath (2009) study Australian companies across nine industries. The authors describe their 
industries as belonging to the core sector or the periphery sector. The core sector is described as 
the largest sector with high productivity and profits, intensive utilization of capital, and a high 
incidence of monopoly power. The authors define the core sector as comprising of energy, 
material, metals and mining, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples. Firms 
belonging to information technology, health care and telecommunications are assigned to the 
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periphery sector. The authors argue that periphery sector firms are exposed to higher degrees of 
business uncertainty and thus are more likely to engage in a higher degree of earnings management 
compared with core sector firms.  
 
In their study, they find that firms in the energy, metals and mining, general industrial, and 
information technology industries engage in income-decreasing accruals-based earnings 
management, while the healthcare, telecommunications, and utilities industries are associated with 
income increasing accruals-based earnings manipulation. They further state that their research 
period coincides with a boom in Australia’s resource sector which could account for the results 
since it is likely that these firms smoothed earnings.  
 
Industry membership can also be associated with real activities-based earnings management. Zhu 
et al. (2015) argue that overproduction as a real earnings management strategy is only available to 
manufacturing firms. Consistent with this argument, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that 
overproduction and price discounts both generate abnormally high production costs relative to 
sales. While both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies can offer price discounts to 
boost sales, overproduction on the other hand is a strategy that is only available to firms in 
manufacturing industries. Thus, the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.14a: Industry membership has an impact upon the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management. 
H1.14b: Industry membership has an impact upon the extent of real activities-based 
earnings management. 
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3.2.15 Financial Development and Earnings Management 
In the extant literature, few studies provide cross-country examinations of earnings management 
based on country-level (macro level) determinants (Leuz et al., 2003; Filip and Raffournier, 2014; 
Lemma et al., 2013; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai, 2007; and Enomoto et al., 2016). The existing 
studies attempt to investigate any differences in earnings management activities across countries 
in relation to investor protection, political stability, corruption, economic development, and 
financial development. There seems to exist a gap in this area of the literature and the few studies 
that attempt to fill this gap are fairly recent extensions. Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007) argue 
that few studies have investigated earnings management in an international context to identify 
factors that explain cross-national differences in the phenomenon. Filip and Raffournier (2014) 
argue that there is an extensive body of research into the determinants and consequences of 
earnings management. However, these studies share the common characteristic that they do not 
take into consideration the macroeconomic environment of the firm.  
 
Financial development is a factor that is likely to mitigate earnings management since firms are 
more likely to raise funds externally and thus impose upon themselves better earnings quality 
standards in countries with more developed stock markets. Poor financial development may limit 
the benefits of improving earnings quality because it is difficult and costly to raise funds (Gaio, 
2010).  
 
Enomoto et al. (2016) argue that countries with more developed financial systems require higher 
quality accounting information and that managers are disciplined in countries with higher levels 
of financial development if they engage in earnings management, and thus their incentives to 
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manage earnings decrease. They conduct a cross-country study of the relation between the level 
of financial development and accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management. They 
examine 37 countries and find that managers are restrained with regards to both types of earnings 
management activities under higher levels of financial development.  
 
Consistent with these results, Lemma et al. (2013) argue that the demand for high quality public 
information, superior protection of investors and stronger law enforcement are likely to result in 
diminished information asymmetry and contracting costs, thereby leading to reduced opportunities 
for earnings management. They find that more market oriented financial systems are likely to 
mitigate accruals-based earnings management, but only if those firms are operating in IFRS 
adoption, high income countries. They also find that such systems deter real activities-based 
earnings management if such firms are operating in high income countries. In addition, Leuz et al. 
(2003) find that large stock markets result in lower levels of earnings management. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.15a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and the degree of financial development of a country. 
H1.15b: There is a negative relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and the degree of financial development of a country.    
  
3.2.16 Economic Growth and Earnings Management 
The degree of economic growth of a country may also impact upon the extent of earnings 
management in its firms. Chen et al. (2015) argue that earnings management, whether accruals-
based or real activities-based, can be a consequence of changing economic conditions such as 
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periods of growth or decline. Further, Filip and Raffournier (2014) argue that a firm’s propensity 
to manipulate earnings, as well as the sign of these manipulations, is impacted by dramatic changes 
in the economic environment of the firm. According to Hoque et al. (2013), during periods of 
economic growth, firms are expected to expand their operations. However, during periods of 
decline, firms are expected to contract their operations. Therefore, periods of economic growth are 
likely to result in natural sales revenues for firms and thus these firms are likely to require a lower 
extent of earnings management. Conversely, periods of economic decline may lead firms to engage 
in a higher extent of income-increasing accruals-based earnings management to offset losses.  
Cohen et al. (2008) argue that poor economic conditions cause higher levels of accruals-based 
earnings management. They investigate US firms and find a negative relationship between GDP 
growth and discretionary accruals. Similarly, Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) conduct a study 
across 22 countries and find a negative association between GDP growth and the extent of 
accruals-based earnings management.  
 
However, during periods of economic growth, investors and analysts are likely to expect firms to 
perform well. If the economy is growing then firms are likely to experience pressure to meet the 
expectations of analysts and investors, particularly in the case of the MENA region where political 
instability is high and firms are likely to be predisposed toward managing their earnings to continue 
to meet these expectations. Therefore, they may be less willing to report losses or decreases in 
earnings. Thus, greater economic growth may lead firms to engage in a greater extent of accruals-
based and real activities-based earnings management in order to avoid lagging behind the 
economy’s growth rate and thereby meet the expectations of analysts and investors. Based on this 
argument, the following hypotheses are stated:  
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H1.16a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and the degree of economic growth of a country. 
H1.16b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and the degree of economic growth of a country.  
 
3.2.17 The Country-Level Index Variables and Earnings Management  
Country-level index variables such as regulatory, quality, the control of corruption, political 
stability, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and the rule of law can play a role 
in earnings management behaviour. It can be argued that countries characterised by higher 
regulatory quality, the rule of law, investor protection, financial development, and economic 
development would experience less earnings management since these factors reduce agency 
problems and information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Lemma et al., 2013). 
Further, countries characterised by higher regulatory quality, voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, and the rule of law are not only likely to exhibit lower information asymmetries and 
lower agency problems, but are also likely to exhibit regulatory transparency, fair application of 
the law, and strict enforcement penalties associated with violations of these laws. For example, 
Dyreng et al. (2012) examine US firms and find that firms with operations in weak rule of law 
countries are characterized by higher levels of discretionary accruals compared to companies with 
subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong.   
 
Additional country-level factors that potentially influence earnings management behaviour include 
corruption and political instability. Corruption is understood as the abuse of public office for 
private benefits which reduces the efficiency of financial markets by hampering their regulation. 
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Overall, corruption creates agency problems and problems of information asymmetry by 
weakening the efficiency and effectiveness of legal and market institutions (Lemma et al. (2013). 
Therefore, it can be expected that countries characterised by higher levels of corruption would 
exhibit higher levels of earnings management behaviour. Consistent with this expectation, Rathke 
et al. (2015) investigate the effect of the perceptions of corruption on earnings management for a 
sample of 33 countries and find that corruption is related to higher incentives for firms to 
manipulate earnings in emerging economies, while such results are not found for developed 
economies.  
 
Further, political instability can have a negative impact upon financial markets and general firm 
performance, which could lead to earnings management behaviour. According to Lemma et al. 
(2013), political stability can affect the confidence of investors that the rule of law will prevail, 
and consequently hinder the development of capital markets. This would consequently impact 
upon the degree of information asymmetry between market participants. Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are stated:  
H1.17a: There is a negative relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and the regulatory quality, control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, and the rule of law indexes.  
H1.17b: There is a negative relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and regulatory quality, control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, the rule of law indexes.  
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3.2.18 Governance and Infrastructure Index and Earnings Management 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) argue that there are six commonly employed country level index 
variables which are political stability, the control of corruption, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law. The authors explain that these 
indices are highly correlated with each other and thus it would be very difficult to use all of them 
in a single regression model. Therefore, they create an aggregate score as the first principal 
component of the six measures. Consistent with this approach, Lemma et al. (2013) and Kirch et 
al. (2009) use Principal Component Analysis to generate an aggregate score for such variables that 
potentially exhibit multicollinearity in their studies. This is referred to as the governance and 
infrastructure index variable. In their study, Lemma et al. (2013) find a positive relationship 
between this governance and infrastructure index variable and both accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management measures. Thus, the following hypotheses are stated:  
H1.18a: There is a positive relationship between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and the governance and infrastructure index variable. 
H1.18b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of real activities-based earnings 
management and the governance and infrastructure index variable.  
 
3.3 The Substitutability of Earnings Management Methods  
While managers can engage in accruals-based earnings management, they can also engage in real 
activities-based earnings management. However, earnings management is not restricted to being 
either accruals-based or real activities-based. Roychowdhury (2006) argues that it is unlikely that 
firms rely solely on accruals manipulation despite the costs associated with real activities 
manipulation. There is empirical evidence in the extant literature that firms can use accruals-based 
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earnings management and real activities-based earnings management techniques as complements 
to achieve earnings targets, or substitute one technique for the other.  
 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that a firm’s choice to employ accruals-based or real activities-
based earnings management techniques is a function of the costs of engaging in accruals-based 
earnings management and the capacity to do so. They explain that the costs of using accruals-
based earnings management include potential litigation penalties and the scrutiny of regulators and 
auditors. Consistent with this argument, Doukakis (2014) argues that accounting choices are 
subject to auditor scrutiny. However, real operating decisions are less subject to the scrutiny and 
review of auditors. Further, Zang (2012) explains that both techniques are costly and firms 
encounter different constraints in terms of employing these strategies, leading to varying abilities 
of employing them. Therefore, the trade-off decision is dependent upon the relative costs of the 
two methods. She further explains that this is dependent upon the accounting and operational 
environment of the firm. Thus, managers will make use of one earnings management method when 
discretion is more constrained for the other.  
 
Further, Zhu et al. (2015) predict that Chinese firms substitute the two earnings management 
techniques. They argue that since operational decisions are more inherently under the discretion 
and expertise of management, real earnings management is less likely to be constrained and 
discovered by regulators and auditors. In addition, they argue that firms which utilized higher 
levels of accruals-based earnings management in previous years are likely to switch to real 
activities-based earnings management in the current and future periods as a result of the constraints 
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of accruals-based earnings management. Thus, based on these arguments, the following hypothesis 
is stated:  
H2: Firms use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management methods as 
substitutes. 
 
3.4 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Earnings management behaviour can either be opportunistic or efficient. When earnings 
management is conducted for the purpose of opportunistically maximizing the utility of managers, 
it is opportunistic. However, if earnings management improves the information content of 
earnings, it is regarded as efficient or beneficial (Siregar and Utama, 2008). There is a large body 
of literature on the motivation for opportunistic earnings management. Chung et al. (2002) argue 
that most studies in the earnings management field conclude that managers engage in opportunistic 
earnings management. However, Subramanyam (1996) finds evidence that earnings management 
improves the ability of earnings to reflect economic value for US firms. Similarly, Wang and 
Williams (1994) argue that income smoothing enhances the informational value of reported 
earnings since the process of income smoothing incorporates the private knowledge of managers 
with regard to the firm’s future performance, and this private knowledge is valuable to prospective 
investors.  
 
Thus, there is evidence in the extant literature of the presence of both opportunistic and efficient 
earnings management. Siregar and Utama (2008), Omid et al. (2012), and Rezaei and Roshani 
(2012) investigate whether earnings management is opportunistic or efficient by examining future 
profitability. In these studies, if the coefficient of discretionary accruals is positive, then earnings 
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management is efficient. If it is insignificant or negative, then earnings management is 
opportunistic. Since earnings management can either be opportunistic or efficient, and evidence of 
both is provided in the literature, then consistent with the existing literature, the following non-
directional hypothesis is stated:  
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability. 
 
The authors mentioned above begin by hypothesizing a non-directional relationship between 
discretionary accruals and future profitability. They then present additional hypotheses for 
variables that may moderate the relationship between discretionary accruals and future 
profitability. This means that they propose hypotheses regarding variables which may lead firms 
to engage in either efficient or opportunistic earnings management behaviour. In this thesis, the 
following variables are examined in this context.  
 
3.4.1 The Relationship between Discretionary Accruals and Future Profitability Moderated by 
Firm Size 
Siregar and Utama (2008) include firm size as a proxy for information asymmetry and argue that 
managers of small firms are more capable of retaining their private information than managers of 
larger firms. However, information on a firm becomes more publicly available as it grows in size. 
Further, since larger firms experience higher scrutiny by investors and the general public, it is more 
difficult for larger firms to manage earnings opportunistically compared with smaller firms. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated: 
H3.1: The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is greater for larger firms 
than for smaller firms.  
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3.4.2 The Relationship between Discretionary Accruals and Future Profitability Moderated by 
Leverage 
Jelinek (2007) argues that increased leverage reduces management’s control over free cash flow 
which might otherwise be used to invest in negative net present value projects where the managers 
will gain some personal benefit from such investments. Managers can then exercise earnings 
management to compensate for the negative impact of these projects. This indicates that higher 
leverage may potentially mitigate opportunistic earnings management since it reduces the free cash 
flow available for such a purpose. Further, firms characterised by higher leverage are likely to 
experience greater scrutiny and monitoring by lenders and analysts, which is likely to reduce 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour. Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated:  
H3.2: The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is greater for firms 
characterized by higher levels of leverage than for those with lower levels of leverage. 
 
3.4.3 The Relationship between Discretionary Accruals and Future Profitability Moderated by 
Growth Opportunities  
Lemma et al. (2013) argue that firms characterized by growth opportunities which need external 
financing may prefer to improve their earnings quality and refrain from engaging in earnings 
management since they are under close scrutiny from the market. Therefore, since greater scrutiny 
is expected to mitigate opportunistic earnings management behaviour (Siregar and Utama, 2008), 
then it may be expected that firms with higher growth opportunities have a lower likelihood of 
engaging in opportunistic earnings management. Thus, the following hypothesis is stated:  
H3.3: The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is greater for firms with 
higher growth opportunities than for firms with lower growth opportunities.  
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3.4.4 The Relationship between Discretionary Accruals and Future Profitability Moderated by 
Free Cash Flows  
As previously mentioned, Chung et al. (2005) argue that managers can use free cash flow to invest 
in those projects which are in their personal best interests, and then resort to earnings management 
to compensate for the negative effects of their actions. Moreover, Ghazali et al. (2015) argue that 
higher free cash flows may create opportunities for managers to manipulate earnings, which 
creates agency problems. Therefore, if higher free cash flows facilitate opportunities for managers 
to make non-value maximizing decisions, and these managers can then engage in income-
increasing earnings management to compensate for the negative effects of their actions, then 
higher free cash flows could be associated with a greater degree of opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is stated:  
H3.4: The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is greater for firms with 
lower free cash flows than for firms with higher free cash flows.  
 
3.4.5 The Relationship between Discretionary Accruals and Future Profitability Moderated by 
Dividend Policy  
Since it has been established that managers can use free cash flows to invest in projects in their 
best interests, and then resort to earnings management to increase reported earnings and hide the 
negative effects of their actions, then dividend payments are likely to mitigate this problem since 
they reduce these free cash flows. In addition, according to Lemma et al. (2013), since dividend 
payments decrease internal funds, they increase the need for external financing. Thus, they argue 
that firms which pay higher dividends are likely to have a greater incentive to improve earnings 
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quality in order to be able to access the necessary external financing at a lower cost of capital, 
which is likely to mitigate opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated:  
H3.5: The effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is greater for firms with 
higher dividend payout ratios than for firms with lower dividend payout ratios. 
 
3.5 Summary 
To summarize, this chapter develops a set of hypotheses to address the thesis research questions. 
Three primary hypotheses are presented, reflecting each of the four research questions. The first 
hypothesis states that both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
techniques are affected by firm-specific and country-level factors. This hypothesis is further 
decomposed into subsidiary hypotheses that address the relationships between accruals-based and 
real activities-based earnings management and each independent variable employed in this thesis. 
The hypothesis addresses the first and second research questions by investigating the potential 
impact of the firm-level and country-level determinants of accruals-based and real activities-based 
earnings management. This includes subsidiary hypotheses related to the potential associations 
between the extent of earnings management and firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, free 
cash flow, profitability, asset tangibility, dividend policy, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, 
ownership concentration, suspect firms, earnings management flexibility, and industry 
membership as firm-specific variables. The hypotheses developed in relation to the potential 
associations between the extent of earnings management and country-level variables focus on 
financial development, economic growth, the country-level index variables, and the governance 
and infrastructure index variable.  
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The second hypothesis addresses the substitutability or complementary nature of earnings 
management techniques and states that firms use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management methods as substitutes, and addresses the third research question. The third 
hypothesis addresses the efficient versus opportunistic empirical character of earnings 
management and begins with a non-directional hypothesis which states that there is a relationship 
between discretionary accruals and future profitability. Following this, a set of subsidiary 
hypotheses are presented to address the moderating variables that may have an impact upon the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability. These variables include firm 
size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and dividend policy. This hypothesis 
addresses the fourth research question of this thesis.  
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Chapter IV – Research Design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sample selection and research methodology used to address the research 
questions of this thesis. The research questions presented in this thesis are as follows: (i) what are 
the firm-specific and country-level determinants of accruals based earnings management for firms 
in the MENA region?; (ii) what are the firm-specific and country-level determinants of real 
activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region?; (iii) are earnings 
management methods used as substitutes or complements by firms in the MENA region?; and (iv) 
is earnings management efficient or opportunistic within firms in the MENA region?  
 
First, the data collection and sample selection employed are discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively. The chapter then presents a description of the dependent variables in the earnings 
management models in section 4.4. The independent variables used in the empirical modelling are 
then discussed in section 4.5. The diagnostic statistics to be computed are then explained in section 
4.6, followed by the specifications of the models used to test the hypotheses for the accruals-based 
earnings management models in section 4.7. Section 4.8 explains the specifications of the models 
used to test the hypotheses for the real activities-based earnings management models, and section 
4.9 explains the specifications of the models used to test the efficient versus opportunistic earnings 
management model. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary in section 4.10.  
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4.2 Data Collection 
This thesis employs secondary data for the firm-specific and country-level variables. Data for the 
firm-specific variables are drawn from the Thompson Reuters Datastream financial database for 
non-financial firms listed on the respective stock exchanges of the following MENA region 
countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. Data for other countries within the region such as Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and 
Lebanon are not available on Datastream, and so those countries are omitted from the study 
sample. Further, these countries, in any case, have relatively small exchanges. As the countries 
selected comprise the majority of the MENA region by number, this thesis only examines the ten 
countries given above as representative of the MENA region.    
 
The dependent variables and firm-specific independent variables are computed from the income 
statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement items of the sample firms. The data are collected 
for the period 1995-2016 inclusively. This study time period is chosen mainly because it spans a 
long time horizon which allows a large number of observations for the data analysis. In addition, 
the time period spans multiple economic cycles, thereby including periods of growth and recession. 
At the time of data collection, there was no data availability for the sample countries prior to 1995. 
Data for the country-level variables are obtained from the World Bank’s Governance and Anti-
Corruption website and the Global Financial Development Database, as well as directly from the 
World Bank website data section which includes the macroeconomic data required.  
 
Data for the country-level index variables, voice and accountability, political stability, the control 
of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law, are complete only 
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for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and the period 2002-2014. The years 1997, 1999, and 2001 are 
thus missing. Rather than excluding these years, this thesis follows Kirch et al. (2009) in using an 
interpolation approach to fill this data. This is conducted by adding the neighbouring years together 
and dividing by two. Finally, data on the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
are collected from the Datastream database which includes a datatype that indicates whether a 
particular firm has adopted International Financial Reporting Standards or uses local standards 
instead.  
 
4.3 Sample Selection 
This thesis examines a total study sample of 802 non-financial listed firms from the ten MENA 
countries discussed above. Although the data are collected for the period 1995-2016, the actual 
sample selected for the research spans a 19-year time period from 1996 to 2014. Since some 
variables require the computation of a change across years, the year 1995 is excluded since there 
is no available data prior to that year. Therefore, the sample begins with the year 1996. Further, 
since the governance data are only available up to the year 2014 at the time of writing, the sample 
selected ends with the year 2014. The total number of sample firms for each country is as follows: 
Bahrain (21), Egypt (158), Jordan (133), Kuwait (120), Morocco (53), Oman (82), Qatar (24), 
Saudi Arabia (115), Tunisia (43), and the United Arab Emirates (53).  
 
Consistent with various authors in the earnings management literature, financial firms are excluded 
from the study. Hessayri and Saihi (2015) omit financial firms and focus on non-financial firms 
with the justification that there are fundamental differences between financial and non-financial 
firms in terms of their financial accounting, which makes computing discretionary accruals 
problematic. In addition, they argue that by excluding financial firms, the results become more 
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comparable. Consistent with this, Bassiouny et al. (2016) exclude financial firms due to their 
different disclosure requirements. Further, various additional authors eliminate financial 
institutions from their samples in the earnings management research literature (e.g. Taylor and Xu, 
2010; Doukakis, 2014; Ho et al., 2015; Im et al., 2015; and Jha, 2013). Jha (2013) argues that the 
exclusion of financial institutions from the sample is common in the earnings management 
literature. Table 4.1 presents the sample of firms based on the exclusion of financial firms and 
delisted firms. 
 
Table 4.1 Final Sample of Firms in the Study over the Period 1996-2014 
Countries Total 
Firms 
Banks and Financial 
Institutions 
Delisted 
Firms 
Final Number of 
Firms 
Bahrain 44 23 - 21 
Egypt 248 56 34 158 
Jordan 217 82 2 133 
Kuwait 201 71 10 120 
Morocco 75 20 2 53 
Oman 118 33 3 82 
Qatar 45 21 - 24 
Saudi Arabia 174 59 - 115 
Tunisia 80 27 10 43 
UAE 115 60 2 53 
Total 1,317 452 63 802 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, the number of firms in these ten MENA countries varies across the years 
since new firms may become listed, existing firms may become delisted, and there are some 
existing firms for which there is no available data. Therefore, the study sample is unbalanced. 
Table 4.2 presents the final number of firms analysed in the study sample across the study period 
to illustrate this. The total number of firms for each country is listed for each year in the study 
period.  
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Table 4.2 Final Sample of Firms Across the Study Period 
Years Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia UAE 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 7 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 6 2 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 12 2 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 14 5 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 21 11 0 14 0 0 3 0 0 
2003 5 31 16 24 16 0 6 44 2 10 
2004 6 35 17 55 18 14 12 55 2 23 
2005 13 108 95 91 39 71 16 71 27 39 
2006 18 118 117 106 47 76 19 87 30 46 
2007 19 139 124 108 47 78 21 89 30 47 
2008 18 143 130 114 49 78 21 101 30 46 
2009 19 140 131 118 49 78 21 104 33 47 
2010 20 139 133 118 51 79 24 112 39 49 
2011 19 143 133 120 53 79 23 114 42 51 
2012 21 151 128 118 53 82 23 114 41 52 
2013 20 147 127 119 53 82 24 115 43 53 
2014 20 158 128 120 53 82 24 115 38 51 
 
Table 4.2 shows the total number of firms in the sample across the study period. The Datastream 
database lists a description of the industry and SIC codes for each firm. However, for MENA 
country firms, SIC codes are not available and could not therefore be downloaded. Instead, the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) developed by Standard and Poor’s is used to 
categorize the firms across ten sectors. Using the description of their industries on Datastream, the 
firms are categorised according to the following GICS industries: Energy, Materials, Industrials, 
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Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Real Estate, Information Technology, 
Telecommunications Services, and Utilities. 
 
Consistent with various authors such as Doukakis (2014), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Ho et al. 
(2015), Zamri et al. (2013), Hessayri and Saihi (2015), Shah et al. (2010), Bukit and Iskandar 
(2009), and Kuo et al. (2014), firm-years that lack the necessary accounting data to compute the 
dependent and independent variables used in the analysis are eliminated. Due to the missing data 
in these MENA countries, analysing each country individually may not be the best approach since 
the number of observations for each individual country would not be large enough. This would 
also pose constraints on computing the dependent variables in this thesis. To overcome this issue, 
the data for all ten countries are aggregated into a single dataset which comprises the MENA 
region, and a dummy variable is used to distinguish between Gulf countries and non-Gulf 
countries. The six Gulf countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. The four non-Gulf countries are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.  
 
The ten MENA countries are very similar in the respect that they are Arab countries and are in 
close proximity geographically. However, there may be distinct differences in the earnings 
management behaviour within the country group depending on whether they are either GCC or 
non-GCC, since the groupings are markedly different economically, socially, and 
demographically. For example, GCC countries are characterized by oil wealth and Bedouin culture 
(Abdullah, 2012). In addition, Nissan and Niroomand (2015) compare GCC countries with non-
GCC countries based on various socio-economic indicators including education, gender, 
demographic trends, survival and health, economic performance, and trade structure. They 
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conclude that GCC countries as a group outperform the non-GCC countries since they are more 
market-based economies. Further, Abdullah (2012) reports that Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia are the leading Arab countries based on average income per capita.  
 
Further, Nobes and Parker (2014) argue that accounting is impacted upon by its environment, 
including the culture of the country in which it operates. According to Hofstede (1980), culture 
includes a set of societal values that drives institutional form and practice. Hofstede defines and 
scores four fundamental dimensions of culture which are: (i) individualism, which refers to the 
degree of independence that a society maintains among individuals; (ii) power distance, which is 
the extent to which members of society accept that power in organizations and institutions is 
distributed unequally; (iii) uncertainty avoidance, which is the degree to which members of society 
feel uncomfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty; and (iv) masculinity, which refers to the 
societal preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success. These cultural 
dimensions are applied by Gray (1988) to explain international differences in the behaviour of 
accountants as well as the nature of accounting practices.  
 
Gray suggests that countries characterised by high uncertainty avoidance and low individualism 
are more likely to exhibit conservative measurement of income and are more likely to have a 
preference to limit disclosure to those closely involved with the business. Moreover, countries 
such as Germany which are characterised by high levels of uncertainty avoidance and low levels 
of individualism are expected to have low levels of disclosure (Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2014). 
However, Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) argue that current practice shows that German firms have 
a tendency to provide high levels of risk reporting.  
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According to Riahi and Omri (2013), in societies characterised by greater power distance, 
relationships are characterised by a lack of communication between managers and subordinates. 
This may result in asymmetric information and consequently facilitate accounting manipulation. 
It is also possible that greater power distance might lead to less questioning of managers’ behaviour 
by the accountants, thereby resulting in greater earnings management behaviour. Further, in 
societies characterised by masculinity, accounting systems focus on the achievement of purely 
financial objectives. Thus, the use of managerial discretion to meet recommended thresholds could 
bring about greater earnings management behaviour (Riahi and Omri, 2013).    
 
Thus, cultural, legal, and regulatory aspects of a country could potentially impact upon the earnings 
management behaviour of firms in that country. Therefore, in addition to analysing the MENA 
region as a whole, it is also logical to separate GCC and non-GCC countries using a dummy 
variable since GCC and non-GCC countries are culturally, economically, socially, and legally 
distinct.  
 
In addition to missing data, outliers are also detected and removed. An observation is considered 
to be an outlier if it is larger than three standard deviations of the sample distribution (Chen et al., 
2015). Outliers are suspicious observations because they are significantly smaller or larger than 
the majority of the observations and are problematic since even a few outliers are sometimes 
enough to distort results (Cousineau and Chartier, 2010). Various authors in the earnings 
management literature deal with the issue of outliers by removing them from the sample (e.g. 
Zamri et al., 2013; Chtourou et al., 2001; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Robin and Wu, 2012; Bukit 
and Iskandar, 2009; Enomoto et al., 2016; and Siregar and Utama, 2008).  
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An alternative approach is to winsorize the data. In this case, outliers are transformed to a value 
that is close to other values in the set. For example, a 90% winsorization would transform all data 
below the 5th percentile of the data to the 5th percentile, and would set all data above the 95th 
percentile to the 95th percentile. However, winsorizing does not solve the problem completely, and 
both approaches are acceptable. Further, Lien and Balakrishnan (2005) investigate the two 
approaches and conclude that when applied to the independent variables, both methods reduce the 
goodness of fit as well as the efficiencies of the estimates of slope. However, the regression slope 
and the mean square error of the regression remain unaffected under trimming. Therefore, 
trimming is used in this thesis. After removing outliers and missing data values necessary in order 
to compute the independent variables needed to estimate the empirical models, the empirical work 
of this study examines the total number of observations for the accruals-based earnings 
management models, the real activities-based earnings management models, and the efficient 
versus opportunistic earnings management models as shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Final Number of Firm-Year Observations in the Earnings Management 
Models 
Earnings Management Models Number of Firm-Year Observations 
Accruals-Based Earnings Management 3,081 
Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 2,729 
Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 2,446 
Total 8,256 
 
The firm-year observations in the earnings management models are matched and the analysis is 
conducted for the matched samples. This means that the total observations of the four accruals-
based earnings management models are the same, the total observations of the six real activities-
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based earnings management models are the same, and the total observations of the three efficient 
versus opportunistic earnings management models are the same. The number of observations differ 
for each model since the variables required to compute each model differ. Since there may be 
missing data values required to compute a particular model which may not be required to compute 
another model, and since it may be the case that some values of a particular model may be outliers, 
then the number of observations of each model ultimately differs.   
 
4.4 The Dependent Variable in the Earnings Management Models  
This thesis focuses on accruals-based earnings management, real activities-based earnings 
management, and efficient versus opportunistic earnings management. According to DuCharme et 
al. (2001), the accruals approach captures the subtle income management techniques used to avoid 
detection by outsiders, since it is not possible to observe such actions directly. The earnings 
management literature largely focuses on accruals-based earnings management and relatively few 
studies investigate real activities-based earnings management (Zang, 2012). However, firms can 
also manage earnings through real activities-based earnings management.  
 
By studying both methods, this thesis provides a contribution to the existing literature. Further, 
recent research suggests that both strategies are employed by firms as substitutes (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Doukakis, 2014; Zhu et al., 2015). Arguably, examining one 
technique in isolation may therefore be misleading. Moreover, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue 
that recent research has shown an increased appreciation of the significance of understanding 
earnings management through real activities in addition to accruals-based activities. They argue 
that real activities-based earnings management has not been as widely studied as accruals-based 
earnings management.   
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As discussed briefly in Chapter 2, a third potential earnings management technique is classification 
shifting-based earnings management which is the deliberate misclassification of items within the 
income statement (McVay, 2006). Classification-based earnings management is conducted to shift 
core expenses such as general and administrative expenses to specific accounts in the income 
statement such as the special items section. This technique does not change bottom-line earnings 
since it only affects core earnings. However, firms may engage in this technique to mislead users 
of financial statements interested in the core earnings of the firm which is the focus of analysts and 
equity investors.  
 
McVay examines US firms over the period 1988-2003 and finds evidence that managers 
opportunistically shift expenses from core expenses (cost of goods sold and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses) to special items, which overstates core earnings but does not change 
bottom-line earnings. Further, Fan et al. (2010) and Abernathy et al. (2014) find evidence for US 
firms over  the periods 1988-2007 and 1988-2011, respectively, of classification shifting-based 
earnings management when accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
techniques are constrained.  
 
However, in this thesis, the focus is on accruals-based earnings management and real activities-
based earnings management techniques. The classification shifting-based earnings management 
technique is not within the scope of this research since it does not change bottom-line earnings. 
McVay (2006) argues that since this technique does not alter bottom-line earnings, auditors are 
less likely to expend energy on the identification or compulsory adjustment of the accounts 
impacted by this technique. She further argues that if financial statement users focus solely on 
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GAAP earnings, classification shifting would be pointless. Therefore, the examination of accruals-
based and real activities-based earnings management activities is arguably of greater importance, 
and therefore classification-based earnings management is not the focus of this thesis.     
 
4.4.1 Accruals-based Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals are used to gauge accruals-based earnings management. In the literature, 
various models are proposed to measure discretionary accruals. The models of earnings 
management range from simple models, in which total accruals are used as a measure of 
discretionary accruals, to more sophisticated models that utilize regression analysis to decompose 
accruals into its discretionary and nondiscretionary components (Bartov et al., 2000).  
 
This thesis employs the most widely used models in the earnings management literature which are 
identified as the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1996), the Kasznik Model (Kasznik, 1999), 
the performance matched discretionary accruals model proposed by Kothari et al. (2005), and the 
Raman and Shahrur (2008) Model. The Modified Jones Model is proposed by Dechow et al. (1996) 
as a development of the original model proposed by Jones (1991). This is the most common model 
used to capture earnings management (see for example, Dechow et al., 1996; Kasznik, 1999; 
Kothari et al., 2005; Jha, 2013; Doukakis, 2014). This model is used in this thesis to model 
discretionary accruals at the cross-section, based on the industry classification of the individual 
firms. The Modified Jones Model is found to provide more powerful tests of earnings management 
compared with the standard Jones Models (Islam et al., 2011; Swai, 2016; Doukakis, 2014).  
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The other models are in addition employed for the purpose of robustness. This follows Charfeddine 
et al. (2013) who also utilize the Modified Jones Model, the Kothari et al. (2005) Model, and the 
Raman and Shahrur (2008) Model in an investigation of the determinants of earnings management 
in Tunisian firms over the period 2003-2009, and find that their results depend on the model used 
to estimate discretionary accruals. Moreover, there is no such thing as a perfect model. For 
example, Kothari et al. (2005) state that their performance-matched model cannot solve all of the 
problems arising from discretionary accruals models or from the researcher’s failure to recognize 
the incentives that induce accruals management unique to the research questions being addressed. 
Rather, their model provides additional controls for what is considered to be ‘normal’ earnings 
management. Further, Keung and Shih (2014) show that performance matching will systematically 
cause discretionary accruals to be underestimated. Thus, the use of a single model may not be an 
adequate approach, and the use of a range of alternative models may be more effective in the 
detection of earnings management. The Raman and Shahrur Model is fairly recent and is thus 
included in this thesis in order to test whether it can adequately capture earnings management in 
the MENA region. Before discussing the Modified Jones Model, it is essential to first discuss the 
standard Jones Model. 
 
4.4.1.1 The Jones Model 
The empirical estimation of the discretionary accruals model requires first computing total 
accruals (𝑇𝐴), then subtracting nondiscretionary accruals (𝑁𝐷𝐴) which are derived from the 
model discussed below. There are two ways to calculate total accruals in the extant literature: the 
balance sheet approach and the cash flow statement approach. These methods are not unique to 
the standard Jones Model and are also used to compute total accruals for the Kasznik Model, the 
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Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model. Consistent with Healy (1985), Jones 
(1991), Kothari et al. (2005), and Raman and Shahrur (2008), the balance sheet approach is used 
for the computation of total accruals as follows. 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 =  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  −  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡  +  ∆𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑡 −  𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡        (1) 
Where: 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 = the change in current assets in year t;  
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 = the change in cash and cash equivalents in year t;  
∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 = the change in current liabilities in year t;  
∆𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑡  = the change in debt included in current liabilities in year t; 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡 = depreciation and amortization expense in year t. 
 
The cash flow statement approach, on the other hand, is used to compute total accruals by 
subtracting operating cash flows from earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kuo et al., 2014; Zang, 2012; Doukakis, 2014). The 
equation for calculating total accruals according to the cash flow statement approach is as follows. 
 𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 − 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠  (2) 
 
This thesis employs both the balance sheet approach and the cash flow statement approach. 
However, the cash flow statement approach is used as the main approach for reporting the results 
while the balance sheet approach is only employed for the purpose of testing the robustness of the 
results. Kothari et al. (2005) recommend using the cash flow statement approach and argue that 
there is an error embedded in estimated total accruals and thus discretionary accruals when the 
balance sheet approach is used. They explain that the error reduces the discretionary accrual 
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models’ power to detect earnings management and may also potentially generate incorrect 
inferences regarding earnings management. Further, Collins and Hribar (2000) examine the impact 
of measuring total accruals using the balance sheet approach and the cash flow statement approach 
and find that studies using the balance sheet approach to test for earnings management are 
potentially contaminated by measurement errors in the estimates of total accruals. They explain 
that if there is a correlation between the partitioning variable used to indicate the presence of 
earnings management and the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions or discontinued operations, 
the tests become biased and result in erroneous conclusions regarding the existence of earnings 
management. Thus, the results of the cash flow statement approach are reported in Chapter 5 and 
the results of the balance sheet approach are included in appendix D-1.  
 
Jones (1991) proposes a model that is used to compute nondiscretionary accruals which are then 
subtracted from total accruals to derive discretionary accruals. The model attempts to control for 
the effects of changes in a firm’s economic circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals. Before 
computing the Jones Model, the following model is used to obtain estimates of the firm specific 
parameters:  
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡      (3) 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = total accruals in year t. 𝜀𝑡 is the residual, which represents the firm-specific discretionary 
portion of total accruals.  
 
The coefficients in Equation 3 are then used to calculate nondiscretionary accruals in Equation 4 
that follows.  
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𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) +  𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ )    (4) 
Where: 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡  = nondiscretionary accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  = gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t; 
𝐴𝑡−1 = total assets at the end of year t-1; and α, α2, and α3 are firm-specific parameters. 
 
Discretionary accruals are then computed as the difference between total accruals scaled by lagged 
total assets and nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets as follows.  
𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡          (5) 
 
Jones uses time series data in her model and explains that gross property, plant, and equipment 
and the change in revenues are included in the model to control for changes in nondiscretionary 
accruals caused by changing conditions. Gross property, plant, and equipment is included to 
control for the portion of total accruals associated with nondiscretionary depreciation expense. In 
addition, gross property, plant, and equipment is used instead of using the change in property, 
plant, and equipment since the total depreciation expense is included in the total accruals measure. 
She further explains that changes in working capital accounts such as accounts receivable, 
inventory, and accounts payable that are dependent to some extent on changes in revenues are 
included in total accruals. Jones further explains that revenues are an objective measure of the 
firm’s operations prior to the manipulation of earnings, and are thus used to control for the 
economic environment of the firm.  
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4.4.1.2 The Modified Jones Model 
The Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) is designed to eliminate the tendency of the 
Jones model to measure discretionary accruals with error when discretion is exercised over revenue 
recognition. The original Jones Model implicitly assumes that revenues are nondiscretionary. If 
earnings are managed through discretionary revenues, then part of the managed earnings from the 
discretionary accruals proxy will be removed by the Jones Model. Thus, the Modified Jones Model 
controls for the possibility that revenue recognition is subject to manipulation by management 
(Doukakis, 2014). The purpose of the model is to derive the nondiscretionary portion of total 
accruals which is subtracted from total accruals to derive discretionary accruals. The model is 
computed as follows.  
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2  [
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ] +  𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ )  (6) 
Where:  
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡 = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t–1; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1;  
α1, α2, and α3 are firm-specific parameters which are obtained from the original Jones Model.  
 
The only difference between the Modified Jones Model and the standard Jones Model is that the 
change in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the event period. Discretionary 
accruals are then derived as follows.  
𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡          (7) 
 
Therefore, the original Jones Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over 
revenues in either the estimation period or event period, while the Modified Jones Model implicitly 
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assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period are the result of earnings management. 
The rationale that underpins this assumption is that it is easier to conduct earnings management by 
exercising discretion over revenue recognition on credit sales than it is to exercise discretion over 
revenue recognition on cash sales (Dechow et al., 1995). In this thesis, all models are estimated at 
the cross-section for each industry member for at least eight observations. This means that the 
parameters are estimated each period for each firm in the event sample using contemporaneous 
accounting data of firms in the same industry (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). This control for the 
effects of changing industry-wide economic conditions on total accruals and allows coefficients to 
vary across time (Kasznik, 1999). Using eight observations ensures sufficient data for parameter 
estimation (Doukakis, 2014).  
 
4.4.1.3 The Kasznik Model 
Kasznik (1999) also focuses on discretionary accruals as the source of earnings management. 
Consistent with previous models, discretionary accruals are estimated as total accruals minus 
nondiscretionary accruals. He estimates the following cross-sectional model.  
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 [
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ] +  𝛼2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡  
           (8) 
Where: 
∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 = the change in cash flow from operations;   
 
The difference between this model and the standard or Modified Jones Models is that in the former, 
the change in operating cash flows is included as an explanatory variable as Dechow (1994) finds 
that it is negatively correlated with total accruals. The model is estimated at cross-section to control 
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for the effects of changing industry-wide economic conditions on total accruals and to allow the 
coefficients to vary across years.  
 
Using the estimated coefficients, the nondiscretionary component of total accruals is estimated as 
follows.  
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 [
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ] +  𝛼2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ )   
           (9) 
Discretionary accruals are thus the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary 
accruals.  
 
4.4.1.4 Performance-Matched Discretionary Accruals Model 
An alternative to the models discussed above is the performance-matched discretionary accruals 
model. Dechow et al. (1995) show that discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones and 
Modified Jones models are higher (lower) than expected for firms with high (low) reported 
earnings. This suggests that Jones-type models may be misspecified for samples skewed toward 
firms with more extreme performance (Keung and Shih, 2014). Kothari et al. (2005) propose the 
performance-matched model in which firms classified as having abnormally low or high levels of 
earnings management are those that manage earnings more than would be expected given their 
level of performance based on the return on assets.  
 
According to the authors, economic intuition, extant models of accruals, earnings, cash flows, and 
empirical evidence all suggest that there is a correlation between a firm’s contemporaneous and 
past performance and accruals. They further argue that estimated discretionary accruals are 
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significantly influenced by a firm’s contemporaneous and past performance. One way of 
controlling for the effect of prior firm performance on estimated discretionary accruals is by 
expanding the set of independent variables used in regression models of discretionary accruals 
such as the Modified Jones Model. They augment the model by including the current or past-year 
return on assets.  
 
There are two main reasons why the return on assets is used as a performance measure. First, 
earnings deflated by assets is equal to the return on assets which measures performance. Second, 
matching on ROA is found to result in more powerful and better specified tests compared with 
other matching variables in prior research analysing long-run abnormal stock return performance 
and abnormal operating performance (see, for example, Barber and Lyon, 1997; Ikenberry et al., 
1995; Lyon et al., 1999). The model proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) is as follows.  
𝑇𝐴
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
  
              (10) 
Where  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑡−1)  = net income divided by total assets in year t or year t-1. 
 
Kothari et al. propose that performance matching may be employed using the current year’s ROA 
or the previous year’s ROA. However, they find that matching based on ROA in year t performs 
better than matching based on ROA in year t-1, as it produces less misspecified tests. Thus, this 
thesis uses ROA in year t rather than in year t-1 to compute discretionary accruals using this model. 
Thus, nondiscretionary accruals are computed as follows.  
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𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡      (11) 
 
Discretionary accruals are thus the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary 
accruals. Kothari et al. also include the constant term in their model for several reasons. First, they 
argue that it provides an additional control for heteroskedasticity not alleviated by using assets as 
a deflator. Second, they argue that it reduces the problems arising from an omitted scale variable. 
Lastly, they argue that models of discretionary accruals which exclude a constant term are less 
symmetric, which causes the power of the test comparisons to be less clear cut. The inclusion of a 
constant term in the Kothari et al. (2005) Model is an additional distinction from the Modified 
Jones Model.    
 
4.4.1.5 Raman and Shahrur Model 
Raman and Shahrur (2008) propose a model that augments the Modified Jones Model by 
controlling for performance based on Kothari et al.’s performance matching as well as growth. 
The authors state that prior research (e.g. McNichols, 2002; Cohen et al., 2005) suggests that firms 
characterized by higher growth opportunities are more inclined to have higher accruals. Thus, they 
add growth to the model and estimate total accruals as follows:  
𝑇𝐴
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 +
𝛼5𝐵𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡            (12) 
Where:  
𝐵𝑀𝑡 = the growth opportunities variable measured as the ratio of total assets to total assets minus 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The market value of equity is computed 
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as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing market price per share. NDA is thus 
calculated as follows.  
  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑀𝑡 
            (13) 
Discretionary accruals are thus the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary 
accruals.  
 
Authors in earnings management research use lagged total assets as a scaling factor. There are 
other scale proxies which may be employed. Barth and Clinch (2009) explain that such proxies 
include the number of shares outstanding, the book value of equity, sales, total assets, and lagged 
price. However, since it is common in earnings management research to use lagged assets as a 
scale proxy, this approach is used.       
 
4.4.2 Real-Activities based Earnings Management 
According to Cohen and Zarowin (2010), firms may have a predisposition toward real activities-
based earnings management since accruals-based earnings management is more likely to draw 
greater scrutiny from regulators and auditors compared with real decisions such as decreasing 
discretionary expenditures on research and development, advertising, and maintenance in order to 
meet an earnings target.  
 
Zang (2012), Roychowdhury (2006), and Zamri et al. (2013) explain that real activities-based 
earnings management can be conducted by means of reducing the cost of goods sold through the 
overproduction of inventory and by means of reducing discretionary expenditures, including 
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research and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general, and administrative 
expenditures. The abnormal level of production costs is used to measure the reduction in the cost 
of goods sold thorough the overproduction of inventory since the fixed cost per unit declines with 
an increasing volume of production (Kuo et al., 2014), while the abnormal level of discretionary 
expenditures is used to measure the reduction in discretionary expenditures. The normal level of 
production costs is estimated by means of the following model. 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ =  𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼4 (
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡    (14) 
Where:  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 = the sum of cost of goods sold in year t and the change in inventory from t-1 to t; 
𝐴𝑡−1 = the total assets in year t-1;  
𝑆𝑡 = net sales in year t;  
And ∆𝑆𝑡−1 = the change in net sales from year t-2 to t-1.  
 
Equation 14 is estimated at cross-section for each industry year for at least eight observations. The 
abnormal level of production costs is measured as the estimated residual from this equation. The 
greater the amount of inventory overproduction, the higher the residual, and thus the greater is the 
increase in reported earnings through the reduction in the cost of goods sold. The normal level of 
discretionary expenditures is estimated as follows.  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡                 (15) 
Where:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡 = discretionary expenditures (the sum of selling, general, and administrative expenditures) 
in year t;  
𝑆𝑡−1 = the net sales of the previous year. 
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Equation 15 is estimated at cross-section for industry years with at least eight observations. The 
abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is measured as the estimated residual from the 
regression. In addition to this, a third real activities-based earnings management model is 
employed consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Roychowdhury (2006), Zamri et al. (2013), 
and Kuo et al. (2014), which models cash flow from operations and expresses it as a linear function 
of sales and the change in sales in the current year. The model is estimated as follows.  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ = 𝛼1 (1 𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼2 (𝑆𝑡 𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝛼3 (∆𝑆𝑡 𝐴𝑡−1
⁄ ) + 𝜀𝑡   (16) 
Where:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂 = the cash flows from operating activities in year t.  
 
The normal level of cash flows from operations is computed using the estimated coefficients from 
Equation 16 and this variable is then subtracted from the actual cash flows from operations to 
derive the abnormal cash flows from operations. In the above models, the right hand side variables 
are only estimated for the purpose of computing the dependent variables.   
 
There are three main reasons for employing the above models in real earnings management 
research. Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) explain that there are three manipulation 
methods with regards to these three real earnings management proxies. First, managers can 
accelerate the timing of sales through providing more lenient credit terms or increased price 
discounts. These discounts and credit terms will increase sales volume temporarily. However, this 
is likely to disappear once the firm returns to its old prices. Assuming the margins are positive, the 
additional sales will boost current period earnings. However, both price discounts and more lenient 
credit terms will lead to lower cash flows in the current period.  
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Second, managers can report a lower cost of goods sold through increased production. By 
increasing production more than is necessary, managers can increase earnings. This is because the 
production of a larger number of units can spread the fixed overhead costs over a larger number 
of units, thereby decreasing fixed costs per unit. The total cost per unit will then decline assuming 
the reduction in fixed costs per unit is not offset by any increase in marginal cost per unit. 
Therefore, this allows the firm to report a lower cost of goods sold and subsequently higher 
operating margins. However, other production and holding costs that will lead to higher annual 
production costs relative to sales will still be incurred, thus leading to lower cash flows from 
operations given sales levels. To produce the additional inventories, incremental marginal costs 
are incurred which result in higher production costs relative to sales.  
 
Third, managers can decrease discretionary expenditures that include advertising expenses, 
research and development expenses, and selling, general, and administrative expenses. By 
reducing these expenses, current period earnings will rise. This could also potentially lead to higher 
current period cash flows assuming the firm normally paid for such expenses in cash. However, 
this comes at the risk of lower future cash flows.   
 
In addition to the three proxies derived from these three models, three aggregate proxies for real 
activities-based earnings management are also computed to capture the total impact of real 
earnings management, consistent with Kuo et al. (2014) as follows.  
𝑅𝑀1 = −𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠     (17) 
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Following Kuo et al., abnormal cash flows from operations are multiplied by -1 and then abnormal 
production costs are added to it. By doing so, higher levels of RM1 indicate higher levels of real 
earnings management activities, as suggested by Zang (2012). Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2016) also explain that this is conducted so that higher values indicate upward real earnings 
management. 
𝑅𝑀2 = −𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 −
𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠                                         (18) 
 
In this aggregate proxy, abnormal discretionary expenditures are added to abnormal cash flows 
from operations after multiplying abnormal cash flows from operations by -1 so that the larger the 
value of this aggregate proxy, the higher the utilization of sales manipulation as well as reductions 
in discretionary expenditures for managing earnings as suggested by Kuo et al. (2014). The third 
aggregate proxy is computed using the following equation.  
𝑅𝑀3 = −𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 −
𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠       (19) 
 
4.4.3 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 
An objective of this thesis is to test whether firms engage in efficient or opportunistic earnings 
management in the MENA region. Siregar and Utama (2008) argue that there has been extensive 
research on earnings management in general, though the literature regarding factors that impact 
upon the selection of a particular type of earnings management technique is underdeveloped. To 
test whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic, a model is employed in which the 
dependent variable is future profitability measured by each of the following.  
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𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 = one year-ahead cash flows from operations; 
𝑁𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑡+1 = one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income computed as one year-ahead 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 − 𝐷𝐴;  
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 = one year-ahead change in earnings computed as 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡; 
𝐷𝐴 =  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠. 
 
4.5 The Measurement of the Independent Variables in the Earnings Management 
Models 
Consistent with the existing literature, and the hypothesis development in this thesis, Table 4.4 
presents the list of the independent variables to be included in the models for accruals-based and 
real activities-based earnings management, as well as explanations of how they are computed. The 
table is included in appendix G-1. Table 4.5 presents the list of the independent variables to be 
included in the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management study model, and is included 
in appendix G-2. The firm-specific variables in the accruals-based and real activities-based models 
are IFRS adoption, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash flow, profitability, asset 
tangibility, the dividend payout ratio, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, ownership 
concentration, the suspect firm-years variable, earnings management flexibility, and industry 
membership. Further, discretionary accruals are employed in the real earnings management model 
to test whether earnings management techniques are used by firms as substitutes or complements 
in the MENA region. The country-level variables are regulatory quality, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, the rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, financial 
development, the GDP growth rate, and the governance and infrastructure variable. The six 
country-level variables which are political stability, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and the rule of law are index variables. 
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Globerman and Shapiro (2002) argue that these indices are highly correlated with each other and 
thus it would be very difficult to use all of them in a single regression model. Therefore, they create 
an aggregate score as the first principal component of the six measures using Principal Component 
Analysis.   
 
To overcome this potential multicollinearity problem in this thesis, two approaches are used. First, 
factor analysis, specifically Principal Component Analysis, is used to generate an aggregate score 
for these six index variables. Principal Component Analysis is a form of data reduction and 
summarization that reduces the dimensionality of a data set consisting of a large number of 
interrelated variables, while retaining the variation present in the data set. To achieve this, the 
interrelated variables are transformed into a new set of variables (principal components) which 
retain most of the variation present in all of the original variables (Joliffe, 2002). This approach 
allows for the inclusion of all six variables without the potential problem of multicollinearity. This 
score is referred to as the Governance and Infrastructure Index (GIF Index) in this thesis. This 
approach follows that of Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Lemma et al. (2013), and Kirch et al. 
(2009) who employ Principal Component Analysis to deal with the potential problem of 
multicollinearity among their country-level variables. Consistent with Kirch et al. (2009), the 
number of factors retained using Principal Component Analysis is determined based on the 
eigenvalues, that is, only factors with eigenvalues greater than one are retained. According to the 
authors, factors initially extracted can rarely be interpreted, and the factors must be rotated in order 
to facilitate their interpretation. This rotation must either be orthogonal or oblique. If the objective 
is to obtain uncorrelated factors, orthogonal rotation is employed. Since this is the objective in this 
thesis, then orthogonal rotation is employed. The method of orthogonal rotation employed is the 
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Varimax method. According to the authors, this is one of the most utilized methods in practice and 
results in simpler solutions compared with other methods. The second approach is to introduce the 
country-level index variables separately in the empirical model.    
 
As shown in Table 4.4, in order to examine whether IFRS adoption impacts upon the extent of 
earnings management activity, a dummy variable is used to indicate the adoption status of the 
country consistent with Lemma et al. (2013), Ho et al. (2015), Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012), 
Jing and Kyu (2012), and Cai et al. (2008). 
 
There are different ways of measuring firm size in the extant literature. Shalit and Sankar (1977) 
argue that there is no single ideal measure of firm size and that the choice of a specific measure is 
dependent upon the purpose of the study. The common measures include total assets, sales, and 
market capitalization, which can all be used as proxies for firm size (Al-Khazali and Zoubi, 2005). 
Dang and Li (2015) argue that the choice of which measurement to employ depends on different 
aspects of firm size, and the measure has implications from a corporate finance perspective. They 
explain that market capitalization is more market orientated and forward looking, but reflects only 
on the ownership of equity. Total assets, however, measures the total resources of the firm, while 
the measure of sales is related more to the product market and is not forward looking.  
 
Some authors such as Siregar and Utama (2008), Omid et al. (2012), and Rezaei and Roshani 
(2012) use the natural logarithm of market capitalization as a measure of firm size. However, 
consistent with Shehata (1991), Niresh and Velnampy (2014), Chen and Liu (2010), and Lemma 
et al. (2013), sales is employed in this thesis since market capitalization only reflects on ownership 
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of equity and a drawback of total assets is that it is affected by different accounting methods. For 
example, if firms use the revaluation approach, their fixed assets may be revalued. However, if 
firms use historical cost accounting, their assets will remain at their historical cost, and this would 
cause variations in the value of firm size.  
 
Subramanyam and Wild (2009, p.547) define capital structure as “the sources of financing for a 
company.” They explain that capital structure is the equity and debt financing of a company, and 
this financing can range from risky or temporary short-term financing sources to more permanent 
equity and debt capital. The practice of financing investments using debt is referred to as financial 
leverage (Groppelli and Nikbakht, 2006). Therefore, a levered firm is a firm that finances part of 
its operations with debt. 
 
According to Ross et al. (2013), financial leverage can be measured using the total debt ratio, the 
debt-to-equity ratio, or the equity multiplier ratio. The total debt ratio measures the percentage of 
assets financed by debt and is computed by dividing total debt by total assets. The debt-to-equity 
ratio measures how much more the firm relies on debt financing compared to equity financing, 
and is computed by dividing total debt by total equity.  
 
The equity multiplier ratio is the ratio of a company’s total assets to its total equity and is computed 
by dividing total assets by total equity. Arsov and Naumoski (2016) argue that leverage can also 
be measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, which reflects the general division of the 
sources of financing between borrowed funds and equity. However, this measure includes all 
liabilities in the firm, and not all liabilities are necessarily debt. For example, if a firm has accrued 
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expenses, they would be classified as part of its liabilities although such accrued expenses are not 
debt. Since the total debt ratio includes only interest-bearing liabilities such as long-term and short-
term bank debt (Arsov and Naumoski, 2016), and it is the most common measure in the earnings 
management literature, then it is employed in this thesis, consistent with Defond and Jiambalvo 
(1994), Sweeney (1994), Sun and Rath (2009), Kim et al. (2010), Lee et al. (2012), Zamri et al. 
(2013), Zhu et al. (2015), Jha (2013), and Kuo et al. (2014). 
  
There are a number of alternative ways in which growth opportunities may be measured. Adam 
and Goyal (2000) argue that three common proxies for growth opportunities are the market-to-
book ratio of assets, the market-to-book ratio of equity, and the earnings-price ratio. The 
justification for the market-to-book ratio of assets is that firms with abundant growth opportunities 
derive less of their value from assets in place, and thus this ratio varies directly with a firm’s 
growth opportunities. Collins and Kothari (1989) explain that the ratio of the market value of 
equity to the book value of equity measures the extent to which a firm’s return on its assets in 
place, and expected future investment, exceeds its required return on equity. According to Adam 
and Goyal, the third proxy for growth opportunities is the earnings-price ratio or the price-earnings 
ratio, which is its inverse. Chung and Charoenwong (1991) argue that a higher earnings-price ratio 
is indicative of a greater proportion of firm equity value attributed to assets in place relative to 
growth opportunities. All three measures of growth opportunities are acceptable proxies. However, 
the most common measure in the earnings management literature is the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity. Therefore, this proxy is employed in this thesis consistent with Hessayri 
and Saihi (2015), Park and Shin (2004), Koh (2007), Cohen et al. (2008), Ho et al. (2015), Im et 
al. (2015), and Swai (2016).  
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Ross et al. (2013) explain that free cash flow includes three components: (i) operating cash flows, 
which is the cash generated from day-to-day activities; (ii) capital spending, which is the net 
spending on purchases of fixed assets minus the sale of fixed assets; and (iii) the change in net 
working capital over the period under examination. Due to data limitations, free cash flow per 
share is not computed manually, but is instead extracted directly from the Datastream database 
and used as a measure of free cash flow.    
 
Return on assets is used to measure profitability consistent with Sun and Rath (2009), Hessayri 
and Saihi (2015), Zhu et al. (2015), Ho et al. (2015), Jha (2013), Kuto et al. (2014), and Swai 
(2016). While other measures of profitability exist, such as the net profit margin, the return on 
equity, and the operating income margin, the return on assets is instead employed for three main 
reasons. First, assets directly reflect both income and expense levels. Second, ROA does not vary 
relative to the amount of leverage employed unlike the return on equity which may reflect good 
profitability or equity capital that is restricted (Growe et al., 2014). Third, ROA is the most 
common measure of profitability in the earnings management literature. Consistent with Sun and 
Rath (2009), Kim et al. (2003), and Yang (2006), the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets is used 
to measure asset tangibility. Arsov and Naumoski (2016) argue that the ratio of tangible assets to 
total assets is the most common proxy for asset tangibility, and thus it is employed. 
 
Authors that investigate dividend policy use the payout ratio as its measure. According to Groppelli 
and Nikbakht (2006), the payout ratio is a significant aspect of dividend policy and valuation, and 
is computed by relating dividends per share to earnings per share. Thus, consistent with Shah et 
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al. (2010), Aurangzeb and Dilawer (2012), Daniel et al. (2008), and Lemma et al. (2013), the 
dividend payout ratio is used as a measure of dividend policy.  
 
A firm’s operating cycle is defined by Ross et al. (2013, p.517) as “the time period between the 
acquisition of inventory and the collection of cash from receivables.” They explain that this cycle 
describes how a product moves through the current asset accounts beginning as inventory, which 
is converted into receivables when it is sold, and finally converted to cash when collection is made. 
They further explain that this cycle has two components: (i) the inventory period, which is the time 
it takes to sell inventory and (ii) the accounts receivable period, which is the time it takes to collect 
the cash from the sale. The operating cycle is therefore the sum of the firm’s inventory period and 
its accounts receivable period. This measure of the operating cycle is employed consistent with 
Demerijan et al. (2013), Lara et al. (2012), and Beuselinck et al. (2014). 
 
Altman’s Z-Score provides an overall measurement of default risk, and is a score that depends on 
the weighted importance of various financial ratios (shown in Table 4.4) of a borrower derived 
from a discriminant analysis model (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). The authors explain that the 
higher the value of the Z-score, the lower the default risk, and vice versa. In Altman’s model, any 
score less than 1.81 is considered a high default risk region. Consistent with Yang (2006), Lara et 
al. (2012), Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015), Zang (2012), and Jha (2013), Altman’s Z-Score is 
employed as an independent variable. The suspect firms variable is employed consistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006), Siriviriyakul (2013), and Zhu et al. (2015), and tests whether firms with 
profitability in the interval to the immediate right of zero engage in earnings management. Lara et 
al. (2012) explain that suspect firms have a high probability of having engaged in earnings 
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management to just beat or meet important earnings benchmarks. It is likely for firms in years 
where their earnings are right at or just above their benchmarks to manage earnings in order to 
meet these benchmarks, and firms with zero earnings are one such important benchmark (Zang, 
2012).  
 
As shown in the table, ownership concentration is measured as the number of closely held shares 
as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding. Consistent with Roychowdhury 
(2006) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016), earnings management flexibility, measured 
as the sum of inventories and receivables as a percentage of total assets, is employed as an earnings 
management determinant.  
 
Consistent with Zamri et al. (2013), Sun and Rath (2009), Ho et al. (2015), Im et al. (2015), and 
Hessayri and Saihi (2015), firms are classified according to their respective industries based on 
dummy variables which take the value of 1 when a firm is a member of a given industry, and 0 
otherwise, since the extant literature evidences that industry membership can impact upon the 
extent of earnings management. The utilities industry is used as the reference industry in this thesis.   
Consistent with Lemma et al. (2013), regulatory quality, voice and accountability, the rule of law, 
the control of corruption index, political stability, government effectiveness, financial 
development, and the GDP growth rate are used as country-level variables. The GDP growth rate 
is employed as a measure of the economic growth. The use of the GDP growth rate also follows 
Cohen and Zarowin (2007), Gaio (2010), Beuselinck et al. (2014), and Chen et al. (2015). 
Following Gaio, financial development is measured as stock market capitalization divided by the 
gross domestic product. The GCC variable is included in the models to investigate the potential 
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differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms. Discretionary accruals are employed in the 
real earnings management model to examine whether earnings management techniques are used 
by firms in the MENA region as substitutes or complements, consistent with Roychowdhury 
(2006), Zang (2012), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Doukakis (2014), and Zhu et al. (2015). 
 
In the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model, operating cash flows in the 
current year, nondiscretionary accruals, and discretionary accruals are employed consistent with 
Siregar and Utama (2008) to test whether earnings management is opportunistic or efficient. Firm 
size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and the dividend payout ratio are employed 
in the model as control variables. The model also includes interaction variables that moderate the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability.  
 
4.6 Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
Data are fit to a linear model in order to predict values of a response (Y) as the weighted sum of 
explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖) and random error (𝜀). The regression coefficient represents the total 
contribution of a given predictor to the response when explanatory variables are independent of 
each other (Graham, 2003). Multicollinearity arises when explanatory variables in a regression 
model are correlated with each other. Graham argues that correlated explanatory variables are 
difficult to analyse since their impact on the response may be due to spurious correlations or 
synergistic relationships among the variables. Thus, multicollinearity is a problematic issue since 
it becomes difficult to determine which of the variables is truly inferential.  
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In order to identify whether there is a problem of multicollinearity in the models of this thesis, a 
Pearson Correlation Matrix and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are computed. Stine (1995) 
explains that the Variance Inflation Factor measures how much multicollinearity has increased the 
variance of a slope estimate and that there is no well-defined critical value for what is considered 
to be a large VIF. However, a VIF at the threshold of 10 is considered large enough to indicate a 
problem. VIF values at the threshold of 5-10 indicate a potential problem of multicollinearity. 
Consistent with this, Siregar and Utama (2008) argue that multicollinearity problems exist if the 
VIF exceeds 10.    
 
4.7 The Specification of the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Model 
To test the relationship between accruals-based earnings management (the dependent variable) and 
its drivers (the independent variables), a pooled cross-sectional regression is employed consistent 
with various authors in the earnings management literature (e.g. Siregar and Utama, 2008; Zhu et 
al., 2015, Doukakis, 2014; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Ho et al., 2015; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 
2012; Sun and Rath, 2009; and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2016). Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002), Lemma et al. (2013), and Kirch et al. (2009) explain that the six country-level index 
variables (the control of corruption, political stability, the rule of law, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality) cannot be used in the same regression model 
since they are potentially highly correlated. Therefore, consistent with these authors, Principal 
Component Analysis is employed to generate an aggregate score for these variables and the first 
principal component is used to proxy for the effect of country-level index variables on earnings 
management. This is used as the main model for reporting the results. However, since this approach 
would cause this thesis to lose one of its distinctive features, a second approach is also employed 
in which these index variables are introduced in the regression models separately. 
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The pooled cross-sectional regression is conducted for an 18-year period in order to determine 
how these variables impact upon accruals-based earnings management in the MENA region. A 
panel regression is not employed as the main model for two reasons. First, a panel regression would 
not make it possible to include industry dummies in the model and industry membership is a 
variable of interest since the literature shows it can potentially impact upon earnings management 
behaviour. Second, since there may be distinct differences between GCC and non-GCC country 
firms, a dummy variable is employed to capture this potential effect. A panel model would not 
allow the inclusion of this dummy variable. Thus, the pooled cross-sectional regression model is 
used for reporting the results and a panel regression is used to test the robustness of the results. 
The Hausman test is used to identify whether a fixed-effects or random-effects regression is 
appropriate. 
 
Eight different specifications of the model are estimated for each of the four dependent variables 
(i.e. discretionary accruals derived from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the 
Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model) estimated using both the cash flow 
statement approach and the balance sheet approach. However, the balance sheet approach is used 
for the purpose of the robustness of results and the results of this approach are included only in 
appendix D-1 as previously mentioned. The specification of the model is conducted as follows.  
 
First, the main model is computed in which firm-level and country-level determinants of accruals-
based earnings management are examined and interaction variables are included as shown in 
Equation 20.  
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𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐺𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽20𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽25𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽26𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽27𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽28𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽29𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (20) 
Where:  
𝐷𝐴 = Discretionary accruals computed from the accruals-based earnings management models; 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 = IFRS adoption; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = firm size; 𝐿𝐸𝑉 = leverage; 𝐺𝑂 = growth opportunities; 𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 
free cash flow per share; 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = return on assets; 𝐴𝑇 = asset tangibility; 𝐷𝑃𝑅 = the dividend 
payout per share; 𝑂𝐶 = the operating cycle; 𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = Altman’s Z-Score; 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 = ownership 
concentration; 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 = the suspect firm’s variable; 𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋 = earnings management 
flexibility; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = industry membership; 𝐹𝐷 = Financial development; 𝐺𝐷𝑃 = the GDP 
growth rate; and 𝐺𝐼𝐹 = the governance and infrastructure index variable.  
 
Next, as a further analysis, a model is computed in which only the firm-level determinants are 
included to investigate their impact on accruals-based earnings management in the absence of 
country-level and interaction variables as shown in Equation 21.   
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (21) 
 
A model is then computed in which only the country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings 
management are included as shown in Equation 22.  
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𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡       (22)  
 
Following this, a model is computed in which firm-level and country-level determinants of 
accruals-based earnings management are combined without interaction variables as shown in 
Equation 23.  
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐺𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
            (23) 
The second approach to overcoming the potential multicollinearity problem with regard to the 
country-level index variables involves introducing these variables one by one in the empirical 
models rather than employing Principal Component Analysis. This is conducted by including voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, the control of 
corruption, and political stability separately in the main model which includes interaction variables 
as shown in Equation 20, and excluding the GIF index variable.   
 
4.8 The Specification of the Real Activities-based Earnings Management Model 
To test the determinants of real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA 
region, the following models are estimated at the cross-section. However, the dependent variable 
now refers to the six real activities-based earnings management proxies, which are abnormal cash 
flows from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures measured 
individually, in addition to each of the three aggregate proxies which are RM1, RM2, and RM3. 
Consistent with the accruals-based earnings management models, the analysis of the real activities-
based earnings management models begins by examining the firm-level and country-level 
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determinants of real activities-based earnings management with interaction variables as shown in 
Equation 24. Further, discretionary accruals are employed in the model to test hypothesis H2 in 
relation to the substitutability, or otherwise, of the two earnings management techniques.  
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐺𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽20𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽25𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽26𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽27𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽28𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽29𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽30𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽31𝐺𝐶𝐶 𝑋 𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   (24)  
Where:  
𝑅𝑀 = The six real earnings management proxies which are (i) abnormal cash flows from 
operations; (ii) abnormal discretionary expenditures; (iii) abnormal production costs; (iv) 
aggregate proxy 1; (v) aggregate proxy 2; and (vi) aggregate proxy 3; 𝐷𝐴 = discretionary accruals.  
As further analysis, Equation 25 is employed to examine the effect of the firm-level factors on the 
extent of real activities-based earnings management in the absence of country-level and interaction 
variables as shown in Equation 25. 
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          (25) 
 
This is followed by an examination of the country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings 
management as shown in Equation 26. 
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡       (26)  
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Discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model are then employed in Equation 
27 as a further test for hypothesis 2 which examines whether firms substitute the two earnings 
management techniques, with the exclusion of interaction variables.   
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡       (27)  
 
The analysis of the real activities-based earnings management models is then conducted by 
combining the firm-level and country-level factors into a single model to examine their joint effect, 
absent interaction variables, on the extent of real activities-based earnings management.  
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐺𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
            (28) 
Consistent with the accruals-based earnings management models, the country-level index 
variables are also employed separately in the main model which includes interaction variables to 
investigate their individual associations with real earnings management in addition to employing 
Principal Component Analysis.  
 
The relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables in the accruals-
based and real activities-based earnings management models reveals the association between the 
variables and earnings management behaviour. Testing the association between the dependent 
variables and the independent variables in both earnings management models enables hypothesis 
H1 and H1.1 through to H1.18 to be tested, which examine the impact of firm-specific and country-
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level factors upon earnings management behaviour. The inclusion of discretionary accruals in the 
real earnings management model allows hypothesis H2 to be tested. This hypothesis states that 
firms use earnings management techniques as substitutes.  
 
4.9 The Specification of the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Model 
An objective of this thesis is to test whether firms engage in opportunistic or efficient earnings 
management in the MENA region. In order to test hypothesis H3, which states that there is a 
relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability, Equation 29 is employed 
consistent with Siregar and Utama (2008) and Razei and Roshani (2012). In this thesis, the model 
is modified slightly to take account of different variables which may potentially moderate the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability, but have not been examined 
in prior research. This is conducted to provide a contribution to the extant literature. The original 
model employed by the authors includes the proportion of family ownership, the proportion of 
institutional ownership, firm size, auditor type, the proportion of independent board members, and 
audit committee as interacting variables that moderate the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and future profitability. In this thesis, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash 
flows, and the dividend payout ratio are instead employed as interacting variables that moderate 
the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability, consistent with the 
hypothesis development. Equation 29 is employed to test whether earnings management is 
efficient or opportunistic in the MENA region as follows.     
𝑋𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡           (29) 
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Where:  
𝑋𝑖𝑡+1 = future profitability, measured by each of the following variables.  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1; 𝑁𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑡+1; and ∆𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡+1, all scaled by lagged total assets; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 = cash flows from 
operating activities; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 = one year-ahead cash flows from operating activities; 𝑁𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑡+1 = 
one year-ahead non-discretionary net income computed as one year-ahead 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 − 𝐷𝐴𝐶; 
𝐷𝐴 = Discretionary accruals; 𝑁𝐷𝐴 = nondiscretionary accruals;  ∆𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 = one year-ahead 
change in earnings measured as 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡; and Size, LEV, GO, FCF, and DPR 
are control variables which refer to firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash flows, and 
the dividend payout ratio, respectively.  
 
Although profitability relates to accrual accounting and cash flows are not a measure of 
profitability, Siregar and Utama refer to one year-ahead cash flows from operations as a measure 
of future profitability and, therefore, consistent with the literature, the same terminology is adopted 
in this thesis. In order to determine whether earnings management is opportunistic or efficient, the 
DA variable is examined. If earnings management is efficient, then coefficient 𝑏1 will be positive. 
However, if the coefficient is negative or insignificant then earnings management is opportunistic. 
Siregar and Utama (2008) explain that ∆𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 is used instead of the level of earnings because 
of an inherent weakness in earnings. Earnings include discretionary accruals and therefore if there 
is a positive and significant relationship between discretionary accruals in year 𝑡 and earnings in 
year 𝑡 + 1, it may be the result of management creating another discretionary accrual in year 𝑡 + 1  
and not an indication of efficient earnings management. They further explain that the change 
(difference) in earnings is employed as a substitute for traditional earnings since discretionary 
accruals and earnings are stationary in nature, while employing the change in earnings controls for 
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the stationary nature of discretionary accruals. Cash flows from operations and nondiscretionary 
net income are also employed because they do not contain a discretionary accrual component, 
which means they are not characterized by the inherent problem associated with earnings. 
Hypotheses H3.1-H3.5 state that the hypothesized variables (firm size, leverage, growth 
opportunities, free cash flow, and dividend policy) influence the 𝐷𝐴 coefficient (𝛽3). To test these 
hypotheses, Equation 30 is estimated which allows the 𝐷𝐴 coefficient to vary.  
𝑋𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 𝑋 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 𝑋 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 𝑋 𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐷𝐴 𝑋 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽13𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 𝑋 𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑡              (30)  
 
The expectations regarding hypotheses H3.1-H3.5 are that the coefficients are significantly greater 
than zero. The hypothesis development chapter explains that the effect of discretionary accruals 
on future profitability is moderated by the variables included in Equation 30. Since these are 
interaction variables, the resulting coefficient will show the incremental impact of each variable 
on the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability. As an illustration, if 
firm size is equal to zero, then the effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability is 𝛽1. 
However, if firm size is equal to one, then the effect of discretionary accruals on future profitability 
is 𝛽1 + 𝛽4. 𝛽4 is the difference between 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = zero and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = one, which is the coefficient of the 
interaction variable. In addition, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and the 
dividend payout ratio are included as control variables in the model to control for the possibility 
that these variables have a direct effect on future profitability. For example, a larger firm size may 
be associated with higher future profitability.  
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The analysis is conducted for firms in the MENA region. However, since there may be differences 
between GCC and non-GCC country firms in terms of their engagement in opportunistic or 
efficient earnings management, the analysis is also conducted by separating GCC and non-GCC 
country firms into two different datasets.   
 
4.10 Summary 
In sum, to address the research questions, this thesis uses a pooled cross-sectional regression 
analysis to model the impact of the independent variables on the extent of earnings management 
behaviour over the period 1996-2014. Discretionary accruals are the dependent variable of the 
accruals-based earnings management model and are computed from the Modified Jones (1991) 
Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. (2005) Model, and the Raman and Shahrur (2008) 
Model. The balance sheet approach and the cash flow statement approach are both employed to 
compute total accruals in these four models. However, the results of the balance sheet approach 
are used to test for the robustness of the results, and the results of the cash flow statement approach 
are used as the main model.    
 
The abnormal level of production costs, abnormal discretionary expenditures, and abnormal cash 
flows from operations are used as dependent variables for the real activities-based earnings 
management models. In addition to this, three aggregate proxies are employed as dependent 
variables of real activities-based earnings management, which gives a total of six proxies for this 
model. In the efficient versus opportunistic model, one year-ahead cash flows from operations, 
one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income, and the one year-ahead change in earnings are used 
as proxies for future profitability. The analysis is conducted for firms in the MENA region which 
149 
 
includes Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. In the accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
models, a dummy variable is used to distinguish between Gulf and non-Gulf countries. The six 
Gulf countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The four non-Gulf countries are Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco. In the efficient versus 
opportunistic earnings management models, the analysis is conducted for firms in the MENA 
region. In addition, GCC and non-GCC country firms are separated into different datasets and 
analysed. 
 
To avoid a potential problem of multicollinearity between the country-level index variable for both 
the accruals-based earnings management and the real activities-based earnings management 
models, two approaches are employed. The first approach is the use of Principal Component 
Analysis to aggregate the index variables into a signle score. The second approach is the inclusion 
of the variables separately in the main empirical model.  
 
The thesis examines secondary data for the purpose of computing firm-specific variables and 
secondary data for the country-level variables. Data for firm-specific variables are drawn from the 
Datastream financial database for non-financial firms listed on the respective stock exchanges of 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United 
Arab Emirates as the ten countries selected to represent the MENA region. Data limitations prevent 
additional countries in the region from being examined. The firm-specific variables are computed 
from the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement items to derive the dependent 
and independent variables. Data for the country-level variables are obtained from the World 
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Bank’s Governance and Anti-Corruption website and the Global Financial Development Database. 
Additional country-level variables are extracted directly from the data section of the World Bank 
website. Further, outliers are detected and removed.   
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Chapter V – Results of the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of the four accruals-based earnings management models which 
are: (i) the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, 1996); (ii) the Kasznik (1999) Model; (iii) the Kothari 
et al. (2005) Model; and (iv) the Raman and Shahrur (2008) Model. The Modified Jones Model 
computes discretionary accruals by controlling for the change in revenues minus the change in 
receivables, and gross property plant and equipment. The Kasznik Model expands this model by, 
in addition, controlling for the change in cash flows from operations. The Kothari et al. Model 
further expands the discretionary accruals model by controlling for net income scaled by the 
current year or previous year’s total assets. The model is further expanded by Raman and Shahrur 
by controlling for growth opportunities in addition to the previously mentioned variables.  
 
Discretionary accruals are computed using both the balance sheet approach and the cash flow 
statement approach. The results of both approaches are consistent when sample sizes are matched 
across models. However, Kothari et al. (2005) recommend using the cash flow statement approach 
as they argue that there is an error embedded in estimated total accruals and thus discretionary 
accruals when the balance sheet approach is used. They explain that the error reduces the 
discretionary accrual models’ power to detect earnings management and may also potentially 
generate incorrect inferences regarding earnings management. Further, Collins and Hribar (2000) 
examine the impact of measuring total accruals using the balance sheet approach and the cash flow 
statement approach and find that studies using the balance sheet approach to test for earnings 
management are potentially contaminated by measurement errors in the estimates of total accruals. 
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They explain that if there is a correlation between the partitioning variable used to indicate the 
presence of earnings management and the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions or discontinued 
operations, the tests become biased and lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the existence, or 
otherwise, of earnings management. Thus, the results of the cash flow statement approach are 
reported in this chapter and the results of the balance sheet approach are included in appendix D-
1.  
 
The dataset analysed includes firms from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. This dataset represents the MENA region 
and a dummy variable referred to as GCC is used to distinguish between Gulf countries and non-
Gulf countries. The analysis of each model is conducted using a pooled cross-sectional regression. 
A stepwise regression is also used to test the robustness of the results, and is included in appendix 
C-1. The results of the stepwise regression are broadly consistent with the results reported in this 
chapter. A panel regression does not show the potential effects of industry membership and the 
GCC variable on earnings management, and thus the results reported in this chapter are for the 
pooled regression model and a panel regression is not used as the main model. However, as a 
further test of robustness, a panel regression is employed. The Hausman test is used to identify 
whether a fixed-effects or random-effects panel regression should be used. The results indicate 
that the use of a fixed-effects model is appropriate for this research. The results of the fixed-effects 
regression are broadly consistent with the results reported for the pooled cross-sectional regression.   
 
The findings presented and discussed in this chapter address the research question: what are the 
firm-specific and country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings management for firms in 
the MENA region? Section 5.2 presents a discussion of the descriptive statistics for the model 
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variables, and section 5.3 presents and discusses the correlation analysis and multicollinearity 
diagnostics. In section 5.4, the regression results are discussed. Section 5.5 concludes with a 
summary.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the six country-level index variables (voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability, the rule of law, and the control of 
corruption) may cause a problem of multicollinearity if they are included in the same regression 
model. Therefore, two approaches are employed to overcome this potential issue of 
multicollinearity. The first approach is the use of Principal Component Analysis. The results of 
this approach are discussed first. However, this approach causes this research to lose one of its 
distinctive features. Therefore, a second approach is employed in which the index variables are 
included in the main model separately. The results of this approach are presented in appendix H-1 
and are discussed following the discussion of the results of the Principal Component Analysis 
model.  
 
The discussion of the regression results begins with an analysis in which firm-level and country-
level determinants of accruals-based earnings management are examined in a model which 
distinguishes between GCC and non-GCC country firms and includes dummy and interaction 
variables to test the potential differences between the two country groupings. As further analysis, 
the impact of the firm-level determinants of accruals-based earnings management is then 
discussed. This is then followed by an analysis in which country-level determinants of accruals-
based earnings management is conducted. Firm-level and country level determinants of accruals-
based earnings management are then combined into a single regression model to analyse their joint 
effect in the absence of interaction variables.  
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Accruals-based Earnings Management Model 
Variables  
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the model variables. The mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown for the dependent and independent variables. 
T Statistics are also reported to identify any potential significant differences between GCC and 
non-GCC country firms. The descriptive statistics are presented for firms in the MENA region. In 
addition, the descriptive statistics are presented for firms in GCC countries and non-GCC countries 
separately. The GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The non-GCC countries include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.   
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Model Variables  
 𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑵𝒐𝒏 − 𝑮𝑪𝑪  𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑨 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 T-Statistics 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 
𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔𝑫𝑨 0.001 0.000 0.077 -0.308 0.393 0.005 -0.000 0.088 -0.422 0.376 (-1.149) 0.003 -0.000 0.082 -0.422 0.393 
𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌𝑫𝑨 -0.005 -0.000 0.075 -0.336 0.324 -0.000 -0.004 0.074 -0.296 0.325 (-0.067) -0.000 -0.001 0.071 -0.296 0.325 
𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝑫𝑨 -0.000 -0.006 0.070 -0.278 0.323 -0.003 -0.004 0.088 -0.341 0.312 (-0.604) -0.004 -0.005 0.080 -0.341 0.324 
𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏𝑫𝑨 -0.006 -0.007 0.073 -0.319 0.315 -0.004 -0.007 0.086 -0.302 0.319 (-0.532) -0.005 -0.007 0.079 -0.319 0.319 
𝑭𝑫 62.769 58.210 31.544 18.250 196.706 69.135 52.806 51.366 12.933 240.882 (-3.891)*** 65.321 57.119 40.778 12.933 240.882 
𝑮𝑫𝑷 4.684 4.761 4.757 -7.076 26.170 4.040 3.193 2.069 -1.917 8.175 (5.131)*** 4.426 4.452 3.920 -7.076 26.170 
𝑮𝑰𝑭 0.590 0.669 0.817 -0.809 2.331 -0.814 -0.742 0.953 -2.779 0.402 (42.412)*** 0.027 0.005 1.113 -2.779 2.331 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 11.915 12.048 2.500 5.164 19.062 11.949 12.320 2.584 3.178 17.823 (-0.365) 11.929 12.206 2.534 3.178 19.062 
𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.207 0.171 0.182 0.000 0.779 0.178 0.134 0.174 0.000 0.758 (4.346)*** 0.195 0.157 0.179 0.000 0.779 
𝑮𝑶 1.214 0.964 1.409 0.000 21.230 2.028 1.463 2.189 0.115 30.590 (-11.556)*** 1.540 1.165 1.808 0.000 30.590 
𝑭𝑪𝑭 0.051 0.011 2.095 -28.711 17.961 0.838 0.042 12.250 -97.541 96.285 (-2.235)** 0.367 0.015 7.931 -97.541 96.285 
𝑹𝑶𝑨 0.069 0.065 0.080 -0.238 0.355 0.063 0.055 0.084 -0.239 0.355 (1.872)* 0.067 0.060 0.082 -0.239 0.355 
𝑨𝑻 0.400 0.387 0.235 0.000 0.986 0.374 0.359 0.235 0.000 0.979 (3.101)*** 0.390 0.376 0.235 0.000 0.986 
𝑫𝑷𝑹 39.261 42.460 31.887 0.000 100.000 40.100 43.870 35.291 0.000 100.000 (-0.671) 39.597 42.740 33.290 0.000 100.000 
𝑶𝑪 5.107 5.157 0.751 2.170 8.575 5.361 5.339 0.889 2.181 8.553 (-8.235)*** 5.209 5.232 0.819 2.170 8.575 
𝒁𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 4.877 3.026 6.143 -4.222 63.756 4.584 2.836 6.553 -1.669 97.873 (1.248) 4.760 2.932 6.311 -4.222 97.873 
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 46.275 55.19 24.999 0.10 99.15 65.498 62.92 12.672 5.04 99.85 (-4.350)*** 53.980 61.65 22.967 0.10 99.85 
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.260 0.199 0.202 0.000 0.894 0.354 0.317 0.221 0.000 0.993 (-11.970)*** 0.298 0.251 0.215 0.000 0.993 
 
Number of Observations 3,081 
This table presents the descriptive statistic for the accruals-based earnings management model variables. The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are presented in the columns for the GCC country 
firms, non-GCC country firms, and the MENA region combined. The t-statistics column reports the t-statistics between brackets to identify the potential significant differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms. ***, **, 
and * refer to the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Non-GCC countries include Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia. The number of observations for the accruals-based earnings management models is reported. JonesDA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; KasznikDA refers to 
discretionary accruals computed from the Kasznik Model; KothariDA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Kothari et al. Model; RamanDA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Raman and Shahrur 
Model; FD refers to financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the percentage change in GDP per capita across years; GIF refers 
to the Governance and Infrastructure index variable; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities 
measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as net income scaled 
by total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the 
operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration proxied by closely held shares and measured 
as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. 
 
 
156 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the level of discretionary accruals across the accruals-based 
earnings management models does not differ significantly between GCC and non-GCC country 
firms. The mean value of discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model is 
positive for both GCC and non-GCC country firms, whereas the mean value is negative for both 
GCC and non-GCC firms when the Kasznik Model, Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and 
Shahrur Models are used to compute discretionary accruals. This may be an indication that firms 
in both regions engage in more income decreasing discretionary accruals compared with income 
increasing discretionary accruals on average. The discretionary accruals computed from the 
Modified Jones Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model for GCC 
country firms are found to have higher standard deviations compared with non-GCC country firms, 
which is indicative of higher accruals volatility.   
 
Although GCC countries would be expected to have a higher level of financial development than 
non-GCC countries, non-GCC countries are on average found to experience significantly slightly 
higher financial development at the 1% level with a mean of 69.135% compared with 62.769% in 
GCC countries. However, non-GCC countries have a lower minimum value of 12.93 and a median 
of 58.210 compared with GCC countries which are found to have a minimum value of 18.250 and 
a median of 52.806. Further, the standard deviation is higher for non-GCC country firms compared 
with GCC country firms, indicating higher volatility. GDP growth is on average significantly 
higher in GCC countries at the 1% level with a mean of 4.684% compared with a mean of 4.040% 
in non-GCC countries, which indicates that GCC countries experience greater economic growth. 
However, the standard deviation in GCC country firms is higher with a value of 4.757 compared 
with non-GCC countries for which the value is 2.069. The governance and infrastructure index 
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variable is significantly higher at the 1% level for GCC countries compared with non-GCC 
countries on average. The mean for GCC country firms is a score of 0.590 compared with a score 
of -0.814 in non-GCC country firms. This suggests that the country-level index variables which 
are the level of the control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, voice and accountability, and the rule of law are higher in GCC country firms, indicating 
that GCC countries are more developed than non-GCC countries in this regard.  
 
Firm size does not significantly differ between GCC and non-GCC countries. Firm size has a mean 
of 11.949 measured as the logarithm of sales compared with GCC countries in which the mean is 
11.915, which suggests that non-GCC country firms are not significantly larger than their GCC 
country counterparts on average. Leverage in GCC country firms is slightly significantly higher 
on average at the 1% compared with non-GCC country firms. The mean for GCC country firms is 
20.7% whereas the mean for non-GCC country firms is 17.8%. It is possible that GCC country 
firms rely on higher debt financing compared with equity financing. This is further evidenced by 
a maximum value of 77.9% for GCC firms compared with a value of 75.8% for non-GCC firms, 
and median of 17.1% for GCC firms compared with a median of 13.4% in non-GCC firms. Growth 
opportunities are on average significantly higher at the 1% level in non-GCC country firms 
compared with their GCC country counterparts. The mean in non-GCC countries is 2.028 whereas 
the mean for GCC countries is 1.214 proxied by the price-book ratio. Free cash flows in non-GCC 
country firms are significantly higher than GCC country firms at the 5% level, with a mean value 
of 0.838 per share in non-GCC country firms compared with a mean value of 0.051 per share in 
GCC country firms. Profitability in GCC country firms is slightly higher than non-GCC country 
firms, which is consistent with the higher GDP growth experienced by GCC country firms. The 
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mean value is 6.9% in GCC country firms compared with a mean value of 6.3% in non-GCC 
country firms. However, the difference is only significant at the 10% level.   
 
GCC country firms have on average significantly higher asset tangibility at the 1% level compared 
with non-GCC country firms. The mean value is 40% in GCC country firms compared with a mean 
value of 37.4% in non-GCC country firms, which suggests that GCC country firms hold a higher 
level of net fixed assets as a proportion of total assets compared with non-GCC country firms. The 
descriptive statistics also show that dividend payout ratios do not differ significantly between GCC 
and non-GCC country firms. The mean value in non-GCC country firms is 40.1% compared with 
a mean value of 39.26% in GCC country firms. In non-GCC country firms, the length of the 
operating cycle is on average significantly higher at the 1% level compared with GCC country 
firms. The mean is 5.361 for non-GCC country firms measured as the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s operating cycle compared with a mean of 5.10 in GCC country firms. The financial health 
of firms based on the Altman’s Z-Score does not differ significantly between GCC and non-GCC 
country firms. The mean in GCC country firms is 4.877 compared with a mean value of 4.584 in 
non-GCC country firms.  
 
On average, GCC country firms have significantly higher ownership concentration at the 1% level 
compared with non-GCC country firms based on the number of closely held shares as a percentage 
of the number of common shares outstanding. The mean value is 46.275% in GCC country firms 
compared with 65.498% in non-GCC country firms. Earnings management flexibility is on 
average significantly higher at the 1% level in non-GCC country firms compared with GCC 
country firms. The mean value is 35.4% in GCC country firms compared with a mean value of 
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26.0% in GCC country firms, which shows that non-GCC country firms hold a greater sum of 
accounts receivable and inventories as a percentage of total assets compared with GCC country 
firms which are shown to hold a greater level of net fixed assets as a percentage of total assets.  
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics show that, on average, discretionary accruals, firm size, the 
dividend payout ratio, and Altman’s Z-Score do not differ significantly between GCC and non-
GCC country firms, while GDP growth and overall country level index variables are significantly 
higher in GCC countries compared with non-GCC countries. On the other hand, non-GCC 
countries experience significantly higher financial development compared with GCC country 
firms. Further, GCC country firms are found to be more profitable and hold a higher level of net 
fixed assets as a proportion of total assets, whereas non-GCC country firms hold a higher sum of 
receivable and inventories as a proportion of total assets and are characterised by higher growth 
opportunities. Moreover, non-GCC country firms are characterised by significantly higher 
ownership concentration compared with GCC country firms. Non-GCC country firms also hold 
higher free cash flows than GCC country firms, while GCC country firms are characterised by 
higher leverage.   
 
5.3 Correlation Analysis and Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Accruals-Based 
Model Variables  
A Pearson Correlation Matrix is computed and shown in Table 5.3 to analyse the correlations 
between the model variables. The correlations between the independent variables and discretionary 
accruals are consistent across the different accruals-based earnings management models. 
Therefore, to avoid repetition, only discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones 
Model are included in the correlation matrix. To test for multicollinearity across the accruals-based 
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earnings management model variables, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is computed and is 
presented in Table 5.5. Consistent with Stine (1995) and Siregar and Utama (2008), a VIF larger 
than the threshold of 10 is considered to signal high multicollinearity. 
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Table 5.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Accruals-Based Model Variables  
 𝑫𝑨 𝑭𝑫 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝑰𝑭 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑳𝒆𝒗 𝑮𝑶 𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑹𝑶𝑨 𝑨𝑻 𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑶𝑪 𝒁𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 
𝑫𝑨 1               
𝑭𝑫 .027 1              
𝑮𝑫𝑷 .083** .197** 1             
𝑮𝑰𝑭 .012 .157** .165** 1            
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 .027 -.220** .113** -.244** 1           
𝑳𝒆𝒗 .001 -.053** -.009 .042* .188** 1          
𝑮𝑶 -.040* .004 .018 -.009 -.023 .008 1         
𝑭𝑪𝑭 -.005 .008 -.006 -.028 .050** -.052** -.031 1        
𝑹𝑶𝑨 .190** .013 .133** -.039* .217** -.348** .079** .088** 1       
𝑨𝑻 -.121** -.075** .055** -.039* .084** .234** -.026 -.071** -.008 1      
𝑫𝑷𝑹 .044* .003 .067** -.032 .182** -.243** .069** .074** .497** -.034 1     
𝑶𝑪 .068** -.027 -.050** -.109** -.172** .035 -.044* -.032 -.238** -.219** -.204** 1    
𝒁𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 .054** .130** .047** -.013 -.153** -.432** .137** .006 .271** -.062** .133** -.029 1   
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 -.044* -.099** -.095** .162** .427** .126** -.036* -.071** -.015 .055** -.005 -.078** -.104** 1  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝒍𝑬𝑿 .169** -.095** -.079** -.155** .038* .026 .041* .025 -.041* -.440** -.023 .378** -.126** -.352** 1 
This table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for the accruals-based earnings management model variables for firms in the MENA region. DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model; FD refers to financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP 
growth measured as the percentage change in GDP per capita across years; GIF refers to the Governance and Infrastructure index variable; Size refers to firm size measured as the 
logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers 
to free cash flow per share measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as net income scaled by 
total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends 
paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-
Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; and EMFLEX refers to 
earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. ** represent correlations significant at the 0.01 level and * represents 
correlations significant at the 0.05 level. The VIFs reported in Table 5.5 show that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity across the accruals-based earnings management 
models.  
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The Pearson Correlation Matrix shows that the GDP growth rate, ROA, the operating cycle, 
Altman’s Z-Score, and earnings management flexibility are significantly positively correlated with 
discretionary accruals at the 1% level. The dividend payout ratio is significantly positively 
correlated with discretionary accruals at the 5% level. This is a potential indication that these 
variables may be associated with higher accruals-based earnings management in the MENA 
region. In contrast, growth opportunities is significantly negatively correlated with discretionary 
accruals at the 5% level, and asset tangibility is significantly negatively correlated with 
discretionary accruals at the 1% level. Ownership concentration is significantly negatively 
correlated with discretionary accruals at the 5% level. This suggests that these variables potentially 
lead to a lower degree of accruals-based earnings management.  
 
GDP growth and financial development are significantly positively correlated at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the governance and infrastructure variable is significantly positively correlated with 
financial development at the 1% level. Firm size is significantly negatively correlated with 
financial development at the 1% level, consistent with the correlation between leverage and 
financial development. Likewise, asset tangibility, ownership concentration, and earnings 
management flexibility are significantly negatively correlated with financial development at the 
1% level. However, Altman’s Z-Score is significantly positively correlated with financial 
development at the 1% level.  
 
GDP growth is significantly positively correlated with firm size, ROA, asset tangibility, the 
dividend payout ratio, and Altman’s Z-Score at the 1% level, whereas the operating cycle, 
ownership concentration, and earnings management flexibility are significantly negatively 
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correlated with GDP growth at the 1% level. The governance and infrastructure variable is 
significantly negatively correlated with firm size, the operating cycle, and earnings management 
flexibility at the 1% level, and significantly negatively correlated with ROA and asset tangibility 
at the 5% level. On the other hand, leverage and ownership concentration are significantly 
positively correlated with the GIF index variable at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Firm size is found to be significantly positively correlated with leverage, free cash flow, ROA, 
asset tangibility, the dividend payout ratio, and ownership concentration at the 1% level, while a 
significant positive correlation is also found at the 5% level between firm size and earnings 
management flexibility. However, firm size is significantly negatively correlated with the 
operating cycle and Altman’s Z-Score at the 1% level.  
 
Leverage is significantly negatively correlated with free cash flow and ROA, dividend payout 
ratio, and Altman’s Z-Score at the 1% level, and significantly positively correlated with asset 
tangibility and ownership concentration at the 1% level. Growth opportunities are found to be 
significantly positively correlated with ROA, the dividend payout ratio, and Atlman’s Z-Score at 
the 1% level, and significantly positively correlated with earnings management flexibility at the 
5% level. In contrast, growth opportunities are significantly negatively correlated with the 
operating cycle and ownership concentration at the 5% level.  
 
Free cash flow is significantly positively correlated with ROA and the dividend payout ratio at the 
1% level, but significantly negatively correlated with asset tangibility and ownership concentration 
at the 1% level. Asset tangibility is found to be significantly negatively correlated with the 
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operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, and earnings management flexibility at the 1% level. The 
dividend payout ratio is significantly negatively correlated with the operating cycle, while being 
significantly positively correlated with Altman’s Z-Score at the 1% level. The correlation matrix 
also shows that the operating cycle is significantly negatively correlated with ownership 
concentration and significantly positively correlated with earnings management flexibility at the 
1% level. Altman’s Z-Score is found to be significantly negatively correlated with both ownership 
concentration and earnings management flexibility at the 1% level. Similarly, ownership 
concentration is found to be significantly negatively correlated with earnings management 
flexibility at the 1% level.  
 
Overall, the Pearson Correlation Matrix does not indicate any significant problem of 
multicollinearity across the model variables. The highest correlation is 0.497 which is between the 
dividend payout ratio and ROA and is significant at the 1% level. This correlation is not high 
enough to indicate a problem of multicollinearity and is likely due to the fact that dividends are 
paid out of net profit. Thus, higher profitability may result in higher dividend payout ratios and 
vice versa.  
 
To test for multicollinearity, the maximum and mean VIFs computed for the accruals-based 
earnings management model variables are presented in Table 5.4. The highest VIF value computed 
is 2.07 for firm size and the mean VIF across variables is 1.46. A VIF value higher than the 
threshold of 10 is considered to be a problem of multicollinearity. VIF values between the 
threshold of 5 and 10 are potential indicators of multicollinearity. However, all VIF values are 
significantly lower than the threshold of 5 and thus show that there is no significant problem of 
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multicollinearity present across the accruals-based earnings management model variables. These 
results further show that country-level variables do not cause a significant multicollinearity 
problem when Principal Component Analysis is employed to aggregate the country-level index 
variables into a single score.  
 
5.4 Regression Results for the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
This section presents the regression results for the accruals-based earnings management models. 
Table 5.3 presents the results for the firm-level and country-level determinants of accruals-based 
earnings management with dummy and interaction variables.  
 
Table 5.3 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings 
Management with Interaction Variables 
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.051 -0.071 -0.029 -0.030  
 (-1.79) (-3.20)*** (-1.01) (-1.22)  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 - 
 (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-0.82)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 - 
 (-2.22)** (-4.21)*** (-2.58)** (-2.03)**  
𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.062 0.071 0.060 0.059 + 
 (3.61)*** (4.92)*** (3.46)*** (3.46)***  
𝑮𝑶 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 + 
 (-2.16)** (-2.73)*** (-1.95)* (-1.98)**  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-0.73) (0.21) (-0.53) (-0.50)  
𝑹𝑶𝑨 0.251 0.338 -0.081 -0.051 + 
 (6.08)*** (9.45)*** (-1.99)** (-1.25)  
𝑨𝑻 0.001 -0.004 0.015 0.021 - 
 (0.12) (-0.40) (1.23) (1.51)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-0.36) (-1.73)* (-0.51) (-0.75)  
𝑶𝑪 0.002 0.008 -0.000 -0.003 + 
 (0.32) (2.05)** (-0.23) (-0.60)  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
 (2.92)*** (2.25)** (1.94)* (1.52)  
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 - 
 (0.86) (0.72) (0.74) (0.75)  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 -0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 + 
 (-0.19) (0.66) (-0.45) (-0.36)  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.105 0.099 0.111 0.115 + 
 (4.79)*** (7.30)*** (6.35)*** (5.88)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 0.001 -0.009 -0.003 0.000 + or - 
 (0.11) (-1.17) (-0.36) (0.01)  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.022 -0.020 -0.006 -0.011 + or - 
 (-3.31)*** (-3.50)*** (-1.02) (-1.68)*  
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Table 5.3 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings 
Management with Interaction Variables (continued) 
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected 
Sign 
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.011 -0.016 -0.002 -0.005 + or - 
 (-1.58) (-2.63)*** (-0.36) (-0.84)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 
0.005 -0.004 0.012 0.008 + or - 
 (0.72) (-0.66) (1.73)* (1.13)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 + or - 
 (-0.42) (-1.37) (-0.58) (-0.92)  
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 -0.002 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 + or - 
 (-0.33) (-1.36) (1.06) (-0.36)  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 0.027 -0.012 -0.036 0.006 + or - 
 (2.37)** (-1.32) (-3.21)*** (0.57)  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  
𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒚 
-0.018 -0.032 -0.028 -0.023 + or - 
 (-1.60) (-3.38)*** (-2.56)** (-2.24)**  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆  
𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 
0.006 0.008 0.028 0.019 + or - 
 (0.79) (1.24) (3.18)*** (2.28)**  
𝑭𝑫 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 - 
 (-0.25) (0.69) (-0.50) (-0.32)  
𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 + 
 (4.25)*** (5.48)*** (4.48)*** (4.40)***  
𝑮𝑰𝑭 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 + 
 (1.91)* (2.50)** (1.55) (1.37)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 -0.038 0.003 -0.046 -0.035 + or - 
 (-1.13) (0.13) (-1.34) (-1.06)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 + or - 
 (0.33) (0.82) (1.04) (0.60)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.009 -0.009 0.001 -0.000 + or - 
 (0.44) (-0.49) (0.09) (-0.01)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑮𝑶 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 + or - 
 (-1.14) (-2.09)** (-0.81) (-1.24)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑭𝑪𝑭 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 + or - 
 (-2.30)** (-2.65)*** (-2.20)** (-2.35)**  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑹𝑶𝑨 0.079 0.076 0.055 0.055 + or - 
 (1.45) (1.55) (0.96) (0.97)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑨𝑻 -0.024 -0.017 -0.024 -0.016 + or - 
 (-1.68)* (-1.43) (-1.61) (-1.10)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑫𝑷𝑹 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + or - 
 (-1.05) (-1.25) (-0.95) (-0.96)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑶𝑪 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.005 + or - 
 (1.28) (1.30) (1.54) (1.22)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 + or - 
 (-0.11) (-0.70) (0.76) (1.32)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 + or - 
 (0.47) (-1.17) (-0.19) (0.09)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 -0.045 -0.060 -0.041 -0.037 + or - 
 (-1.97)* (-3.15)*** (-1.79)* (-1.64)  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.129 0.186 0.085 0.077  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 3,081 3,081 3,081 3,081  
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑽𝑰𝑭 2.07 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑽𝑰𝑭 1.46 
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Table 5.3 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings 
Management with Interaction Variables (continued) 
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 
This table measures the impact of firm-level and country-level variables on accruals-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region 
using a pooled regression. Interaction variables are employed to investigate the differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms. 
Discretionary accruals are measured using the cash flow statement approach and are computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik 
Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model. The utilities industry is used as the reference for the industry membership 
dummy variables. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. 
IFRS refers to IFRS adoption which receives a value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net 
sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to 
book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to 
return on assets measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment 
scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating 
cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares 
refers to ownership concentration measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; 
Suspect refers to the suspect firms variable which receives a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled by total assets greater than or equal 
to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and 
receivables scaled by total assets; FD refers to financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic 
product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the percentage change in GDP per capita across years; GIF refers to the governance and 
infrastructure index variable; and GCC refers to a dummy variable for GCC versus non-GCC countries. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the impact of firm-level and country-level variables on accruals-based earnings 
management and investigates whether there are differences between GCC and non-GCC country 
firms. As shown in the Table, IFRS adoption is an insignificant determinant across the four 
accruals-based earnings management models. The insignificant coefficient contrasts with the 
research findings of Amin and Amin (2015) who find a significant negative relationship in their 
study of firms belonging to Iran, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Thus, there is no support 
for hypothesis H1.1a.  
 
Firm size is found to be significantly negatively associated with discretionary accruals computed 
from the Kasznik Model at the 1% level, and at the 5% level in relation to all of the other 
discretionary accruals models. This may be attributed to the fact that the Kasznik Model controls 
for the effect of cash flows from operations and includes a constant term. The Modified Jones 
Model and the Raman and Shahrur Model do not control for the effects of cash flows from 
operations and do not include a constant term. Although the Kothari et al. Model includes a 
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constant term, it does not control for the effects of cash flows from operations. Therefore, the 
differences between the variables employed in the accruals-based earnings management models 
may impact upon the significance levels of the coefficients.  
 
This negative coefficient shows strong evidence that smaller firms in the MENA region engage in 
higher levels of accruals-based earnings management. This may be due to larger companies having 
more sophisticated internal control systems and more competent internal auditors that would 
mitigate earnings management behaviour. Larger firms are also usually audited by large audit 
firms with more experienced auditors that could prevent earnings management behaviour. Further, 
large firms may also have more concern about their reputation which could prevent them from 
manipulating earnings (Kim et al., 2003; Lemma et al., 2013; and Heninger, 2001). Further, larger 
firms may engage less in earnings management as result of such firms having fewer opportunities 
for earnings management since they are under closer scrutiny by analysts (Hessayri and Saihi, 
2015). Consistent with this argument, Sun and Rath (2009) argue that large firms may have an 
incentive to avoid earnings management as they are subject to greater scrutiny from analysts, 
investors, and regulators.  
 
In developing economies, the rule of law is weak and corruption is high (Gill et al., 2013). Further, 
Looney (2005) argues that MENA countries are lagging in the control of corruption, the rule of 
law, and political stability. Therefore, since these MENA countries are characterized by high 
political instability, it is possible that smaller firms engage in higher accruals-based earnings 
management to portray improved prospects in order to be perceived as more profitable and attract 
investors, and to avoid bankruptcy. Zhu et al. (2015) argue that smaller firms are more vulnerable 
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to business risk and therefore have a greater likelihood of resorting to earnings management in 
order to avoid bankruptcy. Therefore, it is possible that, as a result of the relatively high political 
instability and weak rule of law inherent to the MENA region, smaller firms are exposed to a 
greater degree of business risk compared with larger firms, and thus engage in a higher degree of 
accruals-based earnings management in order to avoid bankruptcy. Larger firms, on the other hand, 
are likely to be less capable of doing so as a result of the greater scrutiny and monitoring by 
analysts, investors, and regulators.  
 
A negative coefficient contrasts with the arguments that large firms face greater pressure to meet 
or beat analysts’ expectations and are thus more likely to engage in earnings management (Lemma 
et al., 2013); larger firms usually have greater bargaining power with auditors and auditors are 
more likely to waive earnings management attempts by larger clients (Nelson et al., 2002); and 
larger firms also have more current assets and thus a greater ability to engage in accruals-based 
earnings management relative to smaller firms (Kim et al., 2003). 
 
This negative coefficient provides support for the research findings of Abbadi et al. (2016) in a 
study of Jordanian firms, Heninger (2001) in a study of US firms, Sirat (2012) in a study of 
Indonesian firms, Omid et al. (2012) in a study of Iranian firms, Hessayri and Saihi (2015) in a 
study of United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa, and the Philippines, and Lemma et al. 
(2013) in a study of 44 countries. The negative coefficient contrasts with the research findings of 
Alzoubi (2016) in a study of Jordanian firms, Charfeddine et al. (2013) in a study of Tunisian 
firms, Gopalakrishnan (1994), Michaelson et al. (1995), and Rangan (1998) for US firms, as well 
as Moradi et al. (2012) for Iranian firms and Abdul Rauf et al. (2012) for Malaysian firms, who 
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find a positive relationship. This finding also contrasts with the research findings of Bassiouny et 
al. (2016) in a study of Egyptian firms who find an insignificant relationship. Further, this negative 
association provides support for hypothesis H1.2a.  
 
The table shows a significant and positive relationship at the 1% level between discretionary 
accruals and leverage across the four accruals-based earnings management models. This positive 
coefficient shows strong evidence that higher leveraged firms engage in higher levels of accruals-
based earnings management in MENA country firms, and supports the argument that high leverage 
firms may tend toward earnings management in order to prevent breaches of debt covenants, and 
to present a favourable picture of the firm to creditors in order for the latter to reduce the 
commitments associated with debt contracts (Sun and Rath, 2009; Defond and Jimbalvo, 1991; 
DeAngelo et al., 1994; Becker et al., 1998; and Charitou et al., 2007). A positive coefficient for 
MENA country firms contrasts with the argument that firms characterized by higher leverage may 
avoid managing earnings since they are more closely monitored and thus would have more 
difficulty engaging in earnings management (Jelinek, 2007). 
 
The positive coefficient provides support for the research findings of Sweeney (1994), DeAngelo 
et al. (1994), Mohrman (1996), Becker et al. (1998), and Charitou et al. (2007) for US firms. 
Further, the positive coefficient is consistent with the research findings of Abbadi et al. (2016) for 
Jordanian firms, Charfeddine et al. (2013) for Tunisian firms, and Bassiouny et al. (2016) for 
Egyptian firms. The research findings of Sercu et al. (2006) for Belgian firms, Rodriguez-Peres 
and Van Hemmen (2010) for Spanish firms, and Waweru and Riro (2013) for Kenyan firms are 
also supported. However, a positive coefficient contrasts with the research findings of Iturriaga 
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and Hoffmann (2005) for Chilean firms, Jelinek (2007) and Alsharairi and Salama (2011) for US 
firms, Wasimullah et al. (2010) and Naz et al. (2011) for Pakistani firms, Lee et al. (2012) for 
Taiwanese firms, Nejad et al. (2012) for Iranian firms, and Zamri et al. (2013) for Malaysian firms, 
who find a negative relationship. Further, this positive association does not provide support for 
hypothesis H1.3a.    
 
The table shows that growth opportunities are significantly negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals computed from the Kasznik Model at the 1% level. The coefficient is 
significant and negative at the 5% level in relation to the Modified Jones Model and the Raman 
and Shahrur Model. The coefficient is significant and negative in relation to the Kothari et al. 
Model as well, but only at the 10% level. This is therefore strong evidence that greater growth 
opportunities in MENA country firms are associated with a lower degree of accruals-based 
earnings management in these firms. The negative coefficient is potentially the result of the fact 
that growing firms refrain from engaging in accruals-based earnings management to improve 
earnings quality so as to access external financing at a lower cost of capital (Gaio, 2010; Lemma, 
et al., 2013). Further, growing firms are likely to be under close scrutiny by outsiders since they 
are likely to attract the attention of investors and analysts, which would make it more difficult to 
manipulate earnings (Lemma et al., 2013). Since MENA countries are characterised by political 
instability and a weak rule of law, it is also possible that low growth firms engage in a greater 
degree of accruals-based earnings management in order to portray improved prospects during these 
periods of instability. Higher growth firms, however, are subject to greater scrutiny by outsiders 
and may thus be less capable of engaging in such earnings management behaviour. This finding 
contrasts with the research findings of Alzoubi (2016) for Jordanian firms, Alnajjar and Riahi-
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Belkaoui (2001) for US firms, Chen and Liu (2010) for Taiwanese firms, and Hessayri and Saihi 
(2015) who study United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa, and the Philippines. These 
authors find a positive relationship. Thus, hypothesis H1.4a is not supported.  
 
The table shows that the free cash flow variable is an insignificant determinant across the four 
accruals-based earnings management models. Therefore, there is no support for hypothesis H1.5a. 
The insignificant coefficient contrasts with the research findings of Alzoubi (2016) who finds a 
positive association in a study of Jordanian firms.  
 
On the other hand, profitability is significantly positively associated with discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model and the Kasznik Model at the 1% level, but significantly 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals computed from the Kothari et al. Model at the 
5% level. The difference in the coefficients may be the result of the fact that the Kothari et al. 
Model controls for the return on assets while the Modified Jones Model and the Kasznik Model 
do not. There is, therefore, mixed evidence in terms of the relationship between profitability and 
accruals-based earnings management. A negative relationship between profitability and accruals-
based earnings management shows support for the Political Cost Hypothesis. On the other hand, a 
positive relationship could be explained by the fact that financial performance affects the 
compensation of management and thus it is likely that firms characterized by higher profitability 
engage in greater earnings management activities in order to augment their compensation (Koh, 
2007; Hessayri and Saihi, 2015). Since the MENA region is characterised by political instability, 
it is also possible that profitable firms engage in income increasing earnings management to avoid 
reporting earnings decreases or losses since analysts and investors are likely to expect such firms 
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to continue to perform well. Therefore, they augment their earnings through accruals-based 
earnings management to ensure that they meet the expectations of analysts and investors, 
particularly during periods of political instability in which they may want to hide the negative 
effects of such events. The negative coefficient is consistent with the research findings of Abbadi 
et al. (2016) and Alzoubi (2016) for Jordanian firms, but is inconsistent with the research findings 
of Hessayri and Saihi (2015) who study the UAE, Morocco, South Africa, and the Philippines. 
The mixed evidence in relation to the association between the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management and profitability does not provide support for hypothesis H1.6a.     
 
Asset tangibility is shown in the Table to be an insignificant determinant across the accruals-based 
earnings management models. Thus, there is no evidence to support hypothesis H1.7a.  
 
The dividend payout ratio is found to be significant and negative in relation to discretionary 
accruals computed from the Kasznik Model, but only at the 10% level. Thus, there is no evidence 
to support hypothesis H1.8a.      
 
The table shows that the operating cycle is significantly positively associated with discretionary 
accruals computed from the Kasznik model at the 5% level. Therefore, there is weak evidence of 
a positive relationship which may be explained by the argument that the longer the firm’s operating 
cycle, the greater the possibility to manage accruals and the lower the need to manage real 
activities. Firms characterised by longer operating cycles are afforded greater flexibility for 
accruals-based earnings management since they have greater accrual accounts and a longer period 
for the reversal of accruals (Zang, 2012). A positive relationship between the operating cycle and 
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discretionary accruals is consistent with the research findings of Lara et al. (2012) who examine 
US firms, and with Beuselinck et al. (2014) who also find that firms with longer operating cycles 
exhibit higher levels of discretionary accruals in 89 countries. Further, this finding provides 
support for hypothesis H1.9a.   
 
Altman’s Z-Score is shown in the table to be significantly positively associated with discretionary 
accruals computed from Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, and the Kothari et al. Model 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This positive coefficient for Altman’s Z-Score is 
strong evidence indicating that firms in MENA countries that experience better financial health 
engage in higher levels of accruals-based earnings management. It is possible that financially 
distressed companies are less capable of managing earnings since they have exhausted the means 
by which they can engage in earnings management prior to the distress (Ghazali et al., 2015). 
Thus, firms characterised by better financial health are more capable of engaging in earnings 
management behaviour. A positive relationship between discretionary accruals and Altman’s Z-
Score contrasts with the argument that firms experiencing poor financial conditions, especially 
those nearing bankruptcy, are expected to do everything they can to improve their financial 
situation, such as adopting radical operating decisions to decrease losses and ameliorate their 
future prospects (Lara et al., 2012). The positive coefficient is consistent with the research findings 
of Yang (2006) and Ghazali et al. (2015) for US firms, and Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015) for 
Indian firms. However, this positive coefficient does not provide support for the research findings 
of Lara et al. (2012) and Chen (2009) for US firms, who find a negative relationship. Further, this 
positive coefficient does not provide support for hypothesis H1.10a.  
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Ownership concentration and the suspect firms variable are found to be insignificantly related to 
discretionary accruals across the models. Therefore, there is no support for hypotheses H1.11a and 
H1.12a.  
 
However, earnings management flexibility is shown to be significantly positively associated with 
discretionary accruals computed from all four accruals-based earnings management models at the 
1% level. This finding presents strong evidence that firms in MENA countries characterized by a 
higher sum of receivables and inventory as a percentage of total assets engage in higher levels of 
accruals-based earnings management. This may be attributed to the fact that firms with higher 
levels of receivables and inventories are more capable of managing earnings through accruals. 
Further, this positive association provides support for hypothesis H1.13a.  
 
The table shows that firms in the materials, industrials, and information technology industries in 
MENA countries engage in lower levels of accruals-based earning management, while firms in the 
mobile telecommunications industry engage in higher accruals-based earnings management. The 
coefficients for the real estate industry show mixed results. It is possible that the mobile 
telecommunications industry in MENA countries suffers from inherently higher information 
asymmetry and agency costs that lead to higher levels of accruals-based earnings management 
activities. Further, this industry may be riskier in terms of being more susceptible to economic, 
political, and international events and more competitive compared with its counterparts. It is 
possible that this industry is more susceptible to the high political instability that is exhibited by 
MENA country firms, and thus it is characterised by a higher degree of accruals-based earnings 
management. On the other hand, the materials, industrials, and information technology industries 
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are likely to be less risky and less competitive, and are possibly characterized by lower information 
asymmetry which result in lower opportunities for accruals-based earnings management. The 
significant impact of industry membership upon the extent of accruals-based earnings management 
provides support for hypothesis H1.14a.   
 
The table shows that financial development is an insignificant determinant across the models. 
Thus, there is no evidence to support hypothesis H1.15a.  
 
On the other hand, GDP growth is significantly associated with discretionary accruals for firms in 
MENA countries. GDP growth is positively associated with discretionary accruals and the 
relationship is consistent and significant at the 1% level across all measures of accruals-based 
earnings management. This provides strong evidence of a positive relationship between economic 
growth and accruals-based earnings management. It is possible that MENA country firms engage 
in higher accruals-based earnings management activity during periods of economic growth since 
analysts and investors are likely to expect firms to perform well since the economy is growing. If 
a firm’s profit is lagging behind the growth rate of the economy, investors may become dissuaded 
from investing in this firm. Therefore, firms may engage in greater earnings management to 
maintain the returns expected of them by analysts and investors as the economy continues to grow. 
It is also possible that since MENA countries are characterised by high corruption, a weak rule of 
law, and political instability, then higher economic growth in MENA countries may encourage 
firms to engage in earnings management activity since it is easier to conduct such behaviour and 
escape detection.   
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This positive coefficient does not provide support for the research findings of Gopalan and 
Jayaraman (2012) in a study of 22 countries and Cohen et al. (2008) in a study of US firms, who 
find a negative relationship. However, this positive association provides support for hypothesis 
H1.16a.  
 
The GIF index variable is significant and positively associated with discretionary accruals 
computed from the Kasznik Model at the 5% level. This positive coefficient provides weak 
evidence that the six country-level index variables which are political stability, the control of 
corruption, the rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and regulatory 
quality are associated with a higher degree of accruals-based earnings management of firms in the 
MENA region. As these scores increase, information asymmetry and agency costs are expected to 
decline. Thus, an increase in these country-level index variables should be expected to curb 
earnings management behaviour. However, it is possible that the increase in these variables also 
results in improved economic conditions for MENA countries, and these improved economic 
conditions are shown to be associated with a higher degree of accruals-based earnings 
management. A positive coefficient is consistent with the research findings of Lemma et al. (2013) 
who find that firms in countries with higher GIF Index scores have a higher likelihood of engaging 
in accruals-based earnings management in a study of 44 countries across the world. Further, this 
positive association provides support for hypothesis H1.18a. Further, hypothesis H1 is supported 
since evidence is found that earnings management is affected by firm-specific and country-level 
factors.  
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The coefficient for the GCC variable is insignificant across all of the discretionary accruals models. 
This suggests that there are no significant differences between the discretionary accruals levels of 
GCC and non-GCC country firms. The insignificant coefficients in relation to the interaction 
between the GCC variable and firm size, leverage, ROA, asset tangibility, the dividend payout 
ratio, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, and ownership concentration indicate that there are 
no significant differences between the two regions in terms of their earnings management 
behaviour as impacted by these firm-level determinants.  
 
On the other hand, the interaction between the GCC variable and growth opportunities is 
significantly negative at the 5% level for the Kasznik Model. This suggests that higher growth 
opportunities in GCC country firms lead to lower discretionary accruals compared with non-GCC 
country firms. The interaction between free cash flow and the GCC variable is significant and 
negatively associated with all of the measures of discretionary accruals at the 5% level for the 
Modified Jones Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model, and 
significant at the 1% level for the Kasznik Model. This coefficient indicates that higher free cash 
flows in GCC country firms lead to lower discretionary accruals compared with non-GCC 
countries. The interaction between the GCC variable and earnings management flexibility is 
significant at the 1% level for discretionary accruals computed from the Kasznik Model. The 
coefficient is negative and indicates that higher earnings management flexibility in GCC country 
firms leads to lower discretionary accruals compared with non-GCC country firms. GCC countries 
outperform non-GCC countries in various socio-economic indicators, and are the leading Arab 
countries based on average income per capita. Further, Kern (2012) argues that the development 
of financial markets has been a policy objective of countries in the Gulf region. In addition, GCC 
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countries have made significant progress in strengthening financial market regulation and 
oversight. Thus, as a result of having stricter regulation compared with non-GCC countries, it is 
possible that GCC country firms encounter greater difficulty engaging in accruals-based earnings 
management compared with non-GCC country firms.  
 
Overall, all four accruals-based earnings management models are significant at the 1% level and 
the Kasznik Model is shown to have the highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 
18.6%.  
 
Table 5.4 presents the results of firm-level determinants of accruals-based earnings management 
in the absence of country-level and interaction variables.  
 
Table 5.4 Firm-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings Management  
  Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected 
Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.069 -0.068 -0.051 -0.052  
 (-3.20)*** (-3.84)*** (-2.51)** (-2.49)**  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 - 
 (0.22) (0.16) (-0.06) (0.07)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 - 
 (-0.94) (-2.88)*** (-0.89) (-0.49)  
𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.069 0.071 0.061 0.058 + 
 (6.98)*** (8.25)*** (6.17)*** (6.00)***  
𝑮𝑶 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 + 
 (-3.54)*** (-4.83)*** (-3.34)*** (-3.72)***  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-1.32) (-0.54) (-1.20) (-1.17)  
𝑹𝑶𝑨 0.290 0.380 -0.057 -0.023 + 
 (10.77)*** (15.30)*** (-2.10)** (-0.89)  
𝑨𝑻 -0.016 -0.018 -0.000 0.011 - 
 (-2.20)** (-2.76)*** (-0.03) (1.48)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-1.44) (-3.79)*** (-1.78)* (-2.18)**  
𝑶𝑪 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.003 + 
 (2.84)*** (5.70)*** (2.15)** (1.28)  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
 (3.82)*** (2.05)** (3.44)*** (3.51)***  
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 - 
 (0.51) (0.46) (0.73) (0.52)  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 + 
 (-0.21) (0.57) (-0.39) (-0.35)  
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Table 5.4 Firm-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings Management 
(continued) 
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected 
Sign 
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.069 0.047 0.063 0.075 + 
 (6.43)*** (5.26)*** (5.89)*** (7.07)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 -0.002 -0.011 -0.006 -0.003 + or - 
 (-0.23) (-1.47) (-0.72) (-0.33)  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.024 -0.022 -0.008 -0.013 + or - 
 (-3.63)*** (-3.81)*** (-1.25) (-2.00)**  
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.012 -0.015 -0.002 -0.006 + or - 
 (-1.70) (-2.54)** (-0.40) (-0.87)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 
0.005 -0.005 0.012 0.008 + or - 
 (0.55) (-0.49) (1.68)* (1.03)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 
-0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 + or - 
 (-0.65) (-1.42) (-0.69) (-1.08)  
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 -0.00 -0.005 0.010 -0.005 + or - 
 (-0.12) (-0.92) (1.29) (-0.22)  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 0.028 -0.008 -0.035 0.005 + or - 
 (2.43)** (-0.96) (-3.14)*** (0.56)  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  
𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒚 
-0.018 -0.031 -0.027 -0.023 + or - 
 (-1.58) (-3.23)*** (-2.51)** (-2.22)**  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆  
𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 
0.004 0.008 0.028 0.018 + or - 
 (0.67) (1.41) (3.27)*** (2.24)**  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.115 0.164 0.072 0.064  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 3,081 3,081 3,081 3,081  
This table measures the impact of firm-level variables on accruals-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using a pooled regression. 
Discretionary accruals are measured using the cash flow statement approach and are computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the 
Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model. The utilities industry is used as the reference for the industry membership dummy variables. 
The year 1997 is used as the reference year for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. IFRS refers to IFRS adoption which 
receives a value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured 
as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow measured as cash 
earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT 
refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables 
period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of 
the number of common shares outstanding; Suspect refers to the suspect firms variable which receives a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled 
by total assets greater than or equal to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the 
sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. 
 
The analysis of the firm-level determinants of accruals-based earnings management is broadly 
consistent with the results reported for the firm-level and country-level determinants with 
interaction variables. Firm size and growth opportunities are still found to be significantly 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals. Leverage, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-
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Score, and earnings management flexibility are still shown to be significantly positively associated 
with discretionary accruals.  
 
In this model, however, asset tangibility is shown to be significantly negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model at the 5% level and significantly 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals computed from the Kasznik Model at the 1% 
level. The coefficients for the Kothari et al. and Raman and Shahrur Models are insignificant and 
this may be attributed to the differences between these models. The Kothari et al. Model controls 
for profitability while the Raman and Shahrur Model controls for growth opportunities in addition 
to profitability unlike the Modified Jones Model and the Kasznik Model. This negative coefficient 
provides weak evidence that is consistent with the argument that the ability of managers to exercise 
discretion over reported earnings depends on the levels of current and non-current assets and 
liabilities (Sun and Rath, 2009). Thus, a higher level of asset tangibility likely limits the ability of 
managers to engage in accruals-based earnings management since a higher proportion of non-
current assets relative to current assets curbs the ability of managers to engage in accruals-based 
earnings management since they have less manoeuvre room. The negative association between 
discretionary accruals and asset tangibility provides support for hypothesis H1.7a.   
 
Further, the coefficient for the dividend payout ratio is shown to be significant and negative at the 
1% level in relation to the Kasznik Model, as well as being significant and negative at the 5% level 
in relation to the Raman and Shahrur Model. Similarly, the coefficient is negative when 
discretionary accruals are measured from the Kothari et al. Model, but significant at the 10% level. 
The different levels of significance across the models may be attributed to the fact that the Kasznik 
182 
 
Model controls for the change in cash flows while the Raman and Shahrur Model controls for 
profitability and growth opportunities. It is possible that firms characterised by higher profitability, 
growth opportunities, and cash flows pay higher dividends and thus the inclusion of these variables 
in the model impacts upon the significance level.   
 
Thus, there is weak evidence that the higher the dividend payout ratios of firms in MENA 
countries, the lower the degree of accruals-based earnings management, which is likely as a result 
of earnings of firms increasing due to earnings management leading firms to become more 
attractive to investors. However, these earnings do not reflect the true financial position of firms 
and the cash flow component of earnings is unlikely to grow as fast as the accruals component of 
earnings. Thus, the ability of these firms to pay dividends diminishes and dividend payout ratios 
decline (Chansarn and Chansarn, 2016). Another possible explanation is that MENA country firms 
make their dividend decisions based on actual earnings rather than managed earnings. Therefore, 
by engaging in earnings management, reported earnings will increase. However, since a portion of 
this reported earnings is managed and not actual earnings, then the dividend payout ratio will 
consequently decline. 
 
This negative coefficient contrasts with the argument that earnings management is often conducted 
to maintain a desired payout ratio or to meet certain dividend thresholds since the payout ratio is 
considered a signal of future growth prospects of a firm (Miller and Rock, 1985; Ambarish et al., 
1987). This negative coefficient contrasts with the research findings of Kasanen et al. (1996) for 
Finish firms, Kato et al. (2002) for Japanese banks, and Daniel et al. (2008) for US firms, who 
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find a positive relationship. Further, the negative coefficient does not provide support for 
hypothesis H1.8a.  
 
Overall, the table shows that the pooled regression model for firm-level determinants of accruals-
based earnings management is significant at the 1% level for all measures of discretionary accruals 
and that the Kasznik Model has the highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 
16.4%.  
 
Table 5.5 presents the results for the country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings 
management for firms in the MENA region.   
 
Table 5.5 Country-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings Management  
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected 
Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.006 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009  
 (-1.89)* (-4.55)*** (-2.88)*** (-3.25)***  
𝑭𝑫 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 - 
 (0.55) (1.45) (0.02) (-0.25)  
𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 + 
 (4.60)*** (6.30)*** (2.89)*** (3.05)***  
𝑮𝑰𝑭 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 + 
 (-0.19) (-0.02) (0.48) (0.27)  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.007 0.014 0.002 0.002  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.020  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 3,081 3,081 3,081 3,081  
This table measures the impact of country-level variables on accruals-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using a pooled 
regression. Discretionary accruals are measured using the cash flow statement approach and are computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik 
Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and 
* represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-
level and are reported between brackets. FD refers to financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic 
product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the percentage change in GDP per capita across years; and GIF refers to the governance and 
infrastructure index variable. 
 
When country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings management are investigated in the 
absence of firm-level determinants and interaction variables, the results do not change. Financial 
development is still found to be an insignificant determinant of accruals-based earnings 
184 
 
management. There is still strong evidence that GDP growth is positively associated with 
discretionary accruals. However, in this model, the GIF index variable is found to be an 
insignificant determinant of accruals-based earnings management. Therefore, the evidence in 
relation to the association between this variable and discretionary accruals remains weak.  
 
Overall, only the Modified Jones Model and the Kasznik Model are significant at the 1% level. 
The Kothari et al. Model and the Raman and Shahrur Model are significant at the 5% level. The 
Kasznik Model is found to have the highest explanatory power based on an R Squared Statistic of 
1.4%.  
 
Table 5.6 presents the analysis for the firm-level and country-level determinants of accruals-based 
earnings management.  
 
Table 5.6 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings 
Management  
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected 
Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.070 -0.071 -0.058 -0.056  
 (-3.25)*** (-4.15)*** (-2.59)** (-2.55)**  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 - 
 (-1.05) (-1.87)* (-1.15) (-1.02)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 - 
 (-1.98)** (-4.25)*** (-1.75)* (-1.59)  
𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.067 0.069 0.059 0.056 + 
 (6.81)*** (7.98)*** (6.03)*** (5.85)***  
𝑮𝑶 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 + 
 (-3.34)*** (-4.54)*** (-3.16)*** (-3.50)***  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-1.22) (-0.38) (-1.05) (-1.04)  
𝑹𝑶𝑨 0.281 0.369 -0.066 -0.033 + 
 (10.50)*** (14.98)*** (-2.47)** (-1.27)  
𝑨𝑻 -0.014 -0.015 0.000 0.011 - 
 (-2.05)** (-2.50)** (0.08) (1.60)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-1.38) (-3.68)*** (-1.67)* (-2.08)**  
𝑶𝑪 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.002 + 
 (2.24)** (5.11)*** (1.71)* (0.88)  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
 (3.57)*** (1.63) (3.21)*** (3.28)***  
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Table 5.6 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings 
Management (continued) 
 Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 Expected 
Sign 
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 - 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12)  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 -0.000 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 + 
 (-0.04) (0.76) (-0.22) (-0.17)  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.077 0.057 0.072 0.083 + 
 (7.06)*** (6.32)*** (6.55)*** (7.67)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 -0.000 -0.009 -0.004 -0.000 + or - 
 (-0.03) (-1.22) (-0.51) (-0.09)  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.023 -0.020 -0.006 -0.011 + or - 
 (-3.36)*** (-3.47)*** (-0.97) (-1.68)*  
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.011 -0.015 -0.002 -0.004 + or - 
 (-1.69)* (-2.55)** (-0.36) (-0.73)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 
0.005 -0.001 0.013 0.008 + or - 
 (0.71) (-0.31) (1.85)* (1.21)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 
-0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 + or - 
 (-0.46) (-1.18) (-0.49) (-0.87)  
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 -0.005 -0.006 0.011 -0.002 + or - 
 (-0.08) (-0.91) (1.35) (-0.16)  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 0.029 -0.007 -0.034 0.007 + or - 
 (2.53)** (-0.84) (-3.04)*** (0.68)  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  
𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒚 
-0.017 -0.029 -0.026 -0.022 + or - 
 (-1.51) (-3.15)*** (-2.43)** (-2.12)**  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆  
𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 
0.007 0.011 0.029 0.020 + or - 
 (0.87) (1.62) (3.43)*** (2.45)**  
𝑭𝑫 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
 (0.78) (1.81)* (0.54) (0.45)  
𝑮𝑫𝑷 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 + 
 (3.86)*** (5.34)*** (4.24)*** (4.16)***  
𝑮𝑰𝑭 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 + 
 (1.10) (1.32) (0.82) (1.05)  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.120 0.175 0.078 0.070  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 3,081 3,081 3,081 3,081  
This table measures the impact of firm-level and country-level variables on accruals-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using 
a pooled regression. Discretionary accruals are measured using the cash flow statement approach and are computed from the Modified Jones Model, 
the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model. The utilities industry is used as the reference for the industry 
membership dummy variables. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. 
IFRS refers to IFRS adoption which receives a value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales 
revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; 
FCF refers to free cash flow measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets 
measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR 
refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm 
of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured 
as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; Suspect refers to the suspect firms variable which 
receives a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled by total assets greater than or equal to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; and EMFLEX 
refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. FD refers to financial development 
measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the percentage change in GDP 
per capita across years; and GIF refers to the governance and infrastructure index variable.  
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When firm-level and country-level variables are combined into a single model, the results do not 
differ in terms of the coefficients for GDP growth, leverage, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-
Score, and earnings management flexibility, which are still shown in Table 5.6 to be significantly 
positively associated with discretionary accruals. Firm size, growth opportunities, the dividend 
payout ratio, and asset tangibility are still found to be significantly negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. The same associations are also found for industry membership. IFRS 
adoption is still found to be an insignificant determinant in relation to the Modified Jones Model, 
the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model. The coefficient is significant in 
relation to the Kasznik Model, but only at the 10% level. Free cash flow, ownership concentration, 
and the suspect firms variable are still found to be insignificant determinants. Further, the energy, 
consumer staples, and healthcare industries are found to be insignificant determinants, while the 
coefficient for the consumer discretionary industry is only significant at the 10% level in relation 
to the Kothari et al. Model.  
 
Overall, all of the accruals-based earnings management models are significant at the 1% level. The 
Kasznik Model is found to have the highest explanatory power as reflected by an R Squared 
statistic of 17.5%.  
 
As shown in Appendix H-1, when the six country-level index variables are added to the regression 
model separately rather than employing Principal Component Analysis to aggregate them into a 
single score, the results in relation to the other firm-level and country-level variables remain 
consistent with the previously discussed models. This provides additional evidence of the 
robustness of the results. Moreover, the results show that voice and accountability, political 
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stability, and the rule of law are insignificant determinants of accruals-based earnings 
management. In contrast, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the control of 
corruption index are shown to be significantly positively associated with discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model at the 1% level. The results in relation to the other 
discretionary accruals models are consistent with the results found for the Modified Jones Model 
and are thus omitted from the appendix to avoid repetition. These results show that the positive 
association in relation to the GIF index variable is the result of government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, and the control of corruption. These findings do not provide support for 
hypothesis H1.17a, and contrast with the argument that as these scores improve, information 
asymmetry and agency problems diminish, thereby mitigating the degree of earnings management. 
These results, therefore, suggest that as regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and the 
control of corruption index strengthen, economic conditions likely improve leading to a greater 
degree of accruals-based earnings management by firms to avoid lagging behind the economy’s 
growth rate.   
 
There are several important results based on the findings presented in this chapter. Based on strong 
evidence, economic growth is positively associated with the degree of accruals-based earnings 
management. This finding provides support for the argument that the degree of accruals-based 
earnings management behaviour is impacted upon by the changing economic environment in 
which firms operate. Similarly, there is weak evidence that the country-level index variables are 
associated with a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management. In contrast to the 
argument that as country-level variables improve, information asymmetry and agency costs 
decline and consequently earnings management behaviour diminishes, these findings indicate that 
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improved economic conditions are associated with a greater degree of accruals-based earnings 
management, which is particularly important for regulators. Further, it is important to recognize 
that there is strong evidence that larger and growing firms engage in a lower degree of accruals-
based earnings management, while higher leveraged firms engage in a higher degree of accruals-
based earnings management.  
 
The results presented and discussed in this chapter are of importance particularly to regulators, 
auditors, and lenders. According to Dechow and Skinner (2000), regulators perceive earnings 
management as being pervasive and problematic. Therefore, national policy makers and regulators 
can use these results to drive down earnings management to lower asymmetry and the cost of 
capital of companies in their country. According to Healy and Wahlen (1998), standard setters and 
regulators must decide how much judgment to allow management to exercise in financial 
reporting. Therefore, regulators may be interested in the evidence presented in this thesis on how 
firm-level and country-level factors impact upon the use or misuse of the judgment permitted under 
accounting standards by managers of MENA country firms. These results can help auditors 
become more cautious when auditing firms, and analysts can make more accurate assessments of 
the performance and risk of MENA country firms, which may have augmented or reduced their 
earnings through accruals-based earnings management. Further, lenders can make more informed 
decisions regarding advancing loans to firms if they are aware of the likelihood that such firms 
have manipulated their earnings, or otherwise, through accruals-based earnings management.  
 
Table 5.7 summarizes which accruals-based earnings management hypotheses are accepted or 
rejected based on the regression results presented in this chapter.  
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Table 5.7 Summary of the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Number Accept/Reject 
H1 Accept 
H1.1a Reject 
H1.2a Accept 
H1.3a Reject 
H1.4a Reject 
H1.5a Reject 
H1.6a Accept 
H1.7a Accept 
H1.8a Reject 
H1.9a Accept 
H1.10a Reject 
H1.11a Reject 
H1.12a Reject 
H1.13a Accept 
H1.14a Accept 
H1.15a Reject 
H1.16a Accept 
H1.17a Reject 
H1.18a Accept 
 
Table 5.7 shows that hypothesis H1 is supported by the research results since firm-level and 
country-level factors are shown to impact upon the extent of accruals-based earnings management. 
Hypotheses H1.1a in relation to IFRS adoption, H1.5a in relation to free cash flow, H1.12a in 
relation to the suspect firms variable, and H1.15a in relation to financial development are not 
supported since the respective variable coefficients are insignificant. Hypothesis H1.2a in relation 
to firm size and H1.7a in relation to asset tangibility are supported since they are negatively 
associated with discretionary accruals. Hypothesis H1.6a in relation to profitability, H1.9a in 
relation to the operating cycle, H1.13a in relation to earnings management flexibility, H1.16a in 
relation to GDP growth, and H1.18a in relation to the GIF index variable are supported by the 
research findings. These variables are found to be positively associated with discretionary accruals. 
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Further, hypothesis H1.14a in relation to industry membership is supported since industry 
membership is found to have an impact upon the degree of accruals-based earnings management. 
In contrast, hypothesis H1.3a in relation to leverage, H1.4a in relation to growth opportunities, 
H1.8a in relation to the dividend payout ratio, H1.10a in relation to Altman’s Z-Score, H1.11a in 
relation to ownership concentration, and H1.17a in relation to the country-level index variables are 
not supported by the research findings.  
 
5.5 Summary 
To summarize, this chapter presents and discusses the results of the accruals-based earnings 
management models. The discretionary accruals models are the Modified Jones Model, the 
Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model computed using the 
cash flow statement approach. Since the inclusion of all six country-level index variables in a 
single regression model is not possible due to a potential problem of multicollinearity, two 
approaches are employed. The first is the use of Principal Component Analysis in which all six 
index variables are aggregated into a single score. The second is the inclusion of each variable in 
the model separately. A pooled cross-sectional regression is used to analyse the determinants of 
accruals-based earnings management in a firm-level model, a country-level model, a model which 
combines both firm-specific and country-specific factors, and the main model in which interaction 
variables are employed to distinguish between GCC and non-GCC country firms.  
 
A correlation analysis is conducted by computing a Pearson Correlation Matrix and VIFs are 
computed to test for multicollinearity. The results show that there is no significant problem of 
multicollinearity present across the model variables.  
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The descriptive statistics show that, on average, discretionary accruals, firm size, the dividend 
payout ratio, and Altman’s Z-Score do not differ significantly between GCC and non-GCC country 
firms, while GDP growth and overall country level index variables are significantly higher in GCC 
countries compared with non-GCC countries. On the other hand, non-GCC country firms 
experience significantly higher financial development compared with GCC country firms. Further, 
GCC country firms are found to be more profitable and hold a higher level of net fixed assets as a 
proportion of total assets, whereas non-GCC country firms hold a higher sum of receivable and 
inventories as a proportion of total assets and are characterised by higher growth opportunities. 
Moreover, non-GCC country firms are characterised by significantly higher ownership 
concentration compared with GCC country firms. Non-GCC country firms also hold higher free 
cash flows than GCC country firms, while GCC country firms are characterised by higher leverage.   
 
Regarding firm-level determinants of accruals-based earnings management, firm size, growth 
opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, and asset tangibility are found to be negatively associated 
with discretionary accruals, while leverage, profitability, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, 
and earnings management flexibility are found to be positively associated with discretionary 
accruals. Industry membership is found to impact upon discretionary accruals and the results of 
the four accruals-based earnings management models are broadly consistent across the models. 
IFRS adoption, free cash flow, the suspect firm’s variable, ownership concentration, and financial 
development are found to be insignificant determinants. The Kasznik Model is found to provide 
the highest explanatory power based on its R Squared statistic. Regarding country-level 
determinants of accruals-based earnings management, GDP growth and the GIF Index variable are 
both shown to be positively associated with discretionary accruals. 
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The regression results also show that while there are no significant differences in the discretionary 
accruals levels between GCC and non-GCC country firms, these two regions differ in terms of 
their accruals-based earnings management behaviour in relation to growth opportunities, free cash 
flow, and earnings management flexibility as interaction variables. The research hypotheses in 
relation to firm size, profitability, asset tangibility, the operating cycle, earnings management 
flexibility, industry membership, GDP growth, and the GIF Index variable as determinants of 
accruals-based earnings management are supported by the research findings. Conversely, the 
research hypotheses in relation to leverage, growth opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, and 
Altman’s Z-Score are not supported by the research findings. The research hypotheses in relation 
to IFRS adoption, free cash flow, the suspect firms variable, ownership concentration, and 
financial development are not supported since the respective variable coefficients are found to be 
insignificant.  
 
Further, when the six country-level index variables are included in the model separately, the results 
show that government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the control of corruption index are 
positively associated with discretionary accruals, while the rule of law, political stability, and voice 
and accountability are insignificant determinants.   
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Chapter VI Results of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the results of the real activities-based earnings management 
models. There are six real earnings management models analysed and reported which are: (i) 
abnormal cash flows from operations (ACFO); (ii) abnormal discretionary expenditures (ADISX); 
(iii) abnormal production costs (APROD); and three aggregate measures of real earnings 
management which are (iv) aggregate proxy 1 (RM1); (v) aggregate proxy 2 (RM2); and (vi) 
aggregate proxy 3 (RM3). The ACFO Model examines whether firms conduct real earnings 
management by providing more lenient credit terms or increasing price discounts to raise sales 
levels (Roychowdhury, 2006). The ADISX Model examines whether real earnings management is 
conducted by means of reducing discretionary expenditures such as research and development, 
advertising, and selling, general, and administrative expenses in order to increase margins 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). The APROD Model examines whether real earnings management is 
conducted by means of reducing cost of goods sold through the overproduction of inventory. 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). RM1 aggregates abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal 
production costs. RM2 aggregates abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal 
discretionary expenditures. RM3 aggregates all three models.   
 
Consistent with the analysis of the accruals-based earnings management models, the research 
findings are reported in this chapter for a pooled cross-sectional regression model. A panel 
regression does not show the potential effects of industry membership and the GCC variable on 
earnings management, and thus the results reported in this chapter are for the pooled regression 
model. The Hausman test is employed to identify whether a fixed-effects or random-effects 
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regression is appropriate and the results show that a fixed-effects regression should be employed. 
Thus, as a further test of robustness, a fixed-effects regression is used and the results are broadly 
consistent with the findings reported for the pooled cross-sectional regression. A stepwise 
regression is also used to test the robustness of the results, and is included in appendix C-2. The 
results of the stepwise regression are broadly consistent with the results reported in this chapter.  
 
The analysis is conducted for firms in the MENA region. This dataset includes a sample of firms 
from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The analysis of the determinants of real earnings management begins with 
a model that examines firm-level and country-level determinants of real earnings management 
with dummy and interaction variables that distinguish between GCC and non-GCC country firms. 
This model also includes discretionary accruals to examine the substitutability, or otherwise, of 
the earnings management techniques. As further analysis, a model is then discussed that examines 
the firm-level determinants of real earnings management. This is followed by a model that 
examines the country-level determinants. Following this, discretionary accruals are employed in 
the firm-level model to examine the substitutability, or otherwise, of earnings management 
techniques in the absence of country-level and interaction variables. Firm-level and country-level 
determinants are then combined in a single model to examine their joint effect.  
 
This chapter examines the substitutability of earnings management techniques by employing 
discretionary accruals measured using the Modified Jones Model as an independent variable in the 
real earnings management models. Authors in the literature that examine this association employ 
the Modified Jones Model. Therefore, consistent with the literature, the discussion focuses on this 
model. The firm-specific and country-level determinants of real earnings management are 
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examined to address the research question: what are the firm-specific and country-level 
determinants of real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region? In 
addition, the discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model are employed in the 
real earnings management models to address the research question: are accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management techniques used as substitutes or complements by firms in 
the MENA region?  
 
Consistent with Chapter 5, two approaches are employed to avoid the potential multicollinearity 
problem associated with the country-level index variables. The first approach is the use of Principal 
Component Analysis to aggregate the index variables into a single score. The second approach is 
the inclusion of each variable in the regression model separately. The results of this approach are 
included in Appendix H-2 and are discussed following the discussion of the results of the Principal 
Component Analysis model.  
 
Section 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the real activities-based earnings management 
models for firms in the MENA region. In section 6.3, the correlation analysis and multicollinearity 
diagnostics for the model variables are presented whereby the results of the Pearson Correlation 
Matrix and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are reported. Section 6.4 presents a discussion of 
the regression results for the model variables which begins with a discussion of the firm-level and 
country-level determinants with interaction and dummy variables. Finally, section 6.5 presents a 
summary of the chapter.  
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Real Earnings Management Model Variables  
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the model variables. The mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown for the dependent variables. T Statistics are 
also reported to identify any potential significant differences between GCC and non-GCC country 
firms. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are consistent with the results reported 
in the previous chapter and are almost identical, and thus are omitted from this chapter to avoid 
repetition. The descriptive statistics are presented for firms in the MENA region. In addition, the 
descriptive statistics are presented for firms in GCC countries and non-GCC countries separately. 
GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Non-GCC countries include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.   
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Real Earnings Management Model Variables  
 𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑵𝒐𝒏 − 𝑮𝑪𝑪  𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑨 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 T-Statistics 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 
𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 -0.035 -0.030 0.106 -0.500 0.384 -0.016 -0.015 0.118 -0.509 0.473 (2.344)** -0.028 -0.025 0.111 -0.509 0.473 
𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 -0.009 -0.003 0.060 -0.223 0.217 0.007 0.007 0.056 -0.219 0.214 (-7.141)*** -0.003 0.000 0.059 -0.223 0.217 
𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 -0.044 -0.043 0.120 -0.879 0.589 -0.029 -0.025 0.116 -0.416 0.590 (-3.203)*** -0.038 -0.035 0.119 -0.879 0.590 
𝑹𝑴𝟏 -0.079 -0.075 0.200 -0.775 0.711 -0.046 -0.044 0.207 -0.766 0.717 (-4.092)*** -0.067 -0.060 0.203 -0.775 0.717 
𝑹𝑴𝟐 -0.044 -0.045 0.124 -0.497 0.456 -0.009 -0.014 0.130 -0.429 0.457 (-6.879)*** -0.031 -0.035 0.127 -0.497 0.457 
𝑹𝑴𝟑 -0.088 -0.088 0.225 -0.820 0.820 -0.038 -0.040 0.225 -0.746 0.771 (-5.561)*** -0.070 -0.068 0.226 -0.820 0.820 
Number of Observations 2,729 
This table presents the descriptive statistic for the real activities-based earnings management dependent variables. The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are presented in the columns for the 
GCC country firms, non-GCC country firms, and the MENA region combined. The t-statistics column reports the t-statistics between brackets to identify the potential significant differences between GCC and non-GCC 
country firms. ***, **, and * refer to the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Non-GCC 
countries include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The number of observations for the real activities-based earnings management models is reported. ACFO refers to abnormal cash flows from operations scaled by lagged 
total assets; ADISX refers to abnormal discretionary expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; APROD refers to abnormal production costs scaled by lagged total assets; RM1 refers to aggregate proxy 1; RM2 refers to 
aggregate proxy 2; and RM3 refers to aggregate proxy 3. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenditures are multiplied by -1 so that higher levels of the earnings management measures 
indicate higher levels of upward real earnings management behaviour. Therefore, a larger mean 
value indicates a higher degree of real earnings management on average. Further, negative mean 
values indicate income decreasing real earnings management on average.  
 
The descriptive statistics show that on average ACFO are significantly higher at the 5% level in 
non-GCC country firms, with a mean of -0.016 compared with a mean of -0.035 for GCC country 
firms. This suggests that non-GCC country firms engage in a greater degree of real earnings 
management behaviour through issuing price discounts and providing more lenient credit terms 
which lead to lower abnormal cash flows compared with GCC country firms. ADISX are 
significantly higher at the 1% level in non-GCC country firms compared with GCC country firms. 
The mean for ADISX is -0.009 for GCC country firms and 0.007 for non-GCC country firms. This 
suggests that non-GCC country firms engage in higher real earnings management behaviour by 
reducing discretionary expenditures compared with GCC country firms. APROD is shown to be 
significantly higher at the 1% level on average in non-GCC country firms compared with GCC 
country firms. The mean for GCC country firms is -0.044 compared with a mean of -0.029, which 
indicates that non-GCC country firms engage in greater real earnings management by 
overproducing inventory to lower cost of goods sold which leads to higher abnormal production 
costs compared with GCC country firms. Further, MENA country firms engage in a greater degree 
of income-decreasing real earnings management on average. 
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On the aggregate level, the degree of real earnings management also significantly differs between 
GCC and non-GCC country firms. RM1, RM2, and RM3 are significantly higher in non-GCC 
country firms compared with GCC country firms at the 1% level. The mean for RM1 is -0.079 for 
GCC country firms and -0.046 for non-GCC country firms. The mean for RM2 in relation to GCC 
country firms is -0.044 compared with a mean of -0.009 in non-GCC country firms. The mean for 
RM3 in GCC country firms is -0.088 compared with a mean value of -0.038 for non-GCC country 
firms. These results suggest that on the aggregate level, the extent of employing real earnings 
management techniques is higher in non-GCC country firms compared with GCC country firms 
since the aggregate proxies of real earnings management are on average higher for non-GCC 
country firms compared with GCC country firms. The minimum and maximum values do not differ 
greatly at the aggregate level between the two regions. The standard deviations of the aggregate 
proxies are slightly higher for non-GCC country firms, indicating greater volatility. 
 
6.3 Correlation Analysis and Multicollinearity Diagnostics of the Real Earnings 
Management Model Variables  
To conduct a correlation analysis, a Pearson Correlation Matrix is computed and is shown in Table 
6.2. To test for multicollinearity across the real activities-based earnings management model 
variables, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is computed and presented in Table 6.3. Consistent 
with Stine (1995) and Siregar and Utama (2008), a VIF larger than the threshold of 10 is considered 
to signal high multicollinearity. 
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Table 6.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Real Earnings Management Model Variables  
 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴 𝑫𝑨 𝑭𝑫 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑮𝑰𝑭 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑳𝒆𝒗 𝑮𝑶 𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑹𝑶𝑨 𝑨𝑻 𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑶𝑪 𝒁𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 
𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 1                   
𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 .028 1                  
𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 .561** .419** 1                 
𝑹𝑴 .875** .261** .892** 1                
𝑫𝑨 .567** .001 .120** .380** 1               
𝑭𝑫 -.052** .015 .004 -.026 .032 1              
𝑮𝑫𝑷 -.056** .060** .016 -.022 .105** .171** 1             
𝑮𝑰𝑭 -.040* -.093** -.031 -.040* .007 .177** .165** 1            
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 .009 .076** .011 .011 .021 -.227** .129** -.235** 1           
𝑳𝒆𝒗 .205** .000 .082** .160** -.008 -.051** -.006 .047* .192** 1          
𝑮𝑶 -.051** .023 -.003 -.029 -.030 .002 .007 .000 -.052** -.002 1         
𝑭𝑪𝑭 -.039* .053** -.001 -.022 -.028 .016 .004 -.019 .042* -.049* -.021 1        
𝑹𝑶𝑨 -.458** .115** -.342** -.450** .217** -.002 .131** -.034 .225** -.355** .088** .088** 1       
𝑨𝑻 -.225** -.052** -.214** -.248** -.102** -.093** .054** -.041* .089** .235** -.037 -.049* -.017 1      
𝑫𝑷𝑹 -.246** .068** -.149** -.222** .026 .011 .067** -.032 .181** -.252** .080** .050** .504** -.048* 1     
𝑶𝑪 .110** -.128** -.024 .046* .080** -.023 -.049* -.104** -.168** .033 -.025 -.031 -.235** -.222** -.212** 1    
𝒁𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 -.226** -.001 -.170** -.223** .087** .128** .051** -.014 -.118** -.486** .150** .022 .375** -.078** .215** -.028 1   
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 -.056** -.112** -.022 -.044* -.067** -.133** -.100** .156** .453** .112** -.024 -.047* -.027 .033 -.005 -.071** -.113** 1  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝒍𝑬𝑿 .380** .120** .271** .366** .160** -.079** -.074** -.156** .036 .038* .047* .041* -.030 -.441** -.027 .374** -.124** -.323** 1 
This table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for the real activities-based earnings management model variables for firms in the MENA region. ACFO refers to abnormal cash flows from operations; 
ADISX refers to abnormal discretionary expenditures; APROD refers to abnormal production costs; RM refers to the real earnings management aggregate proxy (RM1); DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model; FD refers to financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the 
percentage change in GDP per capita across years; GIF refers to the governance and infrastructure index variable; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage 
measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as cash earnings per share net of capital 
expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the 
receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; 
and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. ** represent correlations significant at the 0.01 level and * represents 
correlations significant at the 0.05 level. The VIFs reported in Table 6.5 show that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity across the real activities-based earnings management models.  
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The Pearson Correlation Matrix shows that discretionary accruals are significantly positively 
correlated with ACFO, APROD, and RM1 at the 1% level. This suggests that accruals-based 
earnings management and real activities-based earnings management techniques are potentially 
used as complements rather than as substitutes by firms in the MENA region. Financial 
development is significantly negatively correlated with ACFO at the 1% level, potentially 
indicating that higher financial development is associated with lower levels of real earnings 
management. GDP growth is shown to be significantly negatively correlated with ACFO at the 
1% level, and significantly positively correlated with ADISX at the 1% level. The GIF Index 
variable is shown to be significantly negatively correlated with ACFO, ADISX, and RM1 at the 
5%, 1%, and 5% levels, respectively, which potentially suggests that country-level factors such as 
political stability, the control of corruption, voice and accountability, the rule of law, government 
effectiveness, and regulatory quality may reduce the extent of real earnings management as these 
scores improve.  
 
The correlation between firm size and ADISX is significant and negative at the 1% level, 
potentially indicating a negative association between the degree of real earnings management and 
firm size. The correlations between leverage and ACFO, APROD, and RM1 are significant and 
positive at the 1% level as shown in Table 6.3. This is consistent with the accruals-based earnings 
management model and may indicate that higher leverage in MENA country firms potentially 
leads to higher real earnings management behaviour. Growth opportunities is shown to be 
significantly negatively correlated with ACFO at the 1% level. Similarly, free cash flow is 
significantly negatively correlated with ACFO at the 1% level, but is significantly positively 
correlated with ADISX at the 1% level.   
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In contrast to the accruals-based earnings management model, ROA is shown to be significantly 
negatively correlated with ACFO, APROD, and RM1 at the 1% level. The correlation between 
ROA and ADISX is significantly positive at the 1% level. This is a possible indication that higher 
profitability results in lower levels of real earnings management in MENA country firms.  
 
Consistent with the accruals-based earnings management model, asset tangibility is shown to be 
significantly negatively correlated with the measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the dividend payout ratio is shown to be significantly negatively correlated with ACFO, 
APROD, and RM1 at the 1% level. These findings are a possible indication that higher asset 
tangibility and higher dividend payout ratios lead to lower real earnings management in MENA 
country firms.  
 
The operating cycle is shown to be significantly positively correlated with ACFO at the 1% level, 
but significantly negatively correlated with ADISX at the 1% level. Altman’s Z-Score is found to 
be significantly negatively correlated with ACFO, APROD, and RM1 at the 1% level. This 
potentially indicates that longer operating cycles and improved financial health in MENA country 
firms lead to lower real earnings management behaviour.  
 
Ownership concentration is found to be significantly negatively correlated with ACFO and ADISX 
at the 1% level, and significantly negatively correlated with RM1 at the 5% level, which may 
indicate a possible negative impact of ownership concentration on real earnings management. In 
contrast, earnings management flexibility is found to be significantly positively correlated with the 
measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. This potentially indicates that as the sum 
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of inventories and receivables as a percentage of total assets increases, firms in MENA countries 
engage in a lower degree of real earnings management. The Pearson Correlation Matrix shows that 
there is no significant problem of multicollinearity present across the real activities-based earnings 
management models. The highest correlation is 0.567 which is between ACFO and discretionary 
accruals. However, this correlation is not strong enough to indicate a significant problem of 
multicollinearity. 
  
To test for multicollinearity, the maximum and mean VIFs computed for the real activities-based 
earnings management models are presented in Table 6.3. The highest VIF value computed is 2.21 
for firm size and the mean VIF across variables is 1.47. A VIF value higher than the threshold of 
10 is considered a problem of multicollinearity. VIF values between the threshold of 5 and 10 are 
potential indicators of multicollinearity. However, all VIF values are significantly lower than the 
threshold of 5 and thus show that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity across the 
real activities-based earnings management model variables. These results further show that 
country-level variables do not cause a significant multicollinearity problem when Principal 
Component Analysis is employed to aggregate the country-level index variables into a single 
score.  
 
6.4 Regression Results for the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
This section presents the regression results for the real activities-based earnings management 
models. Table 6.3 presents the results of the firm-level and country-level determinants of real 
activities-based earnings management with interaction variables.  
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Table 6.3 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Real Activities-Based 
Earnings Management with Interaction Variables  
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 0.195 0.105 0.178 0.375 0.305 0.478  
 (9.05)*** (4.05)*** (3.80)*** (6.47)*** (8.52)*** (6.40)***  
𝑫𝑨 0.912 -0.037 0.239 1.165 0.877 1.118 - 
 (36.92)*** (-2.53)** (4.30)*** (15.75)*** (24.73)*** (12.57)***  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 0.008 0.008 0.031 0.082 0.026 0.038 + 
 (1.61) (1.68)* (2.32)** (2.48)** (2.18)** (2.55)**  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.015 + 
 (3.60)*** (4.3#)*** (1.70)* (2.86)*** (5.32)*** (3.66)***  
𝑳𝑬𝑽 -0.009 -0.021 -0.104 -0.113 -0.030 -0.134 + 
 (-0.81) (-1.97)** (-4.99)*** (-4.29)*** (-2.00)** (-4.19)***  
𝑮𝑶 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 + 
 (0.23) (-3.18)*** (-0.05) (0.03) (-1.30) (-0.51)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + 
 (1.40) (0.82) (1.57) (1.82)* (1.47) (2.15)**  
𝑹𝑶𝑨 -0.923 0.019 -0.890 -1.813 -0.904 -1.794 + 
 (-29.44)*** (0.71) (-16.82)*** (-26.60)*** (-24.00)*** (-22.36)***  
𝑨𝑻 -0.072 -0.012 -0.088 -0.161 -0.085 -0.174 + 
 (-7.93)*** (-1.61) (-5.52)*** (-7.64)*** (-6.92)*** (-6.83)***  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (1.16) (-1.63) (-1.26) (-0.51) (-0.39) (-1.00)  
𝑶𝑪 -0.030 -0.016 -0.039 -0.069 -0.049 -0.088 - 
 (-12.03)*** (-6.57)*** (-7.05)*** (-8.72)*** (-9.39)*** (-9.76)***  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 + 
 (-2.48)** (-0.48) (-2.23)** (-4.22)*** (-4.48)*** (-4.75)***  
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 + 
 (-0.40) (-0.52) (0.51) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.67)  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.002 + 
 (-0.01) (-0.14) (0.32) (0.19) (-0.07) (0.12)  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.088 0.047 0.112 0.202 0.134 0.248 + 
 (8.44)*** (5.31)*** (5.15)*** (7.18)*** (8.19)*** (7.43)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 -0.064 -0.022 -0.059 -0.123 -0.087 -0.146 + or - 
 (-10.13)*** (-3.45)*** (-4.23)*** (-6.86)*** (-8.66)*** (-6.77)***  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 0.012 -0.016 0.015 0.027 -0.004 0.010 + or - 
 (2.46)** (-4.01)*** (1.70)* (2.23)** (-0.71) (0.76)  
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.013 0.029 -0.025 -0.038 0.016 -0.009 + or - 
 (-2.65)*** (5.73)*** (-2.24)** (-2.87)*** (2.23)** (-0.58)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.023 -0.027 -0.039 + or - 
 (-2.15)** (-2.96)*** (-1.11) (-1.66)* (-3.45)*** (-2.35)**  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 -0.020 -0.027 -0.029 -0.050 -0.048 -0.078 + or - 
 (-4.13)*** (-5.56)*** (-2.85)*** (-3.74)*** (-6.56)*** (-4.98)***  
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 0.004 -0.037 -0.008 -0.004 -0.033 -0.041 + or - 
 (0.74) (-4.78)*** (-0.71) (-0.28) (-3.37)*** (-2.06)**  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 -0.009 0.029 -0.006 -0.015 0.020 0.014 + or - 
 (-1.11) (5.07)*** (-0.42) (-0.81) (1.86)* (0.66)  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒚 -0.044 -0.030 -0.044 -0.088 -0.074 -0.119 + or - 
 (-6.45)*** (-4.81)*** (-3.47)*** (-5.09)*** (-7.40)*** (-5.84)***  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 0.019 -0.022 0.049 0.068 -0.002 0.046 + or - 
 (2.20)** (-3.37)*** (3.96)*** (3.79)*** (-0.25) (2.19)**  
𝑭𝑫 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 - 
 (-3.58)*** (0.42) (0.44) (-1.08) (-2.15)** (-0.84)  
𝑮𝑫𝑷 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 + 
 (-2.96)*** (3.62)*** (4.60)*** (2.95)*** (0.98) (3.59)***  
𝑮𝑰𝑭 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.014 -0.006 -0.017 + 
 (-2.06)** (-1.25) (-2.92)*** (-3.11)*** (-2.13)** (-2.80)***  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 -0.048 -0.086 0.013 -0.035 -0.134 -0.121 + or - 
 (-1.99)** (-3.22)*** (0.26) (-0.55) (-3.50)*** (-1.51)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.065 0.028 0.036 -0.029 -0.036 -0.000 + or - 
 (-1.59) (1.03) (0.42) (-0.26) (-0.69) (-0.00)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.001 -0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 + or - 
 (1.01) (-3.70)*** (-0.13) (0.28) (-2.05)** (-1.08)  
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Table 6.3 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of Real Activities-Based 
Earnings Management with Interaction Variables (continued) 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models 
 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏    
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑳𝑬𝑽 -0.020 0.060 0.072 0.052 0.040 0.112 + or - 
 (-1.45) (4.19)*** (2.63)*** (1.53) (2.00)** (2.66)***  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑮𝑶 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 + or - 
 (0.43) (-0.08) (1.10) (0.97) (0.23) (0.76)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑭𝑪𝑭 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 + or - 
 (1.45) (2.10)** (-0.18) (0.34) (2.58)** (1.00)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑹𝑶𝑨 -0.056 0.048 0.190 0.133 -0.007 0.182 + or - 
 (-1.50) (1.33) (2.71)*** (1.52) (-0.15) (1.71)*  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑨𝑻 0.030 0.026 0.016 0.047 0.057 0.073 + or - 
 (2.91)*** (2.68)*** (0.83) (1.86)* (3.88)*** (2.39)**  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑫𝑷𝑹 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + or - 
 (-0.93) (1.15) (1.18) (0.61) (0.22) (0.89)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑶𝑪 -0.007 0.004 -0.010 -0.017 -0.002 -0.012 + or - 
 (-2.25)** (1.38) (-1.51) (-2.04)** (-0.53) (-1.18)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 + or - 
 (2.69)*** (3.05)*** (1.87)* (3.15)*** (4.79)*** (4.29)***  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.008 0.006 + or - 
 (1.90)* (3.33)*** (-0.71) (0.05) (3.68)*** (1.22)  
𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑿 𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.106 0.015 0.092 0.196 0.123 0.215 + or - 
 (7.09)*** (1.32) (3.32)*** (5.56)*** (5.84)*** (5.07)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.830 0.196 0.354 0.659 0.676 0.555  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729  
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑽𝑰𝑭 2.21 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑽𝑰𝑭 1.47 
This table measures the impact of firm-level and country-level variables on real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region 
using a pooled regression. Interaction variables are employed to investigate the differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms.  The utilities 
industry is used as the reference for the industry membership dummy variables. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for the year fixed effects. 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. DA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; IFRS refers to 
IFRS adoption which receives a value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev 
refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers to 
free cash flow measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as 
net income scaled by total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the 
dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum 
of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured as the 
number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; Suspect refers to the suspect firms variable which receives 
a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled by total assets greater than or equal to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; and EMFLEX refers to 
earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets; FD refers to financial development measured 
as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the percentage change in GDP per capita 
across years; GIF refers to the governance and infrastructure index variable; and GCC refers to a dummy variable for GCC versus non-GCC countries. 
 
Table 6.3 shows that that discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with ACFO 
at the 1% level. Although the coefficient is significantly negative in relation to ADISX at the 5% 
level, discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with APROD and the three 
aggregate measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. This provides strong evidence 
that firms in MENA countries use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
techniques as complements rather than as substitutes. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that the 
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choice between the two alternative strategies of earnings management varies predictably as a 
function of the firm’s ability to use accruals manipulation as well as the costs of doing so. Further, 
Zang (2012) argues that firms encounter different constraints for the two methods and provides 
evidence that the trade-off decision is dependent upon the relative costs of the two strategies. She 
explains that when one earnings management method is constrained, managers will make use of 
the other. Thus, MENA country firms employ both discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management techniques to manage earnings rather than trading off the two techniques based on 
their relative costs.  
 
This suggests that MENA country firms employ both techniques in order to achieve earnings 
targets. The positive relationship between discretionary accruals and real earnings management 
provides support for the research findings of Kuo et al. (2012) for Chinese firms. However, a 
positive association contrasts with the research findings of Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016), and Zang (2012) for US firms, Doukakis (2014) in a 
study of European country firms, and Zhu et al. (2015) for Chinese firms, who find that firms 
substitute the earnings management techniques. Further, this finding does not provide support for 
hypothesis H2.   
 
IFRS adoption is found to be significantly positively associated with APROD, as well as the three 
aggregate measures at the 5% level. This finding shows that IFRS adoption is associated with a 
higher degree of real earnings management by MENA country firms. This finding provides support 
for the argument that accounting standards can increase accounting quality and induce managers 
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to resort to real earnings management since accruals-based earnings management becomes more 
difficult to utilize.  
 
Further, the adoption of IFRS should reduce the ability of managers to use discretionary accruals 
to manage earnings upward since more principals based accounting standards limit the 
opportunistic interpretation of complex rules and force firms to comply with the intent of the 
standards. However, IFRS adoption does not impact upon a firm’s ability to engage in real earnings 
management (Ho et al., 2015). A positive relationship is consistent with the research findings of 
Ho et al. for Chinese firms. However, this positive relationship contrasts with the research findings 
of Lemma et al. (2013) in an international study of 44 countries, who find a negative relationship. 
The positive association provides support for hypothesis H1.1b.  
 
Firm size is shown to be significantly positively associated with ACFO, ADISX, and the three 
aggregate proxies at the 1% level. Therefore, this positive relationship provides strong evidence 
that firm size is associated with a higher degree of real earnings management in MENA country 
firms. A positive relationship between firm size and real earnings management is consistent with 
the argument that greater pressure to meet or beat benchmarks and greater bargaining power with 
auditors lead to a higher degree of real earnings management (Lemma et al., 2013). Further, this 
association suggests that as firms grow in size, they may find it easier to employ real earnings 
management techniques compared with accruals-based earnings management since larger firms 
are more closely monitored and scrutinised by outsiders. Firm size is shown to be negatively 
associated with the extent of accruals-based earnings management. Therefore, it is possible that 
larger firms are more incapable of managing earnings through discretionary accruals since they 
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are usually audited by large audit firms. Thus, larger firms instead employ real earnings 
management activities. A positive association is consistent with the research findings of Lemma 
et al. (2013) in an international study of 44 countries. However, this positive relationship contrasts 
with the research findings of Zamri et al. (2013) for Malaysian firms, Doukakis (2014) in a study 
of 22 European firms, Chen (2009) for US firms, Ho et al. (2015), and Kuo et al. (2014) for 
Chinese firms, who find a negative relationship. Further, this positive association provides support 
for hypothesis H1.2b.      
 
The table shows strong evidence that leverage is negatively associated with the degree of real 
earnings management. The coefficient is significantly negative at the 5% level in relation to 
ADISX and RM2, and significantly negative in relation to APROD, RM1, and RM3 at the 1% 
level. A negative relationship is consistent with the argument that leverage provides a controlling 
and monitoring mechanism which limits the extent of earnings management (Zamri et al., 2013). 
An alternative explanation for this coefficient is that since a positive relationship between leverage 
and discretionary accruals is evidenced in chapter 5, it is possible that MENA country firms 
manage earnings through accruals manipulation to prevent breaches of debt covenants and thus do 
not require any further earnings management manipulation through real activities. The negative 
relationship between leverage and real earnings management is inconsistent with the research 
findings of Lemma et al. (2013) in an international study of 44 countries, Chen et al. (2015) and 
Lara et al. (2012) for US firms, and Ho et al. (2015) for Chinese firms, who find a positive 
relationship. Further, this finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.3b.   
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As shown in the table, growth opportunities are significantly negatively associated with ADISX at 
the 1% level. This provides weak evidence that higher growth opportunities are associated with a 
lower degree of real earnings management in MENA country firms. This relationship may suggest 
that, since higher growth opportunities lead to lower discretionary accruals and lower real earnings 
management, growing MENA country firms may refrain from engaging in earnings management 
behaviour in order to improve earnings quality so that they may access external financing at a 
lower cost of capital. Further, they are likely to be under greater scrutiny by outsiders (Gaio, 2010; 
Lemma et al., 2013). This relationship contrasts with the research findings of Roychowdhury 
(2006) for US firms, Doukakis (2014) in a study of 22 European countries, and Kuo et al. (2014) 
for Chinese firms, who find a positive relationship. However, this relationship is consistent with 
the research findings of Lemma et al. (2013) in an international study of 44 countries, Ho et al. 
(2015) for Chinese firms, Lara et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2010), and Anagnostopoulou and 
Tsekrekos (2016) for US firms. This positive relationship does not provide support for hypothesis 
H1.4b.  
 
The table shows that free cash flow is significant and positively associated with RM3 at the 5% 
level. This provides weak evidence that higher free cash flow leads to higher levels of overall real 
earnings management behaviour. Managers may invest in negative net present value projects if 
they will gain some personal benefit then resort to earnings management to compensate for the 
negative effects of these projects. A positive relationship between free cash flow and real earnings 
management is consistent with this argument. This relationship contrasts with the research findings 
of Hamza and Bannouri (2015) for Tunisian firms. Further, this finding provides support for 
hypothesis H1.5b.  
210 
 
Profitability is found to be significantly negatively associated with ACFO, APROD, and the three 
aggregate measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. Thus, there is strong evidence 
that profitability is associated with lower levels of real earnings management behaviour in MENA 
country firms. Profitability has been shown to be positively associated with accruals-based 
earnings management in Chapter 5. Therefore, a negative relationship between profitability and 
real earnings management may be due to the fact that more profitable firms employ accruals-based 
earnings management to continue to perform well to meet the expectations of investors and 
analysts, or to continue to achieve financial compensation, and consequently have no need to rely 
on real earnings management behaviour. The negative relationship supports the research findings 
of Zamri et al. (2013) for Malaysian firms. However, this relationship contrasts with the research 
findings of Doukakis (2014) for European firms, Kim et al. (2010) and Chen (2009) for US firms, 
and Ho et al. (2015) and Kuo et al. (2014) for Chinese firms, who find a positive relationship. 
Further, this positive relationship does not provide support for hypothesis H1.6b.  
 
Consistent with a negative relationship between profitability and real earnings management, asset 
tangibility is significantly negatively associated with ACFO, APROD and the three aggregate 
measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. A possible explanation for this coefficient 
is that firms characterised by higher asset tangibility use their net fixed assets as collateral to obtain 
debt, which requires higher monitoring and scrutiny and thus mitigates the degree of earnings 
management behaviour. This finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.7b.  
 
As shown in the table, the dividend payout ratio is an insignificant determinant of real earnings 
management. Therefore, there is no evidence to support hypothesis H1.8b. 
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In contrast, the length of the operating cycle is found to have a significant negative relationship 
with all of the measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. This finding provides strong 
evidence that a longer operating cycle leads to a lower degree of real earnings management in 
MENA country firms. Zang (2012) argues that accruals-based earnings management is constrained 
by the length of firms’ operating cycles and explains that firms with shorter operating cycles have 
less accounting flexibility to inflate accruals. She also finds that a shorter operating cycle leads to 
higher real earnings management. She argues that firms characterised by longer operating cycles 
are afforded greater flexibility for accruals-based earnings management since they have greater 
accrual accounts and a longer period for the reversal of accruals. Thus, firms with shorter operating 
cycles are likely to shift toward real earnings management activities since their accruals-based 
earnings management activities are constrained. A negative association is consistent with the 
research findings of Lara et al. (2012) for US firms. Further, this negative association provides 
support for hypothesis H1.9b.  
 
Altman’s Z-Score is significantly negatively associated with ACFO at the 5% level, and 
significantly negatively associated with APROD and the aggregate measures of real earnings 
management at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This shows strong evidence that improved 
financial health of MENA country firms is associated with a lower degree of real earnings 
management behaviour. Firms experiencing poor financial conditions, especially those nearing 
bankruptcy, are expected to do everything they can to improve their financial situation, such as 
adopting radical operating decisions to decrease losses and ameliorate their future prospects (Lara 
et al., 2012). Thus, it can be expected that firms with lower Z-Scores engage in greater earnings 
management activities since these firms are characterised by poorer financial health. A negative 
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association is consistent with the research findings of Lara et al. for US firms, but does not provide 
support for the research findings of Zang (2012) for US firms, who finds a positive relationship.  
 
The table shows that ownership concentration and the suspect firms variable are insignificant 
determinants of real earnings management. Therefore, there is no evidence to support hypotheses 
H1.11b and H1.12b.   
 
As shown in the table, earnings management flexibility is significantly positively associated with 
all of the measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. This suggests that firms 
characterised by a higher sum of receivables and inventories as a percentage of total assets engage 
in a higher degree of real earnings management. A positive relationship is consistent with the 
argument that it is easier to accomplish excess production to absorb fixed costs and more likely to 
escape detection when a firm maintains a high stock of inventory. Moreover, it would be easier for 
firms with considerable credit sales to dealers to engage in ‘channel stuffing’ or accelerate the 
recognition of sales by shipping goods early to its dealers and booking receivables. Thus, it is 
likely that a high stock of receivables generates a greater ability to accelerate sales as well as a 
lower probability of detection by regulators. A positive relationship between real earnings 
management and earnings management flexibility is consistent with the research findings of 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2016) for US firms. Further, this 
finding provides support for hypothesis H1.13b.   
 
Industry membership is shown in the table to have a significant impact upon real earnings 
management behaviour. Firms in the energy, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer 
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staples, healthcare, and information technology industries engage in lower levels of real earnings 
management. In contrast, firms in the real estate and mobile telecommunications industries are 
predisposed to a higher degree of real earnings management. There is mixed evidence in terms of 
the materials industry.  
 
The degree to which firms in different industries engage in real earnings management behaviour 
may be explained by the extent to which these industries are characterised by information 
asymmetry, agency costs, riskiness, competitiveness, and regulatory conditions. Consistent with 
the results of the accruals-based earnings management models, it is possible that the mobile 
telecommunications industry is a risky and highly competitive industry and may be characterised 
by a high degree of information asymmetry that results in higher levels of earnings management 
behaviour. In contrast, the other industries may be less risky, less competitive, and subject to higher 
regulations that lower the extent of real earnings management behaviour. Zhu et al. (2015) argue 
that overproduction as a real earnings management strategy is only available to manufacturing 
firms. Consistent with this argument, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that overproduction and price 
discounts both generate abnormally high production costs relative to sales. While both 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies can offer price discounts to boost sales, 
overproduction on the other hand is a strategy that is only available to firms in manufacturing 
industries. However, the results of this thesis contrast with this argument. The significant impact 
of industry membership upon the degree of real earnings management provides support for 
hypothesis H1.14b.  
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As shown in the table, financial development is significantly negatively associated with ACFO 
and RM2 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. This provides evidence that higher financial 
development results in a lower degree of real earnings management behaviour. Countries which 
are characterised by more developed financial systems require higher quality accounting 
information and managers are disciplined in countries with higher levels of financial development 
if they engage in earnings management (Enomoto et al., 2016). Thus, a negative relationship 
between the extent of real earnings management and financial development is consistent with the 
argument that managers are restrained with regards to earnings management activities under higher 
levels of financial development. The negative association is consistent with the research findings 
of Enomoto et al. in a cross-country study, and Lemma et al. (2013) and Leuz et al. (2003) in 
international studies. Further, this negative association provides support for hypothesis H1.15b.  
 
As shown in the table, GDP growth is significantly negatively associated with ACFO at the 1% 
level, but significantly positively associated with ADISX and the aggregate proxies at the 1% level. 
This provides strong evidence that GDP growth positively impacts upon real earnings management 
and supports the argument that firms are likely to engage in earnings management behaviour as 
the economy grows in order to meet the expectations of analysts and investors, and to avoid lagging 
behind the GDP growth rate. Further, MENA countries are characterised by high corruption, 
political instability, and a weak rule of law. Therefore, as the economy grows, firms may be more 
capable of engaging in earnings management activities and escape detection. Further, this finding 
provides support for hypothesis H1.16b. 
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The GIF Index variable is shown to be significantly negatively associated with APROD, RM1, 
and RM3 at the 1% level, and significantly negatively associated with ACFO and RM2 at the 5% 
level. This provides strong evidence that increases in the country-level index variables mitigate 
the use of real earnings management by MENA country firms. A negative association potentially 
indicates that as regulatory quality, voice and accountability, the rule of law, the control of 
corruption, political stability, and government effectiveness improve, information asymmetries 
and agency costs decrease within MENA country firms and the degree of real earnings 
management diminishes. A negative association does not provide support for the research findings 
of Lemma et al. (2013), who find a positive relationship. Further, this finding does not provide 
support for hypothesis H1.18b. Hypothesis H1 is supported since firm-specific, industry, and 
country-level factors are found to impact upon the degree of real earnings management. 
   
The table shows that there are significant differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms 
in terms of their real earnings management behaviour. GCC country firms engage in lower levels 
of real earnings management compared with non-GCC country firms. The interaction between 
discretionary accruals and GCC is insignificant across the models, indicating that the use of 
discretionary accruals does not result in significant differences in the degree of employing real 
earnings management between the two regions. The interaction between firm size and the GCC 
variable is significant and negative at the 1% level in relation to ADISX, and significant and 
negative at the 5% level in relation to RM2. This suggests that greater firm size results in lower 
levels of real earnings management in GCC country firms compared with non-GCC country firms.  
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The interaction between leverage and the GCC variable is significant and positive at the 1% level 
in relation to ADISX, APROD, and RM3, and significant and positive at the 5% level in relation 
to RM2. This suggests that higher leverage leads to higher levels of real earnings management in 
GCC country firms compared with non-GCC country firms. The interaction between growth 
opportunities and the GCC variable is insignificant across the models which suggests that there 
are no significant differences between the real earnings management behaviour of firms in the two 
regions.   
 
The interaction between free cash flow and the GCC variable is significant and positive at the 5% 
level in relation to ADISX and RM2. This shows that higher free cash flows in GCC country firms 
result in higher levels of real earnings management compared with non-GCC country firms. The 
interaction between profitability and the GCC variable is shown in the table to be significant and 
positive at the 1% level in relation to APROD, which suggests that higher profitability in GCC 
country firms results in higher levels of real earnings management compared with non-GCC 
country firms.  
 
The interaction between asset tangibility and the GCC variable is significant at the 1% level and 
positively associated with ACFO, ADISX, and RM2. The coefficient is significant and positively 
associated with RM3 at the 5% level. This shows that higher asset tangibility in GCC country firms 
leads to higher levels of real earnings management compared with non-GCC country firms. The 
interaction between the dividend payout ratio and the GCC variable is found to be insignificant 
across the models, which indicates that there are no significant differences between the two regions 
in relation to the dividend payout ratio. The interaction between the operating cycle and the GCC 
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variable is shown to be negatively associated with ACFO and RM1 at the 5% level, which indicates 
that longer operating cycles in GCC country firms result in lower real earnings management 
compared with non-GCC country firms.  
 
The interaction between Altman’s Z-Score and the GCC variable is significantly positive at the 
1% level in relation to ACFO, ADISX, and the three aggregate measures. This shows that higher 
Altman’s Z-Scores lead to higher real earnings management in GCC country firms compared with 
non-GCC country firms. The interaction between ownership concentration and the GCC variable 
is significantly positive at the 1% level in relation to ADISX and RM2. This shows that a higher 
concentration of ownership leads to higher real earnings management in GCC country firms 
compared with non-GCC country firms.  
 
The interaction between earnings management flexibility and the GCC variable is significantly 
positive at the 1% level in relation to ACFO, APROD, and the three aggregate measures of real 
earnings management. This shows that GCC country firms characterized by higher sum of 
receivables and inventories as a percentage of total assets engage in higher real earnings 
management compared with non-GCC country firms.    
 
As previously mentioned, GCC countries are characterized by oil wealth and Bedouin culture 
(Abdullah, 2012). In addition, GCC countries outperform non-GCC countries in various socio-
economic indicators including education, gender, demographic trends, survival and health, 
economic performance, and trade structure (Nissan and Niroomand, 2015). Further, Abdullah 
(2012) reports that Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia are the leading Arab 
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countries based on average income per capita. In addition, Kern (2012) argues that the 
development of financial markets has been a policy objective of countries in the Gulf region, and 
that GCC countries have made significant progress in strengthening financial market regulation 
and oversight. Thus, overall, firms in GCC countries exhibit a lower degree of real earnings 
management behaviour compared with firms in non-GCC countries. In GCC countries, firms are 
likely to be more severely penalized for breaching debt covenants and banks are likely to be stricter 
compared with non-GCC countries. Therefore, GCC country firms engage in greater real earnings 
management compared with non-GCC country firms to avoid breaching debt covenants since real 
earnings management is more difficult to detect.  
 
Further, it is possible that in GCC countries, firms experience higher economic growth and 
development compared with non-GCC countries. Thus, analysts and investors are likely to expect 
GCC country firms to perform well and to continue to do so. Therefore, firms characterised by 
higher profitability, free cash flows, financial health, asset tangibility, earnings management 
flexibility, and concentrated ownership are likely to engage in higher real earnings management 
compared with their non-GCC counterparts.   
 
Overall, the models are significant at the 1% level and the ACFO Model is shown to have the 
highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 83.0%.  
 
Table 6.4 presents the results for the firm-level determinants of the real activities-based earnings 
management models.  
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Table 6.4 Firm-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Models  
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 0.092 0.051 0.177 0.371 0.183 0.362  
 (3.48)*** (5.60)*** (5.32)*** (5.80)*** (6.15)*** (6.75)***  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 -0.003 -0.001 0.007 0.034 -0.024 0.003 + 
 (-0.62) (-0.32) (1.32) (0.48) (-0.70) (0.31)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.008 + 
 (2.14)** (3.53)*** (1.95)* (2.52)** (3.78)*** (3.28)***  
𝑳𝒆𝒗 0.032 0.006 -0.038 -0.006 0.039 0.001 + 
 (2.61)*** (0.90) (-2.76)*** (-0.27) (2.77)*** (0.02)  
𝑮𝑶 -0.003 -0.000 0.010 -0.013 -0.003 -0.004 + 
 (-2.02)** (-0.30) (-0.32) (-1.35) (-2.18)** (-1.42)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 + 
 (-1.52) (1.54) (0.19) (-0.89) (-0.51) (-0.35)  
𝑹𝑶𝑨  -0.635 0.042 -0.643 -1.276 -0.591 -1.234 + 
 (-18.45)*** (2.38)** (-15.53)*** (-22.73)*** (-16.55)*** (-20.12)***  
𝑨𝑻 -0.058 0.003 -0.068 -0.126 -0.055 -0.123 + 
 (-6.89)*** (0.61) (-6.75)*** (-8.43)*** (-5.59)*** (-7.17)***  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 + 
 (-2.44)** (-0.55) (-1.36) (-2.26)** (-2.42)** (-2.14)**  
𝑶𝑪 -0.027 -0.015 -0.041 -0.068 -0.042 -0.083 - 
 (-8.01)*** (-8.12)*** (-11.70)*** (-13.15)*** (-12.54)*** (-8.52)***  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 + 
 (0.10) (0.53) (0.38 (0.25) (0.46) (0.51)  
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.014 + 
 (0.58) (-0.37) (-0.07) (0.28) (-0.40) (-0.39)  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.011 + 
 (0.52) (0.38) (0.42) (0.61) (0.65) (0.63)  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.223 0.053 0.193 0.416 0.276 0.469 + 
 (17.58)*** (7.12)*** (13.42)*** (18.51)*** (18.53)*** (18.20)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 -0.073 -0.020 -0.066 -0.139 -0.093 -0.159 + or - 
 (-6.56)*** (-3.33)*** (-5.20)*** (-7.59)*** (-7.62)*** (-7.84)***  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.008 -0.017 0.004 -0.004 -0.025 -0.021 + or - 
 -(1.00) (-4.74)*** (0.50) (-0.28) (-3.05)*** (-1.44)  
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.022 0.026 -0.032 -0.054 0.004 -0.028 + or - 
 (-2.49)** (5.57)*** (-3.08)*** (-3.40)**** (0.40) (-1.71)*  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 -0.005 -0.020 -0.012 -0.017 -0.025 -0.037 + or - 
 (-0.55) (-4.21)*** (-1.14) (-1.02) (-2.58)** (-2.10)**  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 -0.023 -0.030 -0.032 -0.055 -0.053 -0.085 + or - 
 (-2.57)** (-6.72)*** (-3.22)*** (-3.48)*** (-5.76)*** (-5.20)***  
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 0.002 -0.038 -0.015 -0.012 -0.034 -0.048 + or - 
 (0.24) (-4.89)*** (-1.10) (-0.60) (-2.95)*** (-2.22)**  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 0.021 0.031 0.011 0.032 0.051 0.062 + or - 
 (1.61) (5.85)*** (0.72) (1.33) (3.75)*** (2.52)**  
 (1.61) (5.85)*** (0.72) (1.33) (3.75)*** (2.52)**  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒚 -0.056 -0.030 -0.051 -0.107 -0.087 -0.138 + or - 
 (-4.30)*** (-5.11)*** (-3.86)*** (-4.75)*** (-6.12)*** (-5.71)***  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 0.036 -0.021 0.042 0.088 0.006 0.058 + or - 
 (2.40)** (-3.45)*** (4.35)*** (4.08)*** (0.49) (2.88)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
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Table 6.4 Firm-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Models (continued) 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models 
 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.410 0.1581 0.297 0.435 0.368 0.378  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729  
This table measures the impact of firm-level variables on real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using a pooled 
regression. The utilities industry is used as the reference for the industry membership dummy variables. The year 1997 is used as the reference year 
for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. IFRS refers to IFRS adoption which receives a value of 1 if the firm has 
adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total 
assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow measured as cash earnings per share net 
of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT refers to asset 
tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends 
paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; 
ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the 
number of common shares outstanding; Suspect refers to the suspect firms variable which receives a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled by 
total assets greater than or equal to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the 
sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. 
 
When firm-level determinants of real earnings management are examined in isolation, the results 
are broadly consistent with the model in which country-level and interaction variables are also 
included. However, in this model, IFRS adoption is found to be an insignificant determinant. 
However, firm size and earnings management flexibility are still shown to be significantly 
positively associated with the degree of real earnings management. The associations in terms of 
industry membership are also broadly consistent. Growth opportunities, ROA, the operating cycle, 
and Altman’s Z-Score are still shown to be significantly negatively associated with the degree of 
real earnings management.  
 
In this model, the dividend payout ratio is found to be significantly negatively associated with 
ACFO and the three aggregate measures of real earnings management. This provides evidence of 
a negative association between the dividend payout ratio and the degree of real earnings 
management in MENA country firms. Firms that engage in a higher degree of real activities-based 
earnings management by means of providing price discounts and lenient credit terms ultimately 
experience reduced cash flows from operations. Thus, a higher degree of real earnings 
221 
 
management likely makes it more difficult for firms to make higher dividend payments as a result 
of the reductions in cash flows. Therefore, the dividend payout ratios decline. This finding 
contrasts with the research findings of Im et al. (2015) in a study of Korean firms, who find a 
positive relationship. Further, this finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.8b.  
 
Overall, all of the models are significant at the 1% level and the ACFO model is found to have the 
highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 41%.  
 
Table 6.5 presents the results of the country-level determinants of real earnings management.  
 
Table 6.5 Country-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based Earnings 
Management Models 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.012 -0.009 -0.042 -0.056 -0.022 -0.067  
 (-3.06)*** (-3.97)*** (-8.45)*** (-6.69)*** (-4.45)*** (-6.96)***  
𝑭𝑫 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 - 
 (-2.05)** (1.16) (0.39) (-0.95) (-1.29) (-0.56)  
𝑮𝑫𝑷 -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 + 
 (-2.60)*** (4.20)*** (1.04) (-0.69) (-0.30) (0.44)  
𝑮𝑰𝑭 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 + 
 (-1.39) (-6.15)*** (-1.90)* (-1.89)* (-4.25)*** (-3.35)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.006 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.004  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.083 0.000 0.005  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729  
This table measures the impact of country-level variables on real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using a pooled 
regression. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. FD refers to 
financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP growth measured as the 
percentage change in GDP per capita across years; and GIF refers to the governance and infrastructure index variable. 
 
When country-level variables are analysed in the absence of firm-level and interaction variables, 
the results do not differ in terms of financial development and GDP growth. Both variables are 
still found to be significantly negatively associated with the degree of real earnings management. 
However, the results regarding GDP growth are mixed.  
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Overall, only the ACFO, ADISX, RM2, and RM3 models are significant at the 1% level. Further, 
the ACFO model is found to have the highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 
1.5%. 
 
Table 6.6 presents the regression results for firm-level determinants of real earnings management 
with the inclusion of discretionary accruals in the model.  
 
Table 6.6 Firm-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Models and the Substitutability of Earnings Management Techniques 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 0.155 0.089 0.199 0.354 0.244 0.443  
 (10.14)*** (5.50)*** (5.87)*** (8.64)*** (10.40)*** (8.82)***  
𝑫𝑨 0.865 -0.029 0.268 1.133 0.835 1.104 - 
 (38.61)*** (-2.04)** (6.16)*** (19.53)*** (29.86)*** (17.06)***  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 -0.004 -0.000 0.007 0.002 -0.005 0.001 + 
 (-1.61) (-0.29) (1.17) (0.39) (-1.21) (0.21)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.009 + 
 (5.34)*** (3.50)*** (2.19)** (3.95)*** (6.11)*** (4.39)***  
𝑳𝒆𝒗 -0.029 0.008 -0.057 -0.086 -0.021 -0.078 + 
 (-3.93)*** (1.20) (-4.31)*** (-5.24)*** (-2.09)** (-3.84)***  
𝑮𝑶 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 + 
 (0.74) (-0.68) (0.53) (0.69) (0.11) (0.40)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + 
 (1.58) (1.43) (0.95) (1.33) (2.11)** (2.14)**  
𝑹𝑶𝑨 -0.948 0.052 -0.740 -1.689 -0.895 -1.636 + 
 (-45.41)*** (2.93)*** (-21.64)*** (-39.27)*** (-34.29)*** (-31.50)***  
𝑨𝑻 -0.049 0.002 -0.065 -0.115 -0.046 -0.112 + 
 (-10.30)*** (0.55) (-6.53)*** (-9.28)*** (-6.49)*** (-7.42)***  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (0.23) (-0.70) (-0.68) (-0.48) (-0.39) (-0.63)  
𝑶𝑪 -0.035 -0.015 -0.043 -0.079 -0.050 -0.094 - 
 (-19.35)*** (-8.04)*** (-11.37)*** (-15.90)*** (-17.05)*** (-15.14)***  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-1.84)* (1.13) (-0.72) (-1.92)* (-1.62) (-1.59)  
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 + 
 (1.00) (-5.38)*** (-0.09) (0.29) (-3.47)*** (-1.71)*  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007 + 
 (0.28) (0.40) (0.33) (0.37) (0.43) (0.44)  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.166 0.054 0.175 0.341 0.220 0.395 + 
 (19.81)*** (7.33)*** (12.29)*** (17.83)*** (18.55)*** (17.09)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 -0.073 -0.020 -0.066 -0.126 -0.093 -0.159 + or - 
 (-6.56)*** (-3.33)*** (-5.20)*** (-7.23)*** (-7.62)*** (-7.84)***  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 0.016 -0.017 0.004 0.027 -0.001 -0.021 + or - 
 (3.18)*** (-4.74)*** (0.50) (2.31)** (-0.24) (-1.44)  
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.022 0.026 -0.031 -0.038 0.015 -0.028 + or - 
 (-2.49)** (5.57)*** (-3.08)*** (-2.89)*** (2.20)** (-0.89)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 -0.005 -0.020 -0.011 -0.018 -0.026 -0.037 + or - 
 (-0.55) (-4.21)*** (-1.14) (-1.33) (-3.51)*** (-2.10)**  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 -0.016 -0.030 -0.031 -0.046 -0.053 -0.085 + or - 
 (-3.25)*** (-6.72)*** (-3.22)*** (-3.59)*** (-5.76)*** (-5.20)***  
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Table 6.6 Firm-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Models and the Substitutability of Earnings Management Techniques 
(continued) 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 0.002 -0.037 -0.013 -0.008 -0.034 -0.048 + or - 
 (0.24) (-4.89)*** (-1.10) (-0.57) (-2.95)*** (-2.22)**  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 0.021 0.031 0.010 -0.000 0.051 0.030 + or - 
 (1.61) (5.85)*** (0.72) (-0.04) (3.75)*** (1.50)  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 0.023 -0.020 0.051 0.074 0.002 0.053 + or - 
 (2.84)*** (-3.45)*** (4.30)*** (4.33)*** (0.27) (2.74)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.818 0.159 0.331 0.645 0.659 0.539  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729  
This table measures the impact of firm-level variables on real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using a pooled 
regression. The utilities industry is used as the reference for the industry membership dummy variables. The year 1997 is used as the reference year 
for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. DA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones 
Model; IFRS refers to IFRS adoption which receives a value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of 
net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book 
ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on 
assets measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; 
DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the 
logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration 
measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common shares outstanding; Suspect refers to the suspect firms 
variable which receives a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled by total assets greater than or equal to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; 
and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled by total assets. 
 
Table 6.6 shows that discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with ACFO at 
the 1% level. Although the coefficient is significantly negative in relation to ADISX at the 5% 
level, discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with APROD and the three 
aggregate measures of real earnings management at the 1% level. This provides stronger evidence 
that firms in MENA countries use accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management 
techniques as complements rather than as substitutes.  
 
The results of the other firm-level determinants of real earnings management are broadly consistent 
with the results of the previously discussed models. However, growth opportunities and the 
dividend payout ratio are found to be insignificant determinants across all of the measures of real 
earnings management in the absence of interaction variables.  
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Overall, all of the models are significant at the 1% level and the ACFO model is found to have the 
highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 81.8%.  
 
Table 6.7 presents the results for the firm-level and country-level determinants of the real 
activities-based earnings management models.  
 
Table 6.7 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based 
Earnings Management Models 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 0.163 0.062 0.167 0.331 0.225 0.393  
 (10.02)*** (3.69)*** (4.73)*** (7.66)*** (9.13)*** (7.44)***  
𝑫𝑨 0.870 -0.030 0.260 1.130 0.840 1.100 - 
 (39.14)*** (-2.11)** (5.99)*** (19.51)*** (30.46)*** (17.09)***  
𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺 0.004 0.017 0.023 0.028 0.022 0.046 + 
 (1.25) (3.59)*** (2.93)*** (2.87)*** (3.48)*** (3.50)***  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.010 + 
 (6.10)*** (3.97)*** (1.61) (3.82)*** (6.91)*** (4.43)***  
𝑳𝒆𝒗 -0.027 0.011 -0.052 -0.079 -0.015 -0.067 + 
 (-3.65)*** (1.70)* (-3.93)*** (-4.81)*** (-1.54) (-3.32)***  
𝑮𝑶 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (0.40) (-1.47) (0.06) (0.20) (-0.65) (-0.26)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 + 
 (1.57) (1.38) (1.04) (1.41) (2.10)** (2.21)**  
𝑹𝑶𝑨 -0.945 0.058 -0.738 -1.684 -0.886 -1.625 + 
 (-45.75)*** (3.29)*** (-21.56)*** (-39.01)*** (-34.12)*** (-31.32)***  
𝑨𝑻 -0.051 0.003 -0.065 -0.117 -0.048 -0.114 + 
 (-10.78)*** (0.67) (-6.49)*** (-9.46)*** (-6.75)*** (-7.53)***  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (0.16) (-1.00) (-0.77) (-0.58) (-0.65) (-0.81)  
𝑶𝑪 -0.034 -0.014 -0.044 -0.079 -0.049 -0.093 - 
 (-19.13)*** (-7.98)*** (-11.71)*** (-16.08)*** (-16.91)*** (-15.31)***  
𝒁𝑺𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑬 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 + 
 (-1.64) (1.55) (-0.49) (-1.62) (-1.22) (-1.16)  
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 -0.012 -0.014 0.011 0.005 -0.015 -0.013 + 
 (-0.94) (-0.63) (0.96) (0.44) (-0.16) (-1.05)  
𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 + 
 (0.18) (-0.04) (0.18) (0.22) (0.14) (0.18)  
𝑬𝑴𝑭𝑳𝑬𝑿 0.157 0.052 0.181 0.338 0.209 0.390 + 
 (18.92)*** (6.75)*** (12.19)*** (17.23)*** (17.44)*** (16.40)***  
𝑬𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 -0.062 -0.025 -0.066 -0.129 -0.087 -0.154 + or - 
 (-9.83)*** (-4.00)*** (-4.87)*** (-7.27)*** (-9.28)*** (-7.49)***  
𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 0.015 -0.019 0.011 0.027 -0.003 0.008 + or - 
 (3.19)*** (-5.13)*** (1.31) (2.21)** (-0.68) (0.61)  
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍𝒔 -0.009 0.024 -0.028 -0.037 0.015 -0.012 + or - 
 (-1.91)* (5.20)*** (-2.66)*** (-2.77)*** (2.27)** (-0.84)  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 
-0.006 -0.020 -0.011 -0.018 -0.027 -0.038 + or - 
 (-1.17) (-4.28)*** (-1.10) (-1.26) (-3.69)*** (-2.40)**  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒓  
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒍𝒆𝒔 
-0.017 -0.032 -0.030 -0.048 -0.049 -0.080 + or - 
 (-3.49)*** (-6.94)*** (-3.02)*** (-3.60)*** (-7.35)*** (-5.39)***  
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Table 6.7 Firm-Level and Country-Level Determinants of the Real Activities-Based 
Earnings Management Models (continued) 
 Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝑪𝑭𝑶 𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿 𝑨𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫 𝑹𝑴𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝟐 𝑹𝑴𝟑 Expected Sign 
𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒆 0.005 -0.038 -0.013 -0.008 -0.033 -0.046 + or - 
 (0.89) (-4.97)*** (-1.11) (-0.55) (-3.54)*** (-2.36)**  
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 -0.004 0.027 -0.000 -0.005 0.022 0.022 + or - 
 (-0.57) (5.06)*** (-0.04) (-0.27) (2.24)** (1.08)  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  
𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒏𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒚 
-0.042 -0.032 -0.048 -0.090 -0.075 -0.123 + or - 
 (-6.16)*** (-5.36)*** (-3.68)*** (-5.10)*** (-7.73)*** (-6.09)***  
𝑴𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒆  
𝑻𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 
0.023 -0.025 0.047 0.070 -0.002 0.044 + or - 
 (2.85)*** (-4.20)*** (3.84)*** (3.99)*** (-0.23) (2.19)**  
𝑭𝑫 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 - 
 (-3.82)*** (0.89) (0.04) (-1.58) (-1.91)* (-0.94)  
𝑮𝑫𝑷 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.002 + 
 (-3.66)*** (2.78)*** (5.30)*** (3.29)*** (-0.09) (3.61)***  
𝑮𝑰𝑭 -0.002 -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 -0.012 -0.023 + 
 (-2.05)** (-6.34)*** (-4.11)*** (-4.15)*** (-6.12)*** (-5.65)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅  𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.820 0.174 0.340 0.648 0.664 0.545  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729 2,729  
This table measures the impact of firm-level and country-level variables on real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region using a 
pooled regression. The utilities industry is used as the reference for the industry membership dummy variables. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. DA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; IFRS refers to IFRS 
adoption which receives a value of 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS; Size refers to firm size measured as the logarithm of net sales revenue; Lev refers to leverage 
measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price to book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; ROA refers to return on assets measured as net income scaled by total assets; AT 
refers to asset tangibility measured as net property plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash dividends 
paid scaled by net income; OC refers to the operating cycle measured as the logarithm of the sum of the inventory period and the receivables period; ZSCORE 
refers to Altman’s Z-Score; Shares refers to ownership concentration measured as the number of closely held shares as a percentage of the number of common 
shares outstanding; Suspect refers to the suspect firms variable which receives a value of 1 if firm-years have net income scaled by total assets greater than or 
equal to 0 but less than 0.005, and 0 otherwise; and EMFLEX refers to earnings management flexibility measured as the sum of inventories and receivables scaled 
by total assets; FD refers to financial development measured as stock market capitalization scaled by the gross domestic product; GDP refers to GDP growth 
measured as the percentage change in GDP per capita across years; and GIF refers to the governance and infrastructure index variable. 
 
Table 6.7 shows that when firm-level and country-level determinants are combined into a single 
model, the results continue to provide strong evidence of a complementary relationship between 
both earnings management techniques. As shown in the table, IFRS adoption is still found to be 
significantly positively associated with ADISX, APROD, as well as the three aggregate measures 
at the 1% level.  
 
Further, as shown in the table, leverage is significantly negatively associated with the extent of 
real earnings management. This provides stronger evidence of a negative association between 
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leverage and the degree of real earnings management in MENA country firms. The results 
regarding the remaining firm-level variables are consistent with the results of the firm-level model. 
The table further shows that when firm-level and country-level determinants are combined into a 
single model, financial development remains significantly negatively associated with the degree 
of real earnings management at the 1% level. However, GDP growth is shown to be significantly 
positively associated with ADISX, APROD, RM1, and RM3 at the 1% level. This provides 
stronger evidence that GDP growth positively impacts upon real earnings management and 
supports the argument that firms are likely to engage in earnings management behaviour as the 
economy grows in order to meet the expectations of analysts and investors, and to avoid lagging 
behind the GDP growth rate.  
 
The GIF Index variable shows consistent results with the results of the country-level model. 
However, in this model, the coefficients are significant at the 1% level in relation to all of the 
measures of real earnings management, which provides stronger evidence of a negative association 
between the GIF index variable and the degree of real earnings management.  
 
As shown in the table, all of the models are significant at the 1% level. The ACFO Model is found 
to have the highest explanatory power based on an R Squared statistic of 82.0%.  
 
As shown in Appendix H-2, when the country-level index variables are analysed separately, the 
results of the firm-level and other country-level determinants remain consistent with the previously 
discussed models. Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the control of corruption 
index are shown to be significantly negatively associated with the degree of real earnings 
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management at the 5% level. These results are consistent across the measures of real earnings 
management. This provides evidence that the country-level index variables are associated with a 
lower degree of earnings management behaviour. Therefore, as these scores improve, MENA 
country firms become more predisposed toward utilizing accruals-based earnings management as 
opposed to real earnings management. It is possible that as these scores strengthen, economic 
conditions consequently improve, leading to accruals-based earnings management by firms to 
avoid lagging behind the economy’s growth rate. Thus, there is no necessity for real earnings 
management. Further, these findings provide support for hypothesis H1.17b.    
 
There are several important results with significant implications based on the findings presented 
in this chapter. Unexpectedly, there is strong evidence that firms in the MENA region use the two 
earnings management techniques as complements rather than substituting one technique for the 
other based on their relative costs. Thus, to achieve earnings targets, MENA country firms employ 
both earnings management methods.  
 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards by MENA country firms is associated 
with a greater degree of real earnings management behaviour. This finding is of particular 
importance to regulators. Larger firms engage in a lower degree of accruals-based earnings 
management. However, they engage in a greater degree of real earnings management. This finding 
provides support for the argument that it is more difficult for larger firms to engage in accruals-
based earnings management as a result of the scrutiny and monitoring by analysts and investors. 
However, it is easier to conduct real earnings management.  
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It was expected that firms characterised by higher asset tangibility ratios would be less capable of 
engaging in accruals-based earnings management and consequently engage in a greater degree of 
real earnings management. Unexpectedly, asset tangibility is negatively associated with the degree 
of real earnings management. Further, improved financial health of MENA country firms is 
associated with a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management. In contrast, improved 
financial health is associated with a lower degree of real earnings management.  
 
The results presented and discussed in this chapter are of importance particularly to regulators, 
auditors, and lenders. The findings presented in this chapter are useful for national policy makers 
and regulators who may be interested in lowering asymmetry and the cost of capital of companies 
by driving down earnings management. As discussed previously, regulators perceive earnings 
management as being pervasive and problematic (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Further, standard 
setters and regulators must decide how much judgment to allow management to exercise in 
financial reporting. Therefore, the results of this chapter provide evidence that firms employ real 
earnings management techniques in addition to accruals-based earnings management, and 
therefore regulators should be aware that the extent of earnings management behaviour in MENA 
country firms is not restricted to accruals-based earnings management. Further, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, Hamza and Bannouri (2015) find evidence that Tunisian firms employ real earnings 
management techniques in a tighter regulatory environment. Therefore, the evidence presented in 
this chapter could be important for regulators since it identifies the firm-level and country-level 
factors that could potentially lead to a greater degree of real earnings management behaviour if the 
regulatory environment becomes more strict.   
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Further, by being aware of the findings discussed in this chapter, auditors can take care while 
auditing firms which may have engaged in real earnings management in addition to accruals-based 
earnings management. Further, lenders can make more informed decisions regarding advancing 
loans to firms if they are aware of the likelihood that such firms have manipulated their earnings. 
In addition, it is important for auditors to be aware that MENA country firms employ both earnings 
management techniques as complements since they are both used concurrently to achieve earnings 
targets.  
 
Table 6.8 provides a summary of which real activities-based earnings management hypotheses are 
accepted or rejected based on the regression results of this chapter. 
 
Table 6.8 Summary of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Hypothesis 
Testing 
Hypothesis Number Accept/Reject 
H1 Accept 
H1.1b Accept 
H1.2b Accept 
H1.3b Reject 
H1.4b Reject 
H1.5b Accept 
H1.6b Reject 
H1.7b Reject 
H1.8b Reject 
H1.9b Accept 
H1.10b Reject 
H1.11b Reject 
H1.13b Accept 
H1.14b Accept 
H1.15b Accept 
H1.16b Accept 
H1.17b Accept 
H1.18b Reject 
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Table 6.8 Summary of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Hypothesis 
Testing (continued) 
Hypothesis Number Accept/Reject 
H2 Reject 
 
The results presented and discussed in this chapter provide support for hypothesis 1 since real 
earnings management is shown to be impacted by firm-specific and country-level determinants. 
Hypotheses H1.1b in relation to IFRS adoption, H1.2b in relation to firm size, H1.5b in relation to 
free cash flows, H1.13b in relation to earnings management flexibility, and H1.16b in relation to 
economic growth are supported, since these variables are positively associated with the degree of 
real earnings management. Further, there is evidence to support hypothesis H1.14b since there is 
a significant impact of industry membership upon the degree of real earnings management. 
Hypothesis H1.9b in relation to the operating cycle, H1.15b in relation to financial development, 
and H1.17b in relation to the country-level index variables are supported since they are found to 
be negatively associated with the degree of real earnings management. However, hypotheses 
H1.3b in relation to leverage, H1.4b in relation to growth opportunities, H1.6b in relation to 
profitability, H1.7b in relation to asset tangibility, H1.8b in relation to the dividend payout ratio, 
H1.10b in relation to Altman’s Z-Score, H1.18b in relation to the GIF Index variable, and H2 in 
relation to the substitutability of earnings management techniques are not supported by the results. 
Further, hypothesis H1.12b in relation to the suspect firms variable and H1.11b in relation to 
ownership concentration are not supported since the respective variable coefficients are 
insignificant.  
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6.5 Summary 
To summarize, this chapter discusses the results of the real activities-based earnings management 
models. Two research questions are addressed in this chapter: (i) what are the firm-specific and 
country-level determinants of real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA 
region? And (ii) are earnings management techniques used as substitutes or complements by firms 
in the MENA region? To examine real earnings management, six dependent variables are used 
which are derived from the six different models of real earnings management activities discussed 
in Chapter 4. These variables are abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, abnormal production costs, and three aggregate measures of real earnings 
management.  
 
The analysis is conducted using a pooled cross-sectional regression for firms in the MENA region 
and the countries examined include Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The analysis is conducted by first examining the 
firm-level and country-level determinants of real earnings management with interaction variables. 
This is followed by an investigation of the firm-level determinants as further analysis. country-
level determinants of real earnings management are then examined. Discretionary accruals are then 
included in the regression model to investigate the substitutability, or otherwise, of earnings 
management techniques. The analysis is then conducted by combining firm-level and country-
level determinants in the same model to investigate their joint effect in the absence of interaction 
variables.  
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Principal Component Analysis is employed, consistent with Chapter 5, to overcome the potential 
issue of multicollinearity among the country-level index variables which are regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, the control of corruption, 
and the rule of law. In addition, these index variables are also analysed separately. A Pearson 
Correlation Matrix is computed to conduct a correlation analysis. VIFs are computed to test for 
multicollinearity and the results show that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity 
present across the model variables. The results of the descriptive statistics suggest that the extent 
of employing real earnings management techniques is significantly higher in non-GCC country 
firms compared with GCC country firms on average. 
 
The regression results show that there are significant differences between GCC and non-GCC 
country firms in terms of the extent of their real earnings management behaviour. That is, the 
significant differences between the two regions in terms of the real earnings management 
behaviour of firms are a result of firm size, leverage, free cash flow, profitability, asset tangibility, 
the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, ownership concentration, and earnings management 
flexibility. 
 
The regression results provide strong evidence that earnings management techniques in the MENA 
region are employed by firms as complements rather than as substitutes. The results provide 
evidence that financial development leads to lower levels of real earnings management, and 
provide evidence that GDP growth, IFRS adoption, firm size, free cash flow, and earnings 
management flexibility positively impact upon the overall degree of real earnings management. 
The results also provide evidence that the GIF index variable, leverage, profitability, asset 
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tangibility, the operating cycle, and Altman’s Z-Score negatively impact upon the overall extent 
of real earnings management. There is weak evidence that higher growth opportunities are 
negatively associated with the extent of real earnings management. Further, industry membership 
is found to significantly impact upon the overall extent of real earnings management behaviour in 
the MENA region, and firms in the mobile telecommunications industry are found to exhibit a 
high degree of real earnings management. Further, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, 
and the control of corruption index are found to be significantly negatively associated with the 
degree of real earnings management.  
 
The results presented in this chapter provide support for hypothesis 1 since real earnings 
management is shown to be impacted by firm-specific and country-level determinants. There is 
strong evidence to support the hypotheses in relation to IFRS adoption, firm size, the operating 
cycle, earnings management flexibility, industry membership, the degree of economic growth, and 
the country-level index variables. There is weak evidence to support the hypotheses in relation to 
free cash flows and the degree of financial development. The research hypotheses in relation to 
leverage, growth opportunities, profitability, the dividend payout ratio, asset tangibility, Altman’s 
Z-Score, the GIF index variable, and the substitutability of earnings management techniques are 
not supported by the results. The research hypothesis in relation to the suspect firms variable and 
ownership concentration are not supported since the respective variable coefficients are found to 
be insignificant. 
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Chapter VII – Results of the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management Models 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the results of the efficient versus opportunistic earnings 
management model. The extant literature evidences that earnings management may be employed 
by managers either opportunistically or efficiently. Efficient earnings management improves 
earnings firm informativeness in communicating private information, while opportunistic earnings 
management is conducted by managers to maximize their own utility (Siregar and Utama, 2008). 
The results of this chapter address the research question: is earnings management efficient or 
opportunistic within firms in the MENA region?   
 
Opportunistic earnings management occurs if managers use their discretion to maximize their 
utility, which consequently distorts earnings (Subramanyam, 1996). In contrast, efficient earnings 
management occurs if managers utilize their discretion to communicate private information about 
the profitability of the firm, which has not yet been reflected in the historical cost-based earnings 
(Siregar and Utama, 2008). As an illustration, if managers expect higher profits in the following 
year, they could increase receivables by granting longer receivable terms.  
 
To test whether earnings management is opportunistic or efficient, the ability of discretionary 
accruals to signal future profitability is examined. If earnings management signals future 
profitability, then it is used by managers to convey private information about the profitability of 
the firm. Discretionary accruals are the earnings management proxy and if earnings management 
is efficient, then discretionary accruals will have a significant positive relationship with future 
profitability. Conversely, if discretionary accruals have a significant negative relationship or an 
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insignificant relationship with future profitability, then earnings management is opportunistic. As 
an illustration, if firms engage in earnings management by shifting earnings from a future period 
to the current period, this would be an example of opportunistic earnings management and 
consequently a negative relationship would be found between future profitability and discretionary 
accruals. However, if earnings management is instead efficient then firms have not engaged in 
earnings management to shift earnings from a future period to the current period, and thus a 
positive relationship would exist between discretionary accruals and future profitability. If firms 
are utilizing their discretion to communicate private information about the profitability of the firm 
and this has not been reflected in historical cost-based earnings, then a positive relationship 
between discretionary accruals and future profitability would be found.   
 
To determine whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic, three dependent variables 
are used to proxy for future profitability consistent with Siregar and Utama (2008). These variables 
are one year-ahead cash flows from operating activities (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1), one year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income (𝑁𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑡+1), and the one year-ahead change in earnings 
(∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1).  
 
The analysis is conducted using a pooled cross-sectional regression for a sample of firms belonging 
to MENA countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Consistent with Chapters 5 and 6, the Hausman 
test shows that a fixed-effects regression is appropriate for this research. Therefore, a fixed-effects 
panel regression is also employed as a test of robustness, and the results are broadly consistent 
with the results reported in this chapter for the pooled cross-sectional regression.   
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To test whether earnings management is opportunistic or efficient, the discretionary accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals variables computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, 
the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model measured using the cash flow 
statement approach are employed in the regression model and the association between 
discretionary accruals and future profitability is examined. A model is also computed in which the 
balance sheet approach is used to measure discretionary accruals, but this is included in appendix 
E-1. Siregar and Utama argue that a positive association between discretionary accruals and future 
profitability indicates efficient earnings management while a negative or insignificant association 
indicates opportunistic earnings management.  
 
The analysis is first conducted by examining the efficient versus opportunistic earnings 
management models for firms in the MENA region. The analysis is then conducted for firms in 
GCC countries and firms in non-GCC countries separately, to investigate any potential differences 
between the efficient or opportunistic nature of earnings management within firms across the two 
regions. Firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and the dividend payout ratio 
are included in the models as control variables given their potential impact upon future 
profitability. For example, larger firms may be associated with higher levels of future profitability.  
 
Section 7.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the model variables. Section 7.3 presents the 
correlation analysis and multicollinearity diagnostics for the model variables, and section 7.4 
presents the discussion of the regression results. The chapter concludes with a summary in section 
7.5.  
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Table 4.5 is presented in appendix G-2 and lists the expected coefficient signs in relation to the 
efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model variables.  
 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Model Variables  
Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the model variables. The mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values are shown for the dependent variables, in addition to 
cash flows from operations. T statistics are also reported to identify any potential significant 
differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms. The results of the descriptive statistics of 
the control variables are almost identical to the results presented and discussed in Chapter 5, and 
are thus omitted to avoid repetition. The descriptive statistics are presented for firms in the MENA 
region. In addition, the descriptive statistics are presented for firms in GCC countries and non-
GCC countries separately. GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates. Non-GCC countries include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.   
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Model Variables 
 𝑮𝑪𝑪 𝑵𝒐𝒏 − 𝑮𝑪𝑪  𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑨 𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 T-Statistics 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝑫 𝑴𝒊𝒏 𝑴𝒂𝒙 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 0.084 0.074 0.107 -0.482 2.171 0.081 0.069 0.113 -0.368 0.493 (0.188) 0.083 0.071 0.110 -0.482 2.171 
𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 0.066 0.052 0.112 -0.456 1.599 0.062 0.046 0.126 -0.522 0.878 (0.241) 0.073 0.049 0.118 -0.522 1.599 
∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 0.003 0.004 0.076 -0.571 0.624 0.001 0.001 0.063 -0.402 0.608 (1.640) 0.002 0.003 0.071 -0.571 0.624 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.085 0.074 0.097 -0.276 0.490 0.085 0.069 0.111 -0.368 0.540 (-0.528) 0.085 0.072 0.103 -0.368 0.540 
Number of Observations 2,446 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the efficient versus opportunistic model variables. The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values are presented in the columns for the GCC country 
firms, non-GCC country firms, and the MENA region combined. The t-statistics column reports the t-statistics between brackets to identify the potential significant differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms. 
***, **, and * refer to the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Non-GCC countries include 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The number of observations for the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management models is reported. 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 refers to one year-ahead cash flows from operations scaled by 
lagged total assets; 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 refers to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets; ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 refers to the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets; and 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 
refers to cash flows from operations scaled by total assets. 
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The descriptive statistics show that on average there are no significant differences between GCC 
and non-GCC country firms in terms of their future profitability. Table 7.1 shows that future 
profitability, measured as one year-ahead cash flows from operations, has a mean of 0.084 and 
0.081 for GCC country firms and non-GCC country firms, respectively. One year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income as a measure of future profitability has a mean of 0.066 for GCC 
country firms and a mean of 0.062 for non-GCC country firms. The standard deviation of one year-
ahead cash flows from operations is 0.107 and 0.113 for GCC country firms and non-GCC country 
firms, respectively. The standard deviation for one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income is 
0.112 and 0.126 for GCC country firms and non-GCC country firms, respectively. This shows that 
non-GCC country firms experience greater volatility in terms of future profitability compared with 
GCC country firms. Conversely, GCC country firms experience greater volatility in relation to the 
one year-ahead change in earnings as evidenced by a standard deviation of 0.076 for GCC country 
firms and 0.063 for non-GCC country firms.  
 
The third measure of future profitability is the one year-ahead change in net income. The mean is 
0.003 for GCC country firms and 0.001 for non-GCC country firms. Therefore, the descriptive 
statistics show that future profitability is only slightly higher in GCC country firms compared with 
non-GCC country firms, but does not significantly differ between the two regions. The mean value 
of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets in the current year is 0.085 for both GCC and 
non-GCC country firms. This shows that firms in the two regions do not differ significantly in 
terms of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets. However, the maximum value of cash 
flows from operations scaled by total assets is 0.540 for non-GCC country firms compared with a 
maximum value of 0.490 for non-GCC country firms.    
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7.3 Correlation Analysis and Multicollinearity Diagnostics for the Efficient Versus 
Opportunistic Model Variables  
A Pearson Correlation Matrix is computed to conduct a correlation analysis and is shown in Table 
7.2. To test for multicollinearity across the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management 
model variables, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is computed and is presented in Table 7.3. 
Consistent with Stine (1995) and Siregar and Utama (2008), a VIF larger than the threshold of 10 
is considered to signal high multicollinearity. 
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Table 7.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Model Variables  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 DA NDA 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 Size LEV GO FCF DPR 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 1           
𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 .882
** 1          
∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 .123
** .188** 1         
DA -.079** -.057** -.216** 1        
NDA -.229** -.099** -.016 .009 1       
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 .533
** .497** .004 -.511** -.280** 1      
Size .193** .153** -.017 .041* -.194** .209** 1     
LEV -.165** -.205** .019 -.027 -.036 -.274** .189** 1    
GO .117** .116** .024 -.039 -.073** .125** -.029 .028 1   
FCF .072** .078** .005 -.010 .034 .072** .040* -.046* -.030 1  
DPR .309** .292** -.027 .041* -.056** .387** .177** -.245** .056** .050* 1 
This table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix for variables included in the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management models. ** and * refer to  𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕+𝟏 refers 
to one year-ahead cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 refers to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 refers to the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets; DA refers to discretionary accruals computed from the Modified Jones Model; 
NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as 
the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book 
ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout 
ratio measured as cash dividends paid scaled by net income. ** represent correlations significant at the 0.01 level and * represents correlations significant at the 0.05 level. 
The VIFs reported in Table 7.4 show that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity across the real activities-based earnings management models. 
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The Pearson Correlation Matrix shows that discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals 
are significantly negatively correlated with the three measures of future profitability. Discretionary 
accruals are significant at the 1% level across the three measures of future profitability, whereas 
nondiscretionary accruals are significant at the 1% level in relation to one year-ahead cash flows 
from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income. This is a possible indication that 
earnings management within firms in the MENA region is opportunistic rather than efficient. 
However, in the absence of regression model results, this is only indicative.  
 
Cash flows from operations in the current year are significantly positively correlated with one 
year-ahead cash flows from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 1% 
level. Firm size, growth opportunities, free cash flows, and the dividend payout ratio are shown to 
be significantly positively correlated with one year-ahead cash flows from operations and one year-
ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 1% level. Thus, it is possible that larger firms, growing 
firms, firms with higher free cash flows, and firms with higher dividend payout ratios experience 
higher future profitability. Conversely, leverage is shown to be significantly negatively correlated 
with one year-ahead cash flows from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income 
at the 1% level. Therefore, this suggests that higher leverage in MENA country firms is associated 
with lower future profitability.   
 
As shown in the Pearson Correlation matrix, the highest correlation is 0.533 which is between cash 
flows from operations in the current period and one year-ahead cash flows from operations. 
However, this correlation is not high enough to indicate a significant problem of multicollinearity.  
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To further test for multicollinearity, the maximum and mean VIFs computed for the efficient 
versus opportunistic earnings management model variables are presented in Table 7.4. The highest 
VIF value computed is 2.31 for cash flows from operations and the mean VIF across variables is 
1.37. A VIF value higher than the threshold of 10 is considered a problem of multicollinearity. 
VIF values between the threshold of 5 and 10 are potential indicators of multicollinearity. 
However, all VIF values are significantly lower than the threshold of 5 and thus show that there is 
no significant problem of multicollinearity present across the efficient versus opportunistic 
earnings management model variables.  
 
7.4 Regression Results for the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Models 
This section presents the regression results for the efficient versus opportunistic earnings 
management models. The discussion begins with the results for the control variables and the 
investigation of whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic which is shown in 
Table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.012 -0.024 -0.012 -0.015 -0.003 -0.012  
 (-2.09)** (-301)*** (-1.67)* (-2.05)** (-0.51) (-1.94)*  
𝑫𝑨 0.254 0.352 -0.323 0.211 0.237 -0.345 + or - 
 (6.95)*** (7.40)*** (-10.08)*** (6.78)*** (5.62)*** (-7.91)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 -0.195 0.297 -0.190 0.258 0.308 -0.213  
 (-2.40)** (4.12)*** (-3.78)*** (5.14)*** (9.18)*** (-7.05)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.612 0.688 -0.200 0.625 0.788 -0.180  
 (18.52)*** (20.25)*** (-7.45)*** (19.22)*** (32.28)*** (-7.07***  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002  
 (3.64)*** (3.24)*** (3.96)*** (5.08)*** (1.77)* (3.74)***  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.012 -0.007 -0.023 0.018 -0.001 -0.022  
 (1.15) (-0.56) (-3.40)*** (1.52) (-0.18) (-3.22)***  
𝑮𝑶  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002  
 (2.96)*** (2.86)*** (2.56)** (3.16)*** (2.00)** (2.44)**  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (2.00)** (2.06)** (0.80) (1.50) (1.44) (0.80)  
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Table 7.3 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
 (4.03)*** (2.24)** (3.48)*** (4.21)*** (1.90)* (3.15)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.324 0.299 0.091 0.310 0.476 0.094  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability using a pooled cross-sectional regression for firms 
in the MENA region to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. 
 
 
Table 7.3 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.014 -0.031 -0.010 -0.012 -0.029 -0.010  
 (-1.77)* (-3.65)*** (-1.60) (-1.63) (-3.45)*** (-1.57)  
𝑫𝑨 0.419 0.435 -0.292 0.447 0.513 -0.279 + or - 
 (8.92)*** (8.36)*** (-8.15)*** (9.72)*** (10.05)*** (-8.05)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 0.015 0.698 -0.362 -0.057 0.577 -0.384  
 (0.36) (12.46)*** (-9.18)*** (-1.27) (10.36)*** (-9.19)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.729 0.799 -0.184 0.745 0.851 -0.174  
 (20.42)*** (20.42)*** (-6.45)*** (21.37)*** (22.98)*** (-6.40)***  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003  
 (3.22)*** (4.18)*** (3.12)*** (2.75)*** (3.34)*** (2.95)***  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.009 -0.018 -0.026 0.010 -0.014 -0.026  
 (0.88) (-1.41) (-3.70)*** (0.97) (-1.17) (-3.69)***  
𝑮𝑶  0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002  
 (3.68)*** (3.85)*** (2.60)*** (3.04)*** (3.17)*** (2.45)**  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  
 (1.92)* (1.99)** (1.12) (1.85)* (2.04)** (1.12)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (4.13)*** (3.43)*** (3.29)*** (4.44)*** (3.61)*** (3.36)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
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Table 7.3 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.331 0.377 0.090 0.337 0.379 0.092  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446  
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒎𝒖𝒎 𝑽𝑰𝑭 2.31 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒏 𝑽𝑰𝑭 1.37 
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability using a pooled cross-sectional regression for firms 
in the MENA region to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. 
 
As shown in Table 7.3, discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with one year-
ahead cash flows from operations at the 1% level and are significantly positively associated with 
one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 1% level, but are significantly negatively 
associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings at the 1% level. These results are consistent 
across the three measures of future profitability and suggest that firms in MENA countries manage 
earnings efficiently in order to convey private information to outsiders rather than to 
opportunistically gain private benefits. The consistency across the four earnings management 
models and across the different measures of future profitability is evidence in favour of efficient 
rather than opportunistic earnings management behaviour. However, in the absence of interaction 
variables, these findings are only indicative. Further, these results are consistent with the research 
findings of Siregar and Utama (2008) who also find that discretionary accruals are positively 
associated with one year-ahead cash flows from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary 
net income, and negatively associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings in a study of 
Indonesian firms. They conclude that earnings management tends toward being efficient rather 
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than opportunistic. The associations between discretionary accruals and future profitability 
provide support for hypothesis H3.  
 
The table shows that cash flows in the current period are significantly positively associated with 
one year-ahead cash flows from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 
1% level, but significantly negatively associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings at the 
1% level. The coefficients are consistent across the four accruals-based earnings management 
models. This suggests that the higher the cash flows of MENA country firms, the higher the future 
profitability of these firms.  
 
As shown in the table, firm size is significantly positively associated with the measures of future 
profitability at the 1% level across the accruals-based earnings management models, except in 
relation to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income for the Kasznik Model which is significant 
only at the 10% level. This suggests that greater firm size is associated with higher future 
profitability in MENA country firms. Niresh and Velnampy (2014) argue that the size of the firm 
is a primary factor determining profitability since larger firms have the advantage of economies of 
scale and may thus produce items at a lower cost. This is because fixed costs per unit of production 
decrease as capacity increases. Further, it is likely that larger firms have a greater capacity for 
making profitable investments which could lead to greater future profitability. Therefore, a 
positive impact of firm size upon future profitability may be attributed to the economies of scale 
exhibited by larger firms, as well as the capacity of larger firms to make profitable investments.  
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In contrast, the table shows that leverage is significantly negatively associated with the one year-
ahead change in earnings at the 1% level across the accruals-based earnings management models. 
It is possible that higher leverage in MENA country firms results in lower future profitability. A 
possible explanation for this negative coefficient is that highly leveraged firms face cash 
constraints due to periodic debt servicing payments which may coerce them to forego profitable 
investments (Pattitoni et al., 2014), and eventually lead to lower future profitability. However, in 
the absence of causality testing, it is also possible that more profitable firms require lower levels 
of leverage.  
 
Consistent with the relationship between firm size and future profitability, there is strong evidence 
that growth opportunities are significantly positively related to future profitability. As growth 
opportunities increase, it is expected that firms will have higher profitability (Monti-Belkaoui, et 
al. 1999). Therefore, higher growth opportunities appear to lead to higher future profitability.  
 
Free cash flows are shown to be significantly positively associated with one year-ahead cash flows 
from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 5% level in relation to the 
Modified Jones Model, and significant at the 5% level in relation to one year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income for the Kothari et al. and Raman and Shahrur Models. This could be 
taken as weak evidence that higher free cash flows in MENA country firms are associated with 
higher future profitability. Ambreen and Aftab (2016) argue that free cash flows enable firms to 
invest in profitable ventures that generate profits for the firm. Thus, it is possible that higher free 
cash flows allow firms to make profitable investments which lead to higher future profitability.  
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Similarly, the dividend payout ratio is shown to be significant and positively associated with the 
three measures of future profitability, and this result is consistent across the four accruals-based 
earnings management models. The dividend payout ratio variable is significant at the 1% level in 
relation to all measures of accruals-based earnings management, except for nondiscretionary net 
income in relation to the Modified Jones Model and the Kasznik Model for which the significance 
levels are 5% and 10%, respectively. This finding provides strong evidence that the dividend 
payout ratio positively impacts upon future profitability in MENA country firms, which may be 
attributed to Signalling Theory. Since dividends provide signals about a firm’s future prospects, 
higher dividend payout ratios may signal to the market that the firm is expected to have higher 
future cash flows (Naceur and Goaied, 2002), which could lead to higher investments in the firm 
by investors in the market, which in turn leads to higher future profitability. Overall, all of the 
models are significant at the 1% level and the Kasznik Model is shown to have the highest 
explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 47.6% in relation to one year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income.  
 
Table 7.4 shows how the interaction variables can moderate the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and future profitability.  
 
Table 7.4 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region with Moderating Variables  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.012 -0.014 -0.000 -0.016 -0.011 -0.003  
 (-1.11) (-1.39) (-0.05) (-1.52) (-1.41) (-0.37)  
𝑫𝑨 0.045 0.322 -0.757 -0.062 0.176 -0.870 + or - 
 (0.22) (1.52) (-5.32)*** (-0.32) (1.15) (-4.75)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 -0.151 0.352 -0.143 0.297 0.318 -0.155  
 (-1.61) (4.54)*** (-2.79)*** (5.25)*** (7.67)*** (-4.58)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.682 0.745 -0.128 0.689 0.812 -0.113  
 (23.16)*** (19.08)*** (-4.46)*** (22.50)*** (28.50)*** (-3.87)***  
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Table 7.4 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region with Moderating Variables (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002  
 (2.25)** (1.86)* (1.60) (4.02)*** (2.16)** (1.50)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.008 -0.013 -0.020 0.008 -0.016 -0.017  
 (0.62) (-0.90) (-2.52)** (0.63) (-1.41) (-2.12)**  
𝑮𝑶  0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001  
 (2.66)*** (2.49)** (1.81)* (3.34)*** (2.22)** (1.61)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (2.09)** (2.05)** (1.10) (1.60) (2.01)** (1.06)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (2.41)** (1.18) (1.81)* (2.74)*** (1.89)* (1.79)*  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.016 0.004 0.035 0.019 0.003 0.039 + 
 (1.41) (0.30) (3.13)*** (1.56) (0.28) (2.67)***  
𝑳𝑬𝑽 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.057 -0.254 0.215 0.039 -0.029 0.237 + 
 (-0.29) (-0.92) (1.60) (0.18) (-0.15) (1.42)  
𝑮𝑶 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006 -0.016 -0.011 + 
 (0.09) (-0.51) (-1.13) (-0.32) (-0.75) (-0.94)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 - 
 (0.03) (-0.24) (-0.50) (0.64) (0.11) (1.03)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003 + 
 (3.06)*** (2.02)** (2.53)** (2.75)*** (1.85)* (3.53)***  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.351 0.317 0.091 0.334 0.5108 0.100  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,446 2,446 2,446 2.446 2,446 2,446  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in the MENA region using a pooled cross-
sectional regression to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. Interaction variables are included.  
 
Table 7.4 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region with Moderating Variables (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.011 -0.023 0.001 -0.012 -0.025 0.001  
 (-1.06) (-1.98)** (0.06) (-1.14) (-2.19)** (0.13)  
𝑫𝑨 0.286 0.446 -0.522 0.327 0.577 -0.485 + or - 
 (1.48) (2.06)** (-3.85)*** (1.56) (2.31)** (-3.47)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 0.051 0.743 -0.296 0.006 0.626 -0.315  
 (1.07) (10.43)*** (-6.41)*** (0.14) (9.38)*** (-6.63)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.773 0.853 -0.148 0.775 0.894 -0.144  
 (22.71)*** (18.02)*** (-4.17)*** (24.22)*** (20.84)*** (-4.20)***  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001  
 (2.38)** (2.55)** (1.08) (2.35)** (2.30)** (0.93)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.002 -0.024 -0.022 0.001 -0.023 -0.023  
 (0.17) (-1.56) (-2.74)*** (0.11) (-1.56) (-2.77)***  
𝑮𝑶  0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001  
 (2.81)*** (2.83)*** (1.56) (2.73)*** (2.72)*** (1.53)  
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Table 7.4 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in the 
MENA Region with Moderating Variables (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  
 (1.94)* (1.89)* (1.28) (1.96)* (1.97)** (1.29)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (3.00)*** (2.55)** (2.12)** (3.27)*** (2.77)*** (2.14)**  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.004 -0.006 0.018 0.002 -0.009 0.015 + 
 (0.36) (-0.39) (1.87)* (0.14) (-0.54) (1.47)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.027 -0.033 0.171 0.058 -0.049 0.231 + 
 (0.13) (-0.13) (1.49) (0.27) (-0.18) (1.89)*  
𝑮𝑶 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.003 -0.013 -0.004 0.002 -0.010 -0.007 + 
 (0.19) (-0.71) (-0.41) (0.14) (-0.49) (-0.56)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 - 
 (0.39) (-0.02) (-0.93) (0.60) (0.03) (-0.92)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 + 
 (1.84)* (1.95)* (0.76) (1.82)* (1.40) (0.90)  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.346 0.398 0.0732 0.3516 0.400 0.074  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446 2,446  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in the MENA region using a pooled cross-
sectional regression to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. Interaction variables are included.  
 
As shown in Table 7.4, earnings management is opportunistic within MENA country firms when 
interaction variables are included in the model. Therefore, in the absence of interaction variables, 
earnings management is efficient. However, when interaction variables are included, discretionary 
accruals become insignificant determinants of future profitability in relation to one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income for the Modified 
Jones Model and the Kasznik Model. Discretionary accruals are also found to be insignificant 
determinants of one year-ahead cash flows from operations in relation to the Kothari et al. Model 
and the Raman and Shahrur Model. Further, discretionary accruals are significantly negatively 
associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings in relation to the four accruals-based 
earnings management models. Although discretionary accruals are significantly positively 
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associated with one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 5% level, the findings provide 
strong evidence of opportunistic earnings management for firms in the MENA region.  
 
This finding is important for regulators, investors, auditors, and analysts since it shows that the 
earnings management activities of firms in the MENA region are detrimental to the firm’s future 
profitability and do not enhance the informativeness of firm earnings. These results are of 
particular importance to regulators since they may be interested in knowing that earnings 
management is not beneficial in the MENA region and they should attempt to drive it down to 
reduce information asymmetries. Since regulators must decide how much judgement to allow 
management to exercise in financial reporting, then being aware of the fact that earnings 
management in MENA country firms is opportunistic is essential. The results presented in this 
chapter are thus important for regulators since they provide evidence that firms in MENA countries 
misuse the discretion in financial reporting for opportunistic purposes.  
 
Analysts, investors, and auditors should be cautious of the earnings management behaviour of 
MENA country firms. This finding contrasts with the research findings of Subramanyam (1996) 
for US firms who argues that efficient earnings management improves the ability of earnings to 
reflect economic value. Further, this relationship is inconsistent with the research findings of 
Siregar and Utama (2008) for Indonesian firms, Rezaei and Roshani (2012) and Omid et al. (2012) 
for Iranian firms, who find evidence of efficient earnings management. However, this finding is 
consistent with the research findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Balsam et al. (2002) 
for US firms, each of which evidences opportunistic rather than efficient earnings management.  
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The results regarding cash flows from operations in the current period and the control variables 
are consistent with the previously discussed models. They indicate that current year cash flows 
from operations, firm size, growth opportunities, free cash flows, and the dividend payout ratio are 
significantly positively associated with future profitability. Conversely, leverage, is significantly 
negatively associated with future profitability.  
 
The interaction between firm size and discretionary accruals is shown to be significantly positively 
associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings at the 1% level in relation to the Modified 
Jones Model and the Kasznik Model. This provides weak evidence that greater firm size moderates 
the relationship between future profitability and efficient earnings management. That is, larger 
firms engage in efficient rather than opportunistic earnings management to a greater extent 
compared with small firms in the MENA region. This positive coefficient is consistent with the 
argument that managers of small firms are more capable of retaining their private information than 
managers of larger firms. However, information on a firm becomes more publicly available as it 
grows in size. Further, since larger firms are scrutinized by investors and the general public to a 
greater degree, it is more difficult for larger firms to manage earnings opportunistically compared 
with smaller firms (Siregar and Utama, 2008). This positive coefficient is inconsistent with the 
research findings of Siregar and Utama for Indonesian firms and Rezaei and Roshani (2012) for 
Iranian firms. The authors do not find significant evidence that larger firms engage in efficient 
earnings management. Further, this positive coefficient provides support for hypothesis H3.1.  
 
The results regarding the interaction between leverage and discretionary accruals evidence 
insignificant coefficients across the models. The coefficient is only significant and positively 
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associated with the one year-ahead change in cash flows in relation to the Raman and Shahrur 
Model. However, the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. This may suggest that firms 
characterised by higher leverage in the MENA region do not use efficient earnings management 
more than firms characterised by lower leverage. This finding does not provide support for 
hypothesis H3.2.     
 
The table shows that the interaction between growth opportunities and discretionary accruals is an 
insignificant determinant across the accruals-based earnings management models. Thus, firms 
characterised by greater growth opportunities do not engage in efficient earnings management to 
a greater extent compared with firms characterised by lower growth opportunities. This finding 
does not provide support for hypothesis H3.3.   
 
Further, the coefficient for the interaction between free cash flow and discretionary accruals is 
found to be an insignificant determinant across all measures of future profitability and accruals-
based earnings management models. This may be an indication that firms characterised by higher 
free cash flows do not engage in higher levels of efficient earnings management compared with 
firms characterised by lower levels of free cash flows. The insignificant coefficient does not 
provide support for hypothesis H3.4.  
 
On the other hand, the interaction between the dividend payout ratio and discretionary accruals is 
shown to be significantly positively associated with one year-ahead cash flows from operations, 
one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income, and the one year-ahead change in earnings at the 1%, 
5% and 5% levels, respectively, in relation to the Modified Jones Model. The coefficients are 
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significant for the Kasznik Model in relation to one year-ahead cash flows from operations, one 
year-ahead nondiscretionary net income, and the one year-ahead change in earnings at the 1%, 
10%, and 1% levels, respectively. Therefore, this shows evidence that MENA country firms 
characterised by higher dividend payout ratios engage in more efficient earnings management 
compared with firms characterised by lower dividend payout ratios. A likely explanation for this 
finding is that since dividend payments decrease internal funds, they increase the need for external 
financing. Thus, firms which pay higher dividends are likely to have a greater incentive to improve 
earnings quality in order to be able to access the necessary external financing at a lower cost of 
capital, which is likely to mitigate opportunistic behaviour (Lemma et al., 2013). The positive 
coefficient in relation to the interaction between the dividend payout ratio and discretionary 
accruals provides support for hypothesis H3.5. Overall, all of the models are significant at the 1% 
level and the Kasznik Model in relation to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income is shown 
to have the highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 51.08%.  
 
Table 7.5 examines the efficient versus opportunistic nature of earnings management with 
moderating variables for firms in GCC countries.  
 
Table 7.5 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in GCC 
Countries 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.010 -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 -0.008  
 (-0.65) (-0.87) (-0.55) (-0.63) (-1.04) (-0.58)  
𝑫𝑨 -0.261 0.126 -0.904 -0.224 0.237 -0.994 + or - 
 (-1.08) (0.43) (-3.90)*** (-0.99) (1.15) (-3.91)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 -0.085 0.359 -0.169 0.308 0.324 -0.173  
 (-0.70) (3.03)*** (-2.32)** (4.13)*** (6.26)*** (-3.70)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.666 0.701 -0.173 0.692 0.787 -0.145  
 (17.34)*** (12.99)*** (-4.10)*** (17.90)*** (20.73)*** (-3.73)***  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002  
 (1.81)* (1.18) (2.07)** (2.78)*** (1.42) (1.83)*  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.009 -0.009 -0.027 0.009 -0.014 -0.025  
 (0.58) (-0.48) (-2.59)** (0.56) (-0.80) (-2.40)**  
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Table 7.5 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in GCC 
Countries (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑮𝑶  0.005 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.002  
 (2.28)** (1.90)* (1.75)* (2.34)** (1.83)* (1.48)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001  
 (2.97)*** (1.88)* (-1.16) (1.74)* (1.46) (-1.40)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000  
 (1.59) (1.24) (1.51) (1.30) (1.71)* (1.48)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.041 0.026 0.042 0.030 -0.001 0.045 + 
 (2.58)** (1.26) (2.37)** (1.87)* (-0.05) (2.15)**  
𝑳𝑬𝑽 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.126 -0.276 0.109 0.284 0.083 0.139 + 
 (0.46) (-0.69) (0.49) (0.88) (0.22) (0.53)  
𝑮𝑶 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.008 -0.027 -0.018 -0.024 -0.048 -0.015 + 
 (-0.26) (-0.39) (-0.68) (-0.75) (-0.79) (-0.58)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.034 0.037 -0.004 0.038 0.032 0.004 - 
 (1.95)* (2.07)** (-0.35) (1.50) (1.84)* (0.20)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 + 
        
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.311 0.295 0.119 0.301 0.470 0.134  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in GCC countries using a pooled cross-
sectional regression to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. Interaction variables are included.  
 
Table 7.5 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in GCC 
Countries (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.012 -0.028 -0.006 -0.012 -0.029 -0.005  
 (-0.87) (-1.74)* (-0.32) (-0.89) (-1.87)* (-0.36)  
𝑫𝑨 -0.062 0.255 -0.644 -0.013 0.417 -0.548 + or - 
 (-0.22) (0.86) (-2.98)*** (-0.03) (1.21) (-2.49)**  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 0.036 0.686 -0.343 -0.019 0.564 -0.391  
 (0.56) (6.80)*** (-4.99)*** (-0.30) (6.78)*** (-5.40)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.759 0.830 -0.195 0.755 0.850 -0.183  
 (16.07)*** (12.73)*** (-3.91)*** (17.96)*** (15.04)*** (-3.99)***  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001  
 (2.11)** (1.94)* (1.57) (2.09)** (1.78)* (1.34)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.005 -0.014 -0.029 0.005 -0.014 -0.029  
 (0.29) (-0.71) (-2.70)*** (0.30) (-0.68) (-2.72)***  
𝑮𝑶  0.005 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.00  
 (2.21)** (2.05)** (1.70) (2.30)** (2.14)** (1.77)*  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000  
 (2.99)*** (1.32) (-0.58) (3.48)*** (2.10)** (-0.25)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (1.81)* (2.31)** (1.87)* (2.00)** (2.58)** (1.96)*  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.031 0.016 0.022 0.026 0.008 0.015  
 (1.83)* (0.72) (1.34) (1.44) (0.30) (0.89)  
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Table 7.5 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in GCC 
Countries (continued) 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑳𝑬𝑽 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.276 0.055 0.146 0.358 0.072 0.205 + 
 (0.94) (0.15) (0.79) (1.21) (0.19) (1.07)  
𝑮𝑶 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.001 -0.024 0.003 -0.001 -0.029 0.000 + 
 (-0.03) (-0.56) (0.30) (-0.00) (-0.53) (0.02)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.046 0.046 -0.004 0.045 0.045 -0.004 - 
 (2.49)** (2.46)** (-0.42) (2.45)** (2.47)** (-0.44)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 + 
 (0.53) (-0.25) (0.97) (0.68) (-0.15) (1.08)  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.310 0.383 0.097 0.316 0.373 0.099  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in GCC countries using a pooled cross-
sectional regression to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year for 
the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. Interaction variables are included.  
 
Table 7.5 shows that the results of the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model 
for GCC country firms are broadly consistent with the results shown for the MENA region. The 
coefficients for discretionary accruals continue to provide evidence of opportunistic earnings 
management. Cash flows from operations in the current period, firm size, growth opportunities, 
free cash flows, and the dividend payout ratio are still shown to be significantly positively 
associated with future profitability. Further, leverage is still shown to be significantly negatively 
associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings as a measure of future profitability.  
 
Consistent with the models computed for the MENA region, there is weak evidence that larger 
firms engage in more efficient earnings management compared with smaller firms. Further, there 
is evidence that GCC country firms characterised by higher dividend payout ratios engage in more 
efficient earnings management compared with firms characterised by lower payout ratios. 
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Leverage and growth opportunities are shown to be insignificant determinants as interaction 
variables and thus higher leverage and growth opportunities do not lead to more efficient rather 
than opportunistic earnings management for GCC country firms.  
 
When GCC country firms are analysed separately, the interaction between free cash flows and 
discretionary accruals becomes significant and positively associated with one year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income in relation to the Modified Jones Model at the 5% level. In addition, 
the interaction variable is significant and positively associated with one year-ahead cash flows 
from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income in relation to the Kothari et al. 
Model and the Raman and Shahrur Model. This finding contrasts with the argument that firms 
could invest in non-value maximizing projects and then opportunistically utilize earnings 
management to compensate for the negative impacts of these investments. Thus, GCC country 
firms characterised by higher free cash flows engage in a higher degree of efficient earnings 
management compared with firms characterised by lower free cash flows. GCC country firms 
characterised by higher free cash flows are potentially more orientated toward utilizing their cash 
flows for making profitable investments. Thus, the nature of their earnings management behaviour 
is efficient rather than opportunistic. Overall, all of the models are significant at the 1% level, and 
the Kasznik Model in relation to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income is found to have the 
highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 47.0%.  
 
Table 7.6 examines the efficient versus opportunistic nature of earnings management with 
moderating variables for firms in non-GCC countries. 
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Table 7.6 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in Non-
GCC Countries 
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑱𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒔 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑲𝒂𝒔𝒛𝒏𝒊𝒌 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.018 -0.020 0.004 -0.026 -0.014 0.002  
 (-1.25) (-1.41) (0.40) (-1.74)* (-1.02) (0.10)  
𝑫𝑨 0.519 0.639 -0.518 0.420 0.277 -0.542 + or - 
 (2.65)*** (2.75)*** (-3.85)*** (1.65) (1.28) (-3.00)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 -0.256 0.318 -0.083 0.276 0.293 -0.124  
 (-2.65)*** (2.41)** (-1.08) (3.35)*** (4.25)*** (-2.47)**  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.708 0.807 -0.076 0.679 0.844 -0.060  
 (15.99)*** (13.67)*** (-1.71)* (13.44)*** (18.77)*** (-1.36)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000  
 (1.43) (1.46) (0.02) (2.69)*** (1.63) (0.02)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  0.005 -0.026 -0.012 0.004 -0.025 -0.009  
 (0.27) (-1.05) (-0.99) (0.21) (-1.52) (-0.72)  
𝑮𝑶  0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001  
 (1.22) (1.14) (0.85) (2.02)** (0.19) (0.77)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (1.53) (1.70)* (1.32) (1.37) (1.76)* (1.42)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (1.98)** (0.06) (0.98) (2.57)** (0.90) (0.95)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.022 -0.037 0.023 -0.015 -0.009 0.022 + 
 (-1.38) (-1.92)* (1.90)* (-0.74) (-0.52) (1.33)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.070 0.145 0.243 -0.090 0.142 0.310 + 
 (-0.27) (0.45) (1.66)* (-0.28) (0.55) (1.60)  
𝑮𝑶 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.003 -0.007 -0.018 -0.005 -0.010 -0.019 + 
 (0.18) (-0.32) (-1.46) (-0.25) (-0.59) (-1.52)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 - 
 (-0.46) (-0.64) (-0.85) (0.10) (-0.46) (0.57)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.00 + 
 (2.96)*** (3.77)*** (1.36) (2.34)** (2.77)*** (1.71)*  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.433 0.367 0.055 0.400 0.577 0.054  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 953 953 953 953 953 953  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in non-GCC countries using a pooled 
cross-sectional regression to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year 
for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. Interaction variables are included.  
 
Table 7.6 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in Non-
GCC Countries (continued)  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 -0.013 -0.027 0.006 -0.016 -0.029 0.005  
 (-0.92) (-1.48) (0.49) (-1.09) (-1.65)* (0.45)  
𝑫𝑨 0.911 0.943 -0.318 0.965 1.028 -0.365 + or - 
 (4.09)*** (3.49)*** (-2.66)*** (4.14)*** (3.71)*** (-2.70)***  
𝑵𝑫𝑨 0.084 0.811 -0.209 0.032 0.692 -0.197  
 (1.33) (8.34)*** (-3.71)*** (0.48) (6.35)*** (-3.60)***  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 0.792 0.886 -0.079 0.800 0.953 -0.085  
 (15.90)*** (12.35)*** (-1.54) (16.06)*** (14.55)*** (-1.62)  
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Table 7.6 Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management for Firms in Non-
GCC Countries (continued)  
𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑲𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊 𝒆𝒕 𝒂𝒍. 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑹𝒂𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉𝒓𝒖𝒓 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍  
 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏 ∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏 Expected Sign 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000  
 (1.43) (1.85)* (-0.27) (1.48) (1.73)* (-0.20)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽  -0.004 -0.047 -0.014 -0.006 -0.046 -0.013  
 (-0.18) (-1.69)* (-1.14) (-0.28) (-1.79)* (-1.10)  
𝑮𝑶  0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001  
 (1.74)* (1.81)* (0.41) (1.55) (1.57) (0.63)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (1.27) (1.57) (1.34) (1.23) (1.50) (1.35)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (2.37)** (1.16) (1.05) (2.72)*** (1.25) (1.04)  
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.045 -0.058 0.012 -0.045 -0.054 0.014 + 
 (-2.65)*** (-2.60)*** (1.247) (-2.63)*** (-2.42)** (1.28)  
𝑳𝑬𝑽 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.049 0.241 0.153 -0.129 0.151 0.197 + 
 (-0.18) (0.73) (1.17) (-0.47) (0.46) (1.34)  
𝑮𝑶 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.002 -0.013 -0.015 0.004 -0.002 -0.014 + 
 (0.14) (-0.65) (-1.38) (0.23) (-0.08) (-1.17)  
𝑭𝑪𝑭 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 - 
 (-0.25) (-0.51) (-1.13) (-0.01) (-0.41) (-1.02)  
𝑫𝑷𝑹 𝑿 𝑫𝑨 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000 + 
 (2.29)** (3.53)*** (0.12) (1.88)* (2.94)*** (0.18)  
𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
𝑹 𝑺𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 0.424 0.438 0.044 0.428 0.453 0.044  
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024  
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 953 953 953 953 953 953  
This table measures the relationship between discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in non-GCC countries using a pooled 
cross-sectional regression to investigate whether earnings management is efficient or opportunistic. The year 1997 is used as the reference year 
for the year fixed effects. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level and are reported between brackets. Future profitability is measured using one year-ahead 
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets (𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒕+𝟏), one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income scaled by lagged total assets 
(𝑵𝑫𝑵𝑰𝒕+𝟏), and the one year-ahead change in earnings scaled by lagged total assets (∆𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒕+𝟏). DA refers to discretionary accruals 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow 
statement approach; NDA refers to nondiscretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 refers to cash flows from operations scaled 
by total assets; Size refers to firm size measured as the natural logarithm of net sales revenue; LEV refers to leverage measured as total debt 
scaled by total assets; GO refers to growth opportunities measured as the price-book ratio; FCF refers to free cash flow per share measured as 
cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid; and DPR refers to the dividend payout ratio measured as cash 
dividends paid scaled by net income. Interaction variables are included.  
 
Table 7.6 shows that discretionary accruals are significantly positively associated with one year-
ahead cash flows from operations and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income at the 1% level, 
and are significantly negatively associated with the one year-ahead change in earnings at the 1% 
level in relation to the Modified Jones Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and Shahrur 
Model. The coefficient is insignificant in relation to one year-ahead cash flows from operations 
and one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income, and significantly negative in relation to the one 
year-ahead change in earnings in relation to the Kasznik Model. In contrast to the results found for 
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GCC country firms, these findings provide evidence that non-GCC country firms engage in 
efficient rather than opportunistic earnings management.  
 
Cash flows from operations in the current period are shown to be significantly positively associated 
with future profitability, consistent with the results reported for MENA country firms and GCC 
country firms. There is weak evidence that firm size, growth opportunities, and the dividend payout 
ratio are associated with higher future profitability. Leverage and free cash flows are shown to be 
only significantly positively associated with future profitability at the 10% level.  
 
The table shows that the interaction between firm size and discretionary accruals is significantly 
negatively associated with one year-ahead cash flows from operations and one year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income in relation to the Kothari et al. Model and the Raman and Shahrur 
Model. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level in relation to the Kothari et al. Model for both 
measures of future profitability. Regarding the Raman and Shahrur Model, the coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level in relation to one year-ahead cash flows from operations and is 
significant at the 5% level in relation to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income. Thus, there 
is weak evidence that larger firms engage in higher levels of opportunistic earnings management 
compared with smaller firms in non-GCC countries. Non-GCC countries experience relatively 
higher levels of corruption and political instability compared with GCC countries. Therefore, it is 
possible that larger firms in non-GCC countries are more capable of engaging in opportunistic 
earnings management without being detected or penalized for such behaviour.  
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The interaction variables in relation to leverage, growth opportunities, and free cash flows are 
found to be insignificant determinants. Thus, higher leveraged firms, firms characterised by higher 
growth opportunities, and firms characterised by higher free cash flows in non-GCC countries do 
not engage in efficient earnings management more than their counterparts. Consistent with the 
results reported for MENA country firms and GCC country firms, there is evidence that firms 
characterised by higher dividend payout ratios engage in more efficient earnings management 
compared with firms characterised by lower payout ratios. Overall, all of the models are significant 
at the 1% level and the Kasznik Model in relation to one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income 
is found to have the highest explanatory power with an R Squared statistic of 57.7%. 
 
Table 7.7 provides a summary of which research hypotheses are supported based on the regression 
results of this chapter.   
 
Table 7.7 Summary of the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Accept/Reject 
H3 Accept 
H3.1 Accept 
H3.2 Reject 
H3.3 Reject 
H3.4 Reject 
H3.5 Accept 
 
The results provide support for hypothesis 3 since there is a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals and future profitability for firms in the MENA region. The results provide 
support for hypothesis H3.1 and H3.5 in relation to firm size and the dividend payout ratio, 
respectively, as moderating variables between discretionary accruals and future profitability. 
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These variables are found to be positively associated with future profitability. However, 
hypotheses H3.2, H3.3, and H3.4 in relation to the moderating effect of leverage, growth 
opportunities, and free cash flows on the relationship between discretionary accruals and future 
profitability are not supported since the respective variable coefficients are found to be 
insignificant.  
 
7.5 Summary 
To summarize, this chapter presents a discussion of the results of efficient versus opportunistic 
earnings management models. To determine whether earnings management is efficient or 
opportunistic, three dependent variables are used to proxy for future profitability: one year-ahead 
cash flows from operating activities, one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income, and the one 
year-ahead change in earnings. Discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary accruals computed 
from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the Raman and 
Shahrur Model are employed in the regression model and are examined to identify whether 
earnings management is opportunistic or efficient. A pooled cross-sectional regression is used to 
conduct the analysis for firms in the MENA region, as well as firms in GCC countries and non-
GCC countries separately to investigate the potential differences between the two regions. The 
dataset analysed includes firms belonging to Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Non-GCC countries include Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.  
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A Pearson Correlation Matrix is employed to conduct a correlation analysis and the Variance 
Inflation Factor is employed to test for multicollinearity. The results show that there is no 
significant problem of multicollinearity present across the model variables. The descriptive 
statistics show that future profitability does not differ significantly between GCC and non-GCC 
country firms.  
 
The regression results provide evidence that earnings management in the MENA region tends 
toward being opportunistic rather than efficient. This finding provides important implications for 
investors, analysts, lenders, and auditors, as it should raise their awareness to the fact that the 
earnings management behaviour of firms in the MENA region does not improve the 
informativeness of firm earnings, and does not provide any benefits to prospective investors. There 
is evidence that firm size, growth opportunities, and the dividend payout ratio, as control variables, 
are positively associated with future profitability while leverage is negatively associated with 
future profitability.  
 
There is weak evidence that larger firms engage in higher levels of efficient earnings management 
compared with smaller firms. The results suggest that more highly leveraged firms and firms 
characterised by higher growth opportunities and free cash flows do not engage in efficient 
earnings management more than their counterparts. There is evidence that firms characterised by 
higher dividend payout ratios engage in higher levels of  efficient earnings management compared 
with firms characterised by lower dividend payout ratios. 
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When GCC and non-GCC country firms are separated and analysed independently, the research 
findings suggest that GCC country firms engage in opportunistic earnings management while non-
GCC country firms engage in efficient earnings management. GCC country firms characterised by 
higher free cash flows engage in a higher level of efficient earnings management compared with 
firms characterised by lower free cash flows. There is weak evidence that larger firms engage in 
more efficient earnings management compared with smaller firms. Further, there is evidence that 
GCC country firms characterised by higher dividend payout ratios engage in more efficient 
earnings management compared with firms characterised by lower payout ratios. Leverage and 
growth opportunities are shown to be insignificant determinants as interaction variables and thus 
higher leverage and growth opportunities do not lead to more efficient rather than opportunistic 
earnings management for GCC country firms.  
 
There is weak evidence that larger firms engage in higher levels of opportunistic earnings 
management compared with smaller firms in non-GCC countries. Higher leveraged firms, firms 
characterised by greater growth opportunities, and firms characterised by higher free cash flows 
in non-GCC countries do not engage in efficient earnings management more than their 
counterparts. Further, there is evidence that firms characterised by higher dividend payout ratios 
engage in more efficient earnings management compared with firms characterised by lower payout 
ratios. 
 
The results therefore provide support for hypothesis 3 which predicts a relationship between 
discretionary accruals and future profitability. Further, the results provide support for the research 
hypotheses in relation to firm size and the dividend payout ratio as moderating variables between 
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discretionary accruals and future profitability. In contrast, the research hypotheses in relation to 
the moderating variables of leverage, growth opportunities, and free cash flow are not supported 
by the research findings.  
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Chapter VIII     Summary, Conclusion, Limitations, and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusion for the thesis. The chapter also discusses the 
limitations of the research, and provides recommendations for future research in the earnings 
management field. Section 8.2 summarizes the thesis and the main results of the analysis. Section 
8.3 provides a conclusion of the results and the hypothesis testing. In section 8.4, the limitations 
of the research are discussed. Finally, section 8.5 provides recommendations for future research.  
 
8.2 Summary of the Salient Research Findings 
Earnings management has become a significant issue in the accounting literature and has attracted 
much research attention. It is defined by Schipper (1989, p.92) as a “purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain.” The topic is 
an important issue for academics and practitioners (Dechow et al., 2011) since earnings 
management can mislead stakeholders, and thus the earnings management literature is extensive. 
A review of the literature in this thesis shows that a range of incentives exist for managers to 
engage in earnings management. Managers can be expected to manage earnings for the sake of 
executive compensation benefits. Equity incentives are also identified in the literature as being a 
possible incentive for earnings management behaviour. Managers may also engage in earnings 
management to avoid the penalties associated with breaching debt covenants, or to avoid 
governmental and/or regulatory intervention. Further, earnings management can be undertaken to 
inflate stock prices prior to initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings in order for the 
firm to be able to issue shares at higher prices. 
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In the extant literature, mergers and acquisitions are identified as possible incentives for earnings 
management.  Thus, there are various reasons why it is essential to understand the drivers of 
earnings management behaviour, especially in the MENA region for which research in this area is 
lacking. Firm-specific factors are investigated in the existing literature for their impact upon 
earnings management and evidence is found that factors such as firm size, leverage, growth 
opportunities, profitability, and so on, can impact upon earnings management behaviour. Further, 
evidence shows that country-level factors can impact upon earnings management behaviour. In the 
extant literature, few studies provide cross-country examinations of earnings management based 
on its country-level (macro level) determinants. Existing studies appear to lack a comprehensive 
and in-depth analysis of the relationship between firm-specific and country-level factors and 
earnings management, particularly for firms in the MENA region, despite the fact that these 
variables can potentially impact upon earnings management behaviour. Overall, this thesis 
identifies a gap in the extant literature in terms of firm-level and country-level determinants of not 
only accruals-based earnings management, but also real activities-based earnings management, 
and whether earnings management activities are efficient or opportunistic in the MENA region.  
 
Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to investigate the firm-specific and country-level 
determinants of accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management for firms in the 
MENA region. Further, the thesis aims to examine whether earnings management techniques in 
MENA region firms are used as substitutes or complements, and whether earnings management in 
such firms is efficient or opportunistic. Consistent with these aims, four research questions are 
developed: (i) what are the firm-specific and country-level determinants of accruals-based earnings 
management for firms in the MENA region?; (ii) what are the firm-specific and country-level 
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determinants of real activities-based earnings management for firms in the MENA region?; (iii) 
are earnings management techniques used as substitutes or complements by firms in the MENA 
region?; and (iv) is earnings management efficient or opportunistic within firms in the MENA 
region? To address these research questions, three hypotheses are developed and tested for a 
sample of MENA country firms from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. In the accruals-based and real activities-
based earnings management models, a dummy variable is employed which distinguishes between 
the six GCC countries and the four non-GCC countries since there may be distinct differences in 
the earnings management behaviours of firms in these regions. In the efficient versus opportunistic 
earnings management model, GCC and non-GCC country firms are analysed in separate datasets. 
The six GCC countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. The four non-GCC countries are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.  
 
Discretionary accruals are employed as a gauge of accruals-based earnings management. They 
provide the dependent variable in the accruals-based earnings management models and are 
computed from the Modified Jones Model, the Kasznik Model, the Kothari et al. Model, and the 
Raman and Shahrur Model using the cash flow statement approach. The balance sheet approach is 
also computed, and is included in appendix D-1. Six measures of real activities-based earnings 
management are employed in this thesis. These measures are: (i) abnormal cash flows from 
operations; (ii) abnormal discretionary expenditures; (iii) abnormal production costs; (iv) 
aggregate measure RM1; (v) aggregate measure RM2; and (vi) aggregate measure RM3. The three 
aggregate measures are computed to capture the total impact of the real earnings management 
proxies. In the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model, the association between 
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discretionary accruals and future profitability is examined. Three measures of future profitability 
are examined which are one year-ahead cash flows from operations; one year-ahead 
nondiscretionary net income; and the one year-ahead change in earnings.  
 
In each empirical model, a Pearson Correlation Matrix is employed to conduct a correlation 
analysis, and Variance Inflation Factors are computed to test for multicollinearity. The results 
show that there is no significant problem of multicollinearity present across the model variables. 
However, to overcome a potential issue of multicollinearity in relation to the country-level index 
variables, two approaches are used. The first approach is to aggregate the six country-level index 
variables which are political stability, the control of corruption, the rule of law, government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, and regulatory quality into a single score using Principal 
Component Analysis since these variables are highly correlated with each other. The second 
approach is to analyse each of these variables separately. A pooled cross-sectional regression is 
used to address the research questions. A panel fixed-effects regression is also employed to test 
the robustness of the results.   
 
Regarding the accruals-based earnings management models, the regression results show that while 
there are no significant differences in the discretionary accruals levels between firms in GCC and 
non-GCC countries, the two regions differ in terms of their accruals-based earnings management 
behaviour in relation to growth opportunities, free cash flow, and earnings management flexibility 
as interaction variables. Further, evidence shows that discretionary accruals are positively 
associated with GDP growth, the GIF Index variable (which is the aggregate score of the country-
level index variables using Principal Component Analysis), leverage, profitability, the operating 
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cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, and earnings management flexibility as determinants of accruals-based 
earnings management. On the other hand, discretionary accruals are negatively associated with 
firm size, growth opportunities, the dividend payout ratio, and asset tangibility. Industry 
membership is found to impact upon discretionary accruals. Firms in the materials, industrials, and 
information technology industries are associated with a lower degree of accruals-based earnings 
management. On the other hand, firms in the mobile telecommunications industry are associated 
with a greater degree of accruals-based earnings management. The results of the four accruals-
based earnings management models are broadly consistent with each other. IFRS adoption, free 
cash flow, the suspect firms variable, and financial development are found to have no impact on 
accruals-based earnings management. Further, when the six country-level index variables are 
included in the model separately, the results show that government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and the control of corruption index are positively associated with discretionary accruals, 
while the rule of law, political stability, and voice and accountability are insignificant 
determinants.   
 
With regard to the real activities-based earnings management model, the regression results show 
that there are significant differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms in terms of the 
extent of their real earnings management behaviour. The significant differences between the two 
regions in terms of their real earnings management behaviour are the result of firm size, leverage, 
free cash flow, profitability, asset tangibility, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, ownership 
concentration, and earnings management flexibility as interaction variables. 
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The regression results provide strong evidence that earnings management techniques in the MENA 
region are employed by firms as complements rather than substitutes. The results show evidence 
that financial development leads to lower levels of real earnings management, and show strong 
evidence that GDP growth, IFRS adoption, firm size, and earnings management flexibility 
positively impact upon the overall extent of real earnings management. There is weak evidence 
that free cash flows positively impact upon the extent of real earnings management. The results 
also show strong evidence that the GIF Index variable, leverage, profitability, asset tangibility, the 
operating cycle, and Altman’s Z-Score negatively impact upon the overall extent of real earnings 
management. There is weak evidence that higher dividend payout ratios negatively impact upon 
the extent of real earnings management. Further, there is weak evidence that higher growth 
opportunities are negatively associated with the extent of real earnings management. Further, 
industry membership is found to significantly impact upon the overall extent of real earnings 
management behaviour in the MENA region. Firms in the energy, industrials, consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, healthcare, and information technology industries are associated 
with a lower degree of real earnings management. In contrast, firms in the materials, real estate, 
and mobile telecommunications industries are associated with a greater degree of real earnings 
management.  
 
Further, when the country-level index variables are analysed separately, the results provide 
evidence that government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the control of corruption index are 
negatively associated with the degree of real earnings management.  
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With regard to the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model, the regression 
results provide evidence that earnings management in the MENA region tends toward being 
opportunistic rather than efficient. Firm size, growth opportunities, and the dividend payout ratio 
as control variables positively impact upon future profitability while leverage is negatively 
associated with future profitability. Further, the results show that larger firms engage in efficient 
rather than opportunistic earnings management to a greater extent than small firms in the MENA 
region. The results suggest that firms characterised by higher leverage, higher growth 
opportunities, and higher free cash flows in the MENA region do not use efficient earnings 
management more than firms characterised by their counterparts. The results further suggest that 
MENA country firms characterised by higher dividend payout ratios engage in more efficient 
earnings management compared with firms characterised by lower dividend payout ratios. When 
GCC and non-GCC country firms are analysed separately, the results suggest that earnings 
management within GCC country firms tends toward being opportunistic while the opposite is true 
for non-GCC country firms.  
 
8.3 Conclusion 
There are several conclusions that may be drawn from the results of this thesis. Firm-specific and 
country-specific factors impact upon accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management behaviour, providing support for hypothesis H1. Regarding accruals-based earnings 
management in firms in the MENA region, it may be concluded that smaller firms engage in higher 
levels of accruals-based earnings management which is perhaps expected since larger companies 
have more sophisticated internal control systems and more competent internal auditors that should 
mitigate earnings management behaviour. Larger firms are also usually audited by large audit 
firms with more experienced auditors that should prevent earnings management. Further, large 
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firms may also have more concern about their reputation which could prevent them from 
manipulating earnings (Kim et al., 2003; Lemma et al., 2013; Heninger, 2001). Further, larger 
firms may engage less in earnings management as a result of having fewer opportunities for 
earnings management since they are under closer scrutiny by analysts, investors and regulators 
(Sun and Rath, 2009; Hessayri and Saihi, 2015). It is also possible that as a result of the relatively 
high political instability inherent to the MENA region, smaller firms are exposed to a greater 
degree of business risk compared with larger firms, and thus engage in a higher degree of accruals-
based earnings management in order to avoid bankruptcy. Larger firms, on the other hand, are 
likely to be more incapable of doing so as a result of the greater scrutiny and monitoring by 
analysts, investors, and regulators. This finding provides support for hypothesis H1.2a.   
 
In the MENA region, higher leveraged firms engage in higher levels of accruals-based earnings 
management most likely to prevent breaches of debt covenants, and to present a favourable picture 
of the firm to creditors in order for them to reduce the commitments associated with debt contracts 
(Sun and Rath, 2009; Defond and Jimbalvo, 1991; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Becker et al., 1998; and 
Charitou et al., 2007). This finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.3a and contrasts 
with the argument that increases in leverage can be expected to bring about increased monitoring 
and scrutiny, thereby discouraging accruals-based earnings management behaviour.  
 
Firms characterised by high growth opportunities refrain from engaging in accruals-based earnings 
management and this may be to improve earnings quality so as to access external financing at a 
lower cost of capital (Gaio, 2010; Lemma et al., 2013). Further, these firms are likely to be under 
closer scrutiny by outsiders which would make it harder to manipulate earnings (Lemma et al., 
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2013). Since the MENA region is characterised by political instability and a weak rule of law, it is 
also possible that firms characterised by lower growth opportunities find it easier to engage in 
accruals-based earnings management to be perceived more favourably by analysts and investors. 
It may be more difficult for growing firms to do this, however, since they are under closer scrutiny 
by outsiders. The results, therefore, do not provide support for hypothesis H1.4a and contrast with 
the argument that growing firms manage earnings upward to avoid earnings disappointments.  
 
Higher profitability in MENA country firms leads to greater accruals-based earnings management 
and this may be attributed to two factors. First, financial performance affects the compensation of 
management and thus it is likely that firms characterized by higher profitability engage in greater 
earnings management activities in order to continue to receive higher compensation (Koh, 2007; 
Hessayri and Saihi, 2015). Second, firms characterized by higher profitability are likely to be 
expected to continue to perform well by analysts and investors. Therefore, these firms are likely 
to manage their earnings upward to avoid disappointing analysts and investors, particularly in the 
case of MENA country firms which experience political instability and may prefer to hide any 
negative consequences of such events. This result provides support for hypothesis H1.6a.   
 
In the MENA region, higher asset tangibility mitigates the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management. The ability of managers to exercise discretion over reported earnings depends on the 
levels of current and non-current assets and liabilities (Sun and Rath, 2009). Thus, a higher level 
of asset tangibility likely limits the ability of managers to engage in accruals-based earnings 
management, and provides support for hypothesis H1.7a. 
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There is weak evidence that the higher the dividend payout ratios of firms in MENA countries, the 
lower the extent of accruals-based earnings management. This is likely as a result of the earnings 
of firms increasing due to earnings management leading firms to become more attractive to 
investors. However, these earnings do not reflect the true financial position of firms and the cash 
flow component of earnings is unlikely to grow as fast as the accruals component of earnings. 
Thus, the ability of these MENA country firms to pay dividends diminishes and dividend payout 
ratios decline (Chansarn and Chansarn, 2016). It is also possible that MENA country firms make 
their dividend decisions based on actual earnings rather than managed earnings. Therefore, by 
engaging in earnings management, reported earnings will increase. However, since a portion of 
this reported earnings is managed and not actual earnings, then the dividend payout ratio will 
decline. This finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.8a, and contrasts with the 
argument that earnings management is often conducted to maintain a desired payout ratio or to 
meet certain dividend thresholds.  
 
Longer operating cycles in MENA country firms result in higher accruals-based earnings 
management behaviour. The longer the firm’s operating cycle, the greater the possibility to manage 
accruals. Additionally, firms characterised by longer operating cycles are afforded greater 
flexibility for accruals-based earnings management since they have greater accrual accounts and a 
longer period for the reversal of accruals (Zang, 2012). The results therefore provide support for 
hypothesis H1.9a.  
 
Firms in MENA countries that experience stronger financial health engage in higher levels of 
accruals-based earnings management. This is likely because financially distressed companies are 
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less capable of managing earnings since they have exhausted the means by which they can engage 
in earnings management prior to the distress (Ghazali et al., 2015). Thus, firms characterised by 
stronger financial health are more capable of engaging in earnings management behaviour, which 
does not provide support for hypothesis H1.10a and contrasts with the argument that poor financial 
health leads to higher accruals based earnings management. 
 
Firms in MENA countries characterized by a higher proportion of receivables and inventories as 
a percentage of total assets engage in higher levels of accruals-based earnings management. This 
may be attributed to the fact that firms with higher levels of receivables and inventories are more 
capable of managing earnings through accruals, which provides support hypothesis H1.13a.   
 
Firms in the materials, industrials, and information technology industries in MENA countries 
engage in lower levels of accruals-based earning management, while firms in the mobile 
telecommunications industry engage in a higher extent of accruals-based earnings management. 
This finding suggests that the mobile telecommunications industry in MENA countries has 
inherently higher information asymmetry and agency costs that lead to higher levels of accruals-
based earnings management activities. Further, this industry may be riskier and more competitive 
compared with its counterparts. On the other hand, the materials, industrials, and information 
technology industries are likely to be less risky in terms of being susceptible to international, 
political, and economic events and less competitive, and are possibly characterized by lower 
information asymmetry, resulting in lower opportunities for accruals-based earnings management. 
Based on this finding, hypothesis H1.14a is supported.  
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Higher GDP growth in MENA countries is associated with higher accruals-based earnings 
management. It is possible that greater economic growth results in higher earnings management 
activity since analysts and investors are likely to expect firms to perform well during periods of 
economic growth. In order to meet these expectations, firms are likely to engage in earnings 
management to ensure they report positive earnings and to ensure that they do not lag behind the 
economy’s growth rate. Further, since MENA countries are characterised by high corruption, 
political instability, and weak rule of law, then it is possible that during periods of higher economic 
growth, firms are predisposed to engaging in accruals-based earnings management since they are 
likely to escape detection. This finding provides support for hypothesis H1.16a.  
 
There is weak evidence that as the six country-level index variables which are political stability, 
the control of corruption, the rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and 
regulatory quality strengthen, they result in a greater degree of accruals-based earnings 
management for firms in the MENA region. The evidence suggests that this is the result of 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and the control of corruption index. This may be as 
a result of these variables causing improved economic conditions for MENA countries as they 
strengthen, which in turn give rise to a greater extent of accruals-based earnings management. 
These findings do not provide support for hypothesis H1.17a, but provide support for hypothesis 
H1.18a.  
 
It may be concluded that there are no significant differences between the discretionary accruals 
levels of GCC and non-GCC country firms. Further, there are no significant differences between 
the two regions in terms of their earnings management behaviour as impacted upon by firm size, 
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leverage, ROA, asset tangibility, the dividend payout ratio, the operating cycle, Altman’s Z-Score, 
and ownership concentration. On the other hand, higher growth opportunities in GCC country 
firms lead to lower discretionary accruals compared with non-GCC country firms. Higher free cash 
flows in GCC country firms lead to lower discretionary accruals compared with non-GCC 
countries, and higher earnings management flexibility in GCC country firms leads to lower 
discretionary accruals compared with non-GCC country firms.  
 
Regarding real earnings management, it may be concluded that firms in MENA countries employ 
accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management techniques as complements rather 
than substitutes. Thus, MENA country firms employ both discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management techniques to manage earnings in order to achieve earnings targets rather than trading 
off the two techniques based on their relative costs. This finding does not provide support for 
hypothesis H2 and contrasts with the argument that firms substitute the two techniques.  
 
IFRS adoption in MENA country firms leads to higher real earnings management behaviour, 
which suggests that stricter accounting standards can increase accounting quality which induces 
managers to resort to real earnings management since accruals-based earnings management 
becomes more difficult to engage in. Further, the adoption of IFRS could reduce the ability of 
managers to use discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward since more principals based 
accounting standards limit the opportunistic interpretation of complex rules and force firms to 
comply with the intent of the standards. However, IFRS adoption does not impact upon a firm’s 
ability to engage in real earnings management (Ho et al., 2015). This finding provides support for 
hypothesis H1.1b.  
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Larger firms in MENA countries engage in higher levels of real earnings management behaviour. 
This is likely due to the greater pressure on them to meet or beat benchmarks and their greater 
bargaining power with auditors (Lemma et al., 2013). Further, firm size is shown to be negatively 
associated with the extent of accruals-based earnings management. It is possible that larger firms 
are less capable of managing earnings through discretionary accruals since they are usually audited 
by large audit firms. Thus, larger firms instead employ real earnings management activities. The 
result therefore provides support for hypothesis H1.2b. Higher leverage in MENA country firms 
results in lower real earnings management activities. This suggests that leverage provides a 
controlling and monitoring system which limits the extent of earnings management (Zamri et al., 
2013). Further, it is likely MENA country firms manage earnings through accruals manipulation 
to prevent breaches of debt covenants and thus do not require any further earnings management 
through real activities. The result therefore does not provide support for hypothesis H1.3b and 
contrasts with the argument that firms would have a preference for real earnings management over 
accruals-based earnings management since real earnings management activities can be masked in 
the form of everyday transactions.  
 
There is weak evidence that higher growth opportunities result in lower real earnings management. 
Since growing firms might refrain from engaging in earnings management behaviour in order to 
improve earnings quality so that they may access external financing at a lower cost of capital and 
are likely to be under greater scrutiny by outsiders (Gaio, 2010; Lemma et al., 2013), these MENA 
country firms may refrain from engaging in both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management activities. The result does not provide support for hypothesis H1.4b and contrasts 
with the argument that high growth firms have an incentive to manage earnings upward to avoid 
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earnings disappointments. Further, there is weak evidence that higher free cash flows lead to higher 
levels of real earnings management behaviour, which is most likely as a result of managers 
utilizing earnings management to compensate for negative net present value investments, thereby 
providing support for hypothesis H1.5b. 
 
Higher profitability in MENA country firms leads to lower levels of real earnings management. 
Therefore, it is possible that more profitable firms employ accruals-based earnings management 
and consequently have no need to rely on real earnings management behaviour. However, this 
finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.6b and contrasts with the argument that firm 
performance is positively associated with real earnings management (Zhu et al., 2015).  
 
Further, asset tangibility in MENA country firms mitigates both accruals-based and real activities-
based earnings management. In the context of real earnings management, it is possible that firms 
characterised by higher asset tangibility use their net fixed assets as collateral to obtain debt, which 
requires higher monitoring and scrutiny and thus mitigates the extent of earnings management 
behaviour. This result does not provide support for hypothesis H1.7b and contrasts with the 
argument that higher capital intensity ratios reduce the extent of accruals-based earnings 
management, thereby leading firms to shift toward real earnings management. Further, there is 
weak evidence that higher dividend payout ratios are associated with a lower extent of real earnings 
management in MENA country firms, which does not provide support for hypothesis H1.8b. This 
finding also contrasts with the argument that firms employ both accruals-based and real activities-
based earnings management techniques to raise reported earnings in order to justify high dividend 
payout ratios. 
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The results also lead to the conclusion that MENA country firms with shorter operating cycles are 
likely to shift toward real earnings management activities since their accruals-based earnings 
management activities are constrained as a result of a lower flexibility to inflate accruals, which 
provides support for hypothesis H1.9b. There is a negative association between Altman’s Z-Socre 
and the extent of real earnings management in MENA country firms. This may be due to the fact 
that firms experiencing poor financial conditions, especially those nearing bankruptcy, are 
expected to do everything they can to improve their financial situation, such as adopting radical 
operating decisions to decrease losses and ameliorate their future prospects (Lara et al., 2012). 
This finding does not provide support for hypothesis H1.10b and contrasts with the argument that 
managers might perceive real activities manipulation as relatively costly which results in a lower 
degree of real earnings management.  
 
It may be concluded that MENA country firms characterised by higher sum of receivables and 
inventories as a percentage of total assets engage in a greater extent of real earnings management, 
and this is likely because it is easier for manufacturing firms to accomplish excess production to 
absorb fixed costs and more likely to escape detection when a firm maintains a high stock of 
inventories. Moreover, it would be easier for firms with large credit sales (receivables) to dealers 
to engage in ‘channel stuffing’ or accelerate the recognition of sales by shipping goods early to its 
dealers and booking receivables. The result therefore provides support for hypothesis H1.13b.  
 
Industry membership has a significant impact upon real earnings management behaviour, which 
provides support for hypothesis H1.14b. Firms in the energy, industrials, consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, healthcare, and information technology industries engage in a lower extent of 
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real earnings management behaviour. In contrast, firms in the mobile telecommunications industry 
engage in a higher extent of real earnings management. There is weak evidence that firms in the 
materials industry engage in a higher extent of real earnings management behaviour. The 
differences between the degree to which different industries exhibit information asymmetry, 
agency costs, and are subject to political, economic, and international risks likely explain this 
finding.  
 
A conclusion may be drawn that financial development results in lower real earnings management 
behaviour. The development of financial markets is likely to mitigate earnings management 
behaviour since managers are more disciplined in countries with higher levels of financial 
development, and thus their incentives to manage earnings decrease. Further, GDP growth 
positively impacts upon real earnings management and this finding supports the argument that 
MENA country firms engage in higher accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management under conditions of economic growth to meet the expectations of analysts and 
investors, and to avoid lagging behind the economy’s growth rate. Further, since MENA countries 
are characterized by high corruption, political instability, and a weak rule of law, it is possible that 
firms in these countries are more capable of engaging in both types of earnings management 
activity since they are more likely to escape detection. This finding provides support for hypothesis 
H1.16b.  
 
The governance and infrastructure index variable shows that as country-level variables strengthen, 
they mitigate the extent of real earnings management. There is evidence that regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness, and the control of corruption index are negatively associated with the 
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degree of real earnings management. It is possible that as these scores strengthen, economic 
conditions consequently improve, leading to accruals-based earnings management by firms to 
avoid lagging behind the economy’s growth rate. Thus, there is no necessity for real earnings 
management. These findings provide support for hypothesis H1.17b and H1.18b.  
 
There are significant differences between GCC and non-GCC country firms in terms of their real 
earnings management behaviour. GCC country firms engage in lower levels of real earnings 
management compared with non-GCC country firms. Larger firm size and longer operating cycles 
result in a lower degree of real earnings management in GCC country firms compared with non-
GCC country firms. However, higher leverage, greater free cash flows, greater profitability, greater 
asset tangibility, improved Altman’s Z-Scores, concentrated ownership, and greater earnings 
management flexibility result in a greater degree of real earnings management in GCC country 
firms compared with non-GCC country firms.    
 
Regarding the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model, it may be concluded 
that earnings management in MENA country firms is opportunistic rather than efficient and does 
not improve the informativeness of firm earnings, which provides support for hypothesis H3. 
Larger firms engage in efficient rather than opportunistic earnings management more than small 
firms in the MENA region. This is likely due to the managers of small firms being more capable 
of retaining their private information than the managers of larger firms. However, information on 
a firm becomes more publicly available as it grows in size. Further, since larger firms are 
scrutinized to a greater degree by investors and the general public, it is more difficult for them to 
manage earnings opportunistically compared with smaller firms (Siregar and Utama, 2008). This 
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result provides support for hypothesis H3.1. Firms characterised by higher leverage in the MENA 
region do not use efficient earnings management more than firms characterised by lower leverage. 
This finding does not provide support for hypothesis H3.2. MENA country firms characterised by 
higher growth opportunities do not use efficient earnings management more than firms 
characterised by lower growth opportunities, which does not provide support for hypothesis H3.3. 
Firms characterised by higher free cash flow do not engage in higher levels of efficient earnings 
management compared with firms characterised by lower levels of free cash flow, which does not 
provide support for hypothesis H3.4. MENA country firms characterised by higher dividend 
payout ratios engage in more efficient earnings management compared with firms characterised 
by lower dividend payout ratios. This is likely due to the dividend payments decreasing internal 
funds which increases the need for external financing. Thus, firms which pay higher dividends are 
likely to have a greater incentive to improve earnings quality in order to be able to access the 
necessary external financing at a lower cost of capital, which is likely to mitigate opportunistic 
behaviour (Lemma et al., 2013). This finding provides support for hypothesis H3.5. 
 
It may be concluded that GCC country firms engage more in opportunistic earnings management 
whereas non-GCC country firms engage more in efficient earnings management. GCC country 
firms characterised by higher free cash flows engage in a higher level of efficient earnings 
management compared with firms characterised by lower free cash flows. It is possible that GCC 
country firms characterised by higher free cash flows are potentially more orientated toward 
utilizing their cash flows for making profitable investments, and thus do not engage in 
opportunistic earnings management in this regard. There is weak evidence that larger GCC country 
firms engage in more efficient earnings management compared with smaller firms. Further, there 
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is evidence that GCC country firms characterised by higher dividend payout ratios engage in more 
efficient earnings management compared with firms characterised by lower payout ratios. 
Leverage and growth opportunities are insignificant determinants as interaction variables and thus 
higher leverage and growth opportunities do not lead to more efficient rather than opportunistic 
earnings management for GCC country firms.  
 
 There is weak evidence that larger firms engage in higher levels of opportunistic earnings 
management compared with smaller firms in non-GCC countries. Non-GCC countries experience 
relatively higher levels of corruption and political instability compared with GCC countries. 
Therefore, it is possible that larger firms in non-GCC countries are more capable of engaging in 
opportunistic earnings management without being detected or penalized for such behaviour. 
Further, higher leveraged firms, firms characterised by higher growth opportunities, and firms 
characterised by higher free cash flows in non-GCC countries do not engage in efficient earnings 
management more than their counterparts. However, there is evidence that firms characterised by 
higher dividend payout ratios engage in more efficient earnings management compared with firms 
characterised by lower payout ratios.  
 
Overall, it may be concluded that the results of this thesis are not specific to the MENA region and 
can be generalized to other emerging economies and similar regions of the world as shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The negative association between accruals-based earnings management and firm 
size is consistent with some research findings for Indonesian firms. The positive association 
between accruals-based earnings management and leverage is consistent with some research 
findings for Kenyan firms. The positive association between accruals-based earnings management 
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and Altman’s Z-Score is similar to the research findings for Indian firms. The positive association 
between real earnings management and both growth opportunities and leverage is consistent with 
some research findings for Chinese firms. In addition, the research findings in relation to the 
negative association between real earnings management and profitability is similar to some 
research findings for Malaysian firms. Further, the moderating effect of firm size on future 
profitability in the efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model is similar to the 
research findings for Indonesian firms.  
 
It may also be concluded that the phenomenon of earnings management is not a zero sum game 
and there may be wider externalities for the economy. Earnings management distorts the 
information environment. If investors are unable to detect the direction and magnitude of the 
managed portion of reported earnings, they may tend to over-value firms engaging in income-
increasing earnings management and under-value firms engaging in income-decreasing earnings 
management, which could lead to the misallocation of invested capital (Chambers, 1999). Since 
earnings management distorts the information environment, it makes it difficult to differentiate 
between firms which are genuinely employing their resources efficiently and generating profits 
and those that do not do so but seek rent by means of artificially inflating their profits. Further, if 
investors and creditors or other stakeholders are not able to distinguish between these two types, 
then scarce resources in the economy will not be efficiently allocated to value generating firms 
which will result in problems within the wider economy. Consequently, investor confidence in 
financial information will diminish leading investors to seek other sources of information which 
are not equally available to all investors. This will subsequently impact upon market efficiency.  
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8.4 Limitations of the Research  
The research of this thesis is characterised by several main limitations. Data on the country-level 
index variables were only available up to the year 2014 at the time of writing. Therefore, the study 
sample was restricted to the period 1996-2014. It would have been interesting to identify the 
individual associations between the country-level index variables (political stability, government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and the control of 
corruption) and the degree of earnings management behaviour. However, as a result of these 
variables being highly correlated, Principal Component Analysis was used to aggregate them into 
a single score.  
 
According to Siregar and Utama (2008), there is still doubt regarding the ability of the Modified 
Jones Model to accurately decompose accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary 
components. The possibility of a misclassification of discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals 
could lead to erroneous classifications of some components of nondiscretionary accruals as 
discretionary accruals, which may explain the positive association between discretionary accruals 
and some measures of future profitability.  
 
There is evidence in the literature of a potential impact of corporate governance variables upon the 
degree of earnings management behaviour. However, the inclusion of corporate governance 
variables in this thesis was not possible due to the fact that there was no data availability for such 
variables for MENA country firms at the time of writing. The Datastream Database lacks the 
necessary data which would have required hand collecting these variables. However, this would 
not have been possible since the analysis of this thesis is conducted for ten MENA countries and 
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examines a considerably large number of observations. Therefore, due to time and resource 
limitations, this would not have been possible.  
 
Further, there are generally measurement errors in the estimation models of discretionary accruals 
due to unobservable variables. The real activities-based earnings management models are also not 
perfect. There is a difficulty in distinguishing between real earnings management and genuine 
business decisions. In addition to these limitations, there may also be omitted variables in this 
thesis and different variable specifications may lead to different findings. Finally, this thesis does 
not employ causality tests. Therefore, the findings only provide evidence for associations rather 
than causality.    
 
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
There are several recommendations that can be made for future research in the field of earnings 
management. First, in addition to examining the firm-level and country-level determinants of 
earnings management, future research should also employ cultural dimensions such as 
individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance as potential determinants. Second, in the 
efficient versus opportunistic earnings management model, one year-ahead cash flows from 
operations, one year-ahead nondiscretionary net income, and the one year-ahead change in 
earnings are employed as measures of future profitability. Future research studies could develop 
additional measures of future profitability and investigate the most ideal measure. Third, future 
research in the field of earnings management could employ causality tests in order to not only 
examine the associations between these variables, but also identify causality. This would also 
strengthen the theoretical arguments and justifications for these associations.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A-1 Discretionary Accruals – Cash Flow Statement Approach  
 
Modified Jones Model  
Energy Industry 
 
Materials Industry 
 
Industrials Industry 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.0247897   .0195824    -1.27   0.207    -.0634318    .0138524
      ppeat1    -.0559928   .0102886    -5.44   0.000    -.0762953   -.0356903
         at1    -80.57533   148.6552    -0.54   0.588    -373.9175    212.7669
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.22582262       182    .0177243   Root MSE        =    .12131
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1697
    Residual    2.63414483       179  .014715893   R-squared       =    0.1834
       Model    .591677781         3  .197225927   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 179)       =     13.40
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       182
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.0164652   .0133459    -1.23   0.217    -.0426438    .0097134
      ppeat1    -.0243378   .0030035    -8.10   0.000    -.0302293   -.0184462
         at1     10.67419   28.71416     0.37   0.710    -45.65018    66.99856
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    19.8235416     1,496   .01325103   Root MSE        =     .1123
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0482
    Residual    18.8293723     1,493   .01261177   R-squared       =    0.0502
       Model    .994169241         3  .331389747   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1493)      =     26.28
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,496
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .0223937    .004113     5.44   0.000     .0143182    .0304692
      ppeat1     -.024806   .0062382    -3.98   0.000    -.0370542   -.0125579
         at1    -1.314031   23.66446    -0.06   0.956    -47.77702    45.14896
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10.5942897       693  .015287575   Root MSE        =    .12089
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0441
    Residual    10.0832615       690  .014613422   R-squared       =    0.0482
       Model    .511028144         3  .170342715   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 690)       =     11.66
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       693
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Consumer Discretionary Industry 
 
 
Consumer Staples Industry 
 
Healthcare Industry 
 
Real Estate Industry 
 
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.0426963   .0036172   -11.80   0.000    -.0497955   -.0355971
      ppeat1    -.0406932   .0042645    -9.54   0.000    -.0490628   -.0323235
         at1     99.23605   52.69762     1.88   0.060    -4.189416    202.6615
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    608.500043       897    .6783724   Root MSE        =    .10444
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9839
    Residual    9.75210833       894  .010908399   R-squared       =    0.9840
       Model    598.747935         3  199.582645   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 894)       =  18296.24
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       897
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.0078746   .0143582    -0.55   0.584    -.0360467    .0202975
      ppeat1    -.0347084   .0048459    -7.16   0.000    -.0442166   -.0252002
         at1     56.93952   35.01371     1.63   0.104     -11.7608    125.6398
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     21.602128     1,116  .019356746   Root MSE        =    .13571
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0486
    Residual    20.4980495     1,113  .018416936   R-squared       =    0.0511
       Model    1.10407856         3  .368026186   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1113)      =     19.98
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,116
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     -.179979   .0759791    -2.37   0.019    -.3295349   -.0304231
      ppeat1    -.0215799   .0134238    -1.61   0.109     -.048003    .0048431
         at1     109.1227   175.5447     0.62   0.535    -236.4163    454.6616
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7.07449127       286  .024735983   Root MSE        =    .15491
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0299
    Residual    6.79124854       283  .023997345   R-squared       =    0.0400
       Model    .283242727         3  .094414242   Prob > F        =    0.0090
                                                   F(3, 283)       =      3.93
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       286
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.1345552   .0212045    -6.35   0.000    -.1761745    -.092936
      ppeat1     -.036652   .0096617    -3.79   0.000    -.0556156   -.0176885
         at1    -168.2975   85.95466    -1.96   0.051    -337.0055    .4104559
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    204.684328       854    .2396772   Root MSE        =    .21403
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8089
    Residual    38.9836696       851  .045809247   R-squared       =    0.8095
       Model    165.700659         3  55.2335529   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 851)       =   1205.73
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       854
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Information Technology Industry 
 
 
Mobile Telecommunications Industry 
 
Utilities Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .2361847   .0338993     6.97   0.000     .1694007    .3029687
      ppeat1    -.0400032   .0176398    -2.27   0.024    -.0747548   -.0052516
         at1     346.1802   175.5359     1.97   0.050     .3627403    691.9977
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.88770973       239  .020450668   Root MSE        =    .12951
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1798
    Residual    3.95867411       236  .016774043   R-squared       =    0.1901
       Model    .929035618         3  .309678539   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 236)       =     18.46
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       239
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.1189269   .0349908    -3.40   0.001    -.1879148    -.049939
      ppeat1    -.1041408   .0074557   -13.97   0.000    -.1188405   -.0894411
         at1     153.6686   506.1928     0.30   0.762    -844.3429     1151.68
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.46459467       208  .021464397   Root MSE        =    .09851
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5479
    Residual    1.98930152       205   .00970391   R-squared       =    0.5544
       Model    2.47529315         3  .825097717   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 205)       =     85.03
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       208
                                                                              
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .0500737   .0318477     1.57   0.118     -.012887    .1130344
      ppeat1    -.0495919   .0040823   -12.15   0.000    -.0576623   -.0415214
         at1     501.9592   154.3126     3.25   0.001     196.8937    807.0247
                                                                              
       taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .814268683       144  .005654644   Root MSE        =      .053
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5032
    Residual    .396094818       141  .002809183   R-squared       =    0.5136
       Model    .418173866         3  .139391289   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 141)       =     49.62
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       144
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Kasznik Model 
Energy Industry 
 
Materials Industry 
 
Industrials Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons     .0252988   .0117419     2.15   0.033     .0021257    .0484719
ΔSALESΔRECAt1      .039678    .015938     2.49   0.014     .0082239    .0711322
       ppeat1    -.0744782   .0125462    -5.94   0.000    -.0992386   -.0497178
      ΔCFOAt1    -.5755798   .0497255   -11.58   0.000    -.6737147   -.4774449
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.99742317       179  .016745381   Root MSE        =    .08999
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5164
    Residual    1.42527577       176  .008098158   R-squared       =    0.5245
       Model     1.5721474         3  .524049134   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 176)       =     64.71
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       180
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0028351   .0038174    -0.74   0.458    -.0103232    .0046531
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0623266   .0104792     5.95   0.000     .0417708    .0828824
       ppeat1    -.0194998   .0037204    -5.24   0.000    -.0267977   -.0122018
      ΔCFOAt1     -.518069   .0159533   -32.47   0.000    -.5493627   -.4867754
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    18.7380075     1,476  .012695127   Root MSE        =    .08527
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4272
    Residual    10.7110791     1,473  .007271608   R-squared       =    0.4284
       Model    8.02692848         3  2.67564283   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1473)      =    367.96
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,477
        _cons     .0010958   .0074424     0.15   0.883     -.013517    .0157086
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0458312   .0043971    10.42   0.000     .0371978    .0544645
       ppeat1    -.0228431    .009766    -2.34   0.020    -.0420181   -.0036681
      ΔCFOAt1    -.3634343   .0279707   -12.99   0.000     -.418353   -.3085156
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    10.4587615       687  .015223816   Root MSE        =    .10871
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2237
    Residual    8.08369084       684  .011818261   R-squared       =    0.2271
       Model    2.37507061         3  .791690204   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 684)       =     66.99
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       688
318 
 
Consumer Discretionary Industry 
 
Consumer Staples Industry 
 
Healthcare Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        _cons     .0148702   .0046871     3.17   0.002     .0056712    .0240692
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0367277   .0055357     6.63   0.000     .0258631    .0475922
       ppeat1    -.0479057   .0050394    -9.51   0.000    -.0577962   -.0380152
      ΔCFOAt1    -.5309786   .0240833   -22.05   0.000    -.5782452    -.483712
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    605.667399       893  .678238969   Root MSE        =    .08404
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9896
    Residual    6.28569293       890  .007062576   R-squared       =    0.9896
       Model    599.381706         3  199.793902   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 890)       =  28289.10
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       894
                                                                               
        _cons     .0225513   .0085585     2.63   0.009     .0057585    .0393441
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0017512   .0140986    -0.12   0.901    -.0294144    .0259121
       ppeat1    -.0532472   .0092527    -5.75   0.000    -.0714021   -.0350924
      ΔCFOAt1      .001438   .0011721     1.23   0.220    -.0008619    .0037378
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    20.0559262     1,103   .01818307   Root MSE        =    .13289
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0287
    Residual    19.4267301     1,100  .017660664   R-squared       =    0.0314
       Model    .629196149         3   .20973205   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1100)      =     11.88
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,104
                                                                               
        _cons     .0147657   .0146548     1.01   0.315    -.0140832    .0436146
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0525412   .0548842    -0.96   0.339    -.1605844    .0555019
       ppeat1    -.0383393   .0189016    -2.03   0.043    -.0755484   -.0011303
      ΔCFOAt1     -.508928   .0308192   -16.51   0.000    -.5695976   -.4482583
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    6.97560743       280  .024912884   Root MSE        =    .11091
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5062
    Residual    3.40759619       277  .012301791   R-squared       =    0.5115
       Model    3.56801125         3  1.18933708   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 277)       =     96.68
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       281
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        _cons     .0093979   .0069619     1.35   0.177    -.0042669    .0230627
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1721003   .0192347     8.95   0.000     .1343468    .2098538
       ppeat1     .0348418   .0096562     3.61   0.000     .0158888    .0537949
      ΔCFOAt1     -.423148   .0165096   -25.63   0.000    -.4555528   -.3907431
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    203.943832       845  .241353647   Root MSE        =    .15357
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9023
    Residual    19.8587909       842  .023585262   R-squared       =    0.9026
       Model    184.085041         3  61.3616802   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 842)       =   2601.70
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       846
                                                                               
        _cons     .0504208   .0122585     4.11   0.000     .0262664    .0745752
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .2047138   .0270287     7.57   0.000     .1514558    .2579717
       ppeat1    -.0925421   .0221445    -4.18   0.000    -.1361761   -.0489081
      ΔCFOAt1    -.4887889   .0444128   -11.01   0.000     -.576301   -.4012768
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    4.57831102       231  .019819528   Root MSE        =    .10211
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4739
    Residual    2.37745231       228  .010427422   R-squared       =    0.4807
       Model     2.2008587         3  .733619568   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 228)       =     70.35
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       232
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0196883    .015622    -1.26   0.209    -.0504904    .0111138
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1041752   .0334543    -3.11   0.002    -.1701377   -.0382127
       ppeat1    -.0763008   .0161258    -4.73   0.000    -.1080964   -.0445051
      ΔCFOAt1     -.410779   .0762164    -5.39   0.000    -.5610563   -.2605018
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.32218117       206  .011272724   Root MSE        =     .0923
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2443
    Residual    1.72924609       203  .008518454   R-squared       =    0.2553
       Model    .592935078         3  .197645026   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 203)       =     23.20
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       207
                                                                               
        _cons     .0106556   .0093949     1.13   0.259    -.0079185    .0292298
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0777422   .0301142     2.58   0.011     .0182048    .1372797
       ppeat1    -.0518528   .0078316    -6.62   0.000    -.0673363   -.0363694
      ΔCFOAt1    -.2067472   .0665582    -3.11   0.002    -.3383363   -.0751581
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .557693817       143  .003899957   Root MSE        =    .05319
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2746
    Residual     .39604884       140   .00282892   R-squared       =    0.2898
       Model    .161644977         3  .053881659   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 140)       =     19.05
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       144
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        _cons      .038103    .015586     2.44   0.015     .0073448    .0688612
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0403341   .0188304    -2.14   0.034     -.077495   -.0031732
       ppeat1    -.1094295   .0164691    -6.64   0.000    -.1419305   -.0769285
          at1    -131.9605   147.6387    -0.89   0.373    -423.3191    159.3981
        roait     .3136358   .0835773     3.75   0.000     .1486996    .4785719
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    3.02605738       181  .016718549   Root MSE        =    .11479
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2119
    Residual     2.3321038       177  .013175728   R-squared       =    0.2293
       Model    .693953582         4  .173488395   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 177)       =     13.17
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       182
        _cons     -.018483      .0053    -3.49   0.001    -.0288792   -.0080869
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0362838   .0131418    -2.76   0.006    -.0620621   -.0105055
       ppeat1    -.0278989   .0047713    -5.85   0.000     -.037258   -.0185398
          at1     64.57878   28.77825     2.24   0.025      8.12862    121.0289
        roait     .2712383   .0286466     9.47   0.000     .2150464    .3274303
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    19.1832475     1,495  .012831604   Root MSE        =    .10914
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0716
    Residual    17.7614043     1,491  .011912411   R-squared       =    0.0741
       Model    1.42184318         4  .355460794   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 1491)      =     29.84
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,496
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0124169   .0082214    -1.51   0.131    -.0285589    .0037252
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0227561   .0043037     5.29   0.000     .0143062    .0312059
       ppeat1     -.029962    .010413    -2.88   0.004    -.0504071   -.0095168
          at1     16.68772   23.17345     0.72   0.472    -28.81144    62.18688
        roait     .2876735   .0384861     7.47   0.000     .2121091    .3632379
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    10.4644879       692  .015122092   Root MSE        =    .11642
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1037
    Residual    9.32511899       688  .013553952   R-squared       =    0.1089
       Model    1.13936886         4  .284842215   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 688)       =     21.02
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       693
321 
 
Consumer Discretionary Industry 
 
Consumer Staples Industry 
 
Healthcare Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0199877   .0064068    -3.12   0.002    -.0325618   -.0074135
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0435149   .0053351    -8.16   0.000    -.0539858   -.0330441
       ppeat1    -.0397535   .0060812    -6.54   0.000    -.0516886   -.0278183
          at1     98.72054     50.851     1.94   0.053    -1.081019    198.5221
        roait     .3354971   .0331299    10.13   0.000     .2704755    .4005186
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    605.681739       896  .675984084   Root MSE        =    .09881
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9856
    Residual    8.70960758       892  .009764134   R-squared       =    0.9856
       Model    596.972131         4  149.243033   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 892)       =  15284.82
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       897
        _cons    -.0093142    .008702    -1.07   0.285    -.0263884      .00776
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0388881   .0138132    -2.82   0.005     -.065991   -.0117851
       ppeat1    -.0425051   .0089282    -4.76   0.000    -.0600231   -.0249872
          at1     79.20531   33.78719     2.34   0.019     12.91142    145.4992
        roait       .47999   .0416304    11.53   0.000      .398307    .5616731
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    21.0254335     1,115  .018856891   Root MSE        =    .12812
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1295
    Residual    18.2380145     1,111  .016415855   R-squared       =    0.1326
       Model    2.78741896         4   .69685474   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 1111)      =     42.45
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,116
        _cons    -.0181211   .0238097    -0.76   0.447    -.0649891    .0287469
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.2261365   .0766639    -2.95   0.003     -.377045    -.075228
       ppeat1    -.0362697   .0260795    -1.39   0.165    -.0876057    .0150664
          at1     270.4361   193.3232     1.40   0.163    -110.1095    650.9817
        roait     .4405377   .1522055     2.89   0.004       .14093    .7401453
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    7.00145528       285   .02456651   Root MSE        =    .15307
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0462
    Residual    6.58400057       281  .023430607   R-squared       =    0.0596
       Model    .417454714         4  .104363679   Prob > F        =    0.0017
                                                   F(4, 281)       =      4.45
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       286
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        _cons     .0614965   .0085429     7.20   0.000     .0447289    .0782642
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0032627    .023617    -0.14   0.890    -.0496173     .043092
       ppeat1    -.0933228   .0100878    -9.25   0.000    -.1131227   -.0735229
          at1    -281.7107    79.4506    -3.55   0.000    -437.6533   -125.7681
        roait     .8415749     .07381    11.40   0.000     .6967034    .9864464
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    204.525977       853   .23977254   Root MSE        =    .18896
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8511
    Residual    30.3156827       849  .035707518   R-squared       =    0.8518
       Model    174.210294         4  43.5525735   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 849)       =   1219.70
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       854
                                                                               
        _cons     .0328597   .0155481     2.11   0.036     .0022275    .0634919
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1958834   .0326883     5.99   0.000     .1314824    .2602844
       ppeat1    -.0981755   .0261107    -3.76   0.000    -.1496176   -.0467334
          at1    -36.32934   178.4425    -0.20   0.839    -387.8884    315.2298
        roait     .4680518   .1022544     4.58   0.000      .266595    .6695086
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    4.77896645       238  .020079691   Root MSE        =    .12173
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2620
    Residual    3.46760443       234  .014818822   R-squared       =    0.2744
       Model    1.31136202         4  .327840506   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 234)       =     22.12
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       239
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0189682    .014759    -1.29   0.200    -.0480687    .0101324
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1073552   .0308796    -3.48   0.001    -.1682412   -.0464693
       ppeat1      -.14293   .0163088    -8.76   0.000    -.1750864   -.1107735
          at1     349.9264   448.5264     0.78   0.436    -534.4415    1234.294
        roait     .5672366   .0684079     8.29   0.000     .4323554    .7021177
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.32451399       207  .011229536   Root MSE        =    .08532
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3518
    Residual    1.47772755       203  .007279446   R-squared       =    0.3643
       Model    .846786436         4  .211696609   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 203)       =     29.08
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       208
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        _cons    -.0084162   .0108358    -0.78   0.439    -.0298406    .0130081
ΔSALESΔRECAt1      .054527   .0311924     1.75   0.083    -.0071459    .1161999
       ppeat1    -.0531341   .0077499    -6.86   0.000     -.068457   -.0378112
          at1     357.8161   159.0322     2.25   0.026     43.38121     672.251
        roait     .3848504   .1376466     2.80   0.006     .1126985    .6570022
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .557693817       143  .003899957   Root MSE        =    .05181
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3117
    Residual    .373118118       139  .002684303   R-squared       =    0.3310
       Model    .184575699         4  .046143925   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 139)       =     17.19
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       144
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0244442   .0151214     1.62   0.108     -.005422    .0543105
        roait     .4077958   .0905022     4.51   0.000     .2290455     .586546
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0377046     .01886    -2.00   0.047    -.0749547   -.0004544
       ppeat1    -.1056646   .0168047    -6.29   0.000    -.1388554   -.0724737
          at1     4.801347   149.2273     0.03   0.974    -289.9364    299.5391
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.75265401       163  .016887448   Root MSE        =    .11053
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2766
    Residual    1.93013204       158  .012216026   R-squared       =    0.2988
       Model    .822521964         5  .164504393   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 158)       =     13.47
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       163
                                                                               
      tatlmve    -.0018254   .0051381    -0.36   0.722    -.0119053    .0082544
        roait     .2275593   .0278594     8.17   0.000     .1729047     .282214
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0547468   .0138189    -3.96   0.000    -.0818566    -.027637
       ppeat1    -.0387752   .0046552    -8.33   0.000    -.0479078   -.0296426
          at1      39.8674    28.6698     1.39   0.165    -16.37703    96.11183
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    16.8813746     1,298  .013005681   Root MSE        =    .10788
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1052
    Residual    15.0474485     1,293  .011637624   R-squared       =    0.1086
       Model    1.83392612         5  .366785223   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 1293)      =     31.52
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,298
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      tatlmve    -.0072536   .0067245    -1.08   0.281    -.0204604    .0059532
        roait     .3463654   .0409161     8.47   0.000     .2660066    .4267243
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0248702   .0040721     6.11   0.000     .0168727    .0328678
       ppeat1    -.0397438   .0087734    -4.53   0.000    -.0569746   -.0225129
          at1     11.84947   22.12184     0.54   0.592    -31.59767    55.29661
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    8.81474296       595  .014814694   Root MSE        =    .11179
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1564
    Residual    7.37380407       590  .012497973   R-squared       =    0.1635
       Model    1.44093889         5  .288187778   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 590)       =     23.06
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       595
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0148507   .0057455     2.58   0.010     .0035714    .0261299
        roait       .39295   .0312788    12.56   0.000     .3315455    .4543545
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1608606   .0165402    -9.73   0.000    -.1933312   -.1283901
       ppeat1    -.0689434   .0058725   -11.74   0.000    -.0804718    -.057415
          at1     36.97535   47.42762     0.78   0.436    -56.13133     130.082
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    8.44670189       755  .011187685   Root MSE        =    .08637
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3332
    Residual    5.59464904       750  .007459532   R-squared       =    0.3377
       Model    2.85205285         5   .57041057   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 750)       =     76.47
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       755
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0032656   .0065102     0.50   0.616    -.0095105    .0160416
        roait     .4369421   .0440273     9.92   0.000     .3505393    .5233448
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0392645   .0145653    -2.70   0.007    -.0678487   -.0106804
       ppeat1    -.0517041   .0068246    -7.58   0.000    -.0650973    -.038311
          at1     56.16806   35.21714     1.59   0.111    -12.94496    125.2811
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total     17.753023       948  .018726818   Root MSE        =    .12693
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1397
    Residual    15.1917776       943  .016110051   R-squared       =    0.1443
       Model    2.56124538         5  .512249076   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 943)       =     31.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       948
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0130938    .008797     1.49   0.138     -.004247    .0304346
        roait     .2802987   .0678516     4.13   0.000     .1465485    .4140489
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     -.120374    .036461    -3.30   0.001    -.1922465   -.0485015
       ppeat1    -.0516837   .0118262    -4.37   0.000    -.0749958   -.0283717
          at1     230.5691   101.1149     2.28   0.024     31.24968    429.8885
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.18451379       217  .005458589   Root MSE        =    .06847
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1413
    Residual    .993753067       212  .004687514   R-squared       =    0.1610
       Model    .190760722         5  .038152144   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 212)       =      8.14
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       217
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Real Estate Industry 
 
Information Technology Industry 
 
Mobile Telecommunications Industry 
 
Utilities Industry 
 
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0001309   .0053535     0.02   0.981    -.0103799    .0106417
        roait     .5837226   .0550508    10.60   0.000     .4756381    .6918071
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0190497   .0208099     0.92   0.360    -.0218075     .059907
       ppeat1    -.0025193   .0102741    -0.25   0.806    -.0226909    .0176524
          at1     85.45328   58.46685     1.46   0.144    -29.33812    200.2447
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    12.9081183       705  .018309388   Root MSE        =    .12523
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1435
    Residual    10.9774037       700  .015682005   R-squared       =    0.1496
       Model    1.93071463         5  .386142926   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 700)       =     24.62
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       705
                                                                               
      tatlmve    -.0064667   .0158485    -0.41   0.684    -.0377348    .0248014
        roait     .6446394   .1049436     6.14   0.000     .4375919    .8516869
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1563806   .0350928     4.46   0.000     .0871445    .2256167
       ppeat1     -.009959   .0305357    -0.33   0.745    -.0702041    .0502861
          at1    -360.9393   257.3514    -1.40   0.162    -868.6783    146.7998
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.95445329       189  .015632028   Root MSE        =    .10796
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2544
    Residual    2.14445328       184  .011654637   R-squared       =    0.2742
       Model     .81000001         5  .162000002   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 184)       =     13.90
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       189
      tatlmve    -.0102246   .0103981    -0.98   0.327    -.0307447    .0102956
        roait     .3190469   .0624102     5.11   0.000     .1958829    .4422108
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1033744   .0244327    -4.23   0.000    -.1515913   -.0551575
       ppeat1    -.1255916   .0108962   -11.53   0.000    -.1470948   -.1040884
          at1     435.1824   354.0459     1.23   0.221     -263.512    1133.877
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.88541677       182  .015853938   Root MSE        =     .0668
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7185
    Residual    .789897018       177  .004462695   R-squared       =    0.7262
       Model    2.09551975         5   .41910395   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 177)       =     93.91
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       182
      tatlmve    -.0088545   .0086643    -1.02   0.309     -.026005    .0082959
        roait     .3414075   .1105285     3.09   0.002     .1226231    .5601919
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0590423   .0286104     2.06   0.041     .0024098    .1156748
       ppeat1    -.0520584   .0071398    -7.29   0.000    -.0661913   -.0379256
          at1     356.2708   143.9602     2.47   0.015     71.31043    641.2313
                                                                               
        taat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .675509929       128  .005277421   Root MSE        =    .04707
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5801
    Residual    .272548776       123  .002215844   R-squared       =    0.5965
       Model    .402961153         5  .080592231   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 123)       =     36.37
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       128
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Appendix A-2 Discretionary Accruals – Balance Sheet Approach 
 
Modified Jones Model 
Energy Industry 
 
Materials Industry 
 
Industrials Industry 
 
Consumer discretionary Industry 
 
                                                                              
         at1     604.4275    509.371     1.19   0.237    -400.9955    1609.851
      ppeat1      .063482   .0335669     1.89   0.060    -.0027741     .129738
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .0412751   .0598969     0.69   0.492    -.0769524    .1595026
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    25.4248369       175  .145284782   Root MSE        =    .37543
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0299
    Residual    24.2424652       172  .140944565   R-squared       =    0.0465
       Model    1.18237166         3  .394123887   Prob > F        =    0.0418
                                                   F(3, 172)       =      2.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       175
                                                                              
         at1     115.8017   135.6115     0.85   0.393    -150.2504    381.8538
      ppeat1     .1199087   .0085529    14.02   0.000      .103129    .1366883
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.3418647   .0428844    -7.97   0.000    -.4259983    -.257731
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    133.813315     1,249  .107136361   Root MSE        =    .30031
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1582
    Residual    112.372872     1,246  .090186896   R-squared       =    0.1602
       Model    21.4404431         3  7.14681436   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1246)      =     79.24
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,249
                                                                              
         at1     186.6827   85.07681     2.19   0.029     19.53619    353.8292
      ppeat1    -.0306759   .0137906    -2.22   0.027    -.0577697   -.0035821
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .0626378   .0078208     8.01   0.000     .0472725    .0780031
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    28.7191177       510  .056311995   Root MSE        =    .22325
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1150
    Residual    25.2682065       507  .049838672   R-squared       =    0.1202
       Model     3.4509112         3  1.15030373   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 507)       =     23.08
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       510
                                                                              
         at1     400.0873   263.2718     1.52   0.129    -116.8891    917.0636
      ppeat1    -.0537305   .0161829    -3.32   0.001    -.0855083   -.0219527
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.0571848   .0135336    -4.23   0.000    -.0837602   -.0306094
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     1080.6474       646   1.6728288   Root MSE        =    .31689
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9400
    Residual    64.5693651       643  .100418919   R-squared       =    0.9402
       Model    1016.07804         3  338.692679   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 643)       =   3372.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       646
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Consumer staples Industry 
 
Healthcare Industry 
 
Real estate Industry 
 
Information technology Industry 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         at1    -64.56647   51.09364    -1.26   0.207    -164.8698    35.73688
      ppeat1     -.028347   .0063922    -4.43   0.000    -.0408956   -.0157984
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.0296223   .0195178    -1.52   0.130    -.0679382    .0086937
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    18.1763192       754  .024106524   Root MSE        =    .15209
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0405
    Residual    17.3713592       751  .023130971   R-squared       =    0.0443
       Model    .804960057         3  .268320019   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 751)       =     11.60
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       754
                                                                              
         at1     38.07626   160.4994     0.24   0.813     -278.591    354.7435
      ppeat1    -.0007295   .0105178    -0.07   0.945    -.0214814    .0200223
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.1664386   .0985773    -1.69   0.093    -.3609328    .0280556
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.64141982       186  .008824838   Root MSE        =    .09369
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0053
    Residual    1.60640624       183  .008778176   R-squared       =    0.0213
       Model     .03501358         3  .011671193   Prob > F        =    0.2662
                                                   F(3, 183)       =      1.33
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       186
                                                                              
         at1     189.9788    144.267     1.32   0.189    -94.31538     474.273
      ppeat1     -.048082   .0366387    -1.31   0.191    -.1202826    .0241186
 ΔREVΔRECAt1      .215346   .0427198     5.04   0.000     .1311619    .2995301
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    13.6859925       227  .060290716   Root MSE        =     .2284
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1347
    Residual    11.6855008       224  .052167414   R-squared       =    0.1462
       Model    2.00049176         3  .666830587   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 224)       =     12.78
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       227
                                                                              
         at1     143.0338   249.2633     0.57   0.567    -348.4579    634.5255
      ppeat1     -.012805   .0214398    -0.60   0.551    -.0550796    .0294695
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .3204371   .0416061     7.70   0.000      .238399    .4024751
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5.72243255       205  .027914305   Root MSE        =    .14724
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2234
    Residual    4.37903954       202  .021678414   R-squared       =    0.2348
       Model    1.34339301         3  .447797671   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 202)       =     20.66
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       205
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Mobile telecommunications Industry 
 
Utilities Industry 
 
Kasznik Model 
Energy Industry 
 
Materials Industry 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         at1     330.0639    1656.57     0.20   0.842    -2937.458    3597.586
      ppeat1    -.0990928   .0088198   -11.24   0.000    -.1164894   -.0816961
 ΔREVΔRECAt1    -.2001793   .0634748    -3.15   0.002     -.325381   -.0749776
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.55475194       194  .023478103   Root MSE        =    .10788
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5043
    Residual    2.22281152       191  .011637757   R-squared       =    0.5120
       Model    2.33194042         3  .777313473   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 191)       =     66.79
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       194
                                                                              
         at1    -70.49512    289.118    -0.24   0.808    -643.6997    502.7094
      ppeat1    -.0429068   .0088051    -4.87   0.000    -.0603636   -.0254499
 ΔREVΔRECAt1     .1387631   .0605464     2.29   0.024     .0187238    .2588023
                                                                              
     bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.22364007       109  .011226056   Root MSE        =    .09615
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1764
    Residual     .98004346       106  .009245693   R-squared       =    0.1991
       Model    .243596614         3  .081198871   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 106)       =      8.78
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       109
                                                                               
        _cons    -.1498277   .0528189    -2.84   0.005      -.25413   -.0455255
      ΔCFOAt1    -.0846001   .2209843    -0.38   0.702    -.5209813     .351781
       ppeat1     .2084169     .05681     3.67   0.000     .0962333    .3206005
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0752158   .0677712     1.11   0.269    -.0586131    .2090446
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    25.2741793       165  .153176844   Root MSE        =     .3783
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0657
    Residual    23.1841921       162  .143112297   R-squared       =    0.0827
       Model     2.0899872         3  .696662399   Prob > F        =    0.0029
                                                   F(3, 162)       =      4.87
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       166
                                                                               
        _cons     -.265805   .0125774   -21.13   0.000    -.2904814   -.2411286
      ΔCFOAt1    -.2908795   .0555554    -5.24   0.000    -.3998777   -.1818812
       ppeat1     .3316308   .0119957    27.65   0.000     .3080955    .3551661
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.2994561   .0387074    -7.74   0.000    -.3753989   -.2235133
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    132.521346     1,185   .11183236   Root MSE        =    .25792
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4052
    Residual    78.6270843     1,182  .066520376   R-squared       =    0.4067
       Model    53.8942622         3  17.9647541   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1182)      =    270.06
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,186
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Industrials Industry 
 
Consumer discretionary Industry 
 
Consumer staples Industry 
 
Healthcare Industry 
 
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0033818   .0170351    -0.20   0.843    -.0368526    .0300889
      ΔCFOAt1    -.2296043   .0686853    -3.34   0.001    -.3645584   -.0946502
       ppeat1    -.0189864   .0227979    -0.83   0.405    -.0637801    .0258074
ΔSALESΔRECAt1      .074874    .009596     7.80   0.000     .0560197    .0937284
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    27.9297782       493  .056652694   Root MSE        =    .22232
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1275
    Residual    24.2198909       490  .049428349   R-squared       =    0.1328
       Model    3.70988737         3  1.23662912   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 490)       =     25.02
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       494
                                                                               
        _cons     .0559874   .0212642     2.63   0.009     .0142299    .0977449
      ΔCFOAt1    -.1030848   .1067814    -0.97   0.335    -.3127759    .1066064
       ppeat1    -.0923646   .0242042    -3.82   0.000    -.1398954   -.0448339
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0059058   .0261346    -0.23   0.821    -.0572274    .0454159
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1076.86901       632  1.70390666   Root MSE        =    .31732
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9409
    Residual    63.3353545       629  .100692138   R-squared       =    0.9412
       Model    1013.53366         3  337.844552   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 629)       =   3355.22
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       633
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0074354   .0112013    -0.66   0.507     -.029427    .0145563
      ΔCFOAt1    -.4657446   .0346308   -13.45   0.000    -.5337359   -.3977532
       ppeat1    -.0202961   .0119418    -1.70   0.090    -.0437418    .0031495
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0165696   .0180852     0.92   0.360    -.0189375    .0520767
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    16.1623922       711  .022731916   Root MSE        =    .13443
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2051
    Residual    12.7938182       708  .018070365   R-squared       =    0.2084
       Model      3.368574         3    1.122858   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 708)       =     62.14
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       712
                                                                               
        _cons     .0181628    .015909     1.14   0.255    -.0132379    .0495636
      ΔCFOAt1     -.091632   .0267115    -3.43   0.001    -.1443544   -.0389096
       ppeat1    -.0227478   .0200061    -1.14   0.257    -.0622352    .0167396
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1045087   .1004282    -1.04   0.299     -.302731    .0937135
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.61526986       176   .00917767   Root MSE        =    .09229
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0720
    Residual    1.47340277       173  .008516779   R-squared       =    0.0878
       Model     .14186709         3   .04728903   Prob > F        =    0.0012
                                                   F(3, 173)       =      5.55
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       177
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Real estate Industry 
 
Information technology Industry 
 
Mobile telecommunications Industry 
 
Utilities Industry 
 
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons     .0574277   .0184101     3.12   0.002     .0211413    .0937141
      ΔCFOAt1    -.2613313   .0898896    -2.91   0.004    -.4385044   -.0841582
       ppeat1      -.10126   .0458998    -2.21   0.028    -.1917288   -.0107912
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .2481966   .0385559     6.44   0.000     .1722027    .3241905
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    13.1607465       219  .060094733   Root MSE        =    .22275
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1743
    Residual    10.7174873       216  .049617997   R-squared       =    0.1856
       Model    2.44325917         3  .814419722   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 216)       =     16.41
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       220
                                                                               
        _cons     .0043421   .0186284     0.23   0.816     -.032416    .0411002
      ΔCFOAt1    -.3548321   .0723127    -4.91   0.000    -.4975218   -.2121425
       ppeat1    -.0102703    .032471    -0.32   0.752    -.0743431    .0538025
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .2994024   .0411424     7.28   0.000     .2182189    .3805858
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    5.32832982       183  .029116556   Root MSE        =     .1414
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3133
    Residual    3.59913626       180  .019995201   R-squared       =    0.3245
       Model    1.72919356         3  .576397853   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 180)       =     28.83
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       184
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0143756   .0189672    -0.76   0.449    -.0517891    .0230378
      ΔCFOAt1    -.3137248   .1058579    -2.96   0.003    -.5225325   -.1049171
       ppeat1    -.0805951   .0190695    -4.23   0.000    -.1182103   -.0429799
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     -.133877   .0657836    -2.04   0.043     -.263637   -.0041169
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.54043403       193  .013162871   Root MSE        =    .10562
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1525
    Residual    2.11943439       190  .011154918   R-squared       =    0.1657
       Model    .420999647         3  .140333216   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 190)       =     12.58
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       194
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0038416   .0216543    -0.18   0.860    -.0467781    .0390949
      ΔCFOAt1    -.3831359    .128307    -2.99   0.004    -.6375449   -.1287269
       ppeat1    -.0369573   .0191202    -1.93   0.056    -.0748691    .0009546
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1158183    .054896     2.11   0.037     .0069698    .2246669
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.05978041       108  .009812782   Root MSE        =    .09278
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1228
    Residual    .903830396       105  .008607909   R-squared       =    0.1472
       Model    .155950013         3  .051983338   Prob > F        =    0.0008
                                                   F(3, 105)       =      6.04
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       109
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        _cons    -.1563776   .0518607    -3.02   0.003    -.2587515   -.0540037
        roait    -.2425624   .3018602    -0.80   0.423    -.8384395    .3533148
          at1     883.7726   510.8017     1.73   0.085    -124.5585    1892.104
       ppeat1     .2112164   .0547204     3.86   0.000     .1031973    .3192354
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0770556   .0594553     1.30   0.197    -.0403102    .1944213
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    25.3813191       174   .14586965   Root MSE        =    .36561
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0836
    Residual    22.7239642       170  .133670377   R-squared       =    0.1047
       Model    2.65735497         4  .664338743   Prob > F        =    0.0008
                                                   F(4, 170)       =      4.97
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       175
        _cons    -.2725233    .013757   -19.81   0.000    -.2995128   -.2455339
        roait     .1379481   .0758779     1.82   0.069    -.0109147    .2868108
          at1      416.245   117.9076     3.53   0.000     184.9252    647.5648
       ppeat1     .3128268   .0118185    26.47   0.000     .2896404    .3360132
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.3367149   .0374956    -8.98   0.000    -.4102765   -.2631533
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    133.813078     1,248  .107222018   Root MSE        =    .25774
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3804
    Residual    82.6401842     1,244  .066431016   R-squared       =    0.3824
       Model    51.1728941         4  12.7932235   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 1244)      =    192.58
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,249
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0165214   .0172162    -0.96   0.338    -.0503457    .0173029
        roait     .2651349   .0884253     3.00   0.003     .0914082    .4388617
          at1     214.8721   85.81872     2.50   0.013     46.26641    383.4778
       ppeat1     -.031751   .0222883    -1.42   0.155    -.0755402    .0120383
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0624091   .0085143     7.33   0.000     .0456812     .079137
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    28.6891465       509  .056363746   Root MSE        =    .22172
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1278
    Residual     24.825184       505   .04915878   R-squared       =    0.1347
       Model    3.86396245         4  .965990612   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 505)       =     19.65
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       510
                                                                               
        _cons     .0260911   .0257786     1.01   0.312    -.0245296    .0767118
        roait     .2707057   .1402632     1.93   0.054    -.0047251    .5461366
          at1     279.7698   264.0055     1.06   0.290    -238.6503    798.1899
       ppeat1    -.0895098   .0251781    -3.56   0.000    -.1389514   -.0400682
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0246397   .0218705    -1.13   0.260    -.0675861    .0183068
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1077.66702       645  1.67080159   Root MSE        =    .31472
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9407
    Residual    63.4895703       641  .099047692   R-squared       =    0.9411
       Model    1014.17745         4  253.544364   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 641)       =   2559.82
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       646
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        _cons    -.0229249   .0125454    -1.83   0.068    -.0475532    .0017035
        roait     .3998972   .0643472     6.21   0.000     .2735748    .5262196
          at1    -40.14299   50.30107    -0.80   0.425    -138.8908    58.60488
       ppeat1    -.0218482   .0129756    -1.68   0.093     -.047321    .0036246
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0487023   .0193051    -2.52   0.012    -.0866009   -.0108037
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    17.5853424       753  .023353708   Root MSE        =    .14851
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0556
    Residual    16.5194254       749  .022055308   R-squared       =    0.0606
       Model    1.06591698         4  .266479246   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 749)       =     12.08
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       754
        _cons     -.008995   .0186442    -0.48   0.630    -.0457828    .0277929
        roait     .3309182   .1156274     2.86   0.005     .1027672    .5590691
          at1     144.2863   171.6332     0.84   0.402     -194.373    482.9456
       ppeat1    -.0134525   .0198914    -0.68   0.500    -.0527013    .0257964
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.2749215   .1030153    -2.67   0.008    -.4781869   -.0716562
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.63894173       185  .008859145   Root MSE        =    .09188
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0471
    Residual    1.52793037       181  .008441604   R-squared       =    0.0677
       Model    .111011358         4   .02775284   Prob > F        =    0.0125
                                                   F(4, 181)       =      3.29
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       186
                                                                               
        _cons     .0493509   .0204126     2.42   0.016     .0091237    .0895782
        roait     .2516229   .1942409     1.30   0.197    -.1311691    .6344149
          at1      90.0658   157.8196     0.57   0.569    -220.9505    401.0821
       ppeat1    -.1245374   .0436066    -2.86   0.005    -.2104733   -.0386015
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .2214733    .043087     5.14   0.000     .1365616    .3063851
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    13.3767729       226   .05918926   Root MSE        =    .22458
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1479
    Residual    11.1970985       222  .050437381   R-squared       =    0.1629
       Model    2.17967432         4  .544918581   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 222)       =     10.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       227
        _cons    -.0135924    .019395    -0.70   0.484    -.0518374    .0246525
        roait     .3910423   .1462956     2.67   0.008     .1025626     .679522
          at1     75.59051   251.5281     0.30   0.764    -420.3968    571.5778
       ppeat1    -.0121588   .0321394    -0.38   0.706    -.0755345    .0512168
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .2919848   .0424437     6.88   0.000     .2082902    .3756794
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    5.64697925       204  .027681271   Root MSE        =    .14534
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2369
    Residual    4.22469976       200  .021123499   R-squared       =    0.2519
       Model    1.42227949         4  .355569872   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 200)       =     16.83
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       205
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        _cons     -.051313   .0215813    -2.38   0.018    -.0938857   -.0087403
        roait    -.0308035     .09155    -0.34   0.737    -.2114008    .1497937
          at1     2280.098    1849.41     1.23   0.219    -1368.164     5928.36
       ppeat1    -.0494279    .022486    -2.20   0.029    -.0937851   -.0050706
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1434829   .0671284    -2.14   0.034    -.2759047   -.0110611
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    2.53846502       192  .013221172   Root MSE        =    .11205
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0504
    Residual    2.36027311       188  .012554644   R-squared       =    0.0702
       Model    .178191902         4  .044547975   Prob > F        =    0.0081
                                                   F(4, 188)       =      3.55
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       193
                                                                               
        _cons     .0185574    .026261     0.71   0.481    -.0335192    .0706339
        roait    -.3783263   .2658982    -1.42   0.158    -.9056123    .1489598
          at1     66.42822    304.962     0.22   0.828    -538.3229    671.1793
       ppeat1    -.0470258   .0202001    -2.33   0.022    -.0870833   -.0069683
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1341168   .0606603     2.21   0.029     .0138252    .2544084
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.05978041       108  .009812782   Root MSE        =    .09614
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0580
    Residual    .961316575       104  .009243429   R-squared       =    0.0929
       Model    .098463833         4  .024615958   Prob > F        =    0.0366
                                                   F(4, 104)       =      2.66
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       109
                                                                               
      tatlmve    -.0675203   .0558903    -1.21   0.229    -.1779198    .0428792
        roait    -.4635292   .3232583    -1.43   0.154    -1.102057    .1749988
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0697628   .0647176     1.08   0.283     -.058073    .1975986
       ppeat1     .1513551    .060812     2.49   0.014      .031234    .2714763
          at1     719.9764   583.7685     1.23   0.219    -433.1342    1873.087
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    25.1164107       161  .156002551   Root MSE        =    .38631
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0434
    Residual    23.2812945       156  .149239068   R-squared       =    0.0731
       Model    1.83511618         5  .367023237   Prob > F        =    0.0355
                                                   F(5, 156)       =      2.46
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       161
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      tatlmve    -.1567985   .0156547   -10.02   0.000    -.1875155   -.1260814
        roait    -.4765312   .0811222    -5.87   0.000    -.6357062   -.3173563
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.3709867   .0449419    -8.25   0.000    -.4591701   -.2828033
       ppeat1      .250146   .0130833    19.12   0.000     .2244744    .2758176
          at1      138.839   131.9992     1.05   0.293    -120.1648    397.8429
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    123.051173     1,085  .113411219   Root MSE        =    .28578
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2799
    Residual    88.2064494     1,080  .081672638   R-squared       =    0.2832
       Model    34.8447232         5  6.96894465   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 1080)      =     85.33
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
                                                                               
      tatlmve    -.0055538   .0156671    -0.35   0.723    -.0363445     .025237
        roait      .290256   .0953582     3.04   0.002     .1028476    .4776645
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .0664446   .0084114     7.90   0.000     .0499135    .0829757
       ppeat1    -.0533921   .0200773    -2.66   0.008    -.0928503    -.013934
          at1     226.4213   86.06577     2.63   0.009     57.27545    395.5671
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    25.9506027       450  .057668006   Root MSE        =    .22217
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1441
    Residual    21.9640582       445  .049357434   R-squared       =    0.1536
       Model    3.98654452         5  .797308905   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 445)       =     16.15
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       450
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0260064   .0097856     2.66   0.008     .0067841    .0452288
        roait     .3510337   .0537466     6.53   0.000      .245457    .4566105
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.1343337   .0237196    -5.66   0.000    -.1809271   -.0877402
       ppeat1    -.0843057   .0099229    -8.50   0.000    -.1037977   -.0648137
          at1     132.9299   109.9122     1.21   0.227     -82.9752    348.8351
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    9.75035049       548   .01779261   Root MSE        =    .11839
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2123
    Residual    7.61027109       543  .014015232   R-squared       =    0.2195
       Model    2.14007939         5  .428015879   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 543)       =     30.54
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       548
                                                                               
      tatlmve     -.000117   .0091104    -0.01   0.990    -.0180062    .0177723
        roait     .3724656   .0666238     5.59   0.000     .2416426    .5032886
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.0555863   .0192935    -2.88   0.004    -.0934712   -.0177015
       ppeat1    -.0464558   .0094112    -4.94   0.000    -.0649356    -.027976
          at1     -44.8023   48.40704    -0.93   0.355    -139.8548     50.2502
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    14.7322245       657  .022423477   Root MSE        =    .14242
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0955
    Residual    13.2241448       652  .020282431   R-squared       =    0.1024
       Model    1.50807965         5  .301615931   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 652)       =     14.87
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       657
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      tatlmve    -.0011865   .0158052    -0.08   0.940    -.0324485    .0300756
        roait     .3392172   .1159729     2.92   0.004     .1098273    .5686072
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.2236007   .1200848    -1.86   0.065    -.4611238    .0139225
       ppeat1    -.0261024   .0196486    -1.33   0.186    -.0649665    .0127617
          at1     137.4014   165.6636     0.83   0.408    -190.2748    465.0777
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.25483856       138  .009093033   Root MSE        =    .09347
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0392
    Residual    1.16196216       133  .008736558   R-squared       =    0.0740
       Model      .0928764         5   .01857528   Prob > F        =    0.0661
                                                   F(5, 133)       =      2.13
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       138
                                                                               
      tatlmve     .0415595   .0156165     2.66   0.008     .0107524    .0723666
        roait     .3147253   .2115813     1.49   0.139    -.1026677    .7321183
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .2140982   .0421917     5.07   0.000     .1308653    .2973311
       ppeat1    -.0786247   .0425156    -1.85   0.066    -.1624965     .005247
          at1    -1.391166   156.1975    -0.01   0.993    -309.5268    306.7444
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    10.8142661       192  .056324303   Root MSE        =    .21333
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1920
    Residual    8.51055741       187  .045511002   R-squared       =    0.2130
       Model    2.30370872         5  .460741744   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 187)       =     10.12
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       192
                                                                               
      tatlmve     -.016242   .0182334    -0.89   0.374    -.0522461    .0197621
        roait      .391083   .1186756     3.30   0.001     .1567432    .6254228
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1416045   .0384916     3.68   0.000      .065598     .217611
       ppeat1    -.0093724   .0342892    -0.27   0.785    -.0770808     .058336
          at1    -203.6872   301.4462    -0.68   0.500    -798.9303    391.5559
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total     2.4880723       168  .014809954   Root MSE        =    .11289
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1395
    Residual    2.07717647       163  .012743414   R-squared       =    0.1651
       Model    .410895831         5  .082179166   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 163)       =      6.45
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       168
                                                                               
      tatlmve    -.0075763    .018523    -0.41   0.683    -.0441489    .0289963
        roait     .0336658   .1046149     0.32   0.748    -.1728907    .2402223
ΔSALESΔRECAt1    -.2056959   .0681525    -3.02   0.003    -.3402592   -.0711326
       ppeat1     -.098659   .0184454    -5.35   0.000    -.1350783   -.0622396
          at1     1748.813   2225.616     0.79   0.433    -2645.545    6143.171
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    3.99039262       170  .023472898   Root MSE        =    .10978
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4866
    Residual     1.9883936       165   .01205087   R-squared       =    0.5017
       Model    2.00199903         5  .400399805   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(5, 165)       =     33.23
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       170
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      tatlmve     .0016181   .0266351     0.06   0.952    -.0512891    .0545254
        roait    -.2505462   .2482959    -1.01   0.316    -.7437555     .242663
ΔSALESΔRECAt1     .1494228   .0645874     2.31   0.023     .0211279    .2777177
       ppeat1     -.039259   .0194989    -2.01   0.047    -.0779911   -.0005268
          at1     4.981116   315.5791     0.02   0.987    -621.8781    631.8403
                                                                               
      bstaat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.18004464        96  .012292132   Root MSE        =    .10077
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1740
    Residual    .923980846        91  .010153636   R-squared       =    0.2170
       Model    .256063794         5  .051212759   Prob > F        =    0.0004
                                                   F(5, 91)        =      5.04
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        96
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1     .0422552   .0286545     1.47   0.142    -.0143728    .0988831
    salesat1     .0214935   .0076184     2.82   0.005     .0064378    .0365493
         at1      294.854   265.4318     1.11   0.268    -229.7011    819.4091
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.90847187       150  .032723146   Root MSE        =    .17086
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1079
    Residual    4.29132035       147  .029192655   R-squared       =    0.1257
       Model    .617151522         3  .205717174   Prob > F        =    0.0002
                                                   F(3, 147)       =      7.05
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       150
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1    -.0423422   .0270382    -1.57   0.118    -.0953823    .0106978
    salesat1     .1626389   .0084222    19.31   0.000     .1461173    .1791605
         at1    -575.7621   43.21751   -13.32   0.000    -660.5406   -490.9835
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    79.0999435     1,393  .056783879   Root MSE        =    .20284
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2754
    Residual    57.1904489     1,390  .041144208   R-squared       =    0.2770
       Model    21.9094946         3  7.30316487   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1390)      =    177.50
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,393
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   ΔSALESAt1    -.0369546   .0090218    -4.10   0.000    -.0546706   -.0192386
    salesat1     .0909318   .0078531    11.58   0.000     .0755107    .1063528
         at1    -11.12949   14.82634    -0.75   0.453    -40.24382    17.98483
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    22.3849026       641  .034921845   Root MSE        =    .14665
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3842
    Residual    13.7211824       638  .021506556   R-squared       =    0.3870
       Model    8.66372012         3  2.88790671   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 638)       =    134.28
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       641
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1    -.0188103   .0427192    -0.44   0.660    -.1026616    .0650409
    salesat1     .0915942    .008646    10.59   0.000     .0746234     .108565
         at1     -26.7362   95.65398    -0.28   0.780    -214.4903    161.0179
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    43.7105013       827  .052854294   Root MSE        =    .20597
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1974
    Residual     34.956852       824  .042423364   R-squared       =    0.2003
       Model    8.75364934         3  2.91788311   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 824)       =     68.78
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       827
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1    -.0180068   .0164279    -1.10   0.273    -.0502428    .0142292
    salesat1      .071821   .0046625    15.40   0.000      .062672      .08097
         at1    -35.50641   37.26694    -0.95   0.341    -108.6342    37.62137
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    27.8023625     1,033  .026914194   Root MSE        =    .14293
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2410
    Residual    21.0407227     1,030  .020427886   R-squared       =    0.2432
       Model     6.7616398         3  2.25387993   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 1030)      =    110.33
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,033
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1    -.0111215   .0401282    -0.28   0.782    -.0901463    .0679034
    salesat1     .1177723   .0091165    12.92   0.000     .0998191    .1357255
         at1    -259.4907    91.3694    -2.84   0.005    -439.4254   -79.55595
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.86508754       258  .014980959   Root MSE        =     .0891
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.4700
    Residual    2.02460874       255  .007939642   R-squared       =    0.4762
       Model     1.8404788         3  .613492932   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 255)       =     77.27
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       258
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   ΔSALESAt1    -.1397544   .0248083    -5.63   0.000    -.1884633   -.0910455
    salesat1     .1216951   .0218941     5.56   0.000      .078708    .1646823
         at1    -20.25534   47.57304    -0.43   0.670    -113.6609    73.15019
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    9.85851427       692  .014246408   Root MSE        =    .11666
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0447
    Residual    9.37684452       689  .013609353   R-squared       =    0.0489
       Model    .481669751         3  .160556584   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 689)       =     11.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       692
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1    -.1795233   .0315494    -5.69   0.000    -.2417336    -.117313
    salesat1     .0342004   .0091708     3.73   0.000     .0161171    .0522837
         at1     916.1191   212.4126     4.31   0.000     497.2763    1334.962
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.45505929       204  .016936565   Root MSE        =    .11272
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.2498
    Residual    2.55369844       201  .012704967   R-squared       =    0.2609
       Model     .90136085         3  .300453617   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 201)       =     23.65
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       204
   ΔSALESAt1    -.2876795   .0622293    -4.62   0.000    -.4105009   -.1648581
    salesat1     .3442834   .0218631    15.75   0.000     .3011324    .3874343
         at1     11439.81   1266.128     9.04   0.000     8940.863    13938.75
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    14.5311162       177  .082096702   Root MSE        =    .14746
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7351
    Residual    3.78377665       174  .021745843   R-squared       =    0.7396
       Model    10.7473396         3  3.58244652   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 174)       =    164.74
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       177
                                                                              
   ΔSALESAt1    -.1732194    .041761    -4.15   0.000    -.2558894   -.0905493
    salesat1     .1289242   .0128154    10.06   0.000     .1035549    .1542935
         at1     162.7295   258.9977     0.63   0.531    -349.9824    675.4413
                                                                              
      cfoat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     1.4306646       125  .011445317   Root MSE        =    .07415
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5196
    Residual    .670842834       122  .005498712   R-squared       =    0.5311
       Model    .759821762         3  .253273921   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 122)       =     46.06
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       125
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      st1at1     .0307989   .0024502    12.57   0.000      .025957    .0356408
         at1     588.4319   96.19035     6.12   0.000      398.348    778.5158
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.42502238       150  .009500149   Root MSE        =    .06209
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5942
    Residual    .570627189       148  .003855589   R-squared       =    0.5996
       Model    .854395189         2  .427197595   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 148)       =    110.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       150
                                                                              
      st1at1     .0603065   .0014747    40.89   0.000     .0574136    .0631995
         at1     150.7532    8.66354    17.40   0.000     133.7582    167.7482
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6.32350156     1,393  .004539484   Root MSE        =     .0408
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.6333
    Residual    2.31556476     1,391  .001664676   R-squared       =    0.6338
       Model     4.0079368         2   2.0039684   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 1391)      =   1203.82
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,393
      st1at1     .1894096    .002709    69.92   0.000       .18409    .1947293
         at1     14.31029   12.71455     1.13   0.261    -10.65706    39.27764
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    89.5093384       641  .139640153   Root MSE        =    .12687
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8847
    Residual     10.284914       639  .016095327   R-squared       =    0.8851
       Model    79.2244244         2  39.6122122   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 639)       =   2461.10
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       641
                                                                              
      st1at1     .0748804   .0025344    29.55   0.000     .0699058    .0798551
         at1      465.017   38.00055    12.24   0.000     390.4279    539.6061
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    14.0638879       827   .01700591   Root MSE        =    .08232
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.6015
    Residual    5.59064888       825  .006776544   R-squared       =    0.6025
       Model    8.47323898         2  4.23661949   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 825)       =    625.19
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       827
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      st1at1     .0825721   .0023934    34.50   0.000     .0778756    .0872687
         at1     142.6184   22.62084     6.30   0.000     98.23031    187.0066
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    19.1125598     1,033  .018501994   Root MSE        =    .08705
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5904
    Residual    7.81310687     1,031  .007578183   R-squared       =    0.5912
       Model    11.2994529         2  5.64972645   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 1031)      =    745.53
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,033
                                                                              
      st1at1     .1565222    .006961    22.49   0.000     .1428141    .1702304
         at1     424.0747   81.82862     5.18   0.000     262.9317    585.2177
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6.05108933       258  .023453835   Root MSE        =    .08023
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7255
    Residual    1.64791706       256  .006437176   R-squared       =    0.7277
       Model    4.40317227         2  2.20158613   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 256)       =    342.01
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       258
                                                                              
      st1at1       .19631   .0048806    40.22   0.000     .1867273    .2058927
         at1     67.64319    17.4049     3.89   0.000     33.47027    101.8161
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5.05905718       692  .007310776   Root MSE        =    .04276
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7499
    Residual    1.26184692       690  .001828764   R-squared       =    0.7506
       Model    3.79721026         2  1.89860513   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 690)       =   1038.19
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       692
                                                                              
      st1at1     .0494702   .0039566    12.50   0.000     .0416686    .0572718
         at1     718.5536   106.4938     6.75   0.000     508.5715    928.5358
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.79159978       204  .008782352   Root MSE        =    .05697
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.6305
    Residual    .655551957       202  .003245307   R-squared       =    0.6341
       Model    1.13604782         2  .568023909   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 202)       =    175.03
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       204
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      st1at1     .2152054   .0080526    26.72   0.000     .1993127    .2310981
         at1    -135.6382   566.9932    -0.24   0.811    -1254.663    983.3867
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.17896008       177  .023609944   Root MSE        =    .06616
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8146
    Residual    .765933865       175  .004376765   R-squared       =    0.8167
       Model    3.41302621         2  1.70651311   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 175)       =    389.90
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       177
                                                                              
      st1at1     .0512003    .008062     6.35   0.000     .0352421    .0671586
         at1     204.4641    186.506     1.10   0.275    -164.7132    573.6414
                                                                              
     disxat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .599812916       125  .004798503   Root MSE        =    .05526
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3635
    Residual    .375648922       123  .003054056   R-squared       =    0.3737
       Model    .224163994         2  .112081997   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(2, 123)       =     36.70
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       125
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1     .0711955   .0426968     1.67   0.098    -.0131881    .1555792
   ΔSALESAt1     .0773135   .0349359     2.21   0.028      .008268     .146359
    salesat1      .917419   .0108401    84.63   0.000     .8959952    .9388428
         at1    -662.8377   297.0523    -2.23   0.027    -1249.916   -75.75973
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    576.245505       150   3.8416367   Root MSE        =    .19119
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9905
    Residual    5.33683103       146  .036553637   R-squared       =    0.9907
       Model    570.908674         4  142.727168   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 146)       =   3904.60
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       150
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1     -.046868   .0186814    -2.51   0.012    -.0835149   -.0102212
   ΔSALESAt1     .0520362    .017495     2.97   0.003     .0177167    .0863556
    salesat1     .7759736   .0056942   136.28   0.000     .7648035    .7871437
         at1    -74.38033   27.89126    -2.67   0.008    -129.0939   -19.66678
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    510.436638     1,393  .366429747   Root MSE        =    .13062
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9534
    Residual    23.6996489     1,389  .017062382   R-squared       =    0.9536
       Model    486.736989         4  121.684247   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 1389)      =   7131.73
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,393
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     ΔSt1At1    -.0293429     .02517    -1.17   0.244    -.0787691    .0200833
   ΔSALESAt1     -.264442   .0116431   -22.71   0.000    -.2873054   -.2415786
    salesat1     .8063275   .0102681    78.53   0.000     .7861641    .8264908
         at1    -10.84412   18.02578    -0.60   0.548    -46.24126    24.55303
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     818.51588       641  1.27693585   Root MSE        =    .17795
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9752
    Residual    20.1711936       637  .031665924   R-squared       =    0.9754
       Model    798.344686         4  199.586172   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 637)       =   6302.87
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       641
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1    -.0083147    .038505    -0.22   0.829    -.0838942    .0672649
   ΔSALESAt1     .0723886   .0325891     2.22   0.027     .0084211    .1363561
    salesat1     .8221278   .0082055   100.19   0.000     .8060216     .838234
         at1    -719.4828   73.39757    -9.80   0.000    -863.5513   -575.4143
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    770.497973       827  .931678323   Root MSE        =    .15627
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9738
    Residual    20.0990726       823  .024421716   R-squared       =    0.9739
       Model    750.398901         4  187.599725   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 823)       =   7681.68
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       827
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1     .0523463   .0206183     2.54   0.011     .0118875    .0928051
   ΔSALESAt1     .0864031   .0185251     4.66   0.000     .0500517    .1227544
    salesat1     .8331651   .0057706   144.38   0.000     .8218416    .8444885
         at1    -94.30501    42.0817    -2.24   0.025    -176.8808   -11.72926
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1071.41765     1,033  1.03719037   Root MSE        =    .16071
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9751
    Residual    26.5760809     1,029  .025827095   R-squared       =    0.9752
       Model    1044.84157         4  261.210393   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 1029)      =  10113.81
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,033
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     ΔSt1At1    -.0030111   .0658152    -0.05   0.964    -.1326242    .1266019
   ΔSALESAt1    -.0414093   .0541369    -0.76   0.445    -.1480237     .065205
    salesat1      .680533    .013898    48.97   0.000      .653163     .707903
         at1    -311.7711   123.3937    -2.53   0.012    -554.7761   -68.76599
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    69.9494608       258  .271121941   Root MSE        =    .12007
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9468
    Residual     3.6618211       254  .014416619   R-squared       =    0.9477
       Model    66.2876397         4  16.5719099   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 254)       =   1149.50
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       258
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1    -.0104153   .0457306    -0.23   0.820    -.1002035     .079373
   ΔSALESAt1    -.0557583   .0309345    -1.80   0.072    -.1164957    .0049791
    salesat1     .7851097   .0274704    28.58   0.000     .7311738    .8390456
         at1    -26.14648   55.10338    -0.47   0.635    -134.3375     82.0445
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    62.7366412       692  .090659886   Root MSE        =    .13478
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.7996
    Residual    12.4988744       688  .018166969   R-squared       =    0.8008
       Model    50.2377668         4  12.5594417   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 688)       =    691.33
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       692
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1    -.0420235   .0373378    -1.13   0.262    -.1156498    .0316029
   ΔSALESAt1     .1805847     .03442     5.25   0.000      .112712    .2484574
    salesat1     .8647508   .0104514    82.74   0.000     .8441417    .8853599
         at1    -1289.836   230.4366    -5.60   0.000    -1744.233   -835.4388
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     198.54249       204  .973247499   Root MSE        =    .12208
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9847
    Residual    2.98068217       200  .014903411   R-squared       =    0.9850
       Model    195.561808         4  48.8904519   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 200)       =   3280.49
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       204
                                                                              
     ΔSt1At1    -.1731088   .0922112    -1.88   0.062    -.3551126     .008895
   ΔSALESAt1     .4912056   .0564873     8.70   0.000     .3797125    .6026987
    salesat1     .2495319   .0222161    11.23   0.000     .2056823    .2933815
         at1     10220.19   1144.346     8.93   0.000      7961.51    12478.86
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    16.2136621       177   .09160261   Root MSE        =    .13196
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8099
    Residual    3.01257684       173  .017413739   R-squared       =    0.8142
       Model    13.2010852         4  3.30027131   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 173)       =    189.52
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       177
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     ΔSt1At1     .1965412   .0729816     2.69   0.008     .0520549    .3410276
   ΔSALESAt1     .3111463   .0568141     5.48   0.000     .1986677    .4236249
    salesat1     .7754149   .0201597    38.46   0.000     .7355034    .8153263
         at1    -791.6495   351.0661    -2.25   0.026    -1486.678   -96.62147
                                                                              
     prodat1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    50.8797148       125  .407037718   Root MSE        =    .10008
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9754
    Residual    1.21189129       121   .01001563   R-squared       =    0.9762
       Model    49.6678235         4  12.4169559   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 121)       =   1239.76
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       125
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Appendix C-1    Stepwise Regression of the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Model 
Modified Jones Model 
12 (Constant) 
-.078 .012  -6.688 .000 
ROA .262 .020 .262 13.343 .000 
EMFlexibility 
.061 .008 .160 7.672 .000 
RealEstate 
.036 .008 .084 4.587 .000 
Materials -.018 .003 -.102 -5.389 .000 
Leverage .067 .009 .145 7.068 .000 
GrowthOpportunities 
-.004 .001 -.083 -4.764 .000 
ZSCORE .001 .000 .079 4.061 .000 
GDPGrowth 
.001 .000 .064 3.729 .000 
OperatingCycle 
.007 .002 .070 3.371 .001 
ConsumerDiscretionary 
.010 .004 .046 2.467 .014 
AssetTangibility 
-.017 .007 -.050 -2.458 .014 
NationalityXFCF 
-.002 .001 -.034 -1.964 .050 
a. Dependent Variable: JonesDA 
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Kasznik Model 
20 (Constant) 
-.088 .013  -6.656 .000 
ROA .345 .025 .394 13.649 .000 
OperatingCycle 
.009 .002 .098 4.862 .000 
Leverage .070 .008 .175 8.495 .000 
EMFlexibility 
.080 .010 .237 8.287 .000 
Materials -.013 .003 -.082 -4.388 .000 
GrowthOpportunities 
-.003 .001 -.073 -3.477 .001 
GDPGrowth 
.002 .000 .102 5.780 .000 
DividendPayout 
.000 .000 -.083 -4.286 .000 
LogSales -.004 .001 -.126 -5.242 .000 
Telecom .015 .006 .043 2.351 .019 
InformationTechnology 
-.023 .006 -.065 -3.765 .000 
AssetTangibility 
-.013 .006 -.043 -2.137 .033 
NationalityXEMFlexibility 
-.033 .009 -.092 -3.792 .000 
Shares .004 .001 .106 4.235 .000 
ZSCORE .001 .000 .047 2.438 .015 
NationalityXGrowthOpportunities 
-.005 .001 -.091 -3.690 .000 
GIFIndex .004 .001 .066 2.925 .003 
Industrials 
-.008 .004 -.037 -2.102 .036 
NationalityXROA 
.061 .028 .061 2.181 .029 
NationalityXFCF 
-.002 .001 -.035 -2.091 .037 
a. Dependent Variable: KasznikDA 
 
 
 
 
348 
 
Kothari et al. Model 
14 (Constant) 
-.062 .012  -5.284 .000 
EMFlexibility 
.063 .007 .167 8.357 .000 
Leverage .057 .009 .126 6.134 .000 
GrowthOpportunities 
-.004 .001 -.089 -4.962 .000 
ROA -.073 .021 -.074 -3.430 .001 
GDPGrowth 
.002 .000 .074 4.209 .000 
RealEstate 
-.029 .008 -.068 -3.765 .000 
InformationTechnology 
-.021 .007 -.053 -2.959 .003 
ZSCORE .001 .000 .075 3.725 .000 
Telecom .035 .007 .087 4.761 .000 
ConsumerDiscretionary 
.018 .004 .081 4.338 .000 
OperatingCycle 
.005 .002 .055 2.606 .009 
Healthcare 
.015 .007 .040 2.231 .026 
DividendPayout 
.000 .000 -.043 -2.096 .036 
NationalityXFCF 
-.002 .001 -.036 -2.062 .039 
a. Dependent Variable: KothariDA 
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Raman and Shahur Model 
12 (Constant) 
-.039 .005  -8.271 .000 
EMFlexibility 
.074 .007 .200 10.632 .000 
Leverage .057 .009 .129 6.261 .000 
DividendPayout 
.000 .000 -.056 -2.784 .005 
GDPGrowth 
.002 .000 .075 4.262 .000 
GrowthOpportunities 
-.004 .001 -.088 -4.918 .000 
ConsumerDiscretionary 
.015 .004 .068 3.728 .000 
Telecom .026 .007 .068 3.717 .000 
ZSCORE .001 .000 .074 3.683 .000 
NationalityXFCF 
-.002 .001 -.041 -2.335 .020 
InformationTechnology 
-.016 .007 -.041 -2.285 .022 
ROA -.042 .021 -.044 -2.055 .040 
RealEstate 
.015 .007 .036 2.020 .043 
a. Dependent Variable: RamanDA 
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Appendix C-2 – Stepwise Regression of the Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
Models 
Abnormal Cash Flows from Operations 
19 (Constant) 
.154 .009  16.800 .000 
JonesDA .913 .015 .725 58.974 0.000 
ROA 
-.967 .012 
-
.716 
-77.372 0.000 
EMFLEX .105 .008 .202 12.596 .000 
OC 
-.032 .001 
-
.232 
-23.138 .000 
MATERIALS 
.024 .002 .100 10.248 .000 
ENERGY 
-.053 .005 
-
.094 
-11.448 .000 
TANGIBILITY 
-.063 .007 
-
.135 
-9.419 .000 
LOGSALES 
.004 .000 .092 9.997 .000 
IT 
-.033 .005 
-
.062 
-7.202 .000 
TELECOM .033 .005 .059 6.841 .000 
FINDEV 
.000 .000 
-
.039 
-4.624 .000 
CONSUMERSTAP 
-.010 .003 
-
.033 
-3.706 .000 
GCCXLEV 
-.028 .007 
-
.045 
-4.148 .000 
GCCXEMFLEX 
.089 .010 .163 8.678 .000 
GCCXOC 
-.006 .001 
-
.147 
-6.109 .000 
HEALTHCARE 
.017 .004 .031 3.717 .000 
GCCXDA 
-.066 .020 
-
.040 
-3.267 .001 
GDPGROWTH 
-.001 .000 
-
.023 
-2.808 .005 
GCCXTANG 
.020 .008 .048 2.403 .016 
a. Dependent Variable: ACFO 
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Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures 
16 (Constant) 
.094 .011  8.222 .000 
INDUSTRIALS 
.054 .004 .294 15.152 .000 
GCCXOC .007 .003 .287 2.554 .011 
OC 
-.022 .002 
-
.300 
-10.337 .000 
EMFLEX .062 .006 .222 11.137 .000 
REALESTATE 
.054 .006 .171 8.956 .000 
ROA .081 .015 .112 5.390 .000 
GCC 
-.078 .014 
-
.631 
-5.437 .000 
GCCXLEV .049 .009 .145 5.724 .000 
GCCXZSCORE 
.002 .000 .202 5.304 .000 
ZSCORE 
-.001 .000 
-
.116 
-3.434 .001 
GDPGROWTH 
.001 .000 .065 3.659 .000 
MATERIALS 
.008 .003 .062 2.894 .004 
CONSUMERDISC 
.008 .003 .051 2.524 .012 
JonesDA 
-.037 .013 
-
.054 
-2.942 .003 
GROWTH 
-.002 .001 
-
.044 
-2.404 .016 
HEALTHCARE 
-.011 .005 
-
.037 
-2.001 .046 
a. Dependent Variable: ADISX 
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Abnormal Production Costs 
20 (Constant) 
.144 .024  6.064 .000 
ROA 
-.908 .041 
-
.627 
-21.936 .000 
EMFLEX .114 .017 .204 6.869 .000 
OC 
-.039 .003 
-
.267 
-12.819 .000 
JonesDA .265 .022 .196 11.824 .000 
TANGIBILITY 
-.073 .010 
-
.146 
-7.567 .000 
MATERIALS 
.042 .005 .164 8.841 .000 
TELECOM .076 .010 .125 7.202 .000 
GDPGROWTH 
.003 .000 .089 5.397 .000 
LEVERAGE 
-.092 .020 
-
.140 
-4.741 .000 
ENERGY 
-.031 .010 
-
.052 
-3.211 .001 
REALESTATE 
.023 .011 .036 2.079 .038 
GCCXROA 
.238 .048 .144 4.963 .000 
GIF 
-.012 .003 
-
.114 
-3.667 .000 
IFRS .026 .007 .108 3.667 .000 
LOGSALES 
.004 .001 .079 3.694 .000 
CONSUMERDISC 
.015 .006 .047 2.595 .010 
GCCXEMFLEX 
.088 .020 .150 4.499 .000 
GCCXOC 
-.009 .002 
-
.200 
-4.941 .000 
GCCXLEV .066 .023 .097 2.871 .004 
HEALTHCARE 
.020 .009 .035 2.150 .032 
a. Dependent Variable: APROD 
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Aggregate Proxy (RM1) 
21 (Constant) 
.295 .028  10.477 .000 
ROA 
-1.862 .049 
-
.753 
-37.890 .000 
JonesDA 1.144 .028 .496 41.153 .000 
EMFLEX .222 .022 .233 10.186 .000 
OC 
-.068 .004 
-
.275 
-18.679 .000 
MATERIALS 
.043 .007 .098 6.455 .000 
TANGIBILITY 
-.150 .018 
-
.175 
-8.426 .000 
TELECOM .086 .013 .083 6.529 .000 
ENERGY 
-.110 .013 
-
.107 
-8.705 .000 
IT 
-.073 .012 
-
.074 
-5.832 .000 
LOGSALES 
.009 .001 .105 6.697 .000 
LEVERAGE 
-.074 .015 
-
.066 
-4.863 .000 
CONSUMERSTAP 
-.033 .007 
-
.063 
-4.589 .000 
INDUSTRIALS 
-.022 .008 
-
.035 
-2.656 .008 
GCCXEMFLEX 
.181 .027 .181 6.772 .000 
GCCXOC 
-.016 .003 
-
.199 
-5.376 .000 
GCCXROA 
.189 .056 .067 3.378 .001 
GCCXGROWTH 
.005 .002 .031 2.190 .029 
GDPGROWTH 
.002 .001 .035 2.933 .003 
GIF 
-.014 .004 
-
.080 
-3.541 .000 
IFRS .024 .009 .059 2.667 .008 
GCCXTANG 
.043 .021 .056 2.014 .044 
a. Dependent Variable: RM1 
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Aggregate Proxy (RM2) 
22 (Constant) 
.301 .018  16.870 .000 
JonesDA .844 .017 .584 50.290 0.000 
ROA 
-.900 .021 
-
.581 
-43.359 0.000 
EMFLEX .166 .013 .278 12.437 .000 
OC 
-.053 .002 
-
.338 
-24.499 .000 
ENERGY 
-.099 .008 
-
.154 
-12.655 .000 
CONSUMERSTAP 
-.063 .005 
-
.192 
-13.167 .000 
IT 
-.091 .008 
-
.146 
-11.710 .000 
GCCXTANG 
.046 .014 .098 3.198 .001 
LOGSALES 
.005 .001 .089 7.035 .000 
CONSUMERDISC 
-.043 .005 
-
.123 
-8.320 .000 
HEALTHCARE 
-.046 .007 
-
.076 
-6.175 .000 
MATERIALS 
-.019 .004 
-
.067 
-4.229 .000 
FINDEV 
.000 .000 
-
.031 
-2.709 .007 
GCCXZSCORE 
.004 .001 .139 5.964 .000 
GCC 
-.087 .011 
-
.330 
-8.213 .000 
TANGIBILITY 
-.081 .012 
-
.151 
-6.814 .000 
GCCXEMFLEX 
.090 .016 .143 5.609 .000 
ZSCORE 
-.002 .001 
-
.099 
-4.505 .000 
FCF .001 .000 .024 2.206 .027 
TELECOM 
-.017 .008 
-
.026 
-2.015 .044 
a. Dependent Variable: RM2 
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Aggregate Proxy (RM3) 
22 (Constant) 
.396 .039  10.034 .000 
ROA 
-1.782 .062 
-
.648 
-28.653 .000 
JonesDA 1.107 .035 .431 31.459 .000 
EMFLEX .310 .026 .292 11.912 .000 
OC 
-.089 .005 
-
.320 
-18.773 .000 
ENERGY 
-.157 .016 
-
.137 
-10.020 .000 
CONSUMERSTAP 
-.089 .009 
-
.152 
-10.087 .000 
TANGIBILITY 
-.118 .015 
-
.124 
-7.878 .000 
IT 
-.131 .015 
-
.119 
-8.477 .000 
LOGSALES 
.009 .002 .095 5.288 .000 
CONSUMERDISC 
-.052 .010 
-
.083 
-5.233 .000 
HEALTHCARE 
-.049 .015 
-
.045 
-3.302 .001 
LEVERAGE 
-.059 .019 
-
.047 
-3.027 .002 
TELECOM .033 .017 .029 2.025 .043 
GDPGROWTH 
.003 .001 .048 3.506 .000 
GIF 
-.017 .005 
-
.086 
-3.306 .001 
IFRS .029 .011 .062 2.545 .011 
INDUSTRIALS 
-.019 .010 
-
.028 
-1.924 .055 
GCCXEMFLEX 
.147 .031 .132 4.789 .000 
GCCXOC 
-.013 .003 
-
.151 
-5.154 .000 
GCCXROA 
.200 .072 .063 2.794 .005 
a. Dependent Variable: RM3 
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Appendix D-1    Determinants of Accruals-Based Earnings Management – Balance Sheet 
Approach 
 
Modified Jones Model  
 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,413
F(37, 2375) = 23.75
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.2551
Root MSE = 0.10827
Robust
jonesbsda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality 0.127772 .0570562     2.24 0.025 0.0158869 0.2396571
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0034147 .0030995    -1.10 0.271 -0.0094926 0.0026632
nationalityxleverage 0.0188233 .0328959     0.57 0.567 -0.0456843 0.0833309
nationalityxgrowth -0.0039592 .003421    -1.16 0.247 -0.0106677 0.0027493
nationalityxfcf 0.0024915 .0017539     1.42 0.156 -0.0009479 0.0059309
nationalityxroa -0.0568302 .0870035    -0.65 0.514 -0.2274409 0.1137805
nationalityxassettangibility -0.0815697 .0265189    -3.08 0.002 -0.1335722 -0.0295671
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0000356 .0001687     0.21 0.833 -0.0002951 0.0003664
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0073586 .0073101    -1.01 0.314 -0.0216935 0.0069762
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0008849 .001229    -0.72 0.472 -0.0032949 0.0015252
nationalityxshares -0.0007387 .0036162    -0.20 0.838 -0.00783 0.0063526
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0346025 .0322484    -1.07 0.283 -0.0978404 0.0286355
marketcapofgdp -0.0000221 .0000737    -0.30 0.764 -0.0001667 0.0001224
gdpgrowthrate 0.0021115 .0006722     3.14 0.002 0.0007933 0.0034296
gifindex 0.0027342 .0039317     0.70 0.487 -0.0049759 0.0104442
ifrs -0.0118944 .0082536    -1.44 0.150 -0.0280794 0.0042905
logsales -0.0008464 .0022011    -0.38 0.701 -0.0051626 0.0034698
leverage 0.0989334 .023957     4.13 0.000 0.0519545 0.1459123
growthopportunities -0.0046523 .0020566    -2.26 0.024 -0.0086852 -0.0006195
freecashflowpershare 0.0005914 .000233     2.54 0.011 0.0001345 0.0010483
roa 0.3206693 .0624784     5.13 0.000 0.1981516 0.4431871
assettangibility -0.0275438 .0223055    -1.23 0.217 -0.071284 0.0161965
dividendpolicy -0.0001228 .0001242    -0.99 0.323 -0.0003663 0.0001207
lnoperatingcycle -0.0059409 .0050159    -1.18 0.236 -0.0157769 0.003895
zscore 0.0016757 .0009465     1.77 0.077 -0.0001803 0.0035318
shares 0.0059956 .0026006     2.31 0.021 0.0008958 0.0110954
suspect -0.0048275 .0147713    -0.33 0.744 -0.0337935 0.0241385
emflexibility 0.1378216 .025416     5.42 0.000 0.0879817 0.1876615
energy10 -0.1010862 .0162409    -6.22 0.000 -0.132934 -0.0692384
materials15 -0.1161717 .0136773    -8.49 0.000 -0.1429925 -0.089351
industrials20 -0.0137544 .0143099    -0.96 0.337 -0.0418156 0.0143068
consumerdiscretionary25 0.0032548 .0143607     0.23 0.821 -0.0249059 0.0314156
consumerstaples30 -0.0029161 .0139086    -0.21 0.834 -0.0301903 0.0243581
healthcare35 -0.00259 .0160225    -0.16 0.872 -0.0340095 0.0288295
realestate40 0.0074616 .0183692     0.41 0.685 -0.0285597 0.043483
informationtech45 -0.0623197 .0180592    -3.45 0.001 -0.097733 -0.0269063
telecom50 0.0003781 .0168131     0.02 0.982 -0.0325918 0.033348
_cons -0.0793147 .0430298    -1.84 0.065 -0.1636946 0.0050651
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Kasznik Model 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,413
F(37, 2375) = 12.26
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1742
Root MSE = 0.12266
Robust
kasznikbsda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality 0.175111 .0638128     2.74 0.006 0.0499764 0.3002456
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0063986 .0034673    -1.85 0.065 -0.0131979 0.0004006
nationalityxleverage 0.0536181 .0393548     1.36 0.173 -0.0235553 0.1307915
nationalityxgrowth -0.0047884 .0035953    -1.33 0.183 -0.0118386 0.0022618
nationalityxfcf 0.0030923 .0017411     1.78 0.076 -0.000322 0.0065065
nationalityxroa -0.0711828 .1005982    -0.71 0.479 -0.2684521 0.1260865
nationalityxassettangibility -0.1019957 .0317874    -3.21 0.001 -0.1643297 -0.0396616
nationalityxdividendpayout -0.0000598 .0001861    -0.32 0.748 -0.0004246 0.0003051
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0099835 .0082767    -1.21 0.228 -0.0262138 0.0062468
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0018106 .0014181    -1.28 0.202 -0.0045914 0.0009702
nationalityxshares 0.0007859 .003999     0.20 0.844 -0.007056 0.0086278
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0273969 .0379145    -0.72 0.470 -0.1017459 0.0469521
marketcapofgdp -0.0000482 .0000838    -0.58 0.565 -0.0002124 0.0001161
gdpgrowthrate 0.0020238 .000748     2.71 0.007 0.0005571 0.0034906
gifindex 0.0018046 .0045796     0.39 0.694 -0.0071759 0.010785
ifrs -0.0094965 .0093789    -1.01 0.311 -0.0278882 0.0088952
logsales -0.0019883 .0025706    -0.77 0.439 -0.0070292 0.0030525
leverage 0.0999317 .0302452     3.30 0.001 0.0406219 0.1592414
growthopportunities -0.0059797 .0022551    -2.65 0.008 -0.0104018 -0.0015576
freecashflowpershare 0.0006204 .0002897     2.14 0.032 0.0000522 0.0011886
roa 0.3085672 .0762581     4.05 0.000 0.1590278 0.4581065
assettangibility -0.1050323 .0269797    -3.89 0.000 -0.1579386 -0.052126
dividendpolicy -0.0000391 .0001382    -0.28 0.777 -0.00031 0.0002318
lnoperatingcycle -0.0021016 .005973    -0.35 0.725 -0.0138144 0.0096113
zscore 0.002133 .0010931     1.95 0.051 -0.0000105 0.0042765
shares 0.0071323 .0029885     2.39 0.017 0.001272 0.0129926
suspect -0.0180566 .0194164    -0.93 0.352 -0.0561314 0.0200183
emflexibility 0.1536338 .0304153     5.05 0.000 0.0939905 0.2132772
energy10 -0.073982 .0176579    -4.19 0.000 -0.1086085 -0.0393555
materials15 -0.0349377 .014736    -2.37 0.018 -0.0638345 -0.0060409
industrials20 -0.0378798 .0149728    -2.53 0.011 -0.0672409 -0.0085188
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0275498 .0151667    -1.82 0.069 -0.0572912 0.0021915
consumerstaples30 -0.0225005 .0145382    -1.55 0.122 -0.0510093 0.0060084
healthcare35 -0.026531 .0171148    -1.55 0.121 -0.0600924 0.0070304
realestate40 -0.0817052 .0192985    -4.23 0.000 -0.1195489 -0.0438616
informationtech45 -0.0994384 .0183481    -5.42 0.000 -0.1354183 -0.0634584
telecom50 -0.0073154 .0173137    -0.42 0.673 -0.0412669 0.0266362
_cons -0.0594 .0487268    -1.22 0.223 -0.1549514 0.0361514
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Kothari et al. Model 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,413
F(37, 2375) = 10.82
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1514
Root MSE = 0.12503
Robust
kotharibsda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality 0.1317674 .0657725     2.00 0.045 0.0027899 0.2607449
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0034727 .0035796    -0.97 0.332 -0.0104923 0.0035468
nationalityxleverage 0.0461971 .040009     1.15 0.248 -0.0322591 0.1246533
nationalityxgrowth -0.0035959 .0039315    -0.91 0.36 -0.0113055 0.0041137
nationalityxfcf 0.0029594 .0018325     1.61 0.106 -0.000634 0.0065528
nationalityxroa -0.1643641 .1035866    -1.59 0.113 -0.3674935 0.0387654
nationalityxassettangibility -0.1090339 .0331416    -3.29 0.001 -0.1740234 -0.0440444
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0000236 .0001919     0.12 0.902 -0.0003527 0.0003998
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0063151 .0085866    -0.74 0.462 -0.0231532 0.010523
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0004769 .0015102    -0.32 0.752 -0.0034383 0.0024846
nationalityxshares 0.0002552 .0041284     0.06 0.951 -0.0078404 0.0083507
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0527611 .0388074    -1.36 0.174 -0.1288611 0.0233388
marketcapofgdp -0.0000705 .0000847    -0.83 0.405 -0.0002367 0.0000957
gdpgrowthrate 0.0023062 .0007589     3.04 0.002 0.0008181 0.0037943
gifindex 0.0008352 .0046127     0.18 0.856 -0.0082101 0.0098804
ifrs -0.0127124 .009599    -1.32 0.186 -0.0315356 0.0061108
logsales -0.0021406 .0026432    -0.81 0.418 -0.0073238 0.0030426
leverage 0.0962927 .0299387     3.22 0.001 0.0375841 0.1550014
growthopportunities -0.0058706 .0026072    -2.25 0.024 -0.0109832 -0.0007581
freecashflowpershare 0.0005258 .0002756     1.91 0.057 -0.0000147 0.0010663
roa 0.1145963 .0786539     1.46 0.145 -0.0396411 0.2688336
assettangibility -0.0827398 .0284312    -2.91 0.004 -0.1384922 -0.0269873
dividendpolicy -0.0000422 .0001448    -0.29 0.771 -0.0003261 0.0002417
lnoperatingcycle -0.0086207 .0061009    -1.41 0.158 -0.0205843 0.0033429
zscore 0.0015527 .0011951     1.30 0.194 -0.0007907 0.0038962
shares 0.0089172 .0030735     2.90 0.004 0.0028902 0.0149443
suspect -0.0191694 .0190993    -1.00 0.316 -0.0566224 0.0182836
emflexibility 0.1829061 .0312973     5.84 0 0.1215332 0.244279
energy10 -0.0613327 .019265    -3.18 0.001 -0.0991108 -0.0235547
materials15 -0.025551 .0157843    -1.62 0.106 -0.0565035 0.0054014
industrials20 -0.0307181 .0160023    -1.92 0.055 -0.0620981 0.0006619
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0184873 .0162363    -1.14 0.255 -0.0503261 0.0133515
consumerstaples30 -0.0208206 .0156287    -1.33 0.183 -0.0514679 0.0098266
healthcare35 -0.0164815 .0180536    -0.91 0.361 -0.0518839 0.0189209
realestate40 -0.0693752 .0209801    -3.31 0.001 -0.1105164 -0.0282341
informationtech45 -0.0980186 .019579    -5.01 0 -0.1364122 -0.0596249
telecom50 -0.0034989 .01839    -0.19 0.849 -0.0395609 0.0325632
_cons -0.0476463 .0511829    -0.93 0.352 -0.1480141 0.0527215
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Raman and Shahrur Model 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,413
F(37, 2375) = 12.2
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1575
Root MSE = 0.12511
Robust
ramanbsda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality 0.1583989 .0663813     2.39 0.017 0.0282275 0.2885702
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0034189 .0035086    -0.97 0.330 -0.0102991 0.0034614
nationalityxleverage 0.0076991 .0397792     0.19 0.847 -0.0703064 0.0857047
nationalityxgrowth -0.0081936 .0040802    -2.01 0.045 -0.0161947 -0.0001925
nationalityxfcf 0.0025617 .0017576     1.46 0.145 -0.0008849 0.0060082
nationalityxroa -0.2498151 .1080771    -2.31 0.021 -0.4617503 -0.0378799
nationalityxassettangibility -0.1050354 .0326559    -3.22 0.001 -0.1690724 -0.0409984
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0001196 .0001958     0.61 0.541 -0.0002643 0.0005035
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0096057 .0085133    -1.13 0.259 -0.0262999 0.0070885
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0000789 .0015392    -0.05 0.959 -0.0030972 0.0029394
nationalityxshares -0.0008945 .0042289    -0.21 0.833 -0.0091871 0.0073982
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0383224 .0384628    -1.00 0.319 -0.1137465 0.0371016
marketcapofgdp -0.0001701 .0000834    -2.04 0.042 -0.0003337 -6.47E-06
gdpgrowthrate 0.0022216 .0007756     2.86 0.004 0.0007007 0.0037424
gifindex 0.0015191 .0048805     0.31 0.756 -0.0080514 0.0110896
ifrs -0.0016324 .0103047    -0.16 0.874 -0.0218394 0.0185747
logsales -0.0030002 .0026472    -1.13 0.257 -0.0081913 0.0021909
leverage 0.0997876 .0305367     3.27 0.001 0.0399063 0.1596689
growthopportunities -0.0070609 .00298    -2.37 0.018 -0.0129047 -0.0012172
freecashflowpershare 0.0007531 .0002716     2.77 0.006 0.0002206 0.0012856
roa 0.3492436 .0819202     4.26 0.000 0.1886011 0.509886
assettangibility -0.0502079 .027914    -1.80 0.072 -0.1049461 0.0045304
dividendpolicy -0.000147 .0001493    -0.98 0.325 -0.0004397 0.0001457
lnoperatingcycle -0.0106548 .0060408    -1.76 0.078 -0.0225005 0.001191
zscore 0.0008445 .0012335     0.68 0.494 -0.0015744 0.0032634
shares 0.008208 .0033109     2.48 0.013 0.0017155 0.0147005
suspect -0.0119102 .0181555    -0.66 0.512 -0.0475124 0.023692
emflexibility 0.1705685 .0313374     5.44 0.000 0.109117 0.2320199
energy10 -0.1044108 .0182099    -5.73 0.000 -0.1401197 -0.0687019
materials15 -0.0777535 .0153329    -5.07 0.000 -0.1078208 -0.0476863
industrials20 -0.0364299 .0155981    -2.34 0.020 -0.0670171 -0.0058426
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0271015 .0157569    -1.72 0.086 -0.0580003 0.0037973
consumerstaples30 -0.0286908 .0151659    -1.89 0.059 -0.0584306 0.001049
healthcare35 -0.0282068 .0176295    -1.60 0.110 -0.0627776 0.006364
realestate40 -0.0624716 .0206932    -3.02 0.003 -0.1030502 -0.021893
informationtech45 -0.0843211 .0187507    -4.50 0.000 -0.1210906 -0.0475517
telecom50 -0.0137835 .0180044    -0.77 0.444 -0.0490895 0.0215225
_cons -0.0190383 .0511345    -0.37 0.710 -0.1193112 0.0812347
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Appendix E-1    Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management using the Balance 
Sheet Approach 
 
Modified Jones Model - One Year-Ahead Cash Flows from Operations 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 57.32
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.334
Root MSE = 0.08547
Robust
cfot1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
jonesbsda 0.1565231 .1046869     1.50 0.135 -0.0487671 0.3618133
jonesbsnda 0.0774065 .0291712     2.65 0.008 0.0202021 0.1346109
logsales 0.0035717 .0008536     4.18 0.000 0.0018978 0.0052457
leverage -0.0049264 .0125071    -0.39 0.694 -0.0294526 0.0195999
growthopportunities 0.0036659 .0012773     2.87 0.004 0.0011612 0.0061707
freecashflowpershare 0.0003355 .000284     1.18 0.238 -0.0002215 0.0008924
dividendpolicy 0.0003568 .0000648     5.50 0.000 0.0002297 0.000484
cfoit 0.4753985 .0314777    15.10 0.000 0.4136711 0.5371259
jonesbsdafirmsizexdac -0.011297 .0078706    -1.44 0.151 -0.0267311 0.0041371
jonesbsdaleveragexdac 0.2357388 .101754     2.32 0.021 0.0362 0.4352776
jonesbsdagrowthxdac 0.0031992 .0063648     0.50 0.615 -0.0092822 0.0156805
jonesbsdafcfxdac 0.0011448 .0022994     0.50 0.619 -0.0033643 0.0056539
jonesbsdadividendpolicyxdac 0.0002631 .0005381     0.49 0.625 -0.0007921 0.0013183
_cons -0.012866 .0107133    -1.20 0.230 -0.0338748 0.0081428
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Modified Jones Model - One Year-Ahead Nondiscretionary Net Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 44.72
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1728
Root MSE = 0.18347
Robust
jonesbsdandnit1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
jonesbsda 0.4377925 .3135144     1.40 0.163 -0.1770066 1.052592
jonesbsnda 0.528708 .1376219     3.84 0.000 0.2588327 0.7985833
logsales 0.0015315 .0020255     0.76 0.450 -0.0024406 0.0055035
leverage -0.0084761 .0216648    -0.39 0.696 -0.0509606 0.0340083
growthopportunities 0.0010553 .0025068     0.42 0.674 -0.0038605 0.0059711
freecashflowpershare 0.0003362 .0003818     0.88 0.379 -0.0004125 0.0010849
dividendpolicy 0.000572 .0001427     4.01 0.000 0.0002922 0.0008519
cfoit 0.5525433 .0502168    11.00 0.000 0.4540686 0.6510179
jonesbsdafirmsizexdac -0.0265992 .0227298    -1.17 0.242 -0.0711721 0.0179737
jonesbsdaleveragexdac 0.1662287 .1584525     1.05 0.294 -0.1444953 0.4769526
jonesbsdagrowthxdac -0.009363 .0123786    -0.76 0.449 -0.0336373 0.0149114
jonesbsdafcfxdac 0.0028728 .0025242     1.14 0.255 -0.0020771 0.0078227
jonesbsdadividendpolicyxdac -0.0010641 .00113    -0.94 0.346 -0.0032801 0.0011519
_cons 0.0136914 .0262422     0.52 0.602 -0.0377692 0.0651521
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Modified Jones Model - One Year-Ahead Change in Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 1.65
Prob > F = 0.0642
R-squared = 0.0248
Root MSE = 0.07368
Robust
changeinearningst1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
jonesbsda -0.2745103 .13782    -1.99 0.047 -0.5447742 -0.0042465
jonesbsnda -0.0556988 .025126    -2.22 0.027 -0.1049706 -0.006427
logsales 0.0002332 .0008653     0.27 0.788 -0.0014638 0.0019301
leverage 0.00133 .009913     0.13 0.893 -0.0181093 0.0207693
growthopportunities 0.0005484 .0008048     0.68 0.496 -0.0010297 0.0021265
freecashflowpershare 0.00024 .0001411     1.70 0.089 -0.0000366 0.0005167
dividendpolicy -0.0000155 .0000557    -0.28 0.780 -0.0001247 0.0000937
cfoit -0.0317789 .0228487    -1.39 0.164 -0.0765849 0.0130272
jonesbsdafirmsizexdac 0.0125036 .0099041     1.26 0.207 -0.0069183 0.0319255
jonesbsdaleveragexdac 0.0516507 .0821449     0.63 0.530 -0.1094347 0.2127361
jonesbsdagrowthxdac 0.0007304 .0067225     0.11 0.913 -0.0124523 0.0139132
jonesbsdafcfxdac 0.0007767 .0013538     0.57 0.566 -0.0018781 0.0034316
jonesbsdadividendpolicyxdac 0.0007158 .0004448     1.61 0.108 -0.0001564 0.001588
_cons 0.0020871 .011955     0.17 0.861 -0.0213565 0.0255307
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Kasznik Model – One year-Ahead Cash Flows from Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 60.7
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.3437
Root MSE = 0.08484
Robust
cfot1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
kasznikbsda 0.1754436 .0920425     1.91 0.057 -0.0050509 0.3559381
kasznikbsnda 0.1492612 .0370106     4.03 0.000 0.0766838 0.2218386
logsales 0.0039658 .0007645     5.19 0.000 0.0024666 0.0054649
leverage -0.0128038 .0118547    -1.08 0.280 -0.0360508 0.0104431
growthopportunities 0.0038152 .0012369     3.08 0.002 0.0013896 0.0062408
freecashflowpershare 0.0003831 .0002337     1.64 0.101 -0.0000751 0.0008413
dividendpolicy 0.0003505 .0000628     5.58 0.000 0.0002274 0.0004737
cfoit 0.4760915 .0315661    15.08 0.000 0.4141905 0.5379924
kasznikbsdafirmsizexdac -0.0142678 .0068386    -2.09 0.037 -0.0276782 -0.0008574
kasznikbsdaleveragexdac 0.1830334 .0927725     1.97 0.049 0.0011074 0.3649594
kasznikbsdagrowthxdac 0.0079788 .0072863     1.10 0.274 -0.0063095 0.0222671
kasznikbsdafcfxdac 0.0037381 .0014845     2.52 0.012 0.0008271 0.0066492
kasznikbsdadividendpolicyxdac 0.0001911 .0005093     0.38 0.708 -0.0008077 0.0011898
_cons -0.015631 .0096472    -1.62 0.105 -0.034549 0.0032871
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Kasznik Model – One Year-Ahead Nondiscretionary Net Income 
 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 63.96
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.2527
Root MSE = 0.178
Robust
kasznikbsdandnit1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
kasznikbsda 0.008746 .1842373     0.05 0.962 -0.3525418 0.3700338
kasznikbsnda 0.5773122 .1182294     4.88 0.000 0.3454653 0.8091591
logsales 0.0001353 .0023145     0.06 0.953 -0.0044034 0.0046741
leverage -0.0132314 .0194829    -0.68 0.497 -0.0514371 0.0249744
growthopportunities -0.0005735 .0026446    -0.22 0.828 -0.0057595 0.0046124
freecashflowpershare 0.0004539 .0004312     1.05 0.293 -0.0003917 0.0012995
dividendpolicy 0.000362 .0001414     2.56 0.011 0.0000847 0.0006392
cfoit 0.7709185 .0564035    13.67 0.000 0.6603117 0.8815253
kasznikbsdafirmsizexdac -0.0017694 .0137875    -0.13 0.898 -0.0288065 0.0252678
kasznikbsdaleveragexdac 0.2704733 .1528007     1.77 0.077 -0.0291676 0.5701142
kasznikbsdagrowthxdac -0.0036674 .0156828    -0.23 0.815 -0.0344212 0.0270863
kasznikbsdafcfxdac 0.0016815 .0033475     0.50 0.615 -0.0048828 0.0082459
kasznikbsdadividendpolicyxdac -0.0012674 .0009617    -1.32 0.188 -0.0031534 0.0006186
_cons 0.0078356 .0303538     0.26 0.796 -0.0516879 0.0673591
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Kasznik Model – One Year-Ahead Change in Earnings 
 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 1.58
Prob > F = 0.0824
R-squared = 0.0255
Root MSE = 0.07365
Robust
changeinearningst1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
kasznikbsda -0.2954227 .1286775    -2.30 0.022 -0.5477582 -0.0430871
kasznikbsnda -0.056777 .0227783    -2.49 0.013 -0.1014452 -0.0121089
logsales -0.0001201 .0007427    -0.16 0.872 -0.0015766 0.0013364
leverage 0.0018618 .0091198     0.20 0.838 -0.016022 0.0197455
growthopportunities 0.000602 .0008032     0.75 0.454 -0.0009731 0.0021772
freecashflowpershare 0.0002047 .0001374     1.49 0.137 -0.0000648 0.0004742
dividendpolicy -0.0000285 .0000546    -0.52 0.602 -0.0001356 0.0000787
cfoit -0.0248034 .0220282    -1.13 0.260 -0.0680005 0.0183938
kasznikbsdafirmsizexdac 0.0146133 .0091032     1.61 0.109 -0.003238 0.0324646
kasznikbsdaleveragexdac 0.037309 .0719067     0.52 0.604 -0.1036994 0.1783173
kasznikbsdagrowthxdac 0.0017688 .0069865     0.25 0.800 -0.0119316 0.0154693
kasznikbsdafcfxdac 0.0002408 .0012317     0.20 0.845 -0.0021746 0.0026562
kasznikbsdadividendpolicyxdac 0.0005623 .000406     1.38 0.166 -0.0002339 0.0013584
_cons 0.0065458 .0105761     0.62 0.536 -0.0141938 0.0272853
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Kothari et al. Model – One Year-Ahead Cash Flows from Operations 
 
 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 59.24
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.3388
Root MSE = 0.08516
Robust
cfot1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
kotharibsda 0.1820621 .0894038     2.04 0.042 0.006742 0.3573821
kotharibsnda 0.1216455 .0338163     3.60 0.000 0.0553319 0.187959
logsales 0.0040654 .0007764     5.24 0.000 0.0025429 0.0055879
leverage -0.0135651 .0118584    -1.14 0.253 -0.0368192 0.0096891
growthopportunities 0.0039153 .0012441     3.15 0.002 0.0014757 0.0063549
freecashflowpershare 0.0003413 .0002534     1.35 0.178 -0.0001555 0.0008381
dividendpolicy 0.0003476 .0000625     5.56 0.000 0.0002251 0.0004701
cfoit 0.459293 .0320677    14.32 0.000 0.3964086 0.5221775
kotharibsdafirmsizexdac -0.0141649 .0065687    -2.16 0.031 -0.0270461 -0.0012838
kotharibsdaleveragexdac 0.1984672 .0889389     2.23 0.026 0.0240588 0.3728757
kotharibsdagrowthxdac 0.008589 .007584     1.13 0.258 -0.0062832 0.0234611
kotharibsdafcfxdac 0.0037058 .001885     1.97 0.049 9.41E-06 0.0074022
kotharibsdadividendpolicyxdac 0.000061 .0004908     0.12 0.901 -0.0009015 0.0010234
_cons -0.0154814 .0096419    -1.61 0.108 -0.034389 0.0034262
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Kothari et al. Model – One Year-Ahead Nondiscretionary Net Income 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 49.58
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.2216
Root MSE = 0.18845
Robust
kotharibsdandnit1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
kotharibsda 0.1743382 .2714107     0.64 0.521 -0.3578959 0.7065723
kotharibsnda 0.6303287 .1322628     4.77 0.000 0.3709625 0.8896949
logsales 0.0016043 .0022073     0.73 0.467 -0.0027242 0.0059328
leverage -0.0407384 .0212105    -1.92 0.055 -0.0823321 0.0008553
growthopportunities 0.00263 .0028555     0.92 0.357 -0.0029696 0.0082296
freecashflowpershare 0.0004351 .000434     1.00 0.316 -0.0004159 0.001286
dividendpolicy 0.0005657 .0001488     3.80 0.000 0.0002738 0.0008576
cfoit 0.5384789 .0509476    10.57 0.000 0.4385712 0.6383866
kotharibsdafirmsizexdac -0.0127904 .0195981    -0.65 0.514 -0.051222 0.0256413
kotharibsdaleveragexdac 0.3549604 .1633251     2.17 0.030 0.0346812 0.6752396
kotharibsdagrowthxdac 0.0040639 .0163503     0.25 0.804 -0.0279989 0.0361266
kotharibsdafcfxdac 0.0044413 .0025793     1.72 0.085 -0.0006166 0.0094992
kotharibsdadividendpolicyxdac -0.0017312 .0011437    -1.51 0.130 -0.0039741 0.0005116
_cons 0.0024517 .0292627     0.08 0.933 -0.0549322 0.0598356
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Kothari et al. Model – One Year-Ahead Change in Earnings 
 
 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 1.61
Prob > F = 0.0747
R-squared = 0.0209
Root MSE = 0.07382
Robust
changeinearningst1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
kotharibsda -0.105306 .1245867    -0.85 0.398 -0.3496194 0.1390074
kotharibsnda -0.1005692 .0327702    -3.07 0.002 -0.1648312 -0.0363072
logsales -0.0003657 .0007799    -0.47 0.639 -0.0018951 0.0011636
leverage 0.0025913 .0089934     0.29 0.773 -0.0150448 0.0202273
growthopportunities 0.0008291 .0008222     1.01 0.313 -0.0007832 0.0024414
freecashflowpershare 0.0002062 .000131     1.57 0.116 -0.0000507 0.0004632
dividendpolicy -0.0000485 .0000549    -0.88 0.378 -0.0001562 0.0000593
cfoit -0.0254895 .0231256    -1.10 0.270 -0.0708385 0.0198596
kotharibsdafirmsizexdac 0.0014003 .0086043     0.16 0.871 -0.0154726 0.0182732
kotharibsdaleveragexdac 0.081914 .0770074     1.06 0.288 -0.0690969 0.2329249
kotharibsdagrowthxdac 0.0031712 .0071351     0.44 0.657 -0.0108206 0.017163
kotharibsdafcfxdac 0.0003083 .0010129     0.30 0.761 -0.0016779 0.0022945
kotharibsdadividendpolicyxdac -0.0002251 .0004215    -0.53 0.593 -0.0010518 0.0006015
_cons 0.0094379 .0108964     0.87 0.386 -0.0119298 0.0308057
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Raman and Shahrur Model – One Year-Aheaad Cash Flows from Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 56.04
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.3346
Root MSE = 0.08543
Robust
cfot1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
ramanbsda 0.1562545 .0909573     1.72 0.086 -0.022112 0.334621
ramanbsnda 0.0826063 .0282383     2.93 0.003 0.0272313 0.1379812
logsales 0.0037439 .0007937     4.72 0.000 0.0021874 0.0053004
leverage -0.0112282 .0120574    -0.93 0.352 -0.0348727 0.0124164
growthopportunities 0.004129 .0013796     2.99 0.003 0.0014235 0.0068345
freecashflowpershare 0.0003457 .0002602     1.33 0.184 -0.0001646 0.000856
dividendpolicy 0.0003503 .0000631     5.55 0.000 0.0002266 0.000474
cfoit 0.4710111 .0319323    14.75 0.000 0.4083922 0.53363
ramanbsdafirmsizexdac -0.0106907 .0066311    -1.61 0.107 -0.0236942 0.0023129
ramanbsdaleveragexdac 0.1768985 .0887711     1.99 0.046 0.002819 0.350978
ramanbsdagrowthxdac 0.0080893 .0061573     1.31 0.189 -0.0039852 0.0201637
ramanbsdafcfxdac 0.0029441 .0018574     1.59 0.113 -0.0006982 0.0065864
ramanbsdadividendpolicyxdac 0.0001033 .0004882     0.21 0.832 -0.0008541 0.0010607
_cons -0.013878 .0099163    -1.40 0.162 -0.0333237 0.0055677
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Raman and Shahrur Model – One Year-Ahead Nondiscretionary Net Income 
 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 41.52
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1892
Root MSE = 0.18763
Robust
ramanbsdandnit1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
ramanbsda 0.2236818 .2860417     0.78 0.434 -0.3372436 0.7846071
ramanbsnda 0.5839771 .1230744     4.74 0.000 0.3426293 0.8253249
logsales 0.0019288 .0021336     0.90 0.366 -0.0022552 0.0061127
leverage -0.0251176 .0212443    -1.18 0.237 -0.0667776 0.0165423
growthopportunities 0.0021043 .0026259     0.80 0.423 -0.003045 0.0072536
freecashflowpershare 0.000239 .0003943     0.61 0.544 -0.0005341 0.0010122
dividendpolicy 0.0006062 .0001482     4.09 0.000 0.0003157 0.0008968
cfoit 0.5430161 .0524133    10.36 0.000 0.440234 0.6457982
ramanbsdafirmsizexdac -0.008867 .0207721    -0.43 0.670 -0.0496009 0.031867
ramanbsdaleveragexdac 0.1271759 .1577807     0.81 0.420 -0.1822308 0.4365825
ramanbsdagrowthxdac -0.0089586 .0119227    -0.75 0.452 -0.0323389 0.0144218
ramanbsdafcfxdac 0.0010285 .0027163     0.38 0.705 -0.004298 0.0063551
ramanbsdadividendpolicyxdac -0.0012674 .0010766    -1.18 0.239 -0.0033786 0.0008438
_cons 0.0018279 .0281751     0.06 0.948 -0.0534232 0.057079
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Raman and Shahrur Model – One Year-Ahead Change in Earnings 
  
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,324
F(13, 2310) = 1.55
Prob > F = 0.0913
R-squared = 0.0208
Root MSE = 0.07382
Robust
changeinearningst1 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
ramanbsda -0.0926522 .1267302    -0.73 0.465 -0.3411691 0.1558647
ramanbsnda -0.1037416 .0339031    -3.06 0.002 -0.1702252 -0.037258
logsales -0.0003507 .0008099    -0.43 0.665 -0.0019389 0.0012375
leverage 0.0043396 .0096151     0.45 0.652 -0.0145154 0.0231946
growthopportunities 0.0007476 .0008286     0.90 0.367 -0.0008772 0.0023725
freecashflowpershare 0.0002104 .000128     1.64 0.100 -0.0000405 0.0004613
dividendpolicy -0.0000483 .0000561    -0.86 0.389 -0.0001582 0.0000616
cfoit -0.026207 .0231615    -1.13 0.258 -0.0716265 0.0192125
ramanbsdafirmsizexdac 0.0005942 .0088991     0.07 0.947 -0.0168569 0.0180452
ramanbsdaleveragexdac 0.0672909 .085052     0.79 0.429 -0.0994954 0.2340772
ramanbsdagrowthxdac 0.0009547 .0055095     0.17 0.862 -0.0098493 0.0117587
ramanbsdafcfxdac 0.0009289 .001152     0.81 0.420 -0.0013301 0.0031879
ramanbsdadividendpolicyxdac -0.0001003 .0004346    -0.23 0.818 -0.0009525 0.0007519
_cons 0.0094684 .011311     0.84 0.403 -0.0127124 0.0316492
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Appendix F-1   Histograms – Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models 
Modified Jones Model 
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Raman and Shahrur Model  
 
 
Appendix F-2   Histograms – Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models 
Abnormal Cash Flows from Operations 
 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenditures 
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Aggregate Proxy (RM1) 
 
Aggregate Proxy (RM2) 
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Aggregate Proxy (RM3) 
 
 
Appendix F-3    Histograms – Effficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Models 
One Year-Ahead Cash Flows from Operations 
 
One Year-Ahead Nondiscretionary Net Income 
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One Year-Ahead Change in Cash Flows 
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Appendix G-1 Independent Variables in the Earnings Management Models 
Table 4.4 Independent Variables in the Accruals-Based and Real Activities-Based Earnings Management Models 
Independent Variable Description Measurement Author Hypothesis 
Number 
Accruals 
EM 
Expected 
Sign 
Real EM 
Expected 
Sign 
IFRS Adoption Refers to whether the company uses 
IFRS or local standards 
Dummy variable (binary, 0, 1)  
Takes a value of 1 if the firm uses IFRS and 0 if it uses 
local standards 
Lemma et al. (2013), Ho et al. (2015), Rudra and 
Bhattacharjee (2012), Jing and Kyu (2012), Cai 
et al. (2008) 
H1.1 - + 
Firm Size The size of the firm Natural logarithm of total sales Shehata (1991), Niresh and Velnampy (2014), 
Chen and Liu (2010), Lemma et al. (2013) 
H1.2 - + 
Leverage Debt ratio Total book value of debt
Total assets
 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), Sweeney (1994), 
Sun and Rath (2009), Kim et al. (2010), Lee et 
al. (2012), Zamri et al. (2013), Zhu et al. (2015), 
Jha (2013), Kuo et al. (2014) 
H1.3 + + 
Growth Opportunities A firm’s investment opportunity set Market Price Per Share
Book Value Per Share
 
Hessayri and Saihi (2015), Park and Shin (2004), 
Koh (2007), Cohen et al. (2008), Ho et al. 
(2015), Im et al. (2015), Swai (2016) 
H1.4 + + 
Free Cash Flow Free cash flow per share  
 
Cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures and 
total dividends paid 
Extracted from the Datastream Financial 
Database 
H1.5 + + 
Profitability Return on assets Net Income
Total Assets
 
Sun and Rath (2009), Hessayri and Saihi (2015), 
Zhu et al. (2015), Ho et al. (2015), Jha (2013), 
Kuto et al. (2014), Swai (2016) 
H1.6 + + 
Asset Tangibility Capital intensity ratio Net Property Plant and Equipment
Total Assets
 
Sun and Rath (2009), Kim et al. (2003), Yang 
(2006) 
H1.7 - + 
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Table 4.4 Independent Variables in the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models (continued) 
Independent Variable Description Measurement Author Hypothesis 
Number 
Accruals 
EM 
Expected 
Sign 
Real EM 
Expected 
Sign 
Dividend Policy Dividend payout ratio Cash Dividends Paid
Net Income
 
Shah et al. (2010), Aurangzeb and 
Dilawer (2012), Daniel et al. (2008), 
Lemma et al. (2013) 
H1.8 + + 
Operating Cycle The length of time it takes a 
firm to sell inventory and 
collect cash  
Natural Logarithm of (Inventory period
+ receivables period) 
Inventory period is calculated as: 
average inventory X 360
Cost of goods sold
 
And receivables period is calculated as: 
Average receivables X 360
Sales
 
Demerijan et al. (2013), Lara et al. 
(2012), Beuselinck et al. (2014) 
H1.9 + - 
Altman’s Z-Score Measure of credit risk which 
reflects the possibility of 
default 
1.2 (
Working capital
Total assets
)
+ 1.4 (
Retained earnings
Total assets
)
+ 3.3 (
EBIT
Total assets
)
+ 0.6 (
Market value of equity
Total liabiities
)
+ 1.0 (
Sales
Total assets
) 
 
Yang (2006), Lara et al. (2012), 
Agrawal and Chatterjee (2015), Zang 
(2012), Jha (2013) 
H1.10 - + 
Ownership Concentration The concentration of 
ownership proxied by closely 
held shares 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
Extracted directly from Datastream H1.11 - + 
Suspect-Firm Years Firm-years in the interval to 
the immediate right of zero 
Dummy variable (binary, 0,1) 
Takes a value of 1 if firm-years have net 
income scaled by total assets greater than or 
equal to zero but less than 0.005, and 0 
otherwise 
Roychowdhury (2006), Siriviriyakul 
(2013), Zhu et al. (2015) 
H1.12 + + 
Earnings Management Flexibility Inventories and receivables 
as a percentage of total assets 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Roychowdhury( 2006), 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2016) 
H1.13 + + 
Industry Membership Industries Dummy Variables (binary, 0,1) 
Takes a value of 1 if firm is a member of a 
given industry, and 0 otherwise 
Zamri et al. (2013), Sun and Rath 
(2009), Ho et al. (2015), Im et al. 
(2015), Hessayri and Saihi (2015) 
H1.14 + or - + or - 
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Table 4.4 Independent Variables in the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models (continued) 
Independent Variable Description Measurement Author Hypothesis Number Accruals 
EM 
Expected 
Sign 
Real EM 
Expected 
Sign 
Financial Development The degree of the development of 
stock markets 
Stock Market Capitalization
Gross Domestic Product
 
Gaio (2010) H1.15 - - 
Economic Growth GDP Growth 
 
 
GDP growth rate (calculated as the percentage 
change in GDP per capita across years) 
Cohen and Zarowin (2008), 
Beuselinck et al. (2014), Chen et al. 
(2015)  
H1.16 + + 
Regulatory Quality Refers to the quality of a country’s 
regulatory environment 
Regulatory Quality Governance Index 
constructed by the World Bank 
Lemma et al. (2013) H1.17 - - 
Control of Corruption Refers to the control of corruption 
in a country 
Control of Corruption Index constructed by the 
World Bank 
Lemma et al. (2013), Leuz et al. 
(2003) 
H1.17 - - 
Political Stability Refers to political stability and 
absence of violence in a country 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index 
constructed by the World Bank 
Lemma et al. (2013) H1.17 - - 
Voice and Accountability Refers to perceptions of the extent 
to which citizens have freedom of 
expression, media, and are able to 
select government  
Voice and Accountability Index constructed by 
the World Bank 
Lemma et al. (2013) H1.17 - - 
Government Effectiveness Refers to perceptions of the quality 
of public service, quality of civil 
service, and the degree of its 
independence from political 
pressure 
Government Effectiveness Index constructed by 
the World Bank 
Lemma et al. (2013) H1.17 - - 
The Rule of Law Refers to the perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, the police, the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
Rule of Law Index constructed by the World 
Bank 
Lemma et al. (2013), Leuz et al. 
(2003), Beuselinck et al. (2014), 
Dyreng et al. (2012) 
H1.17 - - 
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Table 4.4 Independent Variables in the Accruals-Based Earnings Management Models (continued) 
Independent 
Variable 
Description Measurement Author Hypothesis Number Accruals EM Expected 
Sign 
Real EM Expected 
Sign 
GIF Index Aggregate score of 
country level index 
variables  
Principal Component Analysis 
score 
Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002), Kirch et al. 
(2009), Lemma et al. 
(2013) 
H1.18 + + 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary accruals 
employed in the real 
earnings management 
model as an 
independent variable 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡
− 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 
 
Roychowdhury (2006), 
Zang (2012), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), 
Doukakis (2014), Zhu et 
al. (2015) 
H2  - 
GCC Dummy variable 
indicating whether a 
country belongs to the 
GCC or non-GCC 
region 
Dummy variable (binary, 0, 1)  
Takes a value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to a GCC country and 
0 if it belongs to a non-GCC 
country 
Authors’ own 
calculation 
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Table 4.5 Independent Variables in the Efficient Versus Opportunistic Earnings Management Model 
Independent 
Variable 
Description Measurement Author Hypothesis Number Expected Sign 
Operating Cash 
Flows 
Cash flows from 
operations in year t 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
Siregar and Utama (2008), 
Rezaei and Roshani (2012), 
Omid et al. (2012) 
  
NDA Nondiscretionary Accruals 𝑁𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
 
Siregar and Utama (2008), 
Rezaei and Roshani (2012), 
Omid et al. (2012) 
  
DA Discretionary Accruals 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 − 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 Siregar and Utama (2008), 
Rezaei and Roshani (2012), 
Omid et al. (2012) 
H3 + or - 
Firm Size x DA The interaction between 
firm size and discretionary 
accruals 
𝐷𝐴 𝑋 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  Siregar and Utama (2008), 
Rezaei and Roshani (2012), 
Omid et al. (2012) 
H3.1 + 
Leverage x DA The interaction between 
leverage and discretionary 
accruals 
𝐷𝐴 𝑋 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  Author’s own calculation H3.2 + 
Growth 
Opportunities x DA 
The interaction between 
growth opportunities and 
discretionary accruals 
𝐷𝐴 𝑋 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠  Author’s own calculation H3.3 + 
Free Cash Flow x 
DA 
The interaction between 
free cash flow per share 
and discretionary accruals 
𝐷𝐴 𝑋 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  Author’s own calculation H3.4 - 
Dividend Payout 
Ratio x DA 
The interaction between 
the dividend payout ratio 
and discretionary accruals 
𝐷𝐴 𝑋 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  Author’s own calculation H3.5 + 
Firm Size  The size of the firm  Natural logarithm of total sales Siregar and Utama (2008), 
Rezaei and Roshani (2012), 
Omid et al. (2012) 
  
Leverage  Debt ratio  Total book value of debt
Total assets
 
Author’s own calculation   
Growth 
Opportunities  
A firm’s investment 
opportunity set 
Market Price Per Share
Book Value Per Share
 
Author’s own calculation   
Free Cash Flow  Free cash flow per share Cash earnings per share net of capital expenditures 
and total dividends paid 
Author’s own calculation   
Dividend Policy Dividend payout ratio Cash Dividends Paid
Net Income
 
Author’s own calculation   
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Appendix H-1 The Inclusion of the Index Variables in the Accruals-Based Earnings 
Management Models 
Voice and Accountability  
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 3,081
F(52, 592) = 9.49
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1422
Root MSE = 0.07689
(Std. Err. adjusted for 593 clusters in companycode)
Robust
jonesda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0651438 .0380412    -1.71 0.087 -.139856    .0095683
nationalityxfirmsize 0.0021113 .0022701     0.93 0.353 -.0023472    .0065698
nationalityxleverage 0.0072374 .0246056     0.29 0.769 -.0410875    .0555624
nationalityxgrowth -0.002051 .0028901    -0.71 0.478 -.0077272    .0036252
nationalityxfcf -0.0019079 .0010662    -1.79 0.074 -.0040019     .000186
nationalityxroa 0.0715755 .0680911     1.05 0.294 -.0621541     .205305
nationalityxassettangibility -0.0256003 .0172109    -1.49 0.137 -.0594022    .0082015
nationalityxdividendpayout -0.0001234 .0001157    -1.07 0.287 -.0003506    .0001039
nationalityxoperatingcycle 0.0081178 .0051248     1.58 0.114 -.0019472    .0181827
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.000052 .0006938    -0.07 0.94 -.0014146    .0013105
nationalityxshares 0.0014588 .002851     0.51 0.609 -.0041406    .0070582
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0513067 .0255511    -2.01 0.045 0.1014885   -0.0011249
voiceaccountability -0.000254 .0002772    -0.92 0.36 -.0007984    .0002905
marketcapofgdp -0.0000528 .0000568    -0.93 0.354 -.0001644    .0000589
gdpgrowthrate 0.0012581 .0004741     2.65 0.008 .000327    .0021893
ifrs 0.0052465 .0054014     0.97 0.332 -.0053616    .0158547
logsales -0.0037717 .0018168    -2.08 0.038 0.0073399   -0.0002036
leverage 0.0634815 .0198675     3.20 0.001 .0244621    .1025009
growthopportunities -0.0035646 .0016565    -2.15 0.032 0.0068179   -0.0003113
freecashflowpershare -0.000166 .0002105    -0.79 0.431 -.0005793    .0002474
roa 0.2555574 .0501521     5.10 0 .1570597    .3540552
assettangibility 0.0004573 .0130718     0.03 0.972 -.0252156    .0261301
dividendpolicy -0.0000226 .0000856    -0.26 0.792 -.0001907    .0001454
lnoperatingcycle 0.0007 .0038581     0.18 0.856 -.0068772    .0082771
zscore 0.0010605 .0004163     2.55 0.011 .0002429    .0018781
shares 0.0025134 .0021725     1.16 0.248 -.0017533    .0067801
suspect -0.0015646 .008434    -0.19 0.853 -.0181288    .0149995
emflexibility 0.1094732 .0209962     5.21 0 .0682371    .1507093
energy10 0.0016558 .011317     0.15 0.884 -.0205705    .0238822
materials15 -0.0235805 .0091991    -2.56 0.011 0.0416474   -0.0055136
industrials20 -0.0106125 .0096824    -1.10 0.273 -.0296286    .0084036
consumerdiscretionary25 0.0056324 .010544     0.53 0.593 -.0150758    .0263405
consumerstaples30 -0.00347 .0098977    -0.35 0.726 -.0229089    .0159689
healthcare35 -0.0024812 .0109981    -0.23 0.822 -.0240812    .0191189
realestate40 0.0272207 .0134859     2.02 0.044 .0007347    .0537068
informationtech45 -0.0178658 .0118936    -1.50 0.134 -.0412245    .0054929
telecom50 0.0068979 .0117653     0.59 0.558 -.0162089    .0300046
y3 0.0229451 .0291975     0.79 0.432 -.0343982    .0802885
y5 -0.0716894 .0285121    -2.51 0.012 0.1276865   -0.0156922
y6 -0.0575167 .0267242    -2.15 0.032 0.1100025   -0.0050309
y7 -0.0612011 .0303513    -2.02 0.044 0.1208104   -0.0015919
y8 -0.0479746 .0291887    -1.64 0.101 -.1053006    .0093515
y9 -0.0441765 .0324938    -1.36 0.174 -.1079937    .0196406
y10 -0.054821 .0266305    -2.06 0.04 0.1071227   -0.0025192
y11 -0.0323039 .026354    -1.23 0.221 -.0840626    .0194548
y12 -0.0438783 .0263312    -1.67 0.096 -.0955923    .0078357
y13 -0.0717285 .0261773    -2.74 0.006 0.1231401   -0.0203168
y14 -0.0474815 .0263396    -1.80 0.072 -.0992119    .0042489
y15 -0.0500332 .0259638    -1.93 0.054 -.1010256    .0009591
y16 -0.0555939 .0260553    -2.13 0.033 0.1067661   -0.0044217
y17 -0.0470891 .0262023    -1.80 0.073 -.0985499    .0043718
y18 -0.0463911 .0260521    -1.78 0.075 -.097557    .0047747
_cons 0.0181934 .0426918     0.43 0.67 -.0656525    .1020393
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Political Stability  
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 3,081
F(52, 592) = 9.37
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1419
Root MSE = 0.0769
(Std. Err. adjusted for 593 clusters in companycode)
Robust
jonesda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0638622 .0381379    -1.67 0.095 -.1387642    .0110398
nationalityxfirmsize 0.0025739 .0022632     1.14 0.256 -.0018709    .0070187
nationalityxleverage 0.0076182 .0246459     0.31 0.757 -.0407858    .0560222
nationalityxgrowth -0.0023026 .0030153    -0.76 0.445 -.0082247    .0036194
nationalityxfcf -0.0019487 .0010765    -1.81 0.071 -.0040629    .0001656
nationalityxroa 0.0680765 .0679295     1.00 0.317 -.0653357    .2014887
nationalityxassettangibility -0.0239644 .0169349    -1.42 0.158 -.0572242    .0092955
nationalityxdividendpayout -0.0001144 .0001147    -1.00 0.319 -.0003397     .000111
nationalityxoperatingcycle 0.0083295 .0051186     1.63 0.104 -.0017234    .0183824
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0000235 .0007007    -0.03 0.973 -.0013998    .0013527
nationalityxshares 0.0007477 .0028017     0.27 0.79 -.0047548    .0062503
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.05066 .0257041    -1.97 0.049 0.1011423   -0.0001777
politicalstability 0.0000207 .0001523     0.14 0.892 -.0002784    .0003199
marketcapofgdp -0.0000567 .000064    -0.89 0.376 -.0001824     .000069
gdpgrowthrate 0.0012945 .0004815     2.69 0.007 .0003488    .0022402
ifrs 0.0023718 .006116     0.39 0.698 -.0096399    .0143835
logsales -0.0039127 .0018216    -2.15 0.032 0.0074902   -0.0003351
leverage 0.0632536 .0198363     3.19 0.002 .0242956    .1022116
growthopportunities -0.0037063 .0016553    -2.24 0.026 0.0069572   -0.0004554
freecashflowpershare -0.0001732 .0002105    -0.82 0.411 -.0005866    .0002402
roa 0.2581972 .0500378     5.16 0 .1599241    .3564703
assettangibility 0.0005118 .0130411     0.04 0.969 -.0251007    .0261243
dividendpolicy -0.0000283 .0000852    -0.33 0.74 -.0001957     .000139
lnoperatingcycle 0.0005322 .0038863     0.14 0.891 -.0071003    .0081648
zscore 0.0010735 .0004163     2.58 0.01 .0002558    .0018912
shares 0.0028867 .0022285     1.30 0.196 -.0014901    .0072635
suspect -0.0017095 .008444    -0.20 0.84 -.0182935    .0148744
emflexibility 0.1094108 .0210109     5.21 0 .0681458    .1506758
energy10 0.0012403 .0114242     0.11 0.914 -.0211965    .0236771
materials15 -0.023333 .0092783    -2.51 0.012 0.0415553   -0.0051107
industrials20 -0.0108865 .0097647    -1.11 0.265 -.0300642    .0082913
consumerdiscretionary25 0.005773 .0106141     0.54 0.587 -.0150729     .026619
consumerstaples30 -0.0033456 .0099854    -0.34 0.738 -.0229568    .0162656
healthcare35 -0.0026147 .0110355    -0.24 0.813 -.0242881    .0190588
realestate40 0.0274286 .0135037     2.03 0.043 .0009075    .0539496
informationtech45 -0.0181052 .0119327    -1.52 0.13 -.0415408    .0053305
telecom50 0.0075949 .0119031     0.64 0.524 -.0157825    .0309722
y3 0.0231085 .0292981     0.79 0.431 -.0344324    .0806495
y5 -0.0713471 .02864    -2.49 0.013 0.1275955   -0.0150987
y6 -0.0564946 .0269718    -2.09 0.037 0.1094667   -0.0035225
y7 -0.0597905 .0305736    -1.96 0.051 -.1198364    .0002554
y8 -0.047705 .0294161    -1.62 0.105 -.1054777    .0100676
y9 -0.0434483 .0325883    -1.33 0.183 -.107451    .0205545
y10 -0.0528182 .0267908    -1.97 0.049 0.1054348   -0.0002016
y11 -0.0302693 .026344    -1.15 0.251 -.0820084    .0214698
y12 -0.0418609 .026564    -1.58 0.116 -.094032    .0103102
y13 -0.0696704 .026265    -2.65 0.008 0.1212543   -0.0180865
y14 -0.0453015 .0264308    -1.71 0.087 -.0972112    .0066081
y15 -0.0480508 .0262503    -1.83 0.068 -.0996058    .0035042
y16 -0.05415 .0263855    -2.05 0.041 0.1059705   -0.0023294
y17 -0.0450656 .0263949    -1.71 0.088 -.0969047    .0067735
y18 -0.0444972 .0262718    -1.69 0.091 -.0960944    .0070999
_cons 0.0102861 .0435498     0.24 0.813 -.0752447     .095817
384 
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 3,081
F(52, 592) = 9.15
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1448
Root MSE = 0.07677
(Std. Err. adjusted for 593 clusters in companycode)
Robust
jonesda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.02372 .0417914    -0.57 0.571 -.1057992    .0583557
nationalityxfirmsize 8.72E-05 .0024236     0.04 0.971 -.0046728    .0048471
nationalityxleverage 0.016536 .0248806     0.66 0.507 -.0323295    .0654004
nationalityxgrowth -0.00233 .002928    -0.80 0.426 -.0080848    .0034163
nationalityxfcf -0.00197 .0010595    -1.86 0.063 -.0040526    .0001091
nationalityxroa 0.079195 .067787     1.17 0.243 -.0539373    .2123271
nationalityxassettangibility -0.02609 .0168451    -1.55 0.122 -.0591685    .0069984
nationalityxdividendpayout -9E-05 .0001125    -0.80 0.425 -.0003108    .0001313
nationalityxoperatingcycle 0.005685 .0052736     1.08 0.281 -.0046719    .0160425
nationalityxaltmanszscore -7.8E-05 .0007034    -0.11 0.912 -.0014593    .0013035
nationalityxshares 0.000098 .0028096     0.03 0.972 -.0054199     .005616
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0437 .0254244    -1.72 0.086 -.093637     .006229
goveffectiveness 0.000562 .0001795     3.13 0.002 .0002097    .0009149
marketcapofgdp -1.7E-05 .0000581    -0.28 0.776 -.0001305    .0000975
gdpgrowthrate 0.001179 .0004661     2.53 0.012 .0002632    .0020941
ifrs -0.00677 .005922    -1.14 0.254 -.0183989    .0048623
logsales -0.00297 .0018551    -1.60 0.11 -.0066095    .0006771
leverage 0.058812 .0199525     2.95 0.003 .0196257    .0979985
growthopportunities -0.00398 .001681    -2.37 0.018 0.0072855   -0.0006827
freecashflowpershare -0.00018 .0002086    -0.86 0.388 -.0005899    .0002294
roa 0.251997 .0495992     5.08 0 .1545854    .3494091
assettangibility 0.001816 .0130882     0.14 0.89 -.0238889     .027521
dividendpolicy -4.3E-05 .0000848    -0.51 0.61 -.0002097    .0001233
lnoperatingcycle 0.001653 .0039424     0.42 0.675 -.0060898    .0093958
zscore 0.001138 .0004203     2.71 0.007 .0003129    .0019639
shares 0.003864 .002258     1.71 0.088 -.0005705    .0082987
suspect -0.00053 .0084948    -0.06 0.95 -.0172139    .0161531
emflexibility 0.10714 .0209179     5.12 0 .0660572     .148222
energy10 0.004359 .0111384     0.39 0.696 -.0175166    .0262347
materials15 -0.02178 .0090091    -2.42 0.016 0.0394776   -0.0040904
industrials20 -0.00959 .0094444    -1.01 0.311 -.0281342    .0089629
consumerdiscretionary25 0.005715 .010362     0.55 0.581 -.0146354    .0260659
consumerstaples30 -0.00221 .0096783    -0.23 0.82 -.0212169     .016799
healthcare35 -0.00222 .0107348    -0.21 0.836 -.0233026    .0188632
realestate40 0.028533 .0133665     2.13 0.033 .0022816    .0547846
informationtech45 -0.01667 .0116377    -1.43 0.152 -.0395286    .0061838
telecom50 0.010294 .0116237     0.89 0.376 -.0125347    .0331228
y3 0.024703 .0299135     0.83 0.409 -.0340464    .0834526
y5 -0.07091 .0290755    -2.44 0.015 0.1280141   -0.0138069
y6 -0.05367 .0272812    -1.97 0.05 0.1072506   -0.0000912
y7 -0.05899 .0308239    -1.91 0.056 -.1195314    .0015435
y8 -0.04583 .0297687    -1.54 0.124 -.1042953     .012635
y9 -0.04112 .0331361    -1.24 0.215 -.1062013    .0239557
y10 -0.05024 .0270527    -1.86 0.064 -.1033725    .0028896
y11 -0.02915 .0266964    -1.09 0.275 -.0815763     .023286
y12 -0.03839 .0267761    -1.43 0.152 -.090982    .0141934
y13 -0.06838 .0265377    -2.58 0.01 0.120501    -0.016262
y14 -0.04318 .0266965    -1.62 0.106 -.0956124    .0092503
y15 -0.04253 .0264541    -1.61 0.108 -.0944813    .0094292
y16 -0.04802 .0265591    -1.81 0.071 -.1001793    .0041436
y17 -0.03952 .0266778    -1.48 0.139 -.0919155    .0128739
y18 -0.04014 .0264992    -1.51 0.13 -.0921883    .0118996
_cons -0.04426 .0467111    -0.95 0.344 -.1360008    .0474785
385 
 
Regulatory Quality 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 3,081
F(52, 592) = 9.01
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1449
Root MSE = 0.07677
(Std. Err. adjusted for 593 clusters in companycode)
Robust
jonesda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0403 .0395378    -1.02 0.309 -.1179486    .0373541
nationalityxfirmsize 0.000598 .002332     0.26 0.798 -.0039823    .0051777
nationalityxleverage 0.01301 .0246638     0.53 0.598 -.035429    .0614492
nationalityxgrowth -0.00237 .002951    -0.80 0.422 -.008168    .0034234
nationalityxfcf -0.00198 .0010525    -1.88 0.06 -.0040488    .0000855
nationalityxroa 0.072231 .0674054     1.07 0.284 -.060152    .2046137
nationalityxassettangibility -0.02775 .0169581    -1.64 0.102 -.0610588     .005552
nationalityxdividendpayout -0.0001 .0001129    -0.90 0.366 -.0003239    .0001196
nationalityxoperatingcycle 0.006584 .0051968     1.27 0.206 -.0036227      .01679
nationalityxaltmanszscore -4.7E-05 .0006964    -0.07 0.946 -.0014151    .0013204
nationalityxshares 0.000745 .0028086     0.27 0.791 -.0047715    .0062604
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.04636 .0253723    -1.83 0.068 -.0961917    .0034695
regulatoryquality 0.000769 .0002534     3.03 0.003 .0002707    .0012662
marketcapofgdp -3.6E-05 .0000561    -0.64 0.523 -.0001461    .0000744
gdpgrowthrate 0.000969 .0004802     2.02 0.044 .0000257    .0019118
ifrs -0.00767 .0061499    -1.25 0.213 -.0197524    .0044042
logsales -0.00304 .001857    -1.64 0.102 -.0066878    .0006066
leverage 0.060755 .0199393     3.05 0.002 .0215946    .0999151
growthopportunities -0.0038 .001657    -2.29 0.022 0.0070506   -0.0005418
freecashflowpershare -0.00018 .0002096    -0.85 0.394 -.0005904    .0002328
roa 0.253315 .0497637     5.09 0 .1555796    .3510493
assettangibility 0.001761 .0130645     0.13 0.893 -.0238978    .0274191
dividendpolicy -4E-05 .0000852    -0.46 0.642 -.0002069    .0001277
lnoperatingcycle 0.00151 .0039394     0.38 0.702 -.0062268    .0092469
zscore 0.001121 .0004209     2.66 0.008 .000294    .0019473
shares 0.003702 .002257     1.64 0.101 -.0007305    .0081348
suspect -0.00044 .0084911    -0.05 0.958 -.0171184    .0162342
emflexibility 0.107004 .0209081     5.12 0 .0659412    .1480672
energy10 0.005297 .011104     0.48 0.634 -.016511     .027105
materials15 -0.02091 .0090136    -2.32 0.021 0.0386125   -0.0032074
industrials20 -0.008 .009449    -0.85 0.397 -.0265617    .0105536
consumerdiscretionary25 0.006979 .0103705     0.67 0.501 -.0133887    .0273463
consumerstaples30 -0.00116 .0096614    -0.12 0.904 -.0201386    .0178108
healthcare35 -0.00013 .0108002    -0.01 0.99 -.0213456    .0210771
realestate40 0.029616 .0134596     2.20 0.028 .0031816    .0560502
informationtech45 -0.01585 .0117053    -1.35 0.176 -.038837    .0071411
telecom50 0.009788 .0116346     0.84 0.401 -.0130622    .0326381
y3 0.024353 .029883     0.81 0.415 -.0343372    .0830422
y5 -0.07411 .0291323    -2.54 0.011 0.1313234   -0.0168928
y6 -0.05922 .0270935    -2.19 0.029 0.1124307   -0.0060085
y7 -0.05645 .0309572    -1.82 0.069 -.117249    .0043495
y8 -0.05021 .0294339    -1.71 0.089 -.1080152       .0076
y9 -0.04991 .0328604    -1.52 0.129 -.114452    .0146223
y10 -0.05809 .0269194    -2.16 0.031 0.1109587   -0.0052202
y11 -0.03788 .0265952    -1.42 0.155 -.0901122    .0143527
y12 -0.04894 .0266331    -1.84 0.067 -.1012464    .0033671
y13 -0.07788 .0264606    -2.94 0.003 0.1298465   -0.0259105
y14 -0.05182 .0265875    -1.95 0.052 -.1040369    .0003976
y15 -0.05269 .0262307    -2.01 0.045 0.1042058   -0.0011726
y16 -0.05822 .0263287    -2.21 0.027 0.1099283   -0.0065104
y17 -0.04943 .026436    -1.87 0.062 -.1013516    .0024878
y18 -0.04902 .0262855    -1.86 0.063 -.1006428    .0026056
_cons -0.04088 .0457944    -0.89 0.372 -.1308179    .0490605
386 
 
The Rule of Law 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 3,081
F(52, 592) = 9.38
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1419
Root MSE = 0.0769
(Std. Err. adjusted for 593 clusters in companycode)
Robust
jonesda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0647547 .0392373    -1.65 0.099 -.1418161    .0123066
nationalityxfirmsize 0.0026632 .0024122     1.10 0.27 -.0020744    .0074008
nationalityxleverage 0.0073503 .0247006     0.30 0.766 -.041161    .0558617
nationalityxgrowth -0.0022543 .0029578    -0.76 0.446 -.0080634    .0035547
nationalityxfcf -0.0019317 .0010728    -1.80 0.072 -.0040387    .0001754
nationalityxroa 0.0671712 .0683437     0.98 0.326 -.0670543    .2013968
nationalityxassettangibility -0.0239816 .0169416    -1.42 0.157 -.0572545    .0092913
nationalityxdividendpayout -0.0001147 .0001144    -1.00 0.316 -.0003393    .0001099
nationalityxoperatingcycle 0.0084525 .005205     1.62 0.105 -.00177    .0186749
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0000256 .0006947    -0.04 0.971 -.00139    .0013387
nationalityxshares 0.0007658 .0027958     0.27 0.784 -.004725    .0062566
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.051058 .0256227    -1.99 0.047 0.1013804   -0.0007356
ruleoflaw -0.0000273 .0002977    -0.09 0.927 -.000612    .0005574
marketcapofgdp -0.0000597 .0000571    -1.04 0.297 -.0001719    .0000525
gdpgrowthrate 0.001318 .0004815     2.74 0.006 .0003724    .0022635
ifrs 0.0031819 .005457     0.58 0.56 -.0075356    .0138993
logsales -0.0039395 .0019243    -2.05 0.041 0.0077188   -0.0001603
leverage 0.0634402 .019935     3.18 0.002 .0242882    .1025922
growthopportunities -0.0036912 .0016519    -2.23 0.026 0.0069355   -0.0004469
freecashflowpershare -0.0001728 .0002108    -0.82 0.413 -.0005868    .0002413
roa 0.2588871 .0504165     5.13 0 .1598701     .357904
assettangibility 0.0004725 .0130335     0.04 0.971 -.0251249    .0260699
dividendpolicy -0.0000281 .0000852    -0.33 0.742 -.0001954    .0001393
lnoperatingcycle 0.0005003 .0039221     0.13 0.899 -.0072027    .0082032
zscore 0.0010687 .0004165     2.57 0.011 .0002507    .0018867
shares 0.0028103 .0021947     1.28 0.201 -.0015    .0071206
suspect -0.001752 .008439    -0.21 0.836 -.018326     .014822
emflexibility 0.1094019 .0210492     5.20 0 .0680617    .1507421
energy10 0.0011346 .0114063     0.10 0.921 -.0212671    .0235362
materials15 -0.0234648 .0092682    -2.53 0.012 0.0416673   -0.0052622
industrials20 -0.010931 .009764    -1.12 0.263 -.0301073    .0082453
consumerdiscretionary25 0.0056726 .0106104     0.53 0.593 -.015166    .0265112
consumerstaples30 -0.0034516 .0099767    -0.35 0.729 -.0230456    .0161424
healthcare35 -0.0026521 .0110236    -0.24 0.81 -.0243023     .018998
realestate40 0.0273748 .0135035     2.03 0.043 .0008543    .0538953
informationtech45 -0.0181639 .0119166    -1.52 0.128 -.0415679      .00524
telecom50 0.0074148 .0118056     0.63 0.53 -.0157711    .0306007
y3 0.0230162 .0293165     0.79 0.433 -.0345608    .0805932
y5 -0.0713624 .0285874    -2.50 0.013 0.1275074   -0.0152174
y6 -0.056617 .0268525    -2.11 0.035 0.1093548   -0.0038792
y7 -0.0599879 .0303128    -1.98 0.048 0.1195216   -0.0004542
y8 -0.0481926 .0292933    -1.65 0.1 -.105724    .0093388
y9 -0.0437057 .0326705    -1.34 0.181 -.1078698    .0204585
y10 -0.0534162 .0268434    -1.99 0.047 0.1061362   -0.0006963
y11 -0.0306103 .0264419    -1.16 0.247 -.0825417     .021321
y12 -0.042356 .0263648    -1.61 0.109 -.0941359    .0094239
y13 -0.0700423 .0261466    -2.68 0.008 0.1213936    -0.018691
y14 -0.0457435 .0263176    -1.74 0.083 -.0974307    .0059438
y15 -0.0487407 .0260266    -1.87 0.062 -.0998563    .0023749
y16 -0.0548581 .0261509    -2.10 0.036 0.1062178   -0.0034984
y17 -0.0457248 .0262335    -1.74 0.082 -.0972468    .0057972
y18 -0.0450543 .0260497    -1.73 0.084 -.0962154    .0061068
_cons 0.0138526 .0499986     0.28 0.782 -.0843437    .1120489
387 
 
The Control of Corruption 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 3,081
F(52, 592) = 8.87
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1465
Root MSE = 0.07669
(Std. Err. adjusted for 593 clusters in companycode)
Robust
jonesda Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0158977 .041936    -0.38 0.705 -.0982592    .0664638
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0012879 .0025703    -0.50 0.617 -.0063359    .0037601
nationalityxleverage 0.0168227 .0246908     0.68 0.496 -.0316695    .0653149
nationalityxgrowth -0.003034 .0030483    -1.00 0.32 -.0090208    .0029528
nationalityxfcf -0.0018937 .0010636    -1.78 0.076 -.0039825    .0001951
nationalityxroa 0.0624595 .0674224     0.93 0.355 -.0699567    .1948758
nationalityxassettangibility -0.0237798 .0167884    -1.42 0.157 -.056752    .0091923
nationalityxdividendpayout -0.000062 .0001131    -0.55 0.584 -.0002842    .0001602
nationalityxoperatingcycle 0.0037916 .0053783     0.70 0.481 -.0067713    .0143545
nationalityxaltmanszscore -0.0000722 .0007069    -0.10 0.919 -.0014605    .0013162
nationalityxshares 0.0010956 .0028454     0.39 0.7 -.0044928    .0066839
nationalitiyxemflexibility -0.0331374 .0257817    -1.29 0.199 -.0837721    .0174973
corruption 0.0007816 .0002025     3.86 0 .000384    .0011792
marketcapofgdp -0.0000475 .0000564    -0.84 0.401 -.0001583    .0000634
gdpgrowthrate 0.0011622 .000463     2.51 0.012 .0002529    .0020715
ifrs -0.0116028 .0064018    -1.81 0.07 -.0241758    .0009702
logsales -0.0024029 .0019016    -1.26 0.207 -.0061375    .0013318
leverage 0.0592205 .0196961     3.01 0.003 .0205379    .0979032
growthopportunities -0.0039399 .001668    -2.36 0.018 0.0072158    -0.000664
freecashflowpershare -0.0001971 .0002119    -0.93 0.353 -.0006132    .0002191
roa 0.2680815 .049985     5.36 0 .169912    .3662509
assettangibility 0.0021548 .0131522     0.16 0.87 -.0236759    .0279855
dividendpolicy -0.000055 .0000848    -0.65 0.517 -.0002217    .0001116
lnoperatingcycle 0.0024874 .0040143     0.62 0.536 -.0053966    .0103714
zscore 0.0011419 .0004169     2.74 0.006 .0003233    .0019606
shares 0.0034089 .0022819     1.49 0.136 -.0010727    .0078906
suspect -0.0006334 .0084758    -0.07 0.94 -.0172798    .0160129
emflexibility 0.1025866 .0210818     4.87 0 .0611825    .1439908
energy10 0.0034544 .0110874     0.31 0.755 -.018321    .0252299
materials15 -0.0221284 .008958    -2.47 0.014 0.0397217   -0.0045352
industrials20 -0.0103834 .0093962    -1.11 0.27 -.0288372    .0080705
consumerdiscretionary25 0.0051596 .0103319     0.50 0.618 -.015132    .0254513
consumerstaples30 -0.002562 .0096148    -0.27 0.79 -.0214452    .0163212
healthcare35 -0.0033476 .0105542    -0.32 0.751 -.0240758    .0173806
realestate40 0.0276414 .0132656     2.08 0.038 .0015881    .0536947
informationtech45 -0.0167245 .0115986    -1.44 0.15 -.039504     .006055
telecom50 0.0116956 .0117156     1.00 0.319 -.0113136    .0347048
y3 0.0236298 .0303454     0.78 0.436 -.0359681    .0832276
y5 -0.0751992 .0292796    -2.57 0.01 0.1327037   -0.0176946
y6 -0.0607345 .0273934    -2.22 0.027 0.1145346   -0.0069345
y7 -0.0592664 .0310611    -1.91 0.057 -.1202699     .001737
y8 -0.0424156 .0299537    -1.42 0.157 -.101244    .0164128
y9 -0.0404241 .0333168    -1.21 0.225 -.1058577    .0250094
y10 -0.0467464 .0272473    -1.72 0.087 -.1002595    .0067666
y11 -0.0258441 .0269064    -0.96 0.337 -.0786876    .0269994
y12 -0.0381129 .0269193    -1.42 0.157 -.0909818    .0147559
y13 -0.067639 .0267373    -2.53 0.012 0.1201505   -0.0151275
y14 -0.0418699 .0268842    -1.56 0.12 -.0946698      .01093
y15 -0.0394498 .0266428    -1.48 0.139 -.0917756     .012876
y16 -0.0472525 .0267281    -1.77 0.078 -.0997459    .0052409
y17 -0.0395674 .0267938    -1.48 0.14 -.0921898    .0130551
y18 -0.0388852 .0266704    -1.46 0.145 -.0912654    .0134949
_cons -0.0572853 .0471929    -1.21 0.225 -.1499712    .0354006
388 
 
Appendix H-2 The Inclusion of the Index Variables in the Real Activities-Based 
Earnings Management Models  
Voice and Accountability 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,729
F(53, 555) = 35.35
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5557
Root MSE = 0.15268
(Std. Err. adjusted for 556 clusters in companycode)
Robust
rm3 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0760633 .1408788    -0.54 0.589 -.3527842    .2006575
nationalityxda -0.0086834 .1293248    -0.07 0.946 -.2627093    .2453426
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0091137 .0072707    -1.25 0.211 -.0233951    .0051677
nationalityxleverage 0.1292527 .0780433     1.66 0.098 -.0240437    .2825491
nationalityxgrowth 0.0027822 .0084304     0.33 0.742 -.0137771    .0193416
nationalityxfcf 0.0011219 .0020504     0.55 0.584 -.0029056    .0051493
nationalityxroa 0.2257941 .1571518     1.44 0.151 -.0828908    .5344791
nationalityxassettangibility 0.0664848 .0512685     1.30 0.195 -.0342192    .1671889
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0002244 .0003035     0.74 0.46 -.0003718    .0008206
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0167415 .0208103    -0.80 0.421 -.0576181     .024135
nationalityxaltmanszscore 0.005051 .0017807     2.84 0.005 .0015533    .0085486
nationalityxshares 0.0064797 .0098215     0.66 0.51 -.0128121    .0257716
nationalitiyxemflexibility 0.2210364 .0731194     3.02 0.003 .0774117    .3646611
jonesda 1.113274 .0860548    12.94 0 .9442414    1.282307
voiceaccountability -0.0006259 .0009115    -0.69 0.493 -.0024163    .0011645
marketcapofgdp -0.0000244 .0001932    -0.13 0.899 -.000404    .0003551
gdpgrowthrate 0.001834 .001119     1.64 0.102 -.0003639    .0040319
ifrs 0.0167737 .0219337     0.76 0.445 -.0263095    .0598568
logsales 0.0148036 .0063798     2.32 0.021 .0022722    .0273351
leverage -0.1442398 .0558239    -2.58 0.01 0.2538918   -0.0345879
growthopportunities -0.0019517 .0040093    -0.49 0.627 -.0098269    .0059234
freecashflowpershare 0.0007562 .0003249     2.33 0.02 .000118    .0013944
roa -1.825639 .1098448   -16.62 0 2.041402   -1.609877
assettangibility -0.1733043 .0405402    -4.27 0 0.2529353   -0.0936734
dividendpolicy -0.0001784 .0002307    -0.77 0.44 -.0006315    .0002748
lnoperatingcycle -0.0873687 .0151157    -5.78 0 0.1170596   -0.0576778
zscore -0.0032691 .0011523    -2.84 0.005 0.0055324   -0.0010057
shares -0.004961 .0069299    -0.72 0.474 -.0185729     .008651
suspect 0.0067444 .0169951     0.40 0.692 -.0266381     .040127
emflexibility 0.2515684 .0540384     4.66 0 .1454237    .3577131
energy10 -0.1402628 .0424523    -3.30 0.001 0.2236497   -0.0568759
materials15 0.0122395 .0213623     0.57 0.567 -.0297214    .0542004
industrials20 -0.0067271 .0245535    -0.27 0.784 -.0549563    .0415021
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0388233 .0281812    -1.38 0.169 -.0941782    .0165316
consumerstaples30 -0.0764858 .0248579    -3.08 0.002 0.1253128   -0.0276588
healthcare35 -0.0408074 .0371461    -1.10 0.272 -.1137715    .0321567
realestate40 0.0171426 .0330948     0.52 0.605 -.0478637    .0821489
informationtech45 -0.1180994 .0344224    -3.43 0.001 0.1857136   -0.0504852
telecom50 0.05153 .0350453     1.47 0.142 -.0173077    .1203678
y4 0.0304521 .0103277     2.95 0.003 .0101659    .0507382
y6 -0.0379712 .0293748    -1.29 0.197 -.0956707    .0197283
y7 -0.0171668 .0287419    -0.60 0.551 -.073623    .0392894
y8 -0.0307514 .0479448    -0.64 0.522 -.124927    .0634241
y9 -0.0529109 .0410154    -1.29 0.198 -.1334753    .0276535
y10 -0.0549402 .031248    -1.76 0.079 -.116319    .0064387
y11 -0.0391796 .0291471    -1.34 0.179 -.0964317    .0180725
y12 -0.025405 .0256364    -0.99 0.322 -.0757613    .0249513
y13 -0.0481006 .0253957    -1.89 0.059 -.0979841    .0017828
y14 -0.0359369 .0248954    -1.44 0.149 -.0848376    .0129638
y15 -0.0301015 .0252984    -1.19 0.235 -.0797939    .0195908
y16 -0.0356792 .0254859    -1.40 0.162 -.0857399    .0143815
y17 -0.0504212 .0245212    -2.06 0.04 0.098587   -0.0022554
y18 -0.0428587 .0249126    -1.72 0.086 -.0917931    .0060758
_cons 0.5145989 .1262784     4.08 0 .2665568    .7626409
389 
 
Political Stability 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,729
F(53, 555) = 33.74
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5555
Root MSE = 0.15272
(Std. Err. adjusted for 556 clusters in companycode)
Robust
rm3 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0700551 .141833    -0.49 0.622 -.3486502      .20854
nationalityxda -0.003831 .1288021    -0.03 0.976 -.2568302    .2491681
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0080032 .0071337    -1.12 0.262 -.0220156    .0060092
nationalityxleverage 0.129964 .0779544     1.67 0.096 -.0231576    .2830857
nationalityxgrowth 0.0021462 .0085627     0.25 0.802 -.014673    .0189654
nationalityxfcf 0.0009759 .0020855     0.47 0.64 -.0031204    .0050723
nationalityxroa 0.2145872 .1560497     1.38 0.17 -.0919331    .5211075
nationalityxassettangibility 0.0705409 .051073     1.38 0.168 -.0297791    .1708609
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0002461 .0003029     0.81 0.417 -.0003488     .000841
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0166498 .0206887    -0.80 0.421 -.0572874    .0239879
nationalityxaltmanszscore 0.005142 .0017797     2.89 0.004 .0016461    .0086378
nationalityxshares 0.0044899 .0094191     0.48 0.634 -.0140116    .0229915
nationalitiyxemflexibility 0.2230331 .0734032     3.04 0.002 .078851    .3672153
jonesda 1.111006 .0862671    12.88 0 .941556    1.280456
politicalstability 0.000144 .0004935     0.29 0.771 -.0008253    .0011133
marketcapofgdp -0.000015 .0001905    -0.08 0.937 -.0003892    .0003592
gdpgrowthrate 0.001834 .0010317     1.78 0.076 -.0001925    .0038605
ifrs 0.0065203 .0251315     0.26 0.795 -.0428441    .0558848
logsales 0.0142831 .0065388     2.18 0.029 .0014392     .027127
leverage -0.1444129 .0559678    -2.58 0.01 0.2543474   -0.0344784
growthopportunities -0.0024195 .0039957    -0.61 0.545 -.0102679     .005429
freecashflowpershare 0.0007533 .0003266     2.31 0.021 .0001118    .0013947
roa -1.817525 .1104862   -16.45 0 2.034548   -1.600503
assettangibility -0.1729716 .0405338    -4.27 0 0.25259   -0.0933532
dividendpolicy -0.0001908 .0002321    -0.82 0.411 -.0006467     .000265
lnoperatingcycle -0.0877376 .0152579    -5.75 0 0.1177078   -0.0577674
zscore -0.0032242 .0011535    -2.80 0.005 0.0054899   -0.0009584
shares -0.0036506 .0071829    -0.51 0.611 -.0177595    .0104584
suspect 0.0061092 .0171363     0.36 0.722 -.0275508    .0397692
emflexibility 0.2524057 .0544637     4.63 0 .1454256    .3593858
energy10 -0.1415959 .0418119    -3.39 0.001 0.2237248    -0.059467
materials15 0.0127914 .0215093     0.59 0.552 -.0294582    .0550411
industrials20 -0.0075287 .0246651    -0.31 0.76 -.055977    .0409196
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0386839 .0283476    -1.36 0.173 -.0943656    .0169979
consumerstaples30 -0.076354 .0249362    -3.06 0.002 0.1253348   -0.0273732
healthcare35 -0.0415632 .0371952    -1.12 0.264 -.1146237    .0314972
realestate40 0.0173857 .032949     0.53 0.598 -.0473343    .0821058
informationtech45 -0.1192035 .0345995    -3.45 0.001 0.1871655   -0.0512414
telecom50 0.0534329 .0352579     1.52 0.13 -.0158223    .1226881
y4 0.0282005 .0107643     2.62 0.009 .0070567    .0493444
y6 -0.0363524 .0304087    -1.20 0.232 -.0960827    .0233779
y7 -0.0150331 .0292352    -0.51 0.607 -.0724583    .0423921
y8 -0.0285201 .0468506    -0.61 0.543 -.1205462     .063506
y9 -0.0531026 .0411006    -1.29 0.197 -.1338344    .0276292
y10 -0.0515059 .0319607    -1.61 0.108 -.1142847    .0112728
y11 -0.0361271 .0294901    -1.23 0.221 -.094053    .0217988
y12 -0.0210968 .0263003    -0.80 0.423 -.0727571    .0305634
y13 -0.0441671 .026261    -1.68 0.093 -.0957501    .0074159
y14 -0.0315422 .025851    -1.22 0.223 -.0823199    .0192356
y15 -0.0246616 .0269829    -0.91 0.361 -.0776628    .0283396
y16 -0.0317239 .0271727    -1.17 0.244 -.0850978    .0216499
y17 -0.0452594 .0264834    -1.71 0.088 -.0972794    .0067606
y18 -0.0381271 .0265927    -1.43 0.152 -.0903618    .0141075
_cons 0.4912877 .1271813     3.86 0 .2414722    .7411032
390 
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,729
F(53, 555) = 34.12
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5578
Root MSE = 0.15232
(Std. Err. adjusted for 556 clusters in companycode)
Robust
rm3 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.1579451 .1393924    -1.13 0.258 -.4317462    .1158561
nationalityxda 0.0119344 .1293298     0.09 0.927 -.2421012    .2659701
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0018976 .0073193    -0.26 0.796 -.0162745    .0124793
nationalityxleverage 0.1072267 .0779492     1.38 0.17 -.0458848    .2603382
nationalityxgrowth 0.0023921 .0084043     0.28 0.776 -.0141161    .0189003
nationalityxfcf 0.0011798 .0021016     0.56 0.575 -.0029483    .0053079
nationalityxroa 0.1729807 .1565619     1.10 0.27 -.1345457    .4805071
nationalityxassettangibility 0.0777344 .0509902     1.52 0.128 -.022423    .1778917
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0001866 .0002996     0.62 0.534 -.0004019    .0007752
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0104429 .0202261    -0.52 0.606 -.050172    .0292862
nationalityxaltmanszscore 0.0052154 .0017359     3.00 0.003 .0018057    .0086251
nationalityxshares 0.005935 .0093687     0.63 0.527 -.0124673    .0243374
nationalitiyxemflexibility 0.2074852 .0729641     2.84 0.005 .0641656    .3508048
jonesda 1.113478 .0861783    12.92 0 .9442019    1.282753
goveffectiveness -0.0014606 .0006628    -2.20 0.028 0.0027624   -0.0001587
marketcapofgdp -0.0001022 .0001902    -0.54 0.591 -.0004758    .0002714
gdpgrowthrate 0.0022585 .0010662     2.12 0.035 .0001643    .0043528
ifrs 0.0386286 .0248017     1.56 0.12 -.0100881    .0873453
logsales 0.0130478 .0062518     2.09 0.037 .0007678    .0253278
leverage -0.1358502 .0556072    -2.44 0.015 0.2450766   -0.0266239
growthopportunities -0.0014003 .0039422    -0.36 0.723 -.0091437    .0063431
freecashflowpershare 0.0007407 .0003274     2.26 0.024 .0000976    .0013837
roa -1.794158 .1091526   -16.44 0 2.008561   -1.579755
assettangibility -0.1757806 .0402041    -4.37 0 0.2547514   -0.0968098
dividendpolicy -0.0001641 .0002296    -0.71 0.475 -.0006151    .0002869
lnoperatingcycle -0.0891834 .0149109    -5.98 0 0.1184721   -0.0598947
zscore -0.0033767 .0011282    -2.99 0.003 0.0055928   -0.0011606
shares -0.0068452 .0071677    -0.96 0.34 -.0209244     .007234
suspect 0.0029201 .0172362     0.17 0.866 -.030936    .0367762
emflexibility 0.2519659 .0545033     4.62 0 .1449079    .3590238
energy10 -0.1487728 .0414889    -3.59 0 0.2302672   -0.0672784
materials15 0.0106544 .0215464     0.49 0.621 -.0316681    .0529768
industrials20 -0.0101862 .0247087    -0.41 0.68 -.0587201    .0383478
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0377947 .0282396    -1.34 0.181 -.0932643     .017675
consumerstaples30 -0.0780235 .0249978    -3.12 0.002 0.1271253   -0.0289217
healthcare35 -0.0419094 .0373671    -1.12 0.263 -.1153076    .0314888
realestate40 0.0147129 .0324133     0.45 0.65 -.0489548    .0783807
informationtech45 -0.1199095 .0343168    -3.49 0.001 0.1873162   -0.0525028
telecom50 0.0462231 .0351739     1.31 0.189 -.0228671    .1153134
y4 0.0325839 .0098934     3.29 0.001 .0131508    .0520171
y6 -0.0416155 .029926    -1.39 0.165 -.1003975    .0171665
y7 -0.0147361 .0291003    -0.51 0.613 -.0718963     .042424
y8 -0.0263701 .0497127    -0.53 0.596 -.1240181    .0712779
y9 -0.0621425 .0414393    -1.50 0.134 -.1435396    .0192546
y10 -0.0647205 .0312257    -2.07 0.039 0.1260555   -0.0033855
y11 -0.0420348 .0293534    -1.43 0.153 -.0996921    .0156224
y12 -0.0326107 .0257414    -1.27 0.206 -.0831733    .0179518
y13 -0.0481411 .0255257    -1.89 0.06 -.0982799    .0019977
y14 -0.0383943 .0250391    -1.53 0.126 -.0875772    .0107887
y15 -0.041581 .0256292    -1.62 0.105 -.0919231    .0087611
y16 -0.04967 .0257926    -1.93 0.055 -.100333    .0009931
y17 -0.0617197 .0249211    -2.48 0.014 0.1106709   -0.0127686
y18 -0.0506326 .0251406    -2.01 0.044 0.1000149   -0.0012502
_cons 0.6176736 .1318211     4.69 0 .3587442    .8766029
391 
 
Regulatory Quality 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,729
F(53, 555) = 34.19
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5581
Root MSE = 0.15227
(Std. Err. adjusted for 556 clusters in companycode)
Robust
rm3 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.1249975 .1407521    -0.89 0.375 -.4014694    .1514744
nationalityxda 0.0145289 .1295957     0.11 0.911 -.2400292    .2690869
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0029069 .0070762    -0.41 0.681 -.0168063    .0109925
nationalityxleverage 0.1144537 .076896     1.49 0.137 -.0365892    .2654965
nationalityxgrowth 0.0026194 .0083274     0.31 0.753 -.0137377    .0189764
nationalityxfcf 0.0012891 .0021157     0.61 0.543 -.0028668    .0054449
nationalityxroa 0.1855564 .1544031     1.20 0.23 -.1177294    .4888423
nationalityxassettangibility 0.0817569 .0508933     1.61 0.109 -.0182101    .1817239
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0002201 .0003014     0.73 0.465 -.0003719    .0008122
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0121245 .0205008    -0.59 0.554 -.0523932    .0281443
nationalityxaltmanszscore 0.0051586 .001732     2.98 0.003 .0017564    .0085607
nationalityxshares 0.0044676 .0093675     0.48 0.634 -.0139324    .0228676
nationalitiyxemflexibility 0.2125433 .0733986     2.90 0.004 .0683703    .3567164
jonesda 1.112207 .0866597    12.83 0 .9419863    1.282429
regulatoryquality -0.0019887 .0007745    -2.57 0.01 0.00351   -0.0004675
marketcapofgdp -0.0000811 .00019    -0.43 0.67 -.0004542     .000292
gdpgrowthrate 0.0027748 .0010719     2.59 0.01 .0006694    .0048802
ifrs 0.0400927 .023791     1.69 0.093 -.0066388    .0868241
logsales 0.012789 .0062895     2.03 0.042 .0004349     .025143
leverage -0.1385117 .0554422    -2.50 0.013 0.2474138   -0.0296096
growthopportunities -0.00207 .0040328    -0.51 0.608 -.0099914    .0058515
freecashflowpershare 0.0007103 .0003185     2.23 0.026 .0000847    .0013359
roa -1.795431 .1092127   -16.44 0 2.009952    -1.58091
assettangibility -0.1754753 .0401984    -4.37 0 0.2544349   -0.0965158
dividendpolicy -0.0001688 .0002307    -0.73 0.465 -.0006219    .0002843
lnoperatingcycle -0.0893525 .0150455    -5.94 0 0.1189055   -0.0597995
zscore -0.0033444 .0011272    -2.97 0.003 0.0055586   -0.0011303
shares -0.0063696 .0071149    -0.90 0.371 -.0203451    .0076059
suspect 0.0022337 .017298     0.13 0.897 -.0317439    .0362112
emflexibility 0.2544391 .0545566     4.66 0 .1472764    .3616018
energy10 -0.1510803 .041273    -3.66 0 0.2321508   -0.0700099
materials15 0.008122 .0218399     0.37 0.71 -.034777     .051021
industrials20 -0.0138828 .0251338    -0.55 0.581 -.0632518    .0354863
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0409193 .0283756    -1.44 0.15 -.0966561    .0148174
consumerstaples30 -0.0808538 .0252015    -3.21 0.001 .1303558   -0.0313519
healthcare35 -0.04653 .0375057    -1.24 0.215 -.1202005    .0271406
realestate40 0.012802 .0325108     0.39 0.694 -.0510573    .0766613
informationtech45 -0.1226589 .0345269    -3.55 0 0.1904782   -0.0548395
telecom50 0.0484197 .0351487     1.38 0.169 -.020621    .1174603
y4 0.0262662 .0099385     2.64 0.008 .0067446    .0457878
y6 -0.034063 .0285087    -1.19 0.233 -.0900612    .0219352
y7 -0.0285982 .0285488    -1.00 0.317 -.0846751    .0274788
y8 -0.0361554 .0485257    -0.75 0.457 -.131472    .0591612
y9 -0.0434106 .0419068    -1.04 0.301 -.1257259    .0389047
y10 -0.0476938 .0316488    -1.51 0.132 -.1098599    .0144722
y11 -0.0216265 .0299506    -0.72 0.471 -.0804569     .037204
y12 -0.0091545 .0268509    -0.34 0.733 -.0618963    .0435872
y13 -0.0276559 .0264522    -1.05 0.296 -.0796147    .0243028
y14 -0.0203522 .0256684    -0.79 0.428 -.0707714     .030067
y15 -0.0198421 .0258848    -0.77 0.444 -.0706863     .031002
y16 -0.028283 .0259535    -1.09 0.276 -.0792621    .0226961
y17 -0.0408886 .0247977    -1.65 0.1 -.0895974    .0078203
y18 -0.0329177 .025166    -1.31 0.191 -.08235    .0165146
_cons 0.6230815 .133437     4.67 0 .3609782    .8851849
392 
 
The Rule of Law 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,729
F(53, 555) = 33.8
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5555
Root MSE = 0.15272
(Std. Err. adjusted for 556 clusters in companycode)
Robust
rm3 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.0734861 .1419034    -0.52 0.605 -.3522195    .2052472
nationalityxda -0.0017988 .1292432    -0.01 0.989 -.2556645    .2520669
nationalityxfirmsize -0.0073819 .0072632    -1.02 0.31 -.0216487    .0068849
nationalityxleverage 0.1281041 .0777536     1.65 0.1 -.0246232    .2808315
nationalityxgrowth 0.0024501 .0083869     0.29 0.77 -.0140238    .0189241
nationalityxfcf 0.0011124 .0020905     0.53 0.595 -.0029939    .0052187
nationalityxroa 0.2051043 .1579524     1.30 0.195 -.1051532    .5153619
nationalityxassettangibility 0.0707599 .0510311     1.39 0.166 -.0294779    .1709977
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0002446 .0003032     0.81 0.42 -.0003509    .0008401
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0159058 .0206366    -0.77 0.441 -.0564411    .0246296
nationalityxaltmanszscore 0.0051301 .0017649     2.91 0.004 .0016634    .0085968
nationalityxshares 0.0045284 .0094008     0.48 0.63 -.0139371     .022994
nationalitiyxemflexibility 0.2209426 .0733934     3.01 0.003 .0767799    .3651054
jonesda 1.110271 .0864135    12.85 0 .9405332    1.280008
ruleoflaw -0.0002914 .0008205    -0.36 0.723 -.001903    .0013202
marketcapofgdp -0.0000208 .0002009    -0.10 0.918 -.0004155    .0003739
gdpgrowthrate 0.0020359 .0010454     1.95 0.052 -.0000176    .0040894
ifrs 0.0139466 .0220551     0.63 0.527 -.029375    .0572682
logsales 0.0142973 .0062802     2.28 0.023 .0019614    .0266333
leverage -0.1433828 .0558587    -2.57 0.011 0.253103   -0.0336625
growthopportunities -0.0022716 .0039768    -0.57 0.568 -.010083    .0055399
freecashflowpershare 0.0007452 .0003283     2.27 0.024 .0001004      .00139
roa -1.809844 .1117384   -16.20 0 2.029326   -1.590362
assettangibility -0.1730153 .0405203    -4.27 0 0.2526072   -0.0934234
dividendpolicy -0.0001916 .0002318    -0.83 0.409 -.0006469    .0002638
lnoperatingcycle -0.0877263 .0150821    -5.82 0 0.1173512   -0.0581013
zscore -0.0032587 .0011526    -2.83 0.005 0.0055228   -0.0009947
shares -0.0043363 .0069656    -0.62 0.534 -.0180185    .0093459
suspect 0.005847 .0171438     0.34 0.733 -.0278276    .0395216
emflexibility 0.2511034 .0541867     4.63 0 .1446672    .3575395
energy10 -0.1420626 .0417945    -3.40 0.001 0.2241572   -0.0599679
materials15 0.012239 .0214954     0.57 0.569 -.0299834    .0544613
industrials20 -0.0076601 .024675    -0.31 0.756 -.056128    .0408078
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0392612 .028302    -1.39 0.166 -.0948532    .0163309
consumerstaples30 -0.0768286 .0249217    -3.08 0.002 0.1257809   -0.0278763
healthcare35 -0.0417169 .0372655    -1.12 0.263 -.1149155    .0314817
realestate40 0.0171692 .0329923     0.52 0.603 -.0476359    .0819743
informationtech45 -0.1190924 .0345845    -3.44 0.001 0.1870249   -0.0511599
telecom50 0.0523106 .0349192     1.50 0.135 -.0162794    .1209005
y4 0.0278534 .0100646     2.77 0.006 .008084    .0476228
y6 -0.0367109 .0302669    -1.21 0.226 -.0961626    .0227409
y7 -0.0159546 .029043    -0.55 0.583 -.0730022     .041093
y8 -0.0302551 .0481399    -0.63 0.53 -.1248139    .0643037
y9 -0.0566569 .0411711    -1.38 0.169 -.1375272    .0242134
y10 -0.0580489 .0319303    -1.82 0.07 -.1207678      .00467
y11 -0.0405943 .0301461    -1.35 0.179 -.0998086      .01862
y12 -0.0255533 .0255456    -1.00 0.318 -.0757312    .0246247
y13 -0.0475966 .0256758    -1.85 0.064 -.0980303    .0028371
y14 -0.0355449 .0251343    -1.41 0.158 -.0849149    .0138252
y15 -0.0304095 .0254412    -1.20 0.232 -.0803823    .0195633
y16 -0.0373964 .0255855    -1.46 0.144 -.0876527    .0128598
y17 -0.0506731 .0247899    -2.04 0.041 0.0993666   -0.0019797
y18 -0.0424635 .0249117    -1.70 0.089 -.0913962    .0064693
_cons 0.5181232 .1386088     3.74 0 .2458612    .7903851
393 
 
Control of Corruption 
 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2,729
F(53, 555) = 34.38
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.5587
Root MSE = 0.15216
(Std. Err. adjusted for 556 clusters in companycode)
Robust
rm3 Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nationality -0.1691952 .1372852    -1.23 0.218 -.4388574    .1004669
nationalityxda 0.0146638 .1296226     0.11 0.91 -.2399471    .2692747
nationalityxfirmsize 0.000894 .007838     0.11 0.909 -.0145017    .0162897
nationalityxleverage 0.1070205 .0781715     1.37 0.172 -.0465277    .2605687
nationalityxgrowth 0.0039711 .0083927     0.47 0.636 -.0125142    .0204565
nationalityxfcf 0.0010682 .0020675     0.52 0.606 -.0029929    .0051292
nationalityxroa 0.2208398 .1530173     1.44 0.15 -.0797241    .5214037
nationalityxassettangibility 0.0718383 .0509836     1.41 0.159 -.0283061    .1719827
nationalityxdividendpayout 0.0001209 .0002978     0.41 0.685 -.000464    .0007058
nationalityxoperatingcycle -0.0062227 .0200416    -0.31 0.756 -.0455894    .0331441
nationalityxaltmanszscore 0.0051631 .0017438     2.96 0.003 .0017379    .0085884
nationalityxshares 0.0033872 .0093518     0.36 0.717 -.0149819    .0217564
nationalitiyxemflexibility 0.183639 .0731501     2.51 0.012 .0399541    .3273239
jonesda 1.113872 .0852164    13.07 0 .9464857    1.281258
corruption -0.0018936 .0008026    -2.36 0.019 0.00347   -0.0003171
marketcapofgdp -0.0000254 .0001909    -0.13 0.894 -.0004003    .0003496
gdpgrowthrate 0.0022658 .0010784     2.10 0.036 .0001476    .0043841
ifrs 0.049026 .0282313     1.74 0.083 -.0064273    .1044794
logsales 0.01202 .0062615     1.92 0.055 -.0002792    .0243192
leverage -0.1377722 .0550216    -2.50 0.013 0.2458483   -0.0296962
growthopportunities -0.001497 .0038823    -0.39 0.7 -.0091227    .0061288
freecashflowpershare 0.0007295 .0003073     2.37 0.018 .0001258    .0013332
roa -1.841198 .1086666   -16.94 0 2.054646    -1.62775
assettangibility -0.1760944 .0403843    -4.36 0 0.2554193   -0.0967696
dividendpolicy -0.0001329 .0002272    -0.59 0.559 -.0005792    .0003133
lnoperatingcycle -0.0910228 .0150374    -6.05 0 0.12056   -0.0614857
zscore -0.003369 .0011469    -2.94 0.003 0.0056217   -0.0011163
shares -0.0056958 .0069749    -0.82 0.415 -.0193962    .0080047
suspect 0.0033729 .0172583     0.20 0.845 -.0305267    .0372725
emflexibility 0.2619575 .054878     4.77 0 .1541636    .3697515
energy10 -0.1461483 .0416319    -3.51 0 0.2279237    -0.064373
materials15 0.0115478 .0211178     0.55 0.585 -.0299329    .0530284
industrials20 -0.0080746 .0241741    -0.33 0.738 -.0555584    .0394092
consumerdiscretionary25 -0.0366137 .0279252    -1.31 0.19 -.0914657    .0182383
consumerstaples30 -0.0771358 .0245988    -3.14 0.002 0.125454   -0.0288176
healthcare35 -0.0385643 .0371726    -1.04 0.3 -.1115805     .034452
realestate40 0.0173764 .0322608     0.54 0.59 -.0459917    .0807446
informationtech45 -0.119581 .0339909    -3.52 0 0.1863476   -0.0528145
telecom50 0.0433936 .0351666     1.23 0.218 -.0256824    .1124696
y4 0.0239797 .0095883     2.50 0.013 .0051459    .0428134
y6 -0.0314792 .0297906    -1.06 0.291 -.0899953    .0270368
y7 -0.0215912 .0285972    -0.76 0.451 -.0777632    .0345807
y8 -0.0504617 .0468967    -1.08 0.282 -.1425784     .041655
y9 -0.0711283 .0411765    -1.73 0.085 -.1520092    .0097526
y10 -0.0786177 .0311794    -2.52 0.012 0.1398618   -0.0173736
y11 -0.0568415 .0291712    -1.95 0.052 -.1141409    .0004579
y12 -0.0393348 .0258611    -1.52 0.129 -.0901324    .0114628
y13 -0.0570291 .0254214    -2.24 0.025 0.1069631   -0.0070951
y14 -0.04876 .0250152    -1.95 0.052 -.097896     .000376
y15 -0.055984 .0263459    -2.12 0.034 0.1077339   -0.0042342
y16 -0.0578301 .025975    -2.23 0.026 0.1088513   -0.0068088
y17 -0.068076 .0249467    -2.73 0.007 0.1170775   -0.0190745
y18 -0.0606639 .0256958    -2.36 0.019 0.1111368    -0.010191
_cons 0.6471174 .1341834     4.82 0 .383548    .9106868
